Socrates and Distributive Justice

As the increasing loss of ecosystem services severely affects life perspectives of today's poor and future populations, governing access to, and use of, ecosystem services in an intragenerational and intergenerational just way is an urgent issue. The author argues that theories of distributive justice should consider the distribution of access rights to ecosystem services. Three specific demands that a theory of distributive justice should fulfill to adequately cope with the distribution of access rights to ecosystem services, and show that Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (1971) can be consistently extended to meet the identified demands.

Two competing theories of justice are currently dominating discussion within contemporary Anglo-American moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The Welfare-State Liberal theory of John Rawls, developed most fully in his book A Theory of Justice [13], contains a sustained defense of the partial redistribution of wealth within society in order to improve the position of the most unfortunate members of society. The Libertarian theory of Robert Nozick, presented in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia [12], is based on the claims that justice is the respecting of people’s rights, that people’s rights are respected when they are allowed to keep and control that to which they are entitled, and that people are entitled to any holding which they have legitimately acquired — that is, without using force, theft, or fraud (activities which would violate the rights of others). Since the kind of redistribution called for by Rawls’ theory of justice would necessarily involve taking from some people (primarily through taxation) holdings to which they have a right, Nozick argues that an application of Rawls’ theory will have unjust consequences: it will fail to show the proper respect for people’s rights upon which any correct theory of justice must be based.KeywordsRational AgentOriginal PositionSocial ContractBorderline CaseMoral ClaimThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The failure of the United States to provide basic health-care coverage for a growing number of its citizens is one of those startling public facts-along with our huge prison population, and our continued use of capital punishment-that leads international commentators to shake their heads and puzzle over an American barbarian streak. Moreover, within U.S. society, there is a large gap between how this issue is understood by actual policymakers, and how it is understood by philosophers analyzing issues of just distribution. For many political philosophers, including John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen, it is a simple matter to show that distributive justice requires universal health-care coverage in a society with the material and technological resources of the United States. Indeed, all other affluent democratic societies today provide such coverage. Yet despite media attention to the suffering of the millions of children and adults who lack adequate access to basic medical and dental treatment, universal coverage does not appear to be on the immediate political agenda in this country. Why not? If, as a problem of distributive justice, universal health care is a “nobrainer,” then what other vectors of analysis are necessary to portray it as the difficult political decision it is today in the United States?

This chapter describes some of the main areas of interaction, overlap, or mutual concern between the disciplines of anthropology and philosophy, primarily as these are reflected in contemporary moral and political philosophy in the Anglophone tradition. The discussion is focussed on three broad themes, each falling under one of the main branches of moral and political philosophy as conventionally understood, namely ‘moral theory’, ‘applied ethics’, and ‘metaethics’. Under the heading of ‘moral theory’, the focus of discussion is the relationship between ideas of the good, the right, and the virtuous. Under the heading of ‘applied ethics’, the focus is on ideas of equality, justice, and cosmopolitan ideals. Under the heading of ‘metaethics’, the focus is on debates about interpretation, difference, and relativism. In each case, an attempt is made to connect some of the most influential literature in recent moral and political philosophy with relevant work in social anthropology.

In political philosophy, reflective equilibrium is a standard method used to systematically reconcile intuitive judgments with theoretical principles. In this paper, we propose that survey experiments and a model selection method—i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based model selection method—can be viewed together as a methodological means of satisfying the epistemic desiderata implicit in reflective equilibrium. To show this, we conduct a survey experiment on two theories of distributive justice, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Our experimental test case and AIC-based model selection method demonstrate that the refined sufficientarian principle, a widely accepted principle of distributive justice, is no more plausible than the prioritarian principle. This tells us that some changes of certain intuitions revolving around sufficientarianism should be examined (separately) based on the findings of the survey experiment and AIC model selection. This shows the potential of our approach—both practically and methodologically—as a novel way of applying reflective equilibrium in political philosophy.

This paper explores the moral and theological imperative of distributive justice as a basis for equitable government support to faith-based universities in Malawi and Zambia. Despite their significant contributions to national development, private religious institutions-including Seventh-day Adventist (SDA), Reformed Church of Zambia (RCZ), Church of Central African Presbyterian (CCAP), Baptist, Catholic, and Islamic universities, remain largely excluded from government financial assistance, even though their students, faculty, and guardians contribute taxes that sustain public systems. Drawing on John Rawls’s theory of distributive justice and Christian ethical principles, the study contends that government support for non-profit faith-based higher education is both a moral obligation and a recognition of human rights. Empirical evidence from Malawi and Zambia indicates that these institutions consistently produce highly employable graduates and complement government efforts in expanding access to quality education. The paper argues that equitable resource allocation would not only enhance sustainability across all higher education institutions but also promote justice, fairness, and the common good as enshrined in the constitutions of both countries. The findings carry particular implications for SDA and other faith-based universities, highlighting their indispensable role in shaping ethical, skilled, and socially responsible citizens. This study combines theological ethics and moral philosophy with emerging empirical data-such as enrollment patterns, funding disparities, and graduate employability-to substantiate its argument. It draws upon Rawlsian fairness, Christian ethics, and African communitarian principles to propose an inclusive distributive justice framework for higher education policy reform. (NCHE, 2023; Ministry of Education, 2022). It draws upon Rawlsian fairness (Rawls, 1971), Christian ethics (Tillich, 1954), and African communitarian principles such as Ubuntu (Mbiti, 1969; Shutte, 2001) to propose an inclusive distributive justice framework for higher education policy reform.

Towards Accountability: The Articulation and Formalization of Fairness in Machine Learning

[Purpose] This study investigates educational welfare policies to address the widening educational disparities among low-income children and adolescents under increasing social polarization. It focuses on analyzing the enactment of social justice in the Head Start program in the USA, Sure Start in the UK, and Dream Start in South Korea.
 [Methods] Employing Gewirtz and Cribb's(2002) plural models of social justice, an extension of John Rawls' theory of distributive justice, this study examines the threefold aspects of 'distributive, cultural, and organizational justice' in these policies.
 [Results] Key findings highlight that these policies variously achieve distributive, cultural, and organizational justice through effective resource allocation, information accessibility, recognition of beneficiary diversity, and democratic participation. Specific emphasis is placed on the need for equitable information distribution in distributive justice, acknowledgment of diversity in cultural justice, and democratic stakeholder participation in organizational justice.
 [Conclusion] The study underscores the necessity of exploring how these justice dimensions interact and coexist, proposing policy recommendations for the future trajectory of child education welfare.

It is commonly believed that morality is importantly and fundamentally connected with the existence of God. The remark, famously (if not quite accurately) attributed to Dostoyevsky, that “without God, all is (morally) permissible,” captures a view shared by many devout religious believers and many atheists as well. Indeed, such a view reflects the majority opinion within Western philosophy throughout most of its history.

<p>Con la ayuda de cuatro filósofos políticos tomistas contemporáneos (Copleston, Lachance, Maritain y Chal- meta), trazamos esbozos del paradigma de la filosofía política de Tomás de Aquino1, que servirá de base para el diálogo con los filósofos políticos contemporáneos. El presente artículo integra, en este estado inicial de la investigación, dos ensayos: el primero presenta nuestra posición frente a la distinción entre filosofía política y ciencia política, clave epistemológica del arranque de la investigación; y, el segundo, trata de articular tres épocas del tomismo político contemporáneo (los primeros tres cuartos del siglo XX, último cuarto y contemporaneidad) en torno a las relaciones entre los conceptos de “bien común”, lo “uno” y lo “múltiple”.</p><p> </p><p>Los mencionados ensayos pertenecen al “contexto de descubrimiento”, según lo planteara Reichenbach en su <em>Experience and Prediction </em>(1938). En el aludido “contexto” de la ciencia encontramos la investigación en el siguiente estado: búsqueda, recolección de información y organización de datos.</p>

Is the Market Wage the Just Wage? A Reassessment of Factor Pricing and Distributive Justice

This book conveys the breadth and interconnectedness of questions of justice - a rarity in contemporary moral and political philosophy. James P. Sterba argues that a minimal notion of rationality requires morality, and that a minimal libertarian morality requires the welfare and equal opportunity endorsee by welfare liberals and the equality endorsed by socialists, as well as a full feminist agenda. Feminist, racial, homosexual, and multicultural justice, are also shown to be mutually supporting. The author further shows the compatibility between anthropocentric and biocentric environmental ethics, as between just war and pacifist theories. Finally, he spells out when normal politics, legal protest, civil disobedience, revolutionary action, and criminal disobedience are morally permitted by justice for here and now. This highly original and potentially controversial book is ideal for courses in moral and political philosophy, applied ethics, women's studies, environmental studies, and peace studies.

The ideas of justice in political theory as expressed by John Rawls and Robert Nozick are contrasted in this study. Mostly from his ideas of liberty and the Difference Principle, Rawls argues using his theory of Justice as Fairness for a distributive approach whereby disparities are allowed only if they aid the least advantaged in society. On the other hand, Nozick underlines in his Entitlement Theory the defence of personal rights and lawful acquisition of property, therefore favouring a limited state and opposing redistributive justice. This study juxtaposes Nozick's advocacy for individual liberty, free market transactions, and minimal government involvement with Rawls's focus on social welfare, equality, and state intervention. Particularly in discussions on taxes, property rights, and welfare policies, the study highlights the ongoing relevance of both theories in contemporary political philosophy. This is achieved by analysing significant differences, such as their perspectives on equality, distributive justice, and the role of the government. Emphasising that Rawls provides a framework for resolving social inequality, the last part of the paper evaluates the application and limits of both theories while underlining that Nozick makes a strong case for maintaining personal liberty. From these different points of view, current political rhetoric still shapes debates on justice, equality, and rights.

In this book Dr Kelly presents the first full-length exposition and sympathetic defence of Jeremy Bentham's unique utilitarian theory of justice. He rescues Bentham's reputation from crude nineteenth- and twentieth-century caricatures, and develops a sophisticated and subtle interpretation of Bentham's moral theory which places him at the heart of the British Liberal tradition. Drawing heavily on Bentham's unpublished civil and distributive law writings, classic and recent Bentham scholarship, and contemporary work in moral and political philosophy, Dr Kelly shows how Bentham developed a moderate welfare-state liberal theory of justice with egalitarian leanings, the aim of which was to secure the material and political conditions of each citizen's pursuit of his own conception of the good life in co-operation with others. This strikingly original interpretation makes a valuable contribution to the growing literature on Bentham's legal and political thought, and develops a utilitarian theory of justice which offers much to contemporary political philosophy.

A central question in international climate policy making is how to distribute the burdens of keeping global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. In particular, there are four distributional issues: how to allocate the total amount of greenhouse gases that can still be emitted, who should bear the costs of mitigation, who should bear the costs of adaptation to unavoidable climate change, and who should bear the costs of residual climate damage. Regarding these distributional issues the academic literature offers a plethora of fairness principles, such as ‘polluter pays’, ‘beneficiary pays’, ‘equal per capita rights’, ‘grandfathering’, ‘ability to pay’, ‘historical responsibility’ and ‘cost effectiveness’. Remarkably, there is a theoretical gap between these principles and the central theories of distributive justice in moral and political philosophy. As a consequence, it is unclear how these principles are related, whether they can be combined or are mutually exclusive, and what the fundamental underlying values are. This paper aims to elucidate that debate. Understanding the different underlying values may facilitate bridge-building and movement in negotiation positions.