Some contributions to definability theory for languages with generalized quantifiers

We consider various extensions of first-order logic. Informally, a logic 𝓛 is an extension of first-order logic if every sentence of first-order logic is also a sentence of 𝓛. We also require that 𝓛 is closed under conjunction and negation and has other basic properties of a logic. In Section 9.4, we list the properties that formally define the notion of an extension of first-order logic. Prior to Section 9.4, we provide various natural examples of such extensions. In Sections 9.1–9.3, we consider, respectively, second-order logic, infinitary logics, and logics with fixed-point operators. We do not provide a thorough treatment of any one of these logics. Indeed, we could easily devote an entire chapter to each. Rather, we define each logic and provide examples that demonstrate the expressive power of the logics. In particular, we show that none of these logics has compactness. In the final Section 9.4, we prove that if a proper extension of first-order logic has compactness, then the Downward Löwenhiem–Skolem theorem must fail for that logic. This is Lindstrom’s theorem. The Compactness theorem and Downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem are two crucial results for model theory. Every property of first-order logic from Chapter 4 is a consequence of these two theorems. Lindström’s theorem implies that the only extension of first-order logic possessing these properties is first-order logic itself. Second-order logic is the extension of first-order logic that allows quantification of relations. The symbols of second-order logic are the same symbols used in first-order logic. The syntax of second-order logic is defined by adding one rule to the syntax of first-order logic. The additional rule makes second-order logic far more expressive than first-order logic. Specifically, the syntax of second-order logic is defined as follows. Any atomic first-order formula is a formula of second-order logic. Moreover, we have the following four rules: (R1) If φ is a formula then so is ￢φ. (R2) If φ and ψ are formulas then so is φ ∧ ψ. (R3) If φ is a formula, then so is ∃x φ for any variable x.

First-order logic augments the expressive power of propositional logic as it links the logical assertions to properties of objects of some non-empty universe: the domain of discourse. This is achieved by allowing the propositional symbols to take arguments that range over elements of the domain of discourse. These are now called predicate symbols and are interpreted as relations on the domain. Elements of the domain of discourse are denoted by terms built up from variables, constants, and functions applied to other terms. First-order logic also expands the lexicon of propositional logic with the quantifiers “for all” and “there exists” that are interpreted consistently with their natural language meaning.This chapter is devoted to classical first-order logic. Our presentation is similar to the one conducted for propositional logic. We first define the syntax of first-order logic, followed by its semantics. Next we define a proof system for it and present the fundamental theoretical results of soundness and completeness. We also discuss the decision problems related to this logic. The remaining sections of the chapter cover variations and extensions of first-order logic, as well as first-order theories.

Remarkable ties between group theory, logic and algebraic geometry have come to light via the positive solution of the Tarski conjecture. This has led to further work on the universal theory of groups. In this paper we describe and survey this material a large body of which is not familiar to most group theorists Contents Introduction. First Order Languages and Model Theory. The Tarksi Problems. Residually Free and Universally Free Groups. Algebraic Geometry over Groups and Applications. The Positive Solution to the Tarski Problems. Discriminating, Co-discriminating and Squarelike Groups. Open Questions. Introduction The elementary theory of a group G consists of all the first-order or elementary sentences (see section 2) which are true in G . Although this is a concept which originated in formal logic, in particular model theory, it arises independently from the theory of equations within groups. Recall that an equation in a group G is a word W ( x 1 ,…, x n , g 1 ,…, g k ) in free variables x 1 ,…, x n and constants g 1 ,…, g k which are elements of G . A solution consists of an n-tuple ( h 1 ,…, h n ) of elements from G which upon substitution for x 1 ,…, x n make the word trivial in G . Hence an equation is a first-order sentence in the language L [ G ] consisting of the elementary language of group theory (again see section 2) augmented by allowing constants from the group G .

Approximate pattern matching and transitive closure logics

We present some model theoretic results for Lukasiewicz predicate logic by using the methods of continuous model theory developed by Chang and Keisler. We prove compactness theorem with respect to the class of all structures taking values in the Lukasiewicz BL-algebra. We also prove some appropriate preservation theorems concerning universal and inductive theories. Finally, Skolemization and Morleyization in this framework are discussed and some natural examples of fuzzy theories are presented. ajek and Cintula wrote: \In the last few decades many formal systems of fuzzy logics have been developed. Since the main dierences between fuzzy and classical logics lie at propositional level, the fuzzy predicate logics have developed more slowly (compared to the propositional ones). In this paper we aim to promote interest in fuzzy predicate logics by contributing to the model theory of fuzzy predicate In that paper the authors proved a generalized completeness result for a wide class of fuzzy predicate logics, namely core fuzzy logics. To do this they used a generalized Henkin method for a through survey of the present status of fuzzy predicate logic, see (3). In the present paper we continue the work on fuzzy predicate logics by developing further model theory of these logics. We choose Lukasiewicz predicate logic. The reason is that the Lukasiewicz BL-algebra is equipped with continuous operations and this is essential in proving the compactness theorem which is a fundamental result in model theory. Here, the compactness theorem says that if each nite subset of a set of sentences has a Lukasiewicz model, then the set itself has a Lukasiewicz model. As consequences of compactness, we prove the most basic model theoretic results including the upward and downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorems. We also prove suitable versions of the most well known preservation theorems, including preservation theorems for universal and inductive theories. At the end, we introduce some fuzzy theories and study their model theoretic properties. To prove the compactness theorem, we use ultraproduct and its basic properties which we rst investigate. We follow the old methods developed by Chang and

We present DFOL, an extension of classical first-order logic with dependent types, i.e., as in Martin-Lof type theory, signatures may contain type-valued function symbols. A model theory for the logic is given that stays close to the established first-order model theory. The logic is presented as an institution, and the logical framework LF is used to define signatures, terms and formulas. We show that free models over Horn theories exist, which facilitates its use as an algebraic specification language, and show that the classical first-order axiomatization is complete for DFOL, too, which implies that existing first-order theorem provers can be extended. In particular, the axiomatization can be encoded in LF.

First-order temporal logic, the extension of first-order logic with operators dealing with time, is a powerful and expressive formalism with many potential applications. This expressive logic can be viewed as a framework in which to investigate problems specified in other logics. The monodic fragment of first-order temporal logic is a useful fragment that possesses good computational properties such as completeness and sometimes even decidability. Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for dealing with situations where the knowledge of agents in a system is involved. In this paper we present a translation from temporal logics of knowledge into the monodic fragment of first-order temporal logic. We can then use a theorem prover for monodic first-order temporal logic to prove properties of the translated formulas. This allows problems specified in temporal logics of knowledge to be verified automatically without needing a specialized theorem prover for temporal logics of knowledge. We present the translation, its correctness, and examples of its use.

On the expressive power of counting

Concrete domains have been introduced in description logic (DL) to enable reference to concrete objects (such as numbers) and predefined predicates on these objects (such as numerical comparisons) when defining concepts. The primary research goal in this context was to find restrictions on the concrete domain such that its integration into certain DLs preserves decidability or tractability. In this article, we complement these investigations by studying the abstract expressive power of both first-order and description logics extended with concrete domains, i.e., we analyze which classes of first-order interpretations can be expressed using these logics, compared to what their counterparts without concrete domains can express. We demonstrate that, under natural conditions on the concrete domain D (which also play a role for decidability), extensions of first-order logic (FOL) or the well-known DL ALC with D share important formal characteristics with FOL, such as the compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties. Nevertheless, these conditions do not ensure that the abstract expressive power of the extensions we consider is contained in that of FOL, though in some cases it is. To be more precise, we show, on the one hand, that unary concrete domains leave the abstract expressive power within FOL if we are allowed to introduce auxiliary predicates. As a by-product, we obtain (semi-)decidability results for some fragments of FOL extended with the concrete domains considered in this article. On the other hand, we show that the ability to express equality between elements of D , another condition employed in the context of showing decidability of ALC ( D ), is sufficient to push the abstract expressive power of most first-order fragments with concrete domains beyond that of FOL. While for such concrete domains D decidability is retained for ALC ( D ), we show that the availability of equality in D causes undecidability of the two-variable fragment of FOL( D ), although the two-variable fragment of FOL is decidable.

This handbook provides a systematic survey of the central areas of philosophical logic. It is divided into four volumes, each devoted to a major sub-field within the disciplines. The articles should be of value to general philosophers, linguists, logicians, mathematicians and computer scientists. Volume 1, Elements of Classical Logic, deals with the background to what has come to be considered the standard formulation of predicate logic - both as far as its semantics and proof theory are concerned. The central chapter on predicate logic is followed by chapters outlining various alternative, but essentially equivalent ways of constructing the semantics for first-order logic as well as its proof theory. In addition, this volume contains a discussion of higher-order extensions of first-order logic and a compendium of the algorithmic and decision-theoretic prerequisites in the study of logical systems. Volume 2, Extensions of Classical Logic, surveys the most significant extensions of predicate logic and their applications to various philosophical fields of inquiry. The 12 chapters in this volume together provide a succinct introduction to a variety of intensional frameworks, a discussion of the most well-known logical systems, as well as an overview of major applications and of the open problems in the respective fields. Volume 3, Alternatives to Classical Logic, consists of a series of surveys of some of the alternatives to the basic assumptions of classical logic. These include many-valued logic, partial logic, free logic, relevance and entailment logics, dialogue logic, quantum logic and intuitionism. Volume 4, Topics in the Philosophy of Language, presents a panorama of the applications of logical tools and methods in the formal analysis of natural language. Since a number of developments in philosophical logic were originally stimulated by concern arising in the semantic analysis of natural language discourse, the chapters in this volume provide some criteria of evaluation of the applications of work in philosophical logic. In revealing both the adequacies and inadequacies of logical investigations in the semantic structures of natural discourse, these chapters also point the way to future developments in philosophical logic in general and thus close again the circle of inquiry relating logic and language.

The twentieth-century mathematician Thoralf Skolem is known principally for two achievements. The first is the statement and proof of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. The second is his construction of countable nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic and set theory when these theories are expressed in first-order (predicate) logic. The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, for which Skolem gave several proofs, showed that no first-order axiom system can characterise a unique infinite model. Skolem regarded this theorem as casting doubt on the belief that mathematics can be reliably founded on formal axiomatic systems alone. He discovered that first-order logics are necessarily incomplete descriptions of their intended models. There is a vivid contrast between the comprehensive syntactic expressive power of first-order theories and their very limited power to constrain their models to a priori desired models. The startling conclusion he derived from his theorem is known as ‘Skolem’s paradox’. It asserts that concepts such as cardinality must be interpreted relative to a given model and thus have no absolute meaning. Anticipating modern model theory, in a later paper he gave a direct construction of a nonstandard model of first-order arithmetic based on plus and times by a method which anticipated the ultraproduct construction of models of first-order theories. He realised that it might be possible to construct new models for set theory which demonstrate the consistency or the independence of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis. The first goal was realised in the early 1930s by Kurt Gödel’s introduction of the notion of constructability for consistency proofs. The second goal was realised in the early 1960s by Paul Cohen’s introduction of the notion of forcing for independence proofs, for which he was awarded the Field’s medal in 1966.

We start from the algebraic method of theorem-proving based on the translation of logic formulas into polynomials over finite fields, and adapt the case of first-order formulas by employing certain rings equipped with infinitary operations. This paper defines the notion of M-ring, a kind of polynomial ring that can be naturally associated to each first-order structure and each first-order theory, by means of generators and relations. The notion of M-ring allows us to operate with some kind of infinitary version of Boolean sums and products, in this way expressing algebraically first-order logic with a new gist. We then show how this polynomial representation of first-order sentences can be seen as a legitimate algebraic semantics for first-order logic, an alternative to cylindric and polyadic algebras and closer to the primordial forms of algebraization of logic. We suggest how the method and its generalization could be lifted successfully to n-valued logics and to other non-classical logics helping to reconcile some lost ties between algebra and logic.

A logic family is a bunch of logics that belong together in some way. First-order logic is one of the examples. Logics organized into a structure occur in abstract model theory, institution theory and in algebraic logic. Logic families play a role in adopting methods for investigating sentential logics to first-order like logics. We thoroughly discuss the notion of logic families as defined in the recent Universal Algebraic Logic book.

Data involving epistemic modals suggest that some classically valid argument forms, such as reductio, are invalid in natural language reasoning as they lead to modal collapses. We adduce further data showing that the classical argument forms governing the existential quantifier are similarly defective, as they lead to a de re–de dicto collapse. We observe a similar problem for disjunction. But if the classical argument forms for negation, disjunction and existential quantification are invalid, what are the correct forms that govern the use of these items? Our diagnosis is that epistemic modals interfere with hypothetical reasoning. We present a modal first-order logic and model theory that characterizes hypothetical reasoning with epistemic modals in a principled manner. One upshot is a sound and complete natural deduction system for reasoning with epistemic modals in first-order logic.

Density elimination by substitutions is introduced as a uniform method for removing applications of the Takeuti-Titani density rule from proofs in first-order hypersequent calculi. For a large class of calculi, density elimination by this method is guaranteed by known sufficient conditions for cut-elimination. Moreover, adding the density rule to any axiomatic extension of a simple first-order logic gives a logic that is rational complete; i.e., complete with respect to linearly and densely ordered algebras: a precursor to showing that it is a fuzzy logic (complete for algebras with a real unit interval lattice reduct). Hence the sufficient conditions for cut-elimination guarantee rational completeness for a large class of first-order substructural logics.