Space and Soviet military planning

What are the implications of human activity in outer space for international human rights law? In this article, we reflect on these questions with a view to advancing dialogue on the intersection between space law and human rights. We do so by considering the impact of extra-terrestrial human activities such as access to space and remote-sensing activities, space debris, space mining, the weaponisation and militarization of space, and the assertion of criminal jurisdiction extra-terrestrially. Ultimately, we conclude that human activity in space has significant consequences for the advancement of human rights. While, in our view, existing legal frameworks on international human rights law apply extra-terrestrially, there is still scope for specialist frameworks guarding human rights law in the context of human activity in outer space. 
 "To confine our attention to terrestrial matters would be to limit the human spirit." 
 ~ Stephen Hawking, Astrophysicist 
 "Space is for everybody. It's not just for a few people in science or math, or for a select group of astronauts. That's our new frontier out there, and it's everybody's business to know about space." 
 ~ Christa McAuliffe, Teacher and Challenger Astronaut

The overarching theme of this article is not to revisit existing debates surrounding the application of jus ad bellum or jus in bello parameters to the “peculiarities” of outer space. Rather, this article examines the major treaties that regulate a States’ military activities in outer space (including, for example, the Outer Space Treaty, Limited Test Ban Treaty, Liability Convention and, PPWT), alongside Charter norms, such as Article 2(4)of the UN Charter, to pinpoint the threshold of breach, violation and incremental militarization of outer space. With respect to the PPWT, it is important to note at this juncture that it remains a “proposal”, and at best, lex ferenda. A natural consequence from this analysis will be to underscore the extent to which “toleration” of such violations by States, and the international community as a whole, has resulted in the incremental militarization of space.

This doctoral thesis, now published as a monograph, provides a thorough analysis of one of the most crucial concepts of the modern law of armed conflicts (LOAC), namely military objectives. The concept is crucial because the targeting of such objectives is directly linked to the principle of distinction, which in turn is a cardinal tenet of LOAC. It requires that the belligerents must always make the distinction between civilian objects and persons on the one hand, and military objectives (persons and objects) on the other, and attack only the latter to the exclusion of the former (Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 (AP I)). Thus, the concept of military objectives is cast amidst the protection of civilians during the conduct of hostilities (whereas Geneva Convention IV of 1949 concerns their protection outside the context of combat action). It stands to reason that this protection is an essential part of the modern law of armed conflicts. Moreover, it is only superficially surprising that AP I was the first treaty to generally define military objectives. In the nineteenth century, the civilian hardly appeared in the LOAC. It was at that time simply taken for granted that civilians were outside the reach of military action; they would not participate in it and concomitantly would be spared from attacks. The social environment of the past was such that military action and civilian presence were reasonably distinct: the battlefield was the pitch for military action, other areas were bluntly aloof from such action. The twentieth century completely changed these parameters. Air power allowed a belligerent to wreak heavy havoc into all the lands of the adverse party. Industrialization and modernization of the army made civilian objectives relevant from a military standpoint, in particular industrial plants. Finally, the difference between civilians and military personnel was blurred, since civilians participated in a variety of forms to military operations (guerilla warfare is but one of the most emblematic forms of such participation). All these factors, among others, explain that the majority of victims in modern armed conflicts are civilians, not rarely up to a proportion of 90 per cent.1 The question of military objectives remains also highly relevant when viewed from another perspective. It is a concept often applied in modern military campaigns, where air power is of the essence. However, it gives rise to uncertainties at least on two accounts. First, the definition is open-ended and contextual; it must be operationalized in single cases and this gives rise to legal uncertainty. Indeed, Article 52, § 2, AP I, the cardinal provision in this regard, provides only for criteria which have to be applied by the belligerent to single sets of facts in order to determine if an object is a military objective. Second, there are marked differences of interpretation between the US and the continental European conceptions of military objectives, especially in certain areas of targeting such as ‘economic targets’ (i.e. targets chosen for their economic value to the war-sustaining effort). Notwithstanding the relevance of the concept of military objectives, there is hardly a wealth of monographic treatment of the subject matter. Indeed, no monograph in the English language was directly and exclusively devoted to that notion before the present publication. This new monograph is thus more than welcome.

What security implications do North Korea's purported peaceful space activities have? North Korea's recent launch of a reconnaissance satellite not only raises concerns about its nuclear weapons program but also has broader implications for international security. The nuclear threat posed by North Korea is certainly growing. However, there seems to be an overlooked security threat in North Korea's space initiative: the threat of militarization and weaponization of outer space. Therefore, the security policy toward North Korea must be changed comprehensively to address the militarization and weaponization of space, as North Korea's threats can be transformed by the use of space. North Korea's destructive weapons and strategies, such as EMP attacks and space hybrid operations, are not prohibited, even when they appear to be aligned with the outer space legal regime. Hence, rather than concentrating only on nuclear weapons, this study proposes that a fundamental shift in policy is required.

This chapter considers what space activities are, what they might be in the near future, and the implications for the interaction of space law with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). After an introduction, Section II and III describe the past, present, and possible future of space activities, noting especially the roles of military space and the evolution of private actors. Section IV then turns to two sources of regulation of military space activities: space law and LOAC. Section V surveys certain regulatory challenges, with an emphasis on the interaction of private companies and governments in military and national security space activities. The chapter concludes by noting the importance of core doctrinal questions related to sources of law, state responsibility, and neutrality in clarifying the regulation of military space operations.

Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law is een online tijdschriftenplatform van Boom uitgevers Den Haag (Boom juridisch, Boom criminologie, Boom bestuurskunde en Eleven International publishing)

After an 11-month review, a new National Space Policy was announced by President Reagan on July 4, 1982. That policy did not reflect major changes to existing NASA programs, but placed increased emphasis on private sector and military space activities. A lasting impact of the policy was to create a Senior Interagency Group for Space [SIG (Space)], operating under the auspices of the National Security Council and having as members heads of major executive branch agencies or their deputies. SIG (Space) was to be the forum for developing Reagan administration space policy. President Reagan announced the new policy as he watched space shuttle orbiter Columbia land at Edwards Air Force Base in the California high desert after its fourth flight and as the transport plane carrying the second orbiter, Challenger, took off, headed to the Kennedy Space Center to enter service.

A State, or one of the States, that launches a space object into Earth orbit or beyond, including a space object used in military space activities or operations, shall register that space object by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain and must furnish to the Secretary-General of the United Nations specified information concerning each space object carried on its registry. This Rule is based on Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), as implemented by the Registration Convention. The launching State that registers a space object is referred to as the State of Registry. Each State of Registry is also required, as soon as practicable, to furnish to the Secretary-General of the United Nations specified information concerning each space object carried on its registry. The OST and the Registration Convention make no distinction between military and civil space objects. Importantly, if an object is sent only on a sub-orbital flight, it need not be registered since it is not a space object launched into Earth orbit or beyond. Similarly, missiles and other military space objects that follow a ballistic trajectory before returning to Earth, detonating, or impacting a target in space need not be registered.

After four decades of a militarised Cold War and a decade of military buildup, the question, ‘Where has the threat gone?’ (A gde zhe ugroza?), seems both appropriate and timely. Only three years ago, when the author first addressed this issue, the problem was to understand the connections between the political and ideological aspects of the East-West competition and the process of militarisation, to evaluate the prospects offered by arms control, dialogue, and confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and to speculate on methods of demilitarising that Cold War.1 Although the arsenals and forces still exist, the profound political changes of the last several years have fundamentally recast the East-West relationship and ushered in a new era. While it is usually the historian’s task to question the distant past about causes and consequences — the issues of who or what caused the Cold War come to mind — the more challenging task now is to win the peace. These reflections on Western threat perception and Soviet military doctrine are offered to that end.KeywordsThreat PerceptionGeneral StaffMilitary AffairLower Force LevelConventional ForceThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Soviet military debates reveal the logic from which their military doctrine and strategy develop. That logic, based on the defense of Soviet territory and the acquisition of sufficient military power to deny military victory to any coalition of enemies, has not changed radically over time. The continuity in Soviet military doctrine and objectives should not, however, result in the failure to recognize the dynamic nature of Soviet military thought and military strategy. That dynamism in the European theater is the subject of this chapter which examines the evolution of deterrence-Soviet style. Its major thesis is that from Stalin to Gorbachev the political leadership has, through its military doctrine, tasked the armed forces to plan and develop military forces and strategies to deter nuclear war against Soviet territory. Military strategy has evolved with dramatic and often sudden shifts in response to American threats, Soviet capabilities, and changes in political leadership. This thesis is not new to Soviet specialists.1 The emphasis here is on Soviet potential for flexibility in war and how its evolution differs from NATO concepts of flexible response.

This chapter addresses the challenges of applying international humanitarian law (IHL) to the targeting of data centers during armed conflicts. Around the world, such centers store vast quantities of civilian and military data—contributing significantly to “Big Data”—along with applications that process the data. The chapter assesses the circumstances under which such data centers could constitute military objectives as defined in IHL, a predicate finding for targeting operations. The diversity of locations, nature, purposes, and use of data centers complicates this analysis, in part because these centers often commingle military and civilian data and applications, can be owned by public or private actors, and so on. The chapter concludes that, in some cases, data centers may be considered military objectives and thus qualify as lawful objects of attack. The most important elements are the purpose and use of the data center. The chapter also considers the challenges of applying the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions to the targeting of data centers that qualify as military objectives, which could be achieved through kinetic or cyber means. Notably, attacks could take the form of temporary or permanent destruction of parts or all of the data center, including the infrastructure necessary to operate the centers. The commingling of civilian and military data presents significant challenges in determining whether attacks can satisfy distinction and proportionality. With respect to proportionality, a particularly thorny issue is to determine potential reverberating effects, due to the number and diversity of the data’s users and uses.

Soviet Military Doctrine

In the Soviet Union military doctrine is the military policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In theory, Soviet military doctrine is formulated by the Central Committee. Soviet spokesmen seek to convince the West that their military doctrine consists of a “purely defensive character,” even claiming that this always was the case. Many in the West hope that current statements by Soviet leaders about their forces being maintained at a level of “reasonable sufficiency” mean a change in Soviet thinking. Soviet spokesmen are very vague on the meaning of “reasonable sufficiency.” Soviet spokesmen press the matter of “reasonable sufficiency” in television programs and radio broadcasts. Since the mid-1950’s the idea of internal Soviet military “doctrinal” debates dominated United States’ perceptions of Soviet military writings. The training of the Soviet leadership, whether they be industrial managers, Party apparatchiki, or military officers, is political and conceptual.

: What are those critical military objectives? An analysis of the explicit and implicit New World Order tasks suggests that tomorrow's American military must be able to: * Deter nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack from any quarter while simultaneously pursuing a dramatic reduction of global NBC armaments through verifiable non-proliferation and arms control agreements. * Deter conventional attack on the American homeland as well as on those states or regions of vital political and economic significance to us; and, should deterrence fail, defend those same areas through military actions which will result in a termination of conflict on terms favorable to U.S. interests. * Maintain and, if necessary, defend the land, sea, air, and space lines of communication necessary for unimpeded global commerce and the fulfillment of our worldwide security requirements. * Reduce the threat of international terrorism. * Reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. * Maintain a robust, expansible industrial and mobilization base sufficient to support the aforementioned military objectives.

The article explores the growing involvement of private space companies in military activities, with a primary focus on the United States. It delves into the specific contributions of private entities to national defense missions, particularly in the militarization of outer space. The authors analyze the strategic interests of government agencies in integrating non-state actors to enhance space capabilities, such as communication, Earth observation, situational awareness, and in-orbit servicing. The paper also assesses the potential implications of these trends for international security, highlighting the complexities that arise from the blurred lines between civil and military space operations. It points to the creation of the U.S. Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR), an initiative aimed at enhancing defense through commercial space partnerships, and discusses the operational and strategic challenges of managing vast satellite constellations. Additionally, the article reflects on the security risks posed by the militarization of commercial space infrastructure, examining the potential consequences for geopolitical stability and the future of space conflict management. Finally, it suggests that further research and regulatory measures are necessary to mitigate the military threats linked to the New Space