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Speculative Probing

  • Oct 30, 2020
  • Enes Göktas +4 more
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Abstract

To defeat ASLR or more advanced fine-grained and leakage-resistant code randomization schemes, modern software exploits rely on information disclosure to locate gadgets inside the victim's code. In the absence of such info-leak vulnerabilities, attackers can still hack blind and derandomize the address space by repeatedly probing the victim's memory while observing crash side effects, but doing so is only feasible for crash-resistant programs. However, high-value targets such as the Linux kernel are not crash-resistant. Moreover, the anomalously large number of crashes is often easily detectable. In this paper, we show that the Spectre era enables an attacker armed with a single memory corruption vulnerability to hack blind without triggering any crashes. Using speculative execution for crash suppression allows the elevation of basic memory write vulnerabilities into powerful speculative probing primitives that leak through microarchitectural side effects. Such primitives can repeatedly probe victim memory and break strong randomization schemes without crashes and bypass all deployed mitigations against Spectre-like attacks. The key idea behind speculative probing is to break Spectre mitigations using memory corruption and resurrect Spectre-style disclosure primitives to mount practical blind software exploits. To showcase speculative probing, we target the Linux kernel, a crash-sensitive victim that has so far been out of reach of blind attacks, mount end-to-end exploits that compromise the system with just-in-time code reuse and data-only attacks from a single memory write vulnerability, and bypass strong Spectre and strong randomization defenses. Our results show that it is crucial to consider synergies between different (Spectre vs. code reuse) threat models to fully comprehend the attack surface of modern systems.

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