The term structure of interest rates, i.e., yield curve, has long been of interest to monetary policymakers and their advisers. The transmission of monetary is conventionally viewed as running from shortterm interest rates managed by central banks to longer-term rates that influence aggregate demand. A central bank's leverage over longer-term rates comes from fact that market determines these as average expected level of short rates over relevant horizon (abstracting from a term premium and default risk). Working in other direction, long bond rate contains a premium for expected and, thus, serves as an indicator of credibility of a central bank's commitment to low inflation.1 Different theoretical perspectives support two above-mentioned uses of term structure for monetary policy: John Hicks's (1939) expectations theory of term structure supports first, and Irving Fisher's (1896) decomposition of nominal bond rates into expected and an expected real return supports second.2 The two views are compatible in principle, although reconciling them creates difficulties of interpretation in practice. For example, does a steepening yield curve indicate a loss of confidence in central bank's commitment to low inflation, or does it indicate that markets expect tighter in form of a higher path of short rates pursued by central bank? The yield curve contains information of use to monetary policymakers, but it needs to be interpreted in light of judicious subsidiary identifying conditions, together with other data on economy. Some circumstances lend themselves to clearer interpretations than others, and there are many pitfalls. Whether or not one regards longer-term interest rates as economic indicators or as part of transmission mechanism for policy, or both, term structure plays a potentially important role in policymaking process. In spite of its complexity, term structure cannot be ignored. This article addresses some issues involved in using term structure to conduct monetary policy. I begin by discussing long bond rate as an indicator of expectations. Second, I comment on role that bond rates have played in recent U.S. monetary history. Third, I explain how information in yield curve can be used to overcome what I call policy in pipeline problem. Fourth, I review recent empirical evidence supporting two theoretical views underlying our understanding of term structure. I explain how peso problems associated with inflation scares in bond market may help to account for a serious empirical failure of expectations theory of term structure. I also discuss evidence supporting view that significant movements in long-term interest rates are largely driven by expected inflation. Finally, I point out some pitfalls of using term structure to make tactical decisions. 1. PURSUING LOW INFLATION The Chairman of Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, supports a longrun goal for price stability such that the expected rate of change of general level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business decisionmaking.3 The long bond rate is particularly well suited to help a central bank assess degree to which it has achieved low defined in that way. One could compare behavior of yield on a long-term nominal bond to its behavior in a past period in which was very low and public was reasonably confident that it would stay low. For instance, in United States 30-year nominal bond rate ranged from around 3 percent to a little over 4 percent from mid-1950s until mid-1960s, a period in which averaged around 1 to 2 percent, and presumably, long-term expectations were no more than that.4 One would think that if Federal Reserve (the Fed) were to achieve full credibility for low inflation, long bond rate would once again move down to 3 to 4 percent range. …
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