Strange (mental) machines. About computation, protocognition and Artificial Life

Biochemical origin of the schizophrenia and of the behavioral pathologies of schizoid type

Research in artificial intelli-gence, artificial life and cogni-tive science has not yet provided answers to any of the most perplexing questions about the mind, such as the nature of consciousness or of the self; in this article the authors make a suggestion for a new approach. They begin by setting their project in the broader cognitive science context and argue that little recent research adequately addresses the question of what are the necessary requirements for conscious experience to be possible. Kant addresses this question in his transcendental psychology, and although Kant's work is now over 200 years old the authors believe his approach is worthy of re-examination in the current debate about the mind.

In 1956 history was made at Dartmouth, at a summer conference organized by John McCarthy which inaugurated (and baptized) the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The fathers of the field were all there: McCarthy, Minsky, Samuel, Simon, Selfridge, and they took their inspiration from Alan Turing and John von Neumann, whose combined genius had given the world not only the serial computer, but also a strikingly clear vision of its cognitive powers. Thirty-one years later, in September of 1987, a meeting was held at Los Alamos which may in time overshadow the Dartmouth meeting and its aftermath: the first international Artificial Life (AL) conference, drawing together thinkers from around the world whose work might be said to owe its inspiration to one of John von Neumann's other great ideas: the idea of self-replicating cellular automata. Not that all workers in AL concern themselves directly with either selfreplication or cellular automata. Indeed one of the most striking features of the volume under review, the proceedings of the first Artificial Life conference, is the great diversity of approaches, goals, and grain-sizes of the simulations presented and discussed. This is an extraordinarily rich volume, exciting in tone, kaleidoscopic in its perspectives and contributions. AI is known for its simulations of cognitive competences modeled "from the top down" and perhaps the most basic difference between AI and AL is that most AL simulations are adamantly bottom up in design philosophy. While some of the virtues of bottom-up modeling are now familiar, especially in the manifestos of the connectionists, broader, deeper reasons are offered here. In Vehicles (MIT Press, 1984), Valentino Braitenberg put forward his "law of uphill analysis, downhill synthesis" which made the compelling point that it is simply much harder to figure out the inner machinery of something whose behavior you have data on

Incremental Conceptualization for Language Production discusses the simultaneous actions involved in thinking and speaking, as well as the piecemeal way in which individuals construct an internal representation of the external world and use this internal representation for speaking. Author Markus Guhe presents the first computational model that captures these observations in a cognitively adequate fashion. The volume is an innovative look at the mind’s process of producing semantic representations that can be transformed into language. The first section of the book illustrates four stages of conceptualization: construction of a conceptual representation; selection of content to be verbalized; linearization of the selected content; and generation of preverbal messages. Guhe then analyzes incremental processing — processing that takes place in a piecemeal fashion — and offers a blueprint of incremental models while discussing the dimensions along which the processing principles and the blueprint varies. Finally, incremental processing and conceptualization merge to form the incremental conceptualiser model (inC). The effective use of inC is demonstrated through simulations carried out with the implementation of the model. Intended for researchers in cognitive science, particularly cognitive modeling of language, this volume will also interest researchers in artificial intelligence, computational linguistics, psycholinguistics, and linguistics and psychology.

Hazardous waste capacity assurance planning: Volumes for one‐time remediation

In recent years, the topic of emotion reading has increasingly received attention from researchers in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. To study this phenomenon, in this paper an adaptive agent model is presented with capabilities to interpret another agent’s emotions. The presented agent model is based on recent advances in neurological context. First a non-adaptive agent model for emotion reading is described involving (preparatory) mirroring body states of the other agent. Here emotion reading is modelled taking into account the Simulation Theory perspective as known from the literature, involving the own body states and emotions in reading somebody else’s emotions. This models an agent that first develops the same feeling, and after feeling the emotion imputes it to the other agent. Next the agent model is extended to an adaptive model based on a Hebbian learning principle to develop a direct connection between a sensed stimulus concerning another agent’s body state (e.g., face expression) and the emotion recognition state. In this adaptive agent model the emotion is imputed to the other agent before it is actually felt. The agent model has been designed based on principles of neural modelling, and as such has a close relation to a neurological realisation.Keywordsagent modelemotion readingcognitivetheory of mindadaptive

How people plan is an active area of research in cognitive science, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. However, tasks traditionally used to study planning in the laboratory tend to be constrained to artificial environments, such as Chess and bandit problems. To date there is still no agreed-on model of how people plan in realistic contexts, such as navigation and search, where values intuitively derive from interactions between perception and cognition. To address this gap and move towards a more naturalistic study of planning, we present a novel spatial Maze Search Task (MST) where the costs and rewards are physically situated as distances and locations. We used this task in two behavioral experiments to evaluate and contrast multiple distinct computational models of planning, including optimal expected utility planning, several one-step heuristics inspired by studies of information search, and a family of planners that deviate from optimal planning, in which action values are estimated by the interactions between perception and cognition. We found that people's deviations from optimal expected utility are best explained by planners with a limited horizon, however our results do not exclude the possibility that in human planning action values may be also affected by cognitive mechanisms of numerosity and probability perception. This result makes a novel theoretical contribution in showing that limited planning horizon generalizes to spatial planning, and demonstrates the value of our multi-model approach for understanding cognition.

Much research in robotic artificial intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life has focused on autonomous agents as an embodied and situated approach to AI. Such systems are commonly viewed as overcoming many of the philosophical problems associated with traditional computationalist AI and cognitive science, such as the grounding problem (Harnad) or the lack of intentionality (Searle), because they have the physical and sensorimotor grounding that traditional AI was argued to lack. Robot lawn mowers and self-driving cars, for example, more or less reliably avoid obstacles, approach charging stations, and so on-and therefore might be considered to have some form of artificial intentionality or intentional directedness. It should be noted, though, that the fact that robots share physical environments with people does not necessarily mean that they are situated in the same perceptual and social world as humans. For people encountering socially interactive systems, such as social robots or automated vehicles, this poses the nontrivial challenge to interpret them as intentional agents to understand and anticipate their behavior but also to keep in mind that the intentionality of artificial bodies is fundamentally different from their natural counterparts. This requires, on one hand, a "suspension of disbelief " but, on the other hand, also a capacity for the "suspension of belief." This dual nature of (attributed) artificial intentionality has been addressed only rather superficially in embodied AI and social robotics research. It is therefore argued that Bourgine and Varela's notion of Artificial Life as the practice of autonomous systems needs to be complemented with a practice of socially interactive autonomous systems, guided by a better understanding of the differences between artificial and biological bodies and their implications in the context of social interactions between people and technology.

Building a human-like integrative artificial cognitive system, that is, an artificial general intelligence (AGI), is the holy grail of the artificial intelligence (AI) field. Furthermore, a computational model that enables an artificial system to achieve cognitive development will be an excellent reference for brain and cognitive science. This paper describes an approach to develop a cognitive architecture by integrating elemental cognitive modules to enable the training of the modules as a whole. This approach is based on two ideas: (1) brain-inspired AI, learning human brain architecture to build human-level intelligence, and (2) a probabilistic generative model (PGM)-based cognitive architecture to develop a cognitive system for developmental robots by integrating PGMs. The proposed development framework is called a whole brain PGM (WB-PGM), which differs fundamentally from existing cognitive architectures in that it can learn continuously through a system based on sensory-motor information.In this paper, we describe the rationale for WB-PGM, the current status of PGM-based elemental cognitive modules, their relationship with the human brain, the approach to the integration of the cognitive modules, and future challenges. Our findings can serve as a reference for brain studies. As PGMs describe explicit informational relationships between variables, WB-PGM provides interpretable guidance from computational sciences to brain science. By providing such information, researchers in neuroscience can provide feedback to researchers in AI and robotics on what the current models lack with reference to the brain. Further, it can facilitate collaboration among researchers in neuro-cognitive sciences as well as AI and robotics.

Robotic soccer is nowadays a popular research domain in the area of multi-robot systems. RoboCup is an international joint project to promote research in artificial intelligence, robotics and related fields. RoboCup chose soccer as the main problem aiming at innovations to be applied for socially relevant problems. It includes several competition leagues, each one with a specific emphasis, some only at software level, others at both hardware and software, with single or multiple agents, cooperative and competitive. In the context of RoboCup, the Middle Size League (MSL) is one of the most challenging. In this league, each team is composed of up to 5 robots with a maximum size of 50cm× 50cm, 80cm height and a maximumweight of 40Kg, playing in a field of 18m× 12m. The rules of the game are similar to the official FIFA rules, with minor changes required to adapt them for the playing robots CAMBADA, Cooperative Autonomous Mobile roBots with Advanced Distributed Architecture, is the MSL Soccer team from the University of Aveiro. The project started in 2003, coordinated by the Transverse Activity on Intelligent Robotics group of the Institute of Electronic and Telematic Engineering of Aveiro (IEETA). This project involves people working on several areas for building the mechanical structure of the robot, its hardware architecture and controllers (Almeida et al., 2002; Azevedo et al., 2007) and the software development in areas such as image analysis and processing (Caleiro et al., 2007; Cunha et al., 2007; Martins et al., 2008; Neves et al., 2007; 2008), sensor and information fusion (Silva et al., 2008; 2009), reasoning and control (Lau et al., 2008), cooperative sensing approach based on a Real-Time Database (Almeida et al., 2004), communications among robots (Santos et al., 2009; 2007) and the development of an efficient basestation. The main contribution of this chapter is to present the new advances in the areas described above involving the development of an MSL team of soccer robots, taking the example of the CAMBADA team that won the RoboCup 2008 and attained the third place in the last edition of the MSL tournament at RoboCup 2009. CAMBADA also won the last three editions

The advancements of the research on Mobile Robots with high degree of autonomy is possible, on one hand, due to its broad perspective of applications and, on other hand, due to the development and reduction of costs on computer, electronic and mechanic systems. Together with the research in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, this scenario currently enables the proposition of ambitious and complex robotic projects. Most of the applications were developed outside the structured environment of industry assembly lines and have complex goals, such as planets exploration, transportation of parts in factories, manufacturing, cleaning and monitoring of households, handling of radioactive materials in nuclear power plants, inspection of volcanoes, and many other activities. This chapter presents and discusses the main topics involved on the design or adoption of a mobile robot system and focus on the control and navigation systems for autonomous mobile robots. Thus, this chapter is organized as follows: • The Section 2 introduces the main aspects of the Robot design, such as: the conceptualization of the mobile robot physical structure and its relation to the world; the state of art of navigation methods and systems; and the control architectures which enables high degree of autonomy. • The Section 3 presents the dynamic and control analysis for navigation robots with kinematic and dynamic model of the differential and omnidirectional robots. • And finally, Section 4 presents applications for a robotic platform of Automation, Simulation, Control and Supervision of Navegation Robots, with studies of dynamic and kinematic modeling, control algorithms, mechanisms for mapping and localization, trajectory planning and the platform simulator.

The Interslip-D project was formed to develop a personal machine inplementation of Interlisp for use as an environment for research in artificial intelligence and cognitive science [Burton et al., 80b]. This note describes the principal developments since our last report almost a year ago [Burton et al., 80a].

There is increasingly much agreement in the cognitive sciences that human cognition is embodied – to some significant extent. However, there is much less agreement regarding in what sense(s) cognition is embodied. In particular, there is much agreement that sensorimotor interaction with the environment is fundamental to cognition. From a historical perspective, this emphasis on the sensorimotor body is at least partly due to the crucial role that the conceptual shift in artificial intelligence (AI) research – from computational to robotic models – has played in the overall development of embodied cognitive science. Most embodied AI research, however, in particular work on symbol grounding and related approaches, reduces the body to a mere sensorimotor interface for internal processes that are still just as computational as they were 30–40 years ago. In Harnad's terms, this type of AI has only gone from a computational to a robotic functionalism. In theory, this could be limited to AI research as such, but in practice the view of the physical body as the computational mind's sensorimotor interface to the world still pervades much of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. The argument presented here is that there are good reasons to say that at least today's robots are in fact not embodied – in any sense that would allow for anything even close to human embodied cognition and intentionality – and that this has implications for social interactions between humans and robots.

In his book “Minds and Computers: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence”, Matt Carter presents a comprehensive exploration of the philosophical questions surrounding artificial intelligence (AI). Carter argues that the development of AI is not merely a technological challenge but fundamentally a philosophical one. He delves into key issues like the nature of mental states, the limits of introspection, the implications of memory decay, and the functionalist framework that allows for the possibility of AI. Carter contrasts functionalism with reductive materialism, highlighting how the former accommodates the concept of artificial minds. He also emphasizes the significance of computationalism, which combines functionalism with computational theory to provide a robust explanation for mental processes. The book further discusses formal systems, the role of register machines in computation, and the inherent challenges in AI research, particularly in developing natural languag processing systems. Carter’s work underscores the limitations of current computational models of cognition while remaining hopeful that advances in neuroscience may lead to stronger AI systems in the future. This book provides critical insights for researchers in AI and cognitive science, motivating further inquiry into the philosophical foundations of artificial intelligence and its practical implications.

Distributional semantics develops theories and methods to represent the meaning of natural language expressions, with vectors encoding their statistical distribution in linguistic contexts. It is at once a theoretical model to express meaning, a practical methodology to construct semantic representations, a computational framework for acquiring meaning from language data, and a cognitive hypothesis about the role of language usage in shaping meaning. This book aims to build a common understanding of the theoretical and methodological foundations of distributional semantics. Beginning with its historical origins, the text exemplifies how the distributional approach is implemented in distributional semantic models. The main types of computational models, including modern deep learning ones, are described and evaluated, demonstrating how various types of semantic issues are addressed by those models. Open problems and challenges are also analyzed. Students and researchers in natural language processing, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science will appreciate this book.