Strict Liability

In February, 2000, the European Commission issued the long-awaited White Paper on Environmental Liability. The White Paper outlines the Commission's views on the key elements of a proposed environmental liability directive. This directive would provide for strict liability for conventional and environmental damage caused by "dangerous" activities regulated by EC law (i.e. virtually all industrial activities), and fault liability for natural resource damage caused by non-dangerous activities. In the Commission's view, such a regime would implement the EC Treaty's grand principles of environmental policy (the preventive, precautionary, and polluter pays principles) and improve the enforcement of EC environmental law. The existing national liability regimes are deemed inadequate by the Commission. This article reviews the main substantive law (and some related procedural law) features of the liability scheme outlined in the White Paper. The first part discusses the justifications for EC legislation on environmental liability. It analyzes whether under the subsidiarity principle, or for reasons of improving the functioning of the internal market, the EC, rather than the Member States, should set any necessary policy in this area. It addresses also the key principles of the EC's environmental policy that the Commission invokes to support its proposal. The second part focusses on the critical question of strict versus fault liability, and the burden of proof. The White Paper argues that strict liability should be preferred over fault liability. The arguments to support strict liability are reviewed. In the third part, the scope of the regime proposed by the Commission is reviewed. Dangerous and non-dangerous activities would be treated in different ways, and the Commission proposes certain exemptions to the directive's scope. The fourth part discusses the issue of insurance and financial security. To secure funds for compensating environmental harm, the White Paper suggests that insurance should play an important role. In part five, the liable persons and available defenses are discussed. Part six analyzes the White Paper's proposals with respect to valuation of natural resource damage, contaminated sites, and standing to sue. Some conclusions are set forth in part seven.

Apart from other instances of strict liability mentioned elsewhere in this volume, true strict liability on a European level can only be found — if at all — in certain international conventions. But also conventions typically do not introduce strict liability as such, but rather a fault-based regime that is combined with a reversed burden of proof. They thereby at least provide for a stricter liability than under the traditional fault concept on which they are founded (at least in theory). In the following, selected conventions on nuclear liability, transport by air, sea and rail, and others will be discussed with a focus on their strict(er) liability aspects.

Products Liability as Enterprise Liability

This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.

Preference revelation in strict liability product safety markets

2 - Managing facilities, due diligence and facility transfers

A strict liability offence is one where it is not necessary to prove any mental state of the defendant. All that needs to be shown is that the defendant caused a particular result or carried out a particular act. The courts will only interpret the offence to be one of strict liability where Parliament has made it quite clear that there is no mens rea requirement for the offence. There are some offences which just require proof that the defendant possessed a prohibited item. This chapter discusses the offences that are strict liability; when a court will not presume mens rea; what mens rea will be presumed; the Human Rights Act 1998 and strict liability offences; common law defences and strict liability offences; possession offences; and the arguments for and against strict liability.

The subject. This article is devoted to the content of the principle of proportionality in disputes about the strict liability of football clubs for the behavior of spectators. The proportionality means that the sanction corresponds to the offense and it has two dimensions. Firstly, the more serious the offense is the higher the sanction should be. Secondly, proportionality protects sport from unreasonably low sanctions while the violation is serious.The purpose of the study is the content of the principle of proportionality: the use of related principles of sports jurisprudence, exceptional circumstances (mitigating and aggravating) in the practice of applying clubs` strict liability for spectators` behavior in UEFA competitions over the period 2007-2021. Liability without fault increases the value of investigating the factual circumstances of a dispute. The broad discretion of the bodies raises the question of the validity of the choice of aggravating circumstances or the refusal of mitigating circumstances. Therefore, the jurisdictional authority in each specific dispute must search for exceptional circumstances thereby fulfilling the principle of proportionality. The second important nuance of strict liability in the UEFA regulations is the difference in the interconnection between violations and sanctions. In some articles, the sanction is predetermined. It is possible to reduce such a sanction only in the presence of an exceptional circumstance and to increase it in the presence of an aggravating circumstance. Separately considered, in conjunction with the principle of proportionality, other principles: principles of predictability of sanctions, equal treatment, the precedent value of decisions on similar disputes (stare decisis).Methodology. The methodological basis of the stated research involves the generalization and analysis of the practice of two institutions of sports jurisprudence. Firstly, the jurisdictional bodies of UEFA are publicly available, as well as available to the author, but currently not available for free download on the UEFA website. Secondly, the relevant decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport are in the public domain. Turning to the approaches of law enforcement officers regarding the content of the principle of proportionality meant comparing positions that did not differ in inconsistency. As a result of the analysis of the practice were systematized and identified typical exceptional circumstances, unique exceptional circumstances, and specific enforcement of the principle of proportionality.The main results of research and the field of their application. The article examined the normative limits of sanctions in the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations; exceptional circumstances affecting the choice of sanction; search by the law enforcement officer of the content of exceptional circumstances; principles of predictability of sanctions, equal treatment, the precedent value of decisions on similar disputes (stare decisis) in connection with the verification of sanctions for proportionality. Compliance with the principle of proportionality, in this case, should protect the club from an unreasonably harsh and grossly disproportional sanction. Therefore, it is important to analyze the factual circumstances: which of them are mitigating and which are aggravating. In other categories of offenses, the sanction remains at the discretion of the jurisdictional authority. In such violations, the principle of proportionality takes on a special value. The more flexibility in the choice of sanction is, the higher is the risk of abuse by the jurisdictional bodes. UEFA`s enforcement practice is seeking exceptional circumstances that are not consistent enough to be predictable. Some consistency exists only concerning aggravating circumstances. There is an unreasonably strict approach to mitigating circumstances. The practice of CAS does not differ from the practice of UEFA in terms of strict liability compositions. The principle of proportionality in sports jurisprudence can be interconnected with other legal concepts. Such concepts are equal treatment, predictability, and so-called stare decisis.Conclusions. For the slightly undisputed observance of the principle of proportionality, several requirements must be fulfilled. First, analyze the factual circumstances to find exceptional circumstances among them. Secondly, always choose the minimum sanction in the absence of aggravating circumstances, since strict liability is a forced legal institution. Thirdly, indicate in the decisions what circumstances are mitigating, what aggravating circumstances have been established, and how they both affect the choice of a sanction. Fourth, use the previous decisions of the UEFA`s jurisdictional bodies and CAS of the strict liability offenses when the actual circumstances are close.

This section explores individual responsibility as a justification put forward to explain or support the imposition of strict liability in the four legal systems studied. First, the section explains the idea behind this argument, clarifying that a high number of conceptions of individual responsibility exist and that they treat strict liability very differently. Secondly, the section unravels the patterns of use that characterize this argument in the four legal systems, it assesses its justificatory significance and pays attention to the contexts of liability in relation to which this argument is invoked. The section shows that individual responsibility is not a particularly prominent justification for strict liability in any of the four systems considered, though with variations across them. The argument has some significance in the United States and England, where several legal scholars have a keen interest in moral philosophy and view tort law as based on norms of individual responsibility and justice. By contrast, it is basically absent from the Italian and French contexts, where strict liability is typically justified by reference to wider societal goals, and norms of individual responsibility are, at most, relevant to liability for fault.

The case Professor Alexander poses at the beginning of his rejoinder, that of the intentionally drunken officer, is a variant of a familiar problem. One does something, usually ingesting drugs or alcohol voluntarily, which then makes one's, subsequent behavior involuntary. Alexander's case is slightly different in that the officer intentionally gets drunk with the further intention (as part of the course of action) of sinking the Bismarck. Why is this a problem for my analysis? He proposes three escape routes from his argument (though I confess, I'm not sure what I'm escaping from). In discussing the second route, he seems to concede that my analysis would work for his counter example since . . the officer's past voluntary acts led him to be where he was when the wave caused him to lose his balance. But, he goes on, . . This route will not allow us to distinguish cases of proper strict liability and negligence liability from cases of no liability due to the absence of a voluntary act. Why not? The issue is the existence of an independently specifiable act or course of action or voluntary omission preceding an involuntary motion that somehow makes us responsible for the involuntary motion. Let us take an example. Suppose one reads but ignores a clear warning label on drugs, then operates a vehicle, then--lapsing into unconsciousness--injures someone. Surely, this is a case of negligence. Following my analysis, it requires the injurious consequence and an act intentional under a variety of descriptions (taking medication, ignoring the directions, and so on) carried out in a proscribed manner, that is, violative of a duty of due care. In the involuntary motion cases, there is no series of prior voluntary acts which we could specify and would characterize as negligence. Of course, all involuntary motions are preceded by various voluntary acts. But not all are preceded by a series of such acts which both cause those involuntary motions to cause injury and are done in a negligent manner. Alexander offers no argument that we cannot distinguish cases of negligence from what Holmes calls no act cases, only the naked assertion that we cannot. But the above approach, following my discussion of negligence in the paper, seems clearly to do that. The one example Alexander does offer as counterargument is the strict liability case, the one in which sinking the Bismarck is a strict liability offense. Note first that this offense is defined by a consequence alone. Typically, this is not how strict liability offenses are defined. Rather, they are constituted by a course of action producing death, injury, or property damage, such as manufacturing impure drugs or causing injury while doing demolition work. …

Autonomous vehicles are said to bring safety to the roads. Machines are expected not to make the same driving mistakes as humans. Indeed, machines will not drive intoxicated or get too tired to drive. However, the application of adversarial machine learning to autonomous vehicles has shown that the reaction of these vehicles to altered traffic signs may be the cause of unpredictable reactions. Rather than stopping in front of a vandalized stop sign, the autonomous vehicle may speed. This may lead to accidents. Therefore, scholars have developed various liability and compensation schemes to deal with accidents by autonomous vehicles. The following liability and compensation schemes have been suggested to deal with the civil liability of accidents of autonomous vehicles: operator liability, product liability, strict liability, no-fault compensation, and negligence. Each of these schemes are judged against victim and innovation friendliness. The former is being framed as easiness to obtain compensation, while the latter is understood as a burden on the industry. Operator liability, strict liability and no-fault compensation are considered as victim friendly. Product liability and negligence put a burden on the victim to prove either a defect of the product or a fault of the manufacturer. Only by shifting the burden of proof to the manufacturer would these systems be made victim friendly. In terms of innovation, the situation is not obvious. Operator liability, product liability and negligence make it difficult for a manufacturer to anticipate the size of the financial burden in case of an accident. This would be different with strict liability and no-fault compensation. Much of the discussion above is framed in relation to vehicles that are operating autonomously on their own. There is, however, more and more research on infrastructure enabled autonomy. In system, autonomous vehicles will be operating in connection with road side units, cloud services, and other traffic participants. As this will bring together products, services, and behavior, a mix of different liability regimes will make it difficult for the victim to obtain compensation. Therefore, a one-stop window may facilitate obtaining compensation. No-fault compensation could be ideal.KeywordsAutonomous vehiclesCivil liabilityRoad accidentsVictim centralityInnovationOperator liabilityProduct liabilityStrict liabilityNo-fault compensationNegligenceReasonable algorithmInfrastructure enabled autonomyConnectivity

For over two decades, the FTC creatively employed its capacious statute to police against shoddy data practices. Although the FTC’s actions were arguably needed at the time to fill a gap in enforcement, there are reasons to believe that its current approach has outlived its usefulness and is in serious need of updating. In particular, our analysis shows that the FTC’s current approach to data security is unlikely to instill anything close to optimal incentives for data holders. These shortcomings cannot be fixed through changes to the FTC enforcement approach, as they are largely generated by a mismatch between the tools that Congress gave it over a century ago and what it needs to foster firms’ incentives to mimic socially optimal levels of care for the data they hold. Not only does the current framework likely suffer from informational deficiencies attendant to its focus on “reasonable” security that render liability standards uncertain, it also lacks the ability to obtain the type of relief that will force firms to internalize the costs of their data security decisions. We examine the problem of data security enforcement through the lens of the economics of optimal precautions and identify several reasons why a strict liability regime administered by the FTC, under which firms pay for the expected harm from breaches they cause, is likely to be superior to the current framework that revolves around the concept of reasonableness. The benefits of strict liability flow from the likelihood that firms do not fully internalize the costs and benefits of their data security decisions and the relatively large informational burdens associated with measuring actual and optimal care under a negligence regime. We also show why in this informational environment, strict liability is better than negligence for developing a vibrant cyber insurance market, allowing for data security regulation to be de facto outsourced to insurers who will contract with firms for optimal levels of care. Because these private contracts will harness private information on costs and benefits from precautions, they are likely to incentivize more efficient behavior.

A strict liability offence is one where it is not necessary to prove any mental state of the defendant. All that needs to be shown is that the defendant caused a particular result or carried out a particular act. This chapter discusses the offences that are strict liability; when a court will not presume mens rea; what mens rea will be presumed; the Human Rights Act 1998 and strict liability offences; common law defences and strict liability offences; possession offences; and the arguments for and against strict liability.

Within the context of transboundary disputes, this paper seeks to determine which liability concept, negligence or strict liability, performs better when assets are secure against foreign claims for transboundary damages. Our results indicate that, if assets are hidden from foreign claims, strict liability will not implement the socially optimal outcome, but neither will negligence. However, even though the socially optimal outcome is not always achieved, strict liability weakly dominates negligence. These results suggest that the harmonization of statues that deal with transboundary pollution should be based on strict liability not negligence.

The Indonesian Supreme Court rejected the cassation and imposed a fine of IDR 199 billion on PT. Rambang Agro Jaya (RAJ), a subsidiary of Malaysia’s Kulim Berhad, for a 500-hectare forest and land fire case in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency, South Sumatra. This study aims to conduct a normative juridical analysis of the courts’ decision, holding PT. Rambang Agro Jaya was strictly liable for the environmental damage caused by the fire. The research reveals: (1) Central Jakarta District Court Decision No. 445/Pdt.G/2019/PN Jkt.Pst establishes strict liability and orders the Defendant to pay material losses totaling IDR 137.57 billion. (2) Jakarta High Court Decision No. 398/PDT/2021/PT DKI upholds the Central Jakarta District Court’s decision, reinforcing strict liability and increasing the total compensation to IDR 199.57 billion. (3) Supreme Court Decision No. 2196 K/PDT/2022 rejects PT. Rambang Agro Jaya’s cassation confirmed the Defendant’s unlawful actions and strict liability and imposed a material loss compensation of IDR 199.57 billion. The rulings signify a progressive step in enforcing environmental responsibility, with the substantial fine signaling a strict stance against ecological violations. The Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of cassation strengthens legal certainty and establishes a robust legal precedent for similar future cases, and underscores the significance of corporate accountability in promoting environmental sustainability.