One of the things we realized as we read the contributions to this symposium is that if you try to shine a bright light on a factor that has been ignored or slighted by previous scholarship in the field, it ends up distorting some of what you are trying to say. In Struggle for the Soul of the Postwar South: White Evangelical Protestants and Operation Dixie, we hope that we did not give the impression that we blamed Protestant evangelicalism for Operation Dixie’s failure or that we intended to privilege that factor above all others. We believe that a powerful mix of racism, anticommunism, employer intransigence, and repressive state and local governments was the major impediment to the CIO’s campaign. What we discovered, however, was that aspects of the region’s dominant religious culture at that particular moment made the CIO’s overtures less appealing to white workers than labor activists and liberal reformers had hoped. The sacred sphere of southern white evangelicals was not static but rather the product of fears as well as hopes, of nightmares as well as dreams, and influenced by the notion that the world was a contest between good and evil in which God and Satan intervened directly into their lives and battled for their souls. This colored the way they saw employers, unions, and communists. Their religious views were also shaped by a rising level of material comfort and the prospect for even greater economic security for their siblings and their children. It is little wonder, then, that a worker like Lucille Hall would look askance at unions’ sending “outsiders in here to tell you how bad you were treated. You’d know better” (quoted on 81).The symposium’s participants have given us a tall order in terms of responding to things we might have done better. We are grateful for their attention to the book—its strengths as well as its weaknesses. It seems as if the best way to proceed is sequential. Let us begin with Christopher D. Cantwell. He is correct in reminding us that Protestant evangelicalism put an emphasis on communalism as well as individualism and that white workers often looked for the “approving nods” of their fellow worshippers. Indeed, we agree that this communal feeling could be a boon to organizing, particularly in places like the coalfields. However, it seems worthwhile to consider what sorts of communities evangelicalism was creating. Most were voluntary communities of believers that could fracture easily over either sacred or secular disputes. They emphasized independent choice among their members and a fierce local autonomy. Do these sound like values that the CIO would welcome? Communities of saints could also be quite exclusionary; the passage constantly drummed into the minds of evangelicals cautioned against “being yoked to unbelievers.” Our friend Steve Rosswurm pushed us some time ago to think about the concept of elective affinities. To us, the worldview of many of these communities of believers jarred against that of the bureaucratic discipline expected by the CIO.To Cantwell, whose grandfather worked for both spiritual and material rewards, it seems probable that the CIO might have had more success focusing on its own economic and political program rather than religion, particularly since few in the movement understood the sacred world they were entering. Perhaps. But CIO organizers found themselves confronted by employers and preachers who warned against caring too much about worldly things. At church, they learned the Biblical lesson of being satisfied with their wages, which, as noted above, were better than they had ever been. Under the circumstances, if the CIO was going to succeed in keeping the South from becoming a low-wage haven for industry, it had to give its crusade a moral imperative. The AFL, to which Cantwell points as an example for its focus on wages and working conditions, benefited from employers who feared the CIO and from organizing more craft-oriented workers; the AFL did not have to win the hearts and minds of its workers to the same degree as the CIO did.We are delighted that Julie Saville stepped outside her normal areas of expertise to give us valuable insights. She draws an interesting parallel between the first and second reconstruction eras and the paradoxical relationship between religious experiences and political modernization. It is interesting, she notes, that white CIO organizers still routinely cast black popular religion as primitive (and not political). We would add, however, that these organizers cast all ecstatic religious expression (white or black) as primitive and mostly counterproductive. In many respects, this speaks to Cantwell’s argument that if the CIO did not comprehend the religious cultures of the South, its organizers might have done better to just leave them alone. Still, we might have done more to draw out this dynamic.Saville also raises the question about how the trajectories of considering black churches as well as white ones might have altered the frame we used to explore Operation Dixie. This was the most difficult decision for us when we got into this project. We knew that attention to the prophetic radical traditions of African American churches and their importance in the long civil rights movement would be an important counterweight to what we found for the most part in the sources illuminating white preachers, white employers, white organizers, and white workers. However, as she points out, we already were juggling three variants of evangelicalism, to say nothing of multiple denominational and fellowship groupings and the splits therein, regional and industrial variations, and the messiness of contested meanings of the sacred among a population noted for its devotion to popular religiosity. In the end, we made the choice to focus on white evangelicals because they were the ones scholars had tagged as the main culprits of the CIO’s failure. Indeed, both at the time and in the decades since, the general assumptions have been that black workers—religious or otherwise—are more likely to join unions, and black ministers are more likely to lend support. Could the CIO have learned important lessons from the black organizing model linking workplace ethics and democratic community participation? Undoubtedly. Would it have translated well in the overwhelmingly white mill villages? That is a tougher proposition.Like Saville, Robert Rodgers Korstad knows that there are inspiring instances of workers uniting around prophetic radicalism. The best examples, highlighted in the work of Michael K. Honey, Toni Gilpin, William P. Jones, and, of course, Korstad’s own prize-winning Civil Rights Unionism, testify to the possibilities inherent in a path that the CIO might have taken in 1946.1 He wonders if a broad-based campaign attempting to build biracial alliances might have resulted in a different outcome. By focusing on the overwhelmingly white textile industry in an effort to avoid race-baiting, he notes, the CIO actually “made race a central issue of the campaign.” We agree, along with all of the participants, that race was the inevitable undertow of any campaign to alter the social and political realities of the postwar South. But for the CIO to tackle that issue directly would have required a very different organization. Moreover, such a campaign would have required a very different milieu. As Jane Dailey points out in her contribution, the white churches of the South fell victim to powerful propositional fallacies effectively used by postwar evangelicals: “Since communists believed in racial equality, anyone who believed in racial equality was a communist,” she writes. “Furthermore, since communists rejected organized religion, to embrace communism via opposition to segregation was to reject God as well.” The difficulties of sustaining biracial unions in Memphis, Louisville, Winston-Salem, and the lumber camps of North Carolina and Louisiana testify to the limits of efforts in such a climate.While it is easy to scoff at such simplistic mental constructions, we are reminded of Findlay Donaldson, the Harlan County miner/Pentecostal preacher who rose to leadership of his National Miners Union (NMU) local until he attended the union’s convention and learned that the NMU was atheistic (71). He then preached against the NMU despite its work in the coalfields. However, it was never our intention to suggest that religion made southern workers docile or necessarily antiunion. In fact, the initial chapters of the book tried to demonstrate that during the Depression, workers—even those who were religious—could be quite militant. The Depression emboldened a range of popular theologies for responding to issues of social and economic justice. We argue, however, that there were important changes in southern churches and the thinking of evangelicals that dampened the progressive sentiments that the Depression had stoked. Even more recently, Alison Collis Greene’s new book, No Depression in Heaven, charts the emergence of a prophetic radicalism in the Mississippi Delta during the 1930s. Similar to us, she also asserts that churches eventually turned against the New Deal and social movements for trying to preempt the work of sacred communities.2 We hope that people reading our book do not include us in the “long tradition of looking to the culture of white workers” to explain the South’s lack of unions. We do, however, stand by our argument that during the most ambitious campaign to organize the South (1946–53), the variant of evangelical Protestantism that had the greatest sway over southern white workers put many of them at odds with the CIO’s model of unionism.Dailey reminds us of just how complicated southern Protestantism was at the end of World War II. She is attentive to the context that confounded the organizations that expounded a “theology of brotherhood, of universalist, ecumenical Protestantism.” Of course, they could not have known just how much the terrain had shifted beneath their feet. It was a tragedy that the CIO could not take advantage of the international human rights discourse associated with the United Nations. But the UN was nearly on par with communism in most southern churches; the Methodist Bishop, G. Bromley Oxnam, who also happened to be head of the FCC, learned this when he gave support to the UN. He was vilified in the South and eventually called before the House Un-American Activities Committee. To fiery radio evangelicals such as J. Harold Smith, Oxnam was doing the work of the Antichrist, promoting modernistic theologies and the expansion of the state—sure signs that the end-times were near.Dailey’s example of Benjamin E. Mays is also a reminder of how much there is to learn from following the leads suggested by her and Saville. It is interesting to us that while there has been a great deal of work on black churches and the civil rights movement, there is very little on people like William Holmes Borders, who embraced the labor movement in the 1940s and 1950s and tried to carve out a position of strength for black workers in the CIO. We hope to make this our next project. We feel that there is much worth exploring in the intersection of black churches, the popular religion of black workers, and the southern campaigns for unions and economic justice in those decades before Brown v. Board of Education.Responding to our current book, however, Dailey notes that the “Christian turn in southern politics boxed people in,” although in ways that were not formulaic or predictable. We agree. We saw it at its starkest when we examined the dilemmas facing preachers. Cleveland Bradner, John Isom, Sam Howie, Arthur Hyde, William Marmion, and a host of others, whose stories are rarely recounted in history books, tried to bridge the chasm separating those Christians who supported labor, civil rights, and modernism from those believers who associated those movements with signs of the coming apocalypse. Many of them, because of the local autonomy claimed by congregations in the South, paid with their careers or had to uproot their families. Of course, African American preachers who acted upon the idea that their Christianity meant pursuing a human rights agenda of economic and racial justice typically faced far worse. It is vital that we take that eventuality into consideration when we examine the roles that churches and congregations played in the postwar struggle for the soul of the South.For too long, there has been little in the labor history literature on how working people’s religious beliefs influenced their secular decisions. That is rapidly changing. We tried to show, in contrast to some of the earlier work on Operation Dixie, that the expression of beliefs was not limited to the reactionary rantings of Militant Truth or the prophetic radicalism of Claude Williams and Don West. The world of the southern working class was in upheaval in 1946. It was probably changing too rapidly for employers and many white workers and preachers who looked for some solid ground in evangelicalism; it was changing all too slowly for black workers, for the CIO, and for many modernist Christians. We hope that our book has contributed to a better understanding of that dynamic, not so much for the past but for the future.Let us begin by thanking the Newberry Library, the Dr. William M. Scholl Center for American History and Culture, and the distinguished contributors to this symposium for the opportunity to share and discuss our book. We should add special thanks to Leon Fink, who took an early interest in the project, and to Erik S. Gellman, who chaired the session and gave a very thorough and insightful overview of the book. Erik is one of that new generation of scholars whose work on religion and labor inspires us. Indeed, it was so much easier for us to push forward with this book surrounded by young people like Erik, Chris Cantwell, Heath Carter, Janine Giordano Drake, Jarod Roll, Bethany Moreton, Darren Dochuk, and Richard Callahan.
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