Structural Reform in America: understanding it through discrimination cases

<p>Jurisprudence refers to the decisions made by earlier judges regarding cases that are not covered by the law and which serve as a model for later judges when deciding cases of a like nature. The Supreme Court is an entity with judicial authority in Indonesia and has the authority to publish rulings. As a civil law country, Indonesian law courts do not use jurisprudence as a main legal source. Court judgments under this system are predicated on pertinent laws and regulations, such as the 1945 Constitution, MPR Decrees, Laws, Government Regulations, Presidential Decrees, Supreme Court, Ministerial Decrees, and others. This means that the judge's judgement, which is based on the facts or the available evidence, has some latitude. On the contrary, some countries use common law as their legal system. This legal system favours customary law, which changes over time in accordance with societal changes. In order to ensure that the law is always consistent with a feeling of justice and advantages that are felt immediately by the community, it was established via a judicial institution with a jurisprudence system that is regarded to be superior. Although the Indonesian legal system does not operate on a precedent system, general court judges or judges in lower-level courts are nonetheless required to take the Supreme Court's rulings seriously. This paper will be written as a discussion of how Indonesian law court as a civil law country utilises the jurisprudence, which is the product of common law system, even when it is not commonly used. This paper will also be written to elaborate the comparison between the use of jurisprudence in civil law countries such as Indonesia, and the origin countries that are using the common law system.</p><p>Keywords: Jurisprudence, Indonesian Law Court, Civil Law Country</p>

What moral readings characterize contemporary U.S. Supreme Court opinions on discrimination by race; ethnicity; religion; gender; sexuality; and disabilities? John Rohr and the Constitutional School of Public Administration scholars have analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions for moral insights in public affairs. The authors sought to take a modest step with analysis based on a more nuanced, empirical moral reading of the Court’s cases. First, the authors critiqued the case-study method of the Constitutional School, comparing these with moral readings of the Court’s opinion, including moral justifications that are teleological and nonteleological. Second, the authors analyzed selected opinions by the contemporary Supreme Court on discrimination by race; ethnicity; religion; gender; sexuality; and disabilities. Third, the authors analyzed patterns of teleological (utilitarian or virtue) and nonteleological (deontological) moral justifications and concluded the Supreme Court ordinarily uses ethical arguments, often teleological (utilitarian), with nonteleological (deontological) justifications in cases of perceived injustice. Virtue moral justifications are rare: only with a nonvirtuous litigant. Thus, the authors meld a more nuanced, empirical moral reading with the traditional case-study method of the Constitutional School of Public Administration, without assuming appeal to some universal moral faculty—instead deferring to each person in accepting or rejecting these moral justifications.

The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the Supreme Court

Executive Discretion, Judicial Decision Making, and Separation of Powers in the United States

With its blend of accessible writing and actual excerpts from Court opinions, this book serves to explain the legal and cultural underpinnings of landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the past 35 years—and to illuminate how these decisions have shaped the trajectory and character of modern American society. As the nation's law defines society, society defines the law. As the nation's fundamental law, the U.S. Constitution is the overarching statement of the people's will. Interpreting the Constitution, however, is no simple task. This book examines more than 100 landmark Supreme Court cases from 1973 to the present, providing readers with insights into decisions that have had a profound impact on American politics, commerce, culture, and life. Organized categorically, this book serves readers either as a comprehensive review of modern constitutional law or as a ready reference source. It includes entries on Supreme Court decision-making regarding high-interest issues such as abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973;Gonzales v. Carthart, 2007), climate change (Massachusetts v. EPA, 2007), voting rights (Bush v. Gore, 2000), free speech (Texas v. Johnson, 1989), the death penalty (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), immigration (Arizona v. United States, 2012), campaign financing (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010), gun control (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008), the Affordable Care Act (National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2012), and gay marriage (United States v. Windsor, 2013). The book not only interprets key Court decisions but also provides critical context and perspective that makes the subject matter easier to understand and more meaningful, especially for readers without an extensive background in Constitutional law. Bibliographies are provided at the end of each case to direct those seeking to delve more deeply into specific topics.

\V J hen the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington in 2004, W Justice Sandra Day O'Connor thought the Court had overturned several state sentencing systems: "What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy"(at 325). The "far reaching" decision, she said, would "cast constitution al doubt" on sentencing in many states (at 328). Significant sentencing changes indeed appeared to be on the horizon. The Supreme Court's Blakely decision presaged changes in both sentencing procedures and sentencing statutes. However, that has not happened in many states. Instead, some state courts have held that Blakely simply does not apply to their states' sentencing systems, while others have minimized the impact by holding that it affects only a frac tion of criminal cases. Was Justice O'Connor's argument a merely histrionic, gloom-and-doom predic tion? Or did she accurately foresee an outcome unsettled only by state courts' misin terpretation of the Blakely holding? To assess the true impact of Blakely, we must attempt to answer two questions: 1 ) Does Blakely apply to a given state's sentencing system? 2) If it applies, what does Blakely require? The first question posed little doubt, at least initially. Justice O'Connor helpfully listed ten affected states as exam ples.1 Blakely also seemed rather clear about its effect. It forbid the states from increasing a punishment beyond the "maximum" without a finding beyond a reason able doubt by a jury of a fact that warrants greater punishment. The "maximum" sen tence is not literally the highest penalty allowed by statute. Instead, it is the punish ment that can be imposed based on the jury verdict alone, i.e., without finding any facts other than those decided by the verdict.2 (For further discussion of Blakely, see accompanying Legal Note in this issue.) The effect on sentencing seemed plain: To increase punishment beyond the "maximum," juries and not judges had to find the facts. Because judges decided the facts in so many states, large numbers of sentencing reversals seemed inevitable. O'Connor, who predicted that result, was also prescient in predicting that the feder al sentencing guidelines also would fall under the Blakely ax, as happened with the ruling in United States v. Booker (2005). Not all state courts responded with whole sale reversals of legions of sentences, however. Instead, some courts narrowed Blakely almost to insignificance. Others denied that the Supreme Court's opinion affected

Law & Psychiatry: The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception, and the Courts

Do Supreme Court decisions matter? In 1896 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson that railroad segregation laws were permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1954 the Court's decision in Brown v. the Board of Education held that the same constitutional provision invalidated statutes segregating public schools How great an impact did judicial rulings such as Plessy and Brown have? How much did such Court decisions influence the larger world of race relations? In From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, Michael J. Klarman examines the social and political impact of the Supreme Court's decisions involving race relations from Plessy, the Progressive Era, and the Interwar Period to World Wars I and II, Brown and the Civil Rights Movement. He explores the wide variety of consequences that Brown may have had--raising the salience of race issues, educating opinion, mobilizing supporters, energizing opponents of racial change. He concludes that Brown was ultimately more important for mobilizing southern white opposition to racial change than for encouraging direct-action protest. The decision created concrete occasions for violent confrontation--court ordered school desegregation and radicalized southern politics, leading to the election of politicians who calculated that violent suppression of civil rights demonstrations would win votes. It was such violence--vividly captured on television--that ultimately transformed northern opinion on race, leading to the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation in the mid 1960s. A fascinating investigation of the Supreme Court's rulings on race, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, spells out in exhaustive detail the political and social context against which the Supreme Court Justices operate and the consequences of those decisions on the civil rights movement and beyond.

The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions

The study aimed to identify the role of technology in spreading terrorism, Identify cybercrime sanctions in international public law, and Identify gaps in international public law in reducing cyber terrorism by identifying weaknesses. Of the most important findings of the study include: current global developments show that terrorism is unlikely to be terminated in the coming few years, despite the cooperative efforts by the United Nations, the international community and its Member States. Through the "war on terror", the United States has taken the lead in this regard. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was carried out as consequence of the terrorist strikes of September 11 in the United States America. Since then constant unrest continued in the Middle East. The case law on terrorist organizations in these three authorities, and particularly the legal values resulting from the proportion or jurisdiction of these provisions, indicates that, despite tariff variances, there seems to be a similarity of legitimate values arising from jurisprudence. A relative examination of the judicial principles arising from the proportions of each of the Supreme Court's rulings on terrorism discloses an extensive variety of principles of law which, in some cases, apply in particular to the legal system of their State. What is more clear is that these lawful principles are similar, and if they are considered as a whole, they are perfectly consistent. These legal values seem to show a similarity rather than a difference in this area of crucial importance to domestic criminal law. This supports both transnational and global counterterrorism policies, laws and strategies because it suggests that what seems to be developing is a public comprehending of what creates terrorism, at least through these three main jurisdictions of public law. The Supreme Courts recognize the obligation to abide by legitimate principles and domestic and global rules when applied.

Insult to Injury: Libel, Slander, and Invasions of Privacy, by William K. Jones (University Press of Colorado, 2003) 376 pages, $45Last March marked the 40th anniversary of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the landmark case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood about his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.Thus, the Sullivan rule-for the first time in American history-subjected defamation (libel and slander) law to First Amendment limitations. And it reflects the Supreme Court's awareness of the self-censorship that would-be critics, including the news media, are likely to face in engaging in their robust, uninhibited, and wide-open debates on the government and public officials.In Insult to Injun/, William K. Jones, professor emeritus of law at Columbia University, notes that the Sullivan decision was revolutionary because it dramatically altered the law of defamation. Criticism of the government and public officials is now a matter of constitutional privilege for Americans.Jones undertakes to examine defamation and related expressive transgressions such as invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The book is divided into six parts. Its first four relate to and common law on press freedom and defamation. Part 5 centers on intrusions and public disclosures of embarrassing facts. While Part 6 purportedly concludes the book, its two chapters probe the fact-fiction relations and the Internet law.Although he discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings, Jones pays close attention to lower courts' application of the Supreme Court's guidelines on the balancing of freedom of expression with individual reputation. This is a refreshing departure from the often-unwarranted fascination of legal scholars with the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence. As Judge A. Richard Posner of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court observed recently, the Supreme Court decisions receive disproportionate attention as compared with those of other appellate courts.Jones considers the current libel law a losing game. And his book is a measured effort on his part to make the unsatisfactory, complex law more manageable. But he is no advocate of the wholesale revision of substantive principles. Instead, he prefers procedural reform. Jones' three-stage proposal aims to make libel lawsuits expeditious and largely cost-free while vindicating plaintiffs' reputations if their claims are merited.Retraction or corrections to libel victims are first recommended as a moneysaving means to clear their names. If this pre-litigation approach does not work, Jones suggests that it move to the initial phase of the litigation. The first phase of the libel litigation revolves around the issue of falsity, not around whether the defendant was at fault. Under Jones' formula, the second phase of the libel litigation kicks in where falsity is particularly complicated. Here, the plaintiff must prove falsity and the requisite degree of fault (actual malice or negligence) as well. …

Theorv: Government bureaucracies are strategic and implement Supreme Court opinions based upon the costs and benefits of alternative policy choices. Agencies develop these expectations from prevailing resource environments and bureaucracies are more likely to establish larger policy change when resources favor the Court because the costs of not changing their policies appear larger. Hypotheses: The amount of bureaucratic policy change due to Court opinions is a function of: (1) attributes of Supreme Court opinions-specificity of Court-ordered policy change, basis of opinions, remands, and dissents; (2) agency characteristics-policy preferences, type of proceedings, and time preferences; and (3) external actors-amicus curiae, opposing litigants, Congress, and presidents. Methods: An Ordered Probit analysis tests a multivariate model of the impact of every Supreme Court opinion reversing or remanding a federal agency decision from the 1953 through 1990 terms. Results: Agency policy change after Court opinions is influenced by the specificity of Supreme Court opinions, agency policy preferences, agency age, and amicus curiae support.

The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment

Despite the importance of Supreme Court opinions for the American polity, scholars have dedicated little systematic research to investigating the factors that contribute to the content of the justices’ opinions. In this article, we examine the ability of lower federal courts to shape the content of Supreme Court opinions. We argue that lower court opinions will influence the content of the Court’s opinions to the extent that the justices perceive that integrating language from lower court opinions will aid them in making efficacious law and policy. Utilizing plagiarism detection software to compare lower federal court opinions with the majority opinions of the Supreme Court during the 2002–2004 terms, we uncover evidence that the Court systematically incorporates language from the lower federal courts into its majority opinions.

I spend much of my time dealing with Supreme Court opinions. Usually, I download and read them the day that they are announced by the Court. I edit them for my casebook and teach them to my students. I write about them, lecture about them, and litigate about them. My focus, like I am sure most everyone's, is functional: I try to discern the holding, appraise the reasoning, ascertain the implications, and evaluate the decision's desirability. Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this functional approach is overlooking a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions: their rhetoric. I use rhetoric here, not in the popular pejorative sense, but in the classical meaning of the word. The Supreme Court's opinions are rhetoric in that they are reasoned arguments intended to persuade. I believe that we can gain new insights about the Court and constitutional law by looking at the opinions from a rhetorical perspective. Imagine that the Supreme Court decided cases without published opinions. This is not inconceivable.1 Other branches of government generally make their choices without written opinions. Congress generally provides legislative history for its bills, but it usually is about explaining the meaning of the provisions more than presenting a persuasive argument in favor of a law. Most state and local governments don't even provide a formal legislative history for their enactments. Presidents tend to act without formal statements justifying their conduct. Even in lower courts, cases are most frequently decided without published opinion. One study found that there is no written opinion in almost seventy-five percent of federal court of appeals decisions.2 But every Supreme Court decision has a written opinion.3