Target Zones with Limited Reserves

Hysteresis, Monetary Policy and Target Zones

Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Target Zone - A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach

The discussion of target zones for flexible exchange rates is evidence of the desire to experiment with new instruments for stabilising the international monetary system. What distinguishes target zones from systems of flexible and fixed exchange rates? What form should they take? How should one regard the various objections to target zones?

This article presents a new way of modeling the dynamics of an exchange rate target zone. In the presence of a single upper (lower) target boundary, the exchange rate is precisely represented as the sum of a free float and a short (long) position in a call (put) option with strike price at the boundary. To model a target zone (with two boundaries), a natural approach consists of describing the exchange rate dynamics as the combination of the two, namely the sum of free float together with a long position in a put written on the lower boundary and a short position in a call option written on the upper boundary, respectively. The authors show that this first order approximation leads to significant mispricing (as much as 20%) and must be iterated, leading to an infinite sequence of compounded “mirrored” option prices. They analyze basic properties of such mirrored nested options analytically, describe how to calculate them numerically, and show why it is crucial to take into account higher order corrections in realistic target zones. They argue that this analogy to option prices allows for conceptually simple generalizations that describe different target zone arrangements. They then apply their methodology to the estimation of the fundamental value of the Hong Kong dollar that is hidden by the target zone pegged to the US dollar. They also estimate the implied maturity and explain how this parameter serves as direct proxy for target zone credibility.

External shocks and exchange rate regimes in Southeast Asia: A DSGE analysis

From conception through gestation and birth, and now in its early infancy, the euro has consistently proved the skeptics wrong. Some Cassandras thought that Brussels-bashing nationalists would reject the single currency in referendums. Others doubted that Italy and other fiscally troubled applicants would fulfill the Maastricht Treaty's strict limits on budget deficits and national debt. Still others predicted that the fierce 1998 dispute over the presidency of the European Central Bank might abort the entire enterprise. Yet economic and monetary union (emu) has proceeded more or less according to plan. The French referendum's petit oui in 1992 may have required a little gentle massaging; the Maastricht fiscal criteria may have been honored partly in the breach; and of course the currency has, over the past year, depreciated markedly against the dollar. But the fixed exchange rates within the eurozone have held firm, despite warnings about speculative attacks during the transition. And with its depreciation spurring economic growth, the euro is likely to recover somewhat against the dollar this year. Nevertheless, the skeptics may have the last laugh. For whether a euro equals a dollar tomorrow or the next day does not really matter.

This paper analyzes Krugman's contention that there is a "gold standard paradox" in the speculative attack literature. The paradox occurs if a country's currency appreciates after it runs out of gold or equivalently if a speculative attack can happen only after the country "naturally" runs out of reserves. We first show that Krugman's paradox is a very general phenomenon which does not require mean reverting processes for the fundamentals and which can be present in discrete time models as well as in continuous time models. We present several specific cases in which the paradox occurs i.e. environments which do not support an equilibrium. Next we show that, contrary to Krugman's conjecture, it is not necessary to abandon the assumption of a perfectly fixed exchange rate in favor of a band system in order to recover a well-defined equilibrium. We propose two alternative ways of amending the model which produce an equilibrium and preserve the fixed exchange rate assumption.

Journal Article The Linkage Between Speculative Attack and Target Zone Models of Exchange Rates Get access Robert P. Flood, Robert P. Flood International Monetary Fund Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Peter M. Garber Peter M. Garber Brown University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 4, November 1991, Pages 1367–1372, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937968 Published: 01 November 1991

This paper analyzes credibility in the Colombian exchange rate target zone. A model of imperfect credibility, in the spirit of Bertola and Svensson (1993) is derived, and is used to explain why the exchange rate in Colombia has remained for prolonged periods near the borders of the zone. The main feature of the model is that central parity depreciation expectations are endogenous with respect to the position of the exchange rate inside the target zone. The krugman(1991) perfectly credible setup turns out to be a particular case of this general model. One of the main implications of the model is that depreciation expectations increase rather than decrease as the exchange rate approaches the upper band. Hence a model as the one presented in this paper, is useful to explain the recent dynamics of interest rates in Colombia. It is also shown, that this model shares empirical features with the basic target zone model. Hence, policy makers might be misled when trying to recognize their credibility stance. A estructural estimation of the underlying parameters of the model, using McFadden's (1989) method of simulated moments, is suggested to identify the presence of non credibility issues. Econometric evidence suggest that Colombia's exchange rate target zone is properly described by a model of this nature.

An algorithmic approach to exchange rate stabilization

We examine the effects of endogenously determined realignment expectations in a model of a target zone with sluggish price adjustment. We allow these expectations to be based on a policy rule that generates an increasing probability of realignment as output moves away from full employment. We find that for realistic parameter values, even relatively small misalignments of the currency band lead to strongly skewed conditional distributions for the nominal exchange rate, thus generating pressures for realignment. We show that the reason for this is that the speed of adjustment in the absence of realignments is rather slow. Further, we find that the existence of an equilibrium path for the exchange rate depends on the responsiveness of realignment expectations to economic fundamentals. Paradoxically, higher credibility may increase the probability that a target zone will collapse. This feature of the model provides a possible explanation for the crisis within the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. A policy of monetary accommodation to real shocks can alleviate the problem but severely constrains a country?s ability to pursue counterinflationary measures within the band.

I examine authorities' interventions in goods and money markets to keep exchange rates within targeted zones, in an economy where both the exchange rate and the prices of goods are interdependent forward-looking variables. I show that, (1) in order to support target zones in both goods and money markets, there needs to be coordinated, simultaneous intervention in the two markets; (2) intervention takes place almost certainly before the exchange rate or the price level reaches its upper or lower bounds; and (3) zones for the exchange rate and for the price level cannot be separately designed as independent policy goals.

Realignment risk and currency option pricing in target zones

Part 1 International policy co-ordination and exchange rate management: the European monetary system, exchange rate expectations and the reputation of authorities, P.Artus would US protectionism be a threat to economic stability?, A.J.Hughes Hallett and G.J.Huston international adjustment and the dollar - a game theoretic approach, J.C.Martinez Oliva exchange rates and policy co-ordination in an asymmetric model, P.Kennen international policy co-ordination, imperfect information and target zones, A.Bisin and P.Tedeschi target zones, currency options and the dollar, P.Weller. Part 2 Strategic aspects of international policy co-ordination: time inconsistency, discounting and the returns to co-operation, M.Miller, et al policy co-operation among benevolent governments may be undesirable - an extension, P.J.Kehoe can international policy co-ordination really be counterproductive?, C.Carraro and F.Giavazzi profit shifting motives and international trade union co-ordination, D.Laussel and A.Soubeyran. Part 3 Information and uncertainty: robust lyapunov games under bounded uncertainty, C.Diessenberg asymmetric information and policy co-ordination, M.Cripps international policy co-ordination in a world with model uncertainty, A.R.Ghosh and P.R.Masson.

Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime