Technical safety requirements control level verification

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment of the DWTF. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment of the DWTF (LLNL 2004). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment of the DWTF is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment of the DWTF (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment of the DWTF are shown in the B695 Segment of the DWTF DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment of the DWTF include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating low-level waste (LLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained LLW. A permit modification for B696S was submitted to DTSC in January 2004 to store and treat hazardous and mixed waste. Upon approval of the permit modification, B696S rooms 1007, 1008, and 1009 will be able to store hazardous and mixed waste for up to 1 year. Furthermore, an additional drum crusher and a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 3}H. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for this facility. The DSA is applicable to the handling of radioactive waste stored and treated in the B695 Segment of the DWTF. Section 5 of the TSR, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the B695 Segment of the DWTF. A basis explanation follows each of the requirements described in Section 5.5, Specific Administrative Controls. The basis explanation does not constitute an additional requirement, but is intended as an expansion of the logic and reasoning behind development of the requirement. Programmatic Administrative Controls are addressed in Section 5.6.

This report documents the accident analyses and nuclear safety control options for use in Revision 7 of HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062, ''K Basins Safety Analysis Report'' and Revision 4 of HNF-SD-SNF-TSR-001, ''Technical Safety Requirements - 100 KE and 100 KW Fuel Storage Basins''. These documents will define the authorization basis for Sludge Water System (SWS) operations. This report follows the guidance of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports'', for calculating onsite and offsite consequences. The accident analysis summary is shown in Table ES-1 below. While this document describes and discusses potential control options to either mitigate or prevent the accidents discussed herein, it should be made clear that the final control selection for any accident is determined and presented in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062.

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

The US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) has initiated Phase 1 of a two-phase privatization strategy for treatment and immobilization of low-activity waste (LAW) currently being managed by the Hanford Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Project. In this strategy, DOE will purchase services from a contractor-owned and operated facility under a fixed price. The Phase 1 TWRS privatization contract requires that the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) contractors, on behalf of DOE, deliver LAW feed in specified quantities and composition to the Privatization Contractor in a timely manner (DOE-RL 1996). Additional requirements are imposed by the interface control document (ICD-19) for LAW feed (PHMC 1997). In response to these requirements, the Tank Waste Remediation System Operation and Utilization Plan (TWRSO and UP) (Kirkbride et al. 1997) was prepared by the PHMC. The TWRSO and UP, as updated by the Readiness-To-Proceed deliverable (Payne et al. 1998), establishes the baseline operating scenario for the delivery of LAW feed to the Privatization Contractor. The scenario specifies tanks from which LAW will be provided for each feed batch, the operational activities needed to prepare and deliver each batch, and the timing of these activities. The operating scenario was developed based on current knowledge of waste composition and chemistry, waste transfer methods, and operating constraints, such as tank farm logistics and availability of tank space. A project master baseline schedule (PMBS) has been developed to implement the operating scenario. The PMBS also includes activities aimed at reducing programmatic risks. One of the activities, ''Confirm Plans and Requirements,'' was identified to verify the basis used to develop the scenario. Additional data on waste quantity, physical and chemical characteristics, and transfer properties will be needed to support this activity. This document describes the data quality objective (DQO) process undertaken to assme appropriate data will be collected to support the activity, ''Confirm Tank Plans and Requirements.'' The DQO process was implemented in accordance with the TWRS DQO process (Banning 1997) with some modifications to accommodate project or tank-specific requirements and constraints.

This report is published quarterly by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Performance Assurance Organization. The Department of Energy Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS), as prescribed in DOE Order 232.2 “Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information,” requires a quarterly analysis of events, both reportable and not reportable, for the previous 12 months. This report is the analysis of 64 occurrence reports and over 50 deficiency reports (including not reportable events) identified at the INL during the period of July 2012 through June 2013. Following the last quarterly ORPS report, Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) issued a finding for BEA’s failure to identify recurring events for several lockout/tagout (LO/TO) violations and several Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) violations. BEA’s definition of recurrence and DOE-ID’s interpretation of the term differed and, although BEA was following approved company procedures, DOE did not believe BEA was being conservative enough in identifying recurring issues. BEA has agreed to make improvements in this quarterly ORPS report and to work with DOE-ID to re-define a recurring issue. This report reflects the changes to the quarterly ORPS report. An action to redefine recurrence is being tracked under IO-027970.

The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings.

This report documents the evaluations was undertaken to establish the sampling and analysis requirements, for the Double-Shell Tank (DST) waste based on a review of the chemical composition of the waste mechanisms for chemistry change, and operations and waste transfers in the tanks. A sampling schedule, for the DST waste has been established previously and is documented in the Technical sampling Basis-Waste Information Requirements Document (TSB-WIRD). However, the TSB-WIRD was based on programmatic drivers for the collection of waste samples rather than on the specific needs of a chemistry control program. The focus of this evaluation is to ensure that the sampling requirements of the TSB-WIRD meet the needs of the DST chemistry control program defined in Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) Administrative Control (AC) 5.15, and to provide adjustments, if necessary, to those sampling requirements to account for known mechanisms for changes in chemistry of the tanks. DST waste composition data for nitrite, nitrate, and hydroxide was compiled from sample data and best basis liquid composition data extracted from the Tank Waste Information Network System (TWINS) database. Operations in the tanks up to January 1, 2001, were reviewed. Three free hydroxide depletion models were used to predict the future tank liquid hydroxide concentration over the next five year period and trend historical sample results where possible. This data was used as the method to provide priority to the sampling requirements provided in the TSB-WIRD. The effort looked at identifying those tanks that could become caustic deficient prior to the next scheduled tank specific sampling event, and recommended appropriate actions for those tanks that may not comply with the waste chemistry limits defined in AC 5.15.

This document provides a summary of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Retrieval and Disposal Mission Initial Updated Baseline (scope, schedule, and cost), developed to demonstrate Readiness-to-Proceed (RTP) in support of the TWRS Phase 1B mission. This Updated Baseline is the proposed TWRS plan to execute and measure the mission work scope. This document and other supporting data demonstrate that the TWRS Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) team is prepared to fully support Phase 1B by executing the following scope, schedule, and cost baseline activities: Deliver the specified initial low-activity waste (LAW) and high-level waste (HLW) feed batches in a consistent, safe, and reliable manner to support private contractors` operations starting in June 2002; Deliver specified subsequent LAW and HLW feed batches during Phase 1B in a consistent, safe, and reliable manner; Provide for the interim storage of immobilized HLW (IHLW) products and the disposal of immobilized LAW (ILAW) products generated by the private contractors; Provide for disposal of byproduct wastes generated by the private contractors; and Provide the infrastructure to support construction and operations of the private contractors` facilities.

The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included.

HNF-SD-WM-TRD-O07, System Specification for the Double-Shell Tank System, (hereafter referred to as DST Specification), defines the requirements of the double-shell tank system at the Hanford Site for Phase 1 privatization. Many of the sections in this document reference other documents for design guidance and requirements. Referenced documents include Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) procedures (HNF-PROS), Codes of Federal Regulation (CFRs), DOE Orders, and Washington Administrative Codes (WACs). This document provides rationale for the selection and inclusion of HNF-PROS, CFRs, DOE Orders and WACs.

One of the main functions of the River Protection Project is to store the Hanford Site tank waste until the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) is ready to receive and process the waste. Waste from the older single-shell tanks is being transferred to the newer double-shell tanks (DSTs). Therefore, the integrity of the DSTs must be maintained until the waste from all tanks has been retrieved and transferred to the WTP. To help maintain the integrity of the DSTs over the life of the project, specific chemistry limits have been established to control corrosion of the DSTs. These waste chemistry limits are presented in the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Sec. 5.15, Rev 25 (CHG 2001). In order to control the chemistry in the DSTs, the Chemistry Control Program will require analyses of the tank waste. This document describes the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process undertaken to ensure appropriate data will be collected to control the waste chemistry in the DSTs.

Functional safety validation of electrical and electronic systems based on ISO26262 is an activity of critical nature as it can protect the life of the humans using the automobiles from unintended faults and accidents. This paper is an approach for the implementation of ISO26262 system level functional safety validation of the battery management system in automobiles. Test case generation methods, traceability to technical safety requirements are discussed. Battery management system architecture, test system architecture, functional safety validation approach is considered in detail. With the help of three examples, the process of creating system level functional safety test cases from hazard, safety goal and technical safety requirements are explained. This paper is putting forward an end to end approach for the system level functional safety validation of electric and electronic systems using ISO26262 taking battery management system in automobiles as a reference.

This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazards (NEH)-initiated representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report.

Technical Basis Document for the Nuclear Criticality Representative Accident and Associate Represented Hazardous Conditions. Revision 2 of RPP-12371 provides accident consequence estimates for a hypothetical criticality event in an above grade facility (e.g. DBVS, CH-TRUM, and S-109 PWRS). This technical basis document was developed to support RPP-13033, ''Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)'', and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for the nuclear criticality representative accident and associated hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls.

This report describes the control decisions for flammable gas hazards in double-contained receiver tanks (DCRTs) made at control decision meetings on November 16, 17, and 18, 1999, on April 19,2000, and on May 10,2000, and their basis. These control decisions, and the analyses that support them, will be documented in an amendment to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (CHG 2000a) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) (CHG 2000b) to close the Flammable Gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) (Bacon 1996 and Wagoner 1996) for DCRTs. Following the contractor Tier I review of the FSAR and TSR amendment, it will be submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) for review and approval.