Terrorism and organized crime: The Romanian perspective

We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimated for sixty-five terrorist groups using the global terrorism database and the fragile states index.

All the Iraqi state institutions and civil society organizations should develop a deliberate systematic policy to eliminate terrorism contracted with all parts of the economic, social, civil and political institutions and important question how to eliminate Daash to a terrorist organization hostile and if he country to eliminate the causes of crime and punish criminals and not to justify any type of crime of any kind, because if we stayed in the curriculum of justifying legitimate crime will deepen our continued terrorism, but give it legitimacy formula must also dry up the sources of terrorism media and private channels and newspapers that have abused the Holy Prophet Muhammad (p) and all kinds of any of their source (a sheei or a Sunni or Christians or Sabians) as well as from the religious aspect is not only the media but a meeting there must be cooperation of both parts of the state facilities and most importantly limiting arms possession only state you can not eliminate terrorism and violence, and we see people carrying arms without the name of the state and remains somewhat carefree is sincerity honesty and patriotism the most important motivation for the elimination of violence and terrorism and cooperation between parts of the Iraqi people and not be driven by a regional or global international schemes want to kill nations and kill our bodies of Sunnis, sheei , Christians, Sabean and Yazidi and others.

Book synopsis: The Handbook on Crime is a comprehensive edited volume that contains analysis and explanation of the nature, extent, patterns and causes of over 40 different forms of crime, in each case drawing attention to key contemporary debates and social and criminal justice responses to them. It also challenges many popular and official conceptions of crime. This book is one of the few criminological texts that takes as its starting point a range of specific types of criminal activity. It addresses not only 'conventional' offences such as shoplifting, burglary, robbery, and vehicle crime, but many other forms of criminal behaviour - often an amalgamation of different legal offences - which attract contemporary media, public and policy concern. These include crimes committed not only by individuals, but by organised criminal groups, corporations and governments. There are chapters on, for example, gang violence, hate crime, elder abuse, animal abuse, cyber crime, identity theft, money-laundering, eco crimes, drug trafficking, human trafficking, genocide, and global terrorism. Many of these topics receive surprisingly little attention in the criminological literature. The Handbook on Crime will be a unique text of lasting value to students, researchers, academics, practitioners, policy makers, journalists and all others involved in understanding and preventing criminal behaviour.

Nations are seeking avenues to play bigger role in the global economy and the world at large. One of such quests led to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 by a – 15 – member nation to promote socio-economic integration among member countries. As a result, this body has encountered numerous challenges in its quest to move West African countries to the desired direction. One of such challenges which reared its ugly head not too long ago is terrorism. The emergence of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujoo), the Niger Delta Avengers, Ansar – Dine, Boko Haram and Juma’ata Ansarul Muslimina (Ansaru) and their activities within and around West Africa have become a matter of serious concern to governments and citizens of the region as their activities, being violent in nature, had negatively affected the flow of commerce and socio-economic interaction among Member States. This, of course has been identified by ECOWAS leaders as a major threat to the integration effort of the body. To this end, several regional mechanisms and instruments for enhancing security, development, good governance and counter terrorism activities were adopted by the body to stem the tide of crime and terrorism in the region. Among the security tightening measures to forestall terrorism and other forms of insecurity within the region include effective police to police co-operation in borderless communities, enhancement of police co-operation with the international police organization (INTERPOL), soliciting some intelligence agencies of the western world, as well as regional cooperation among security and intelligence agencies against terrorism. These measures, it is believed, would go a long way to check-mating the activities of terrorist groups and criminal gangs in the region, thereby enhancing and promoting the socio-economic interaction among member states. This paper work concludes that regional integration in ECOWAS is necessary if West African countries must play crucial role in the global economy and occupy a crucial position among the committee of nations. The paper recommends among others that ECOWAS as a body must re-strategize and enhance its security and intelligence apparatus for more proactive response to all forms of security threats and terrorism.

In the article, we discuss the features of one of the investigative actions, governed by the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan – the inspection of the scene during the investigation of a terrorist act, a crime described in Art. 255 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, committed with the use of biological weapons. Although at the moment there is no previous history of the terrorist use of biological weapons in the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK), in the context of activation of Islamic extremism crime investigation authorities should be prepared for any of its manifestations, so the research conducted within the framework of the present article is extremely timely and relevant. The author discusses the investigative actions, in particular the inspection of the scene, the features of which are quite significant in case of investigation of an act of bio-terrorism. The consideration of these features can ensure a successful investigation of the act of bio-terrorism, and on the contrary, ignoring them may not only complicate the investigation, but also endanger the lives and health of participants in the investigation.

Os tradicionais grupos de delinquencia transnacional e seus homologos mais recentemente formados possuem relacoes bastante diferentes com o Estado e com o terrorismo. Em paises formados ha muito tempo,os grupos delitivos de maior antiguidade tem se desenvolvido junto aos orgaos estatais e dependem das estruturas institucionais e financeiras existentes para movimentar seus produtos e investir seus ganhos. Estes grupos tambem requerem comunidades estaveis e com frequencia tentam com elas contribuir, ao tempo que repudiam qualquer contato com grupos terroristas.Os grupos mais recentes de delinquencia transnacional, frequentemente, tem sua origem em situacoes pos-conflito, onde ainda pode haver um estado de caos, sao os atores que dominam a economia clandestina. Estes novos grupos geram aliancas com organizacoes terroristas porque nenhum dos dois possui estrategias financeiras nem horizontes politicos a longo prazo. A vinculacao desestabilizadora entre o delito transnacional e o terrorismo tem resultado tao dificil de atacar porque os planejadores das politicas continuam considerando o delito em termos dos paradigmas tradicionais. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: delinquencia, transnacional, corrupcao, terrorismo. UNHOLY TRINITY: delinquency transnational, corruption and terrorism Louise Shelley The traditional groups of transnational delinquency and their more recently formed homologous ones have quite different relations with the State and with terrorism. In long stablished countries, the more ancient criminal groups were developed along the state organs and depend on the existent institutional and financial structures to move their products and to invest their earnings. These groups also require stable communities and frequently try to contribute to them, while rejecting any contact with terrorist groups.The more recent groups of transnational delinquency have often their origins in post-conflict situations, where there can still be a state of chaos: they are the actors that dominate the clandestine economy. These new groups generate alliances with terrorist organizations because none of the two possess long term financial strategies or political horizons. The destabilizing link between the transnational crime and terrorism are so difficult to attack because the planners of the policies continue considering crime in terms of the traditional paradigms. KEYWORDS: delinquency, transnational corruption, terrorism. LA TRINITE PAS SAINTE: delinquance transnationale, corruption et terrorisme Louise Shelley Les groupes traditionnels de delinquance transnationale et leurs homologues plus recemment formes ont des relations bien differentes avec l’Etat et le terrorisme. Dans des pays formes depuis plus longtemps, les goupes infracteurs plus anciens se developpent aupres des institutions etatiques et dependent des structures institutionelles et financieres existantes pour actionner leurs produits et investir leurs gains. Ces groupes ont aussi besoin de communautes stables et frequemment essaient de leur apporter une contribution alors qu’ils rejettent tous contacts avec les groupes terroristes. Les groupes plus recents de delinquance transnationale trouvent souvent leur origine dans des situations posterieures aux conflits ou il existe encore un etat de chaos. Ce sont eux les acteurs qui dominent l’economie clandestine. Ces nouveaux groupes font des alliances avec des organisations terroristes parce que ni les uns ni les autres ne possedent de strategies financieres ou d’horizons politiques a long terme. Le resultat du lien desequilibrant existant entre le delit transnational et le terrorisme est tres difficile a vaincre parce que ceux qui planifient les politiques considerent toujours le delit en termes de paradigmes traditionnels. MOTS-CLES: delinquance, transnational, corruption et terrorisme. Publicacao Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

Scholars have long puzzled over the conditions that promote cooperation between nation-states. This thesis develops a new approach to the puzzle by examining the practice of international cooperation through a socio-legal lens. It is grounded in a qualitative case study of the criminal justice relationship between Australia and Indonesia, focusing on three areas: police cooperation, extradition arrangements, and cooperation relating to detained nationals. The thesis asks: what are the conditions that promote crime cooperation between Australia and Indonesia? Beneath this overarching question, it poses the following sub-questions: What drives the cooperation? How do different actors influence the cooperation? What determines the scope for cooperation? The thesis frames these questions socio-legally by situating the cooperative relationship within transnational legal orders (TLOs) that regulate terrorism and other transnational crimes. The TLO framework has several advantages over existing approaches to studying international cooperation. First, rather than privileging the state as an actor, the framework attends to the multiplicity of actors above and below the state who shape cooperative initiatives. Second, rather than focusing on political dynamics, it also highlights the significance of law and policy in the practice of international cooperation. Third, it embraces the inherent complexity of this practice by integrating various empirical and theoretical perspectives into its analysis. To provide a rich empirical picture of the criminal justice relationship between Australia and Indonesia, the thesis relies on interviews with over 100 current and former participants in the relationship, and extensive archival material, including media reporting and government records. To make sense of this data within the TLO framework, the thesis draws on theories relating to the construction of transnational problems (securitisation), the interplay of domestic and international politics (two-level games), the operation of international police networks (bureaucratic autonomy and culture), and the scope for international cooperation (reciprocity). It also incorporates insights from regulatory studies. Based on this analysis, the thesis argues that there is a structural tension between political and policy interests at the heart of the cooperative relationship. It further argues that cooperation is more likely to occur when these interests are in balance, and that law is a critical institution in enabling this balance to be struck. To conclude, the thesis brings the key findings of the study together to propose a model of the cooperative relationship. It also considers whether the findings could be generalised and their practical implications.

This paper presents actual results from the field using a novel deployed system referred to as the Multi-Operation Patrol Scheduling System (MOPSS). MOPSS generates patrols for a transit system considering three different threats: fare evasion (FE), terrorism (CT) and crime (CR). In so doing, this paper present four contributions: (i) we propose the first multi-operation patrolling system; (ii) MOPSS uses Markov decision processes (MDPs) to handle uncertain interruptions in the execution of patrol schedules; (iii) we are the first to deploy a new Opportunistic Security Game model, where the adversary, a criminal, makes opportunistic decisions on when and where to commit crimes and, finally (iv) we evaluate MOPSS in the real-world, providing some of the first actual data from security games in the field.

Crime in the Caribbean consists of drug and human trafficking, weapons smuggling and terrorism, and is fuelled by this region’s physical location as a gateway to the United States (US). Significant challenges to effective policing are transnational (TN), making the region an ideal testing ground to study transnational police cooperation (TNPC). Current cooperation is seen as reactive and hindered by the Caribbean’s topography, cultures, legal systems, nepotism and territorialism. Using a phenomenological perspective, this qualitative study investigates TNPC in the Caribbean region, focusing on Puerto Rico (PR) and the Dominican Republic (DR), assessing how TNPC works within this region, current structures and operations in the Caribbean. Other researchers such as Malcolm Anderson and Ethan Nadelmann have established the theoretical research base upon which this study is built. However, as empirical research is limited around this particular study, this paper primarily draws upon interviews with law enforcement agents in PR working for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program, administered by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. This study investigates stakeholders’ perspectives and the various methods of TNPC with the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of multi-agencies towards a practical model, as embodied by HIDTA. This research is the first of its kind, offering a new direction for theory and research.

A marriage made in hell? Terrorism and organized crime

This chapter discusses how national cybersecurity policy classifies all serious cyberattacks as cyberwar. Cyberspace is different. In cyberspace, technology is broadly spreading its capability, and everyone is using the same weaponry: hackers, criminals, politically motivated hacktivists, national spies, militaries, even the potential cyberterrorist. They are all exploiting the same vulnerabilities, using the same sort of hacking tools, engaging in the same attack tactics, and leaving the same traces behind. They all eavesdrop or steal data. They all engage in denial-of-service attacks. They all probe cyber defenses and do their best to cover their tracks. Despite this, knowing the attacker is vitally important. As members of society, we have several different types of organizations that can defend us from an attack. We can call the police or the military. We can call on our national anti-terrorist agency and our corporate lawyers. Or we can defend ourselves with a variety of commercial products and services. Depending on the situation, all of these are reasonable choices.

Indirectly Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law

Al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks that targeted strategic and iconic assets in the United States rank high among the incidents that have changed the course of history in more than one way. More than 10 years after 9/11, terrorism continues to be at the forefront of the security discourse involving the public, the state and the international community at large. There is a concern that an over emphasis on fighting terrorism has pushed human rights and human security projects off the agenda and substituted militarization with development goals. In the years preceding 9/11, one of the key arguments of the proponents of the human security discourse was that the state is not a good or sufficient provider of human security. India is an interesting case study for analyzing the roots of violence involving terrorism and crime, their impact on public policy and national security and the tradeoffs involving the security of the state vis-a-vis the security of the individual.

Terrorism and Crime

Both the EU and Japan face threats of terrorism and organised crime and both are committed to upholding liberal norms and peace or stability at the global level. Yet since the beginning of the twenty-first century, specific problem perceptions and institutional path-dependencies of either partner have only led to a weak policy convergence at the diplomatic and multilateral level. The EU and Japan are undergoing dynamic changes with respect to these policy fields. In Japan this mainly concerns a controversial legislative framework on organised crime and terrorism and the country’s preparation for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Meanwhile, the EU is in a period of intensifying cooperation on information-exchanges and border security in response to the threat from so-called Islamic State and the refugee crisis. Some of these developments could stimulate more cooperation between the EU and Japan but, overall, are accentuating limited overlap on security interests and understandings of privacy or civil liberties. So despite repeated common declarations, European and Japanese cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised is likely to remain limited.