The Genesis of Technoscientific Revolutions

Notes on Contributors

P ublic support for U.S. federal expenditures for basic research gained momentum with the science and technology breakthroughs that contributed to the Allies' victory in World War II. After World War II, the Korean and Cold Wars concentrated research appropriations in the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD research expenditures were massive from 1950 to 1990. They included not only direct investments in weapons and intelligence systems but support of the underlying science, centered in physical sciences and engineering. What is less well remembered today is that DOD's basic research investments were broadly based, ranging far beyond the physical sciences and engineering into the life and social sciences. Through its service research offices and the Advanced Research Projects agencies, DOD also fostered interdisciplinary research in promising new areas, such as computation, and developed new modes for the performance of research, as in university materials research laboratories. The large investment in the physical sciences also contributed indirectly to medical science and health care, giving rise to many technologies used today. The life sciences now account for more than 50 percent of U.S. federal investment in basic research. Biomedical research funding has followed a pattern of steady significant growth over four decades, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have slowly come to dominate that funding. Today's strong federal support for the life sciences is warranted, because biomedical research is on the cusp of a revolution in preventative medicine and treatment. Nevertheless, today's overall research budget is increasingly out of balance. Federal funding of many fields in the physical sciences and engineering is down substantially since 1993 (9 to 36% in real terms in fields such as chemistry, physics, and electrical and chemical engineering). This loss, if continued, will imperil advances in these disciplines and endanger the continued flow of valuable discoveries and technologies that have been important to biomedical research and health care. National science and technology (S&T) policy over the past four decades has largely been led by physical scientists who first gained national experience in World War II. They crafted policies for broad investment in basic research and infrastructure, including the life sciences. As we enter the 21st century, biological scientists must assume broader leadership responsibilities in S&T policy, and they must speak out about the importance of support for all disciplines, including the physical sciences and engineering. NIH's Harold Varmus and the National Science Foundation's Rita Colwell recognize the imbalance in the current federal research portfolio and have begun advocating increased investment in all areas of research. Their leadership is to be commended, but it is not enough. Government, organizations, institutions, and industry can and should do more to bolster all basic research. NIH must set the example by much more broadly supporting innovative interdisciplinary research embracing all science, just as DOD did when it was the prime funder of R&D. Some of this has already begun in NIH's cross-institute bioengineering initiative and in prospective increased NIH support of information technology for biocomputation. Similar initiatives should be launched in other areas of the physical sciences and in the social and behavioral sciences. Funding for these initiatives should become a much larger percentage of NIH's overall expenditures. The life science professional societies must speak broadly for basic research and not just argue their own disciplinary cases. Disease advocacy groups must also articulate the case for the physical sciences in their work with the public and before Congress. University leaders and corporate executives must make the case for investment in all research disciplines. Most of all, biologists in the laboratory—working scientists and their students—need to appreciate that their research rests on the legacy not only of the life sciences but also the physical and other sciences. Today's life scientists and the next generation they are training must be the national leaders of the future who will increasingly guide all of U.S. basic research policy in the 21st century.

Notes on Contributors

Literally speaking, "Philosophy of biology" is a rather old expression. William Whewell coined it in 1840, at the very time he introduced the expression "philosophy of science". Whewell was fond of creating neologisms, like Auguste Comte, his French counterpart in the field of the philosophical reflection about science. Historians of science know that a few years earlier, in 1834, Whewell had generated a small scandal when he proposed the word "scientist" as a general term by which "the students of the knowledge of the material world" could describe themselves, and distinguish themselves from artists. The term "philosopher", Whewell argued, was too wide. A new generic term, more or less equivalent to the French term "savant", was needed in order to prevent the disintegration of science that seemed to flow from its specialization in modern times.1 When Whewell first introduced the terms "philosophy of science" and "philosophy of biology" in his 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences, the latter term was merely a special branch of "philosophy of science". The expression "philosophy of science" itself had two justifications: firstly, this phrase expressed the idea that "science" remained cognitively coherent enough to justify a critical enquiry into its methodological unity and its foundation; secondly, the phrase "philosophy of science" was required in order to distinguish a properly "philosophical" enquiry from a "historical" approach to science. Although Whewell's 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences 2 had approximately the same chapter structure as his 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences 3 (that is, a series of chapters successively devoted to the concept of science in general, and although there was considerable overlap between the contents of the two books, then to particular sciences), its theoretical purpose was different. Clearly, Whewell was not willing to confuse the genres of history and philosophy as Auguste Comte had done in his 1830 Cours de philosophie positive.4 Note also that the word "biology" was still extremely rare in English when Whewell used it in 1840. In fact, Whewell's 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences does not make use of the word "biology": Whewell successively examines "botany", "zoology", "physiology" and "comparative antomy" as special branches of "analytico-classificatory science", then discusses palaeontology as a special case of the "palaeo-etiological sciences". Three years later, in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell does use "biology" as a generic term for all the sciences dealing with life. The various sciences which were separately examined in the previous book are now collectively considered. Furthermore, the main philosophical problem raised by biology is its dual nature: biology is both nomological and a historical science. Modern philosophers of biology are generally unaware of the story of the origins of the expression "philosophy of biology", but Whewell's dual theoretical nature of biology is still a major concern for modern "philosophy of biology".

Notes on Contributors

Introduction The term “scientist” lacks a universally accepted definition, reflecting the evolving, interdisciplinary nature of scientific work and posing challenges for recognition, communication, and policy. This study aims to develop consensus-based definitions of the term “scientist” by engaging experienced scholars across diverse fields. Methods This study involved 156 scholars, each with at least 1,000 citations, recruited via convenience sampling. Fourteen scientist definitions, derived from literature and expert input, were assessed using a nine-point Likert scale via a structured google forms survey. The sample size was calculated using G*power (effect size = 0.5, power = 0.95), requiring at least 80 participants. Content Validity Index (CVI) was used for analysis. Definitions scoring ≥0.78 were accepted and included for final analysis, 0.70–0.78 were revised and re-evaluated, and <0.70 were excluded. Participation was voluntary and anonymous, ensuring ethical compliance and confidentiality. Results Of the 14 proposed definitions, six (42.9%) were excluded (CVI < 0.70), seven (50.0%) were accepted (CVI > 0.78), and one (7.1%) underwent revision (CVI 0.70–0.78). The highest-rated definitions were refined into two consensus-based versions: a short definition (“A scientist is a person who conducts research”) and a detailed one emphasizing hypothesis formulation and knowledge dissemination. Final validation yielded CVIs of 0.82 and 0.84, respectively, confirming strong expert agreement on both definitions. Conclusion This study developed two validated definitions of “scientist” emphasizing systematic research and knowledge dissemination. These definitions clarify the concept of scientific identity, providing a flexible yet rigorous framework applicable across academic, interdisciplinary, and policy-making contexts. Introduction The term "scientist" has undergone significant transformation since its inception, reflecting the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry and the evolving landscape of knowledge. This lack of clarity stems from the diverse roles and contributions of individuals in scientific fields, the evolving nature of research, and the interdisciplinary scope of modern science. Historically, figures such as Galileo and Newton were regarded as natural philosophers, a reflection of an earlier framework for knowledge production that has evolved alongside modern scientific advancements. Before twentieth century, the term "scientist" was commonly referred to as a "man of science," "natural philosopher," or by various other designations [1,2]. In contemporary contexts, scientists operate across a broad spectrum of fields, including medicine, biology, chemistry, physics, and social sciences, each employing methodologies tailored to their specific inquiries. For instance, biologists may design experiments to test hypotheses about living organisms, while social scientists might use qualitative methods to explore human behavior [3]. The Science Council defines a scientist as an individual who methodically collects and applies research and evidence to develop hypotheses, performs experiments, and shares results to advance knowledge in their field [4]. While National Cancer Institute defines a scientist as an individual with a background in science, particularly someone actively engaged in a specific area of research [5]. This diversity in practices underscores the challenge of defining "scientist" in a way that captures the breadth of their contributions. The plurality of definitions extends to global organizations and frameworks. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization highlights the critical role of scientists in addressing global challenges and promoting sustainable development. This definition broadens the scope to include individuals working in multidisciplinary teams or applying scientific knowledge to public policy and societal issues. Similarly, some academic discussions focus on the characteristics of a scientist, such as curiosity, skepticism, and a commitment to evidence-based conclusions, rather than formal qualifications or job titles [6]. Unlike well-defined professions such as medicine or engineering, where specific educational pathways and professional titles (e.g., "doctor" or "engineer") confer clear identities, the term "scientist" lacks a universally recognized credentialing system. This absence can lead to underrepresentation or misrepresentation of scientific expertise, especially in interdisciplinary and collaborative contexts [7]. For example, the growing integration of data science in biology or physics illustrates the importance of understanding who qualifies as a scientist to ensure effective communication and collaboration among stakeholders. The absence of a standardized definition poses practical challenges for scientific communication, policymaking, and inclusivity. This study aims to address this gap by engaging scholars across disciplines to develop a consensus-based definition of "scientist." By recognizing the diverse and interdisciplinary contributions of scientists, such a definition could enhance collaboration, improve public understanding, and inform policies that support the scientific community. Methods Study design and participants A total of 156 scholars (out of 300 invited) participated in this study. Eligibility was determined based on the scholars' substantial academic expertise, evidenced by the achievement of at least 1,000 citations within their respective fields. This criterion ensured that participants had significant research experience and were highly qualified to contribute to the formulation of a consensus-based definition of "scientist." Participants were recruited through a convenience sampling method, and data were collected via a structured survey administered through google forms. While convenience sampling was used due to the accessibility of high-citation scholars, efforts were made to ensure disciplinary diversity to mitigate potential bias. Personalized invitations were sent via email to each scholar to facilitate their inclusion in the study. Sample size determination The sample size was determined using G*power statistical software (version 3.1.9.7), employing a two-tailed goodness of fit test with an effect size of 0.5, an alpha error probability of 0.05, and a statistical power of 0.95. According to the calculations, a minimum of 80 participants were required to achieve statistically valid results. Consequently, 156 scholars were recruited to participate in the study, ensuring robust representation and adequate statistical power. Data collection Fourteen proposed definitions of "scientist," curated from existing literature and expert contributions, were presented to the enrolled scholars for evaluation (Table 1). Each definition included a Likert scale with nine response options, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Responses were systematically recorded and compiled in an Excel sheet for subsequent analysis. This process facilitated the systematic capture of scholarly consensus on each definition. Table 1. Respondent Agreement on Various 'Scientist' Definitions. Proposed Definitions Options A person studying or has expert knowledge of one or more natural or physical sciences. (Oxford Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree An expert who studies or works in one of the sciences. (Cambridge Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A person learned in science and especially natural science. (Merriam-Webster Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A scientist is someone who systematically gathers and uses research and evidence, to make hypotheses and test them, to gain and share understanding and knowledge. (Science Council) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A scientist is someone who has studied science and whose job is to teach or do research in science. (Collins Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree An expert in science, especially one of the physical or natural sciences. (Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A scientist is a person with some kind of knowledge or expertise in any of the sciences. (Vocabulary dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A person who is trained in a science and whose job involves doing scientific research or solving scientific problems. (Britannica Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A person who has studied science, especially one who is active in a particular field of investigation. (National Cancer Institute) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree Someone who works or is trained in science. (Longman Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A person whose profession is investigating in one of the natural sciences. (Your Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A person who is engaged in and has expert knowledge of a science. (Free Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree Someone whose job or education is about science. (LanGeek Dictionary) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree A scientist is a person who researches to advance knowledge in an area of the natural sciences. (Wikipedia) Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Undecided Slightly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Strongly Agree Data analysis The Content Validity Index (CVI) was employed to assess the relevance and agreement of the definitions. Definitions with a CVI below 0.70 were excluded, as they failed to meet the minimum threshold for consensus. Definitions with a CVI between 0.70 and 0.78 underwent a second round of evaluation, with refined wording sent back to the same scholars for further review. Definitions achieving a CVI above 0.78 were deemed sufficiently valid for inclusion in the final analysis [8]. These definitions formed the foundation for the development of a unified, consensus-based definition of "scientist." Ethical considerations Participation in the study was entirely voluntary, and all responses were anonymized to preserve participant confidentiality. Results Initially, out of the 14 proposed definitions of the term "scientist," six (42.9%) received a CVI score below the threshold of 0.70 and were consequently excluded from further consideration. In contrast, seven definitions (50.0%) demonstrated strong content validity with CVI scores equal to or exceeding 0.78 and were therefore retained for subsequent synthesis and analysis. Only one definition (7.1%) fell within the intermediate range, with a CVI between 0.70 and 0.78 (Table 2). Table 2. Comparison of Agreement and CVI Across Proposed Definitions of 'Scientist'. Proposed Definition Agree Disagree Undecided CVI Status Science Council Definition 146 8 2 0.94 Accepted Britannica Dictionary Definition 136 16 4 0.87 Accepted Cambridge Dictionary 130 20 6 0.83 Accepted Wikipedia Definition 125 27 4 0.80 Accepted Free Dictionary Definition 124 25 7 0.79 Accepted National Cancer Institute Definition 124 25 7 0.79 Accepted Collins Dictionary Definition 122 31 3 0.78 Accepted Oxford Dictionary Definition 120 31 5 0.77 Revised Longman Dictionary Definition 104 42 10 0.67 Excluded Your Dictionary Definition 103 48 5 0.66 Excluded Dictionary (generic) Definition 91 52 13 0.58 Excluded Vocabulary dictionary Definition 88 58 10 0.56 Excluded Merriam-Webster Dictionary Definition 81 64 11 0.52 Excluded LanGeek Dictionary Definition 79 67 10 0.51 Excluded CVI: Content Validity Index, CVI Thresholds: Accepted: ≥ 0.78, Revised: 0.70–0.78, Excluded: < 0.70 Through a rigorous, iterative evaluation process involving expert feedback, the definitions with the highest CVI scores (those above 0.78) were integrated and refined into two distinct, consensus-based definitions of the term "scientist." The first was a concise definition: “A scientist is a person who conducts research.” The second was a more comprehensive and elaborated definition: “A scientist is someone who systematically conducts or gathers and uses research to formulate hypotheses and test them, in order to gain and disseminate understanding and knowledge.” These two final definitions were subsequently circulated among the panel of scholars for a second round of evaluation, during which they were asked to rate the definitions for content validity. The short definition received a CVI of 0.82, while the more detailed definition attained a slightly higher CVI of 0.84, reflecting strong agreement among the experts. Although no additional formal qualitative feedback was solicited at this stage; minor wording adjustments were made based on informal suggestions received during this validation round. Discussion The role of a scientist extends far beyond the stereotypical image of an individual in a white coat working exclusively in a laboratory setting. Careers grounded in scientific expertise are remarkably diverse, encompassing domains such as research, education, industry, and regulatory affairs. The Science Council categorizes scientists into 10 different types, highlighting the diversity of scientific roles beyond the stereotypical lab-based researcher. It includes types such as experimental scientists, theoretical scientists, data scientists, and more, reflecting the broad spectrum of scientific work today [9]. Definitions of the term “scientist” vary, yet they generally converge on the principles of systematic inquiry, evidence-based investigation, and the pursuit of knowledge across various disciplines. For instance, the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and the Britannica Dictionary emphasize formal training and research functions, typically within the natural sciences such as biology, chemistry, or physics [10,11]. In contrast, contemporary perspectives, such as those discussed by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 2024, recognize a broader spectrum of scientific engagement, encompassing both professional researchers and individuals committed to understanding the world through observation, experimentation, and analysis [12]. In light of this diversity, the present study aimed to clarify and formalize the definition of a "scientist" through expert consensus. Two definitions were developed: a concise definition “A scientist is a person who conducts research”, and a comprehensive definition “A scientist is someone who systematically conducts or gathers and uses research to formulate hypotheses and test them, in order to gain and disseminate understanding and knowledge.” These definitions encapsulate the core activities and guiding principles of scientific inquiry, emphasizing both methodological rigor and the essential role of knowledge dissemination across disciplines. A key finding of this study lies in its recognition of the evolving tension between disciplinary specialization and the increasing importance of interdisciplinary collaboration. As highlighted in contemporary analyses of interdisciplinary research and development, scientists now frequently operate at the intersection of multiple fields, such as nanomedicine, where the diversity and dissimilarity of collaborators’ knowledge can significantly enhance research productivity [13]. The concise definition, "A scientist is a person who conducts research" captures this shift by avoiding constraints tied to specific disciplinary boundaries. In contrast, the more detailed definition explicitly incorporates the systematic formulation and testing of hypotheses, along with the dissemination of knowledge, thereby reinforcing the structured and communicative nature of scientific inquiry. These elements align closely with UNESCO’s 2019 call for stronger science-society engagement and underscore the ethical responsibilities inherent in modern scientific practice [14]. The study’s findings also contribute to ongoing debates surrounding professional identity within the scientific community. In contrast to regulated professions such as medicine, the absence of a universal credentialing system for scientists complicates formal recognition, particularly in non-academic and interdisciplinary contexts. This ambiguity is reflected in the National Cancer Institute’s pragmatic definition of a scientist, which emphasizes active participation in research rather than reliance on formal titles or qualifications [15]. By anchoring the term “scientist” in core research activities rather than occupational labels, the consensus-based definitions proposed in this study offer a more inclusive framework. This approach accommodates emerging roles in fields such as data science and applied research, thereby addressing the risk of under recognition in collaborative and cross-sector environments. The dual definitions, concise and comprehensive, offer flexibility for different contexts, a strategy aligned with the Science Council’s emphasis on methodological diversity [4]. The detailed definition’s focus on systematic inquiry and dissemination aligns with studies of interdisciplinary science, where “impassioned commitment” to shared goals drives innovation [13]. Simultaneously, the availability of a concise definition enhances clarity in public discourse and science communication, while the more detailed version provides the specificity necessary for institutional contexts such as policy development, research funding, and professional accreditation. Notably, the study’s findings also challenge enduring stereotypes of the “lone genius” scientist by highlighting the inherently collaborative and iterative nature of scientific practice. Contemporary frameworks, such as those emerging from computational biology, suggest that scientific identity is increasingly dynamic, pluralistic, and shaped by collective knowledge production [16]. The process undertaken in this study, involving successive refinement and expert validation of definitions, closely mirrors the recursive logic of the scientific method itself. This methodological alignment is particularly salient in fields like nutritional epidemiology, where the replication of findings remains a persistent challenge and iterative inquiry is essential for refining evidence [17]. Despite the methodological rigor and expert involvement, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the study employed convenience sampling, which may introduce selection bias and limit the generalizability of the findings. Although participants were selected based on a minimum citation threshold to ensure scholarly expertise, this criterion may have inadvertently excluded emerging researchers or experts with significant practical contributions who have not yet achieved high citation metrics. Second, the use of an online survey format may have constrained participant engagement, as scholars with limited availability or preference for alternative formats may have been underrepresented. Additionally, response bias cannot be ruled out, as those with a particular interest in the topic or in defining scientific identity may have been more inclined to participate, potentially skewing the results. Future refinements of the definition should also consider voices from non-academic scientific contexts including those in industry, policy, and community-based science who are increasingly central to addressing complex global challenges. Conclusion By engaging experienced scholars across disciplines, this study establishes two validated definitions of “scientist” that emphasize systematic research activity and knowledge dissemination. These definitions offer a structured yet adaptable framework for understanding scientific identity, balancing clarity with flexibility. They help address the ambiguity surrounding the term “scientist,” providing a foundation for improved communication, interdisciplinary collaboration, and evidence-informed policy development. Importantly, they remain open to future refinement as scientific practice continues to evolve. Declarations Conflicts of interest: The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose. Ethical approval: Not applicable. Patient consent (participation and publication): Not applicable. Funding: The present study received no financial support. Acknowledgements: None to be declared. Authors' contributions: JG, MM, SB, BS, VS, ASN, SHM, HAH, AGH, ADS, RAK, WRR, AB, GB, SS, SN, CJ, PL, MSS, ZK, MC, AM, SK, FCT, FB, FRK, MAM, AA, VK, DH, PM, VRM, MSA, EA, and RV were significant contributors to the conception of the study, voting for the items. FHK, BAA, and AMM were involved in the literature review, manuscript writing, and data analysis and interpretation. FHK and AMM Confirmation of the authenticity of all the raw data. All authors have read and approved the final version of the manuscript. Use of AI: ChatGPT-3.5 was used to assist in language editing and improving the clarity of the manuscript. All content was reviewed and verified by the authors. Authors are fully responsible for the entire content of their manuscript. Data availability statement: Not applicable.

George Sarton had a strong influence on modern history of science. The method he pursued throughout his life was the method he had discovered in Ernst Mach’s Mechanics when he was a student in Ghent. Sarton was in fact throughout his life implementing a research program inspired by the epistemology of Mach. Sarton in turn inspired many others (James Conant, Thomas Kuhn, Gerald Holton, etc.). What were the origins of these ideas in Mach and what can this origin tell us about the history of science and science education nowadays? Which ideas proved to be successful and which ones need to be improved upon? The following article will elaborate the epistemological questions, which Darwin’s “Origin” raised concerning human knowledge and scientific knowledge and which led Mach to adapt the concept of what is “empirical” in contrast to metaphysical a priori assumptions a second time after Galileo. On this basis Sarton proposed “genesis and development” as the major goal of Isis. Mach had elaborated this epistemology in La Connaissance et l’Erreur (Knowledge and Error), which Sarton read in 1913 (Hiebert 1905/1976; de Mey 1984). Accordingly for Sarton, history becomes not only a subject of science, but a method of science education. Culture—and science as part of culture—is a result of a genetic process. History of science shapes and is shaped by science and science education in a reciprocal process. Its epistemology needs to be adapted to scientific facts and the philosophy of science. Sarton was well aware of the need to develop the history of science and the philosophy of science along the lines of this reciprocal process. It was a very fruitful basis, but a specific part of it, Sarton did not elaborate further, namely the psychology of science education. This proved to be a crucial missing element for all of science education in Sarton’s succession, especially in the US. Looking again at the origins of the central questions in the thinking of Mach, which provided the basis and gave rise to Sarton’s research program, will help in resolving current epistemic and methodological difficulties, contradictions and impasses in science education influenced by Sarton. The difficulties in science education will prevail as long as the omissions from their Machian origins are not systematically recovered and reintegrated.

Here we have two textbooks from the US market directed at two distinctive groups of students. The Physical Sciences is for non-science majors whereas Physics for Scientists and Engineers, as its title implies, is for science and engineering majors. Although many similar topics are covered, their styles are appropriately very different. The Physical Sciences is intended to integrate physics, chemistry and earth science. However, most of the content consists of material which we associate with physics or its borders. It contains very little mathematics. Not only is calculus excluded but the mathematical equations are kept at a very simple level, usually simple equalities and substitution of numbers. Despite the limited mathematics, the authors have included a wide range of advanced physics topics. A chapter on energy is followed by one on thermodynamics, which proceeds as far as entropy. There is a chapter on quantum mechanics where the only equation is that for Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and there is another chapter on relativity, which includes time dilation and the equation for apparent mass of moving objects but little further mathematics. The broad scope of the book can be seen from a selection of other chapters. Physics ones include electricity and magnetism, waves and electromagnetic radiation, the atom and fundamental particles. More general chapters are introductory ones on the language of science and the development of basic classical mechanics via the ordered universe. Later ones concern chemical bonding and reactions, properties of matter, earth science, atmospheric science, geology, the stars and cosmology. It is unusual for a textbook to develop quite so many advanced concepts with such little mathematics. The text is clear and the words and illustrations are more than adequate to provide the reader with a good qualitative knowledge. In contrast, Physics for Scientists and Engineers follows a specific syllabus followed in the USA, a much tighter syllabus than the A-level and university syllabuses we see in Britain. It is written by an experienced physicist and author from California State University and is very similar in content and level to many other texts on the market. When the texts are used in the UK, it is usually for foundation year and traditional first-year university physics students, although the scope of the contents goes beyond. This is because they use calculus, but do not use higher level mathematics. Experience shows that the subtle differences in the texts only show up as one teaches from them, and even then there is wide variation of preference by both teachers and students. Physics for Scientists and Engineers covers all the usual traditional topics of physics. Thus there are extensive sections on mechanics and gravitation, thermodynamics, wave motion, electrostatics and electricity and magnetism, optics and relativity. Unusually, modern physics has been covered in a supplementary book which repeats the chapters involving relativity. It goes on to provide a quantum approach to light and the atom, the wave-like properties of matter including application of the Schrödinger equation, further quantum systems including the nucleus, short sections on semiconductors, superconductors and superfluids, and finally a chapter on fundamental particles. A huge range of examples are included, both worked out and for the student to attempt. Achieving a spread in general understanding of the physical sciences needs books such as The Physical Sciences. However, it is not adequate for the intending physicist or engineer. So there remains the fundamental question as to whether the non-specialist will spend the time such coverage would require. But the book provides an excellent general overview of traditional and modern physics topics including technological applications. The alternative specialist approach is provided by Physics for Scientists and Engineers but it is difficult to identify any particularly distinctive feature to the book compared with others available. The quality of production of both books is excellent with large numbers of coloured pictures. As is usual with American texts, instructor's manuals and other back-up material are available for each.

The rapid expansion of big data has transformed research practices across disciplines, yet disparities exist in its adoption among U.S. institutions of higher education. This study examines trends in NSF-funded big data-driven research across research domains, institutional classifications, and directorates. Using a quantitative approach and natural language processing (NLP) techniques, we analyzed NSF awards from 2006 to 2022, focusing on seven NSF research areas: Biological Sciences, Computer and Information Science and Engineering, Engineering, Geosciences, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences, and STEM Education (formally known as Education and Human Resources). Findings indicate a significant increase in big data-related awards over time, with CISE (Computer and Information Science and Engineering) leading in funding. Machine learning and artificial intelligence are dominant themes across all institutions’ classifications. Results show that R1 and non-minority-serving institutions receive the majority of big data-driven research funding, though HBCUs have seen recent growth due to national diversity initiatives. Topic modeling reveals key subdomains such as cybersecurity and bioinformatics benefiting from big data, while areas like Biological Sciences and Social Sciences engage less with these methods. These findings suggest the need for broader support and funding to foster equitable adoption of big data methods across institutions and disciplines.

Notes on Contributors

Previous articleNext article FreeSynthetic Bibliography, with Special Reference to the History of ScienceGeorge SartonGeorge Sarton Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 3, Number 2Autumn, 1920 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/357911 Views: 103Total views on this site Citations: 4Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Marcel Martin George Sarton (1884-1956): the Founder of the History of Science Branch, Historica Olomucensia 53, no.vol. 53vol. 53 (Dec 2017): 273–320.https://doi.org/10.5507/ho.2017.036 Herman H. Henkle Content and the Curriculum in Education for Librarianship, The Library Quarterly 12, no.11 (Sep 2015): 29–48.https://doi.org/10.1086/615103 George Sarton Sixteenth Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization, Isis 7, no.22 (Oct 2015): 171–352.https://doi.org/10.1086/358324 George Sarton Ninth Critical Bibliography of the History, Philosophy and Organization of Science and of the History of Civilization, Isis 3, no.33 (Oct 2015): 451–497.https://doi.org/10.1086/357970

AN introductory public lecture to a series of seven courses of lectures on the history of science will be given by Sir W. H. Bragg at University College (University of London) on Thursday, October 7, at 5 p.m. The courses arranged are as follows:—The General History and Development of Science, Dr. A. Wolf; The More Important Developments in Physical Science during the Nineteenth Century, Sir W. H. Bragg, Prof. E. J. Garwood, Mr. D. Orson Wood, and others; Egyptian Science, Prof. Flinders Petrie; The History of the Biological and Medical Sciences from Early Times to the Eighteenth Century, Dr. Charles Singer; The History of the Biological Sciences since the Eighteenth Century, Prof. J. P. Hill; Elementary Astronomy, treated Historically, Prof. L. N. G. Filon; and The History of Mathematics up to the Eighteenth Century, Mr. T. L. Wren.

My qualifications for writing a comment on the excellent article by Paul Meehl are limited. My impressions, accumulated during more than 50 years of reading and writing research articles, are that neither the philosophy nor the history of science has served to improve the quality of poor research or guide good research. I have relegated these disciplines to the task of making sensible and formalizing after the fact what good scientists have accomplished. The fact that physical scientists, by and large, are much less concerned about the philosophy of science than psychologists reinforced my position. It seems that concern about such matters is an attribute of an immature science. I did read Kuhn's (1962) discussion of paradigm shifts shortly after his book appeared. It not only reinforced my attitude about the function of philosophers of science, but about the scientific immaturity of many psychologists as well. The paradigm shift has been used to justify doing anything and everything except science. That I find Meehl's presentations attractive is not a conversion phenomenon, because I arrived at similar views by a different route (Humphreys, 1985). That this was done without reading widely in the philosophy of science-my tally is zero for almost every name Meehl cites-may be important. He mentions in one context a broad, shared common-sense among scientists. This may provide for an intuitive grasp of the issues that some philosophors of science explicate more fully and formally.

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview ArticlesHISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP OR MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?RONALD N. GIERERONALD N. GIEREDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 24, Number 3September 1973 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/24.3.282 Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref © 1973 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article: By Alan Richardson Scientific Philosophy as a Topic for History of Science Alan Richardson, Isis 99, no.11 (Jul 2015): 88–96.https://doi.org/10.1086/587534 Ronald N. Giere Philosophy of Science Naturalized, Philosophy of Science 52, no.33 (Oct 2015): 331–356.https://doi.org/10.1086/289255 Stephen J. Wykstra Toward a Historical Meta-Method for Assessing Normative Methodologies: Rationability, Serendipity, and the Robinson Crusoe Fallacy, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980, no.11 (Oct 2015): 211–222.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.1.192566 James Robert Brown History and the Norms of Science, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980, no.11 (Oct 2015): 236–248.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.1.192568 Richard M. Burian More than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science 44, no.11 (Oct 2015): 1–42.https://doi.org/10.1086/288722 Nancy L. Maull Reconstructed Science as Philosophical Evidence, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976, no.11 (Oct 2015): 119–129.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1976.1.192355 Ernan McMullin History and Philosophy of Science: A Marriage of Convenience?, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974 (Sep 2015): 585–601.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1974.495828

Previous article No AccessSeventy-Second Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization (To January 1948)George Sarton and Frances SiegelGeorge Sarton Search for more articles by this author and Frances Siegel Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 39, Number 4Nov., 1948 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/348984 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1948 History of Science SocietyPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article: George Sarton , and Frances Siegel Seventy-Third Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization (To November 1948), Isis 40, no.22 (Oct 2015): 124–193.https://doi.org/10.1086/349039