The security perception and security policy of Serbia

This chapter analyses the variations in foreign, security, and defence policy as well as the consequences of a possible fragmentation on the positioning of the Union as a united global force. Since ‘security and defence policy’ is separated from ‘foreign and security policy’, one of the key questions concerns the dividing line between the two areas. Is it possible for Member States not to participate in the security and defence integration or does the single legal order of the Union prevents this variation? A second question concerns the more general possibilities for closer or enhanced cooperation. And, finally, a third question is to what extent the proposed new EU Constitutional Treaty further consolidates the somewhat fragmented legal regime on differentiation in the area of foreign, security, and defence policy.

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

This chapter examines the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It tells the story of increasing co-operation between member states on foreign policy matters, first with European Political Co-operation (EPC) and, since the 1990s, with CFSP and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The chapter highlights the internal dynamics and external events that drove the member states towards such co-operation and considers the most recent example of such efforts: the 2017 attempt to create a system of permanent structured co-operation (PESCO). However, it is noted that the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and there remains a reluctance from member states to push much further integration, given states’ keen desire to remain sovereign in this area. Finally, the chapter considers the EU’s status as a ‘power’ in international relations, noting that it has diminished in important respects since 2003, but remains an important economic power.

This chapter analyzes the key drives underpinning continuity and change in Polish foreign and security policy from 1990 to 2019. This period has marked a significant shift in Poland’s position on the European continent. From a country under Russian tutelage during the Cold War, Poland has ‘returned to Europe’, joining the EU (2004) and NATO (1999). As this chapter will highlight, while the core of Poland’s foreign and security policy has remained focused on Poland’s territorial integrity as sacrosanct, how this has been operationalized by Poland’s policy-making elites has fluctuated. This not only relates to shifts in government, but also to external drivers, not least the behavior of Poland’s neighbor Russia. In particular, Poland’s pro-active approach to participating in international military operations, whether in the context of NATO, CSDP or US coalitions of the willing, marking it as a ‘go to player’ in European defense (Whitney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 24), has been replaced by a territorial defense focus. This has been accompanied by a fortified Atlanticism and a skeptical Europeanism. Overall, however, this chapter will demonstrate that Polish foreign and security policy has shown remarkable continuity and that changes can primarily be found in how policies are designed, actioned or prioritized.

The study addresses the patterns, that determine German security and defence policy and its further evolution into the current state. The paper identifies the changes in German approaches to security maintenance on both domestic and foreign political levels. Special attention is paid to the shift from territorial defence to active role of Germany on international security landscape, where Germany undertakes measures to prevent and solve crises and conflicts. We consider aspects that shape German integration into political and military alliances, e.g., EU Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO. German security and defence policy faces multiple challenges, which predominantly deal with scarce financing, inaccurate estimation of defence priorities, etc. It is found out that even with the already existing historically formulated antimilitaristic attitudes, current situation on international landscape requires from Germany a reorientation of its security and defence policy to rational and pragmatic estimation of security risks, dangers and threats, which will result in corresponding security policy. These tendencies do not evidence for German remilitarization. Instead, they demonstrate that security and defence policy can no more fall behind current political, economic or social concerns.

Despite acute international tensions, the EU has failed to exert influence, especially in security matters most requiring heroic leadership. The EU has no defence responsibility or capability, and seeks indirect influence through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Anglo-French European Security and Defence Policy, and through other policies. The main actors are the Council Secretariat and the Political and Security Committee, but lack of clear institutional lines of authority results in disputes, notably over relations with NATO and policy implementation despite the efforts of the High Representative for foreign policy. Because foreign and security policy are member state responsibilities, the EU is condemned to leaderlessness and concentration on non-military tasks and ambitious schemes are unrealistic. It should reduce institutional overlap to achieve greater coherence in action.

EU cooperation in foreign, security, and defence policy has developed rapidly since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s. The first section of this chapter charts the first steps towards a common policy in this area, including the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the gradual militarization of the EU. The chapter then reviews the key theoretical debates on the EU’s role as a foreign and security actor. The subsequent section analyses the main actors involved in the CFSP, focusing in particular on the role of the member states and EU institutions in the development of the policy. The next section of the chapter evaluates the range of military and civilian CSDP operations and missions that the EU has undertaken to date, before examining the key challenges that the EU faces in this area.

EU cooperation in foreign, security, and defence policy has developed rapidly since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s. Section 18.1 charts the first steps towards a common policy in this area, including the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the gradual militarization of the EU. Section 18.2 then reviews the key theoretical debates on the EU’s role as a foreign and security actor. Sections 18.3 and 18.4 analyse the main actors involved in the CFSP, focusing in particular on the role of the member states and EU institutions in the development of the policy. Section 18.5 evaluates the range of military and civilian CSDP operations and missions that the EU has undertaken to date, before examining the key challenges that the EU faces in this area in Section 18.6.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) in a classical sense entails focusing on agents (individuals or groups of individuals). In the case of the European Union (EU), FPA becomes more problematic. Firstly, the question arises of what a foreign policy of the EU really means. This article defines EU foreign policy in a wider sense, namely along the lines of what is known as EU's external action. It focuses however on the security aspect of the EU's external action – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its defence dimension, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, a problem of identifying agents arises in the EU setting in large part because of the complex institutional setup of the CFSP/CSDP. Although final decisions are made at the level of the Council, the policy itself is drafted and prepared at lower levels of policy-making (working parties, committees and agencies) based in Brussels. This article proposes a discursive institutionalist model of analysis, applicable to any organization of the policy process. After presenting the model's ontological and epistemological positions, as well as theoretical underpinnings, the article elaborates on the different levels of information processing and meaning construction by actors and their role in setting the overall foreign policy discourse by shaping the coordinative discourses1 during this early phase of the policy-making process.

In an essay originally written in the early 1990s, Weiler wrote that, ‘[i]n some ways, Community law and the European Court were everything an international lawyer could dream about: the Court was creating a new order of international law in which norms were norms, sanctions were sanctions, courts were central and frequently used, and lawyers were important’. This emphasis on law as a motor for integration has been apparent in the extraordinary process of group therapy which the European Union has undergone in the last nine years: the Laeken Declaration of the European Council in December 2001, the establishment of the European Convention, the process of the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the fateful story of its ratification, the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, the tumultuous process of its ratification and its entry into force on 1 December 2009, all brought the law to the very centre of the debate about the Union’s direction. And as the process got longer and the road to the entry into force of the relevant legal arrangements revealed more roadblocks and turns than their drafters had envisaged, the debate became more heated and its subject-matter wider and more profound. The fate of the legal rules agreed upon first in the Constitutional Treaty and then in the Lisbon Treaty was associated with the very identity of the Union: law was seen as guaranteeing the effectiveness of the Union’s stature on the world scene. It is interesting in this context that, during the Russia–Georgia crisis in 2008, President Sarkozy of France, then holder of the rotating EU Presidency, wrote that, had the Lisbon Treaty entered into force,the Union would have had the appropriate institutions to deal with international crises. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of institutional innovations which provided a focal point for this debate about the role of legal rules in the EU’s foreign affairs. The appointment of the President of the European Council under Article 15(6) TEU, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy under Article 18 TEU had been anticipated eagerly as boosting the ability of the Union to act on the international scene. Similarly, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under Article 27(3) TEU had been viewed as enhancing the coherence of the EU’s foreign policies. The appointment of Herman van Rompuy, who had been the Prime Minister of Belgium for nine months, as the first President of the European Council, and Baroness Ashton, the Trade Commissioner for a year and a former head of a regional health authority in the United Kingdom, were subsequently viewed as distinctly underwhelming. As for the inter-institutional squabbles which marred the process of setting up the EEAS, they were not only unhelpful but also entirely typical of the internal conflicts which underpin the shaping of the Union’s external posture. The analysis of the institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the aim of this chapter is to focus on legal rules which govern the Common Security and Defence Policy, and examine the different functions which they may assume in areas which are at the core of national sovereignty. Therefore, the point of reference for this analysis is distinct from that of the quote which began this chapter: by focusing on the CSDP, one moves away from the tighter legal system set out in what used to be the Community legal order. However, it will become apparent that, whilst further away, the subject matter of this chapter is not entirely distinct from that legal order. The choice of topics it will discuss is highly selective, the aim being to highlight different functions that legal rules assume in the CSDP context. The analysis is structured as follows. First, the chapter will examine the mutual assistance clause introduced at Lisbon and will assess its limitations in terms of the legal duties it imposes on Member States. Second, it will outline the provisions on permanent structured cooperation and will comment on the issues which its application raises. Third, it will analyse the only provision of primary law on defence products, namely Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), explain its evolving interpretation and set it out within the broader legal and political CSDP context.

This chapter highlights the changing nature of defence cooperation between Berlin and London since the end of the Cold War. We stress three important developments which have ensured that British-German defence relations have been characterised by elements of divergence rather than the closeness which defined their relationship during the Cold War. First, the end of the centrality of NATO in security and defence policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall has made British-German defence relations more complicated — and in many ways less vital. Second, the emergence of the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has highlighted NATO's changed position. NATO has become less central and the important role of France in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and wider European defence policy has altered the specificity of British-German defence relations compared with the Cold War era. Further differences have emerged concerning the geopolitical implications of the USA's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York in 2001. Third, defence priorities in Europe have become defined by the end of the primacy of territorial defence and have moved to meet the demands of expeditionary warfare. Whilst Heisbourg (2001) might characterise the United Kingdom as an 'extrovert' in defence policy, Germany remains caught between the role of introvert and extrovert in its view on the utility of military force.KeywordsForeign PolicyTerritorial DefenceDefence PolicyDefence RelationNational Security StrategyThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The replacement of European Political Cooperation (EPC) by a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the terms of the 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU) promised to create a much more effective European foreign policy within the context of a new commitment to external policy as a whole, including for the first time security and defence policy. Under TEU, it will be recalled that the EC was transformed into an EU constructed upon three ‘pillars’, the second of which contained CFSP. Thus CFSP immediately became one of the new Union activities and may appropriately be labelled Union foreign policy. An intergovernmental approach to foreign policy was reinforced by the pillar structure, but it was envisaged that CFSP would be integrated into other Union activities in ways that appeared to resolve continuing debates between integrationists and intergovernmentalists.

In 2003, Javier Solana introduced the European Security Strategy (ESS). Since then, there have been important developments regarding the security and defense of the European Union member states. This article examines the impact of Europeanization on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Specifically, I analyze how the Europeanization of CSDP has been incorporated into the logic of Greece’s domestic security and defense policy. Hence, the Europeanization process is identified and presented according to Claudio M. Radaelli’s definition. Furthermore, this analysis identifies the impact of CSDP on Greece’s political structures, which are related to the country’s defense and security policy. These changes are presented in terms of an explanatory schema for better understanding the Europeanization dynamics in the Greek case.

Whilst its genesis was focused on the economic dimension of market building, the whole process of European integration has always been, in essence, a security policy project. Seeking to ensure the impossibility of another war in Europe has been a central part of the DNA of the European polity. It was for this reason that the wars in the former Yugoslavia shocked the European Union (EU) system so profoundly. They also proved to be a powerful incentive for the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy, both in terms of its legal grounding in primary rules and its increasingly prominent position in the rhetoric of the Union’s elites. However, to focus exclusively on its self-referential aspects is to ignore not only the direct interaction between the development of the EU’s security and defence policy and the fundamental and constant changes of the international geopolitical landscape in the last twenty years, but also the distinct emphasis on the international outlook of the Union’s strategic objectives and the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. In terms of the geopolitical changes, whilst they have had an impact on the Union in various ways, two in particular are noteworthy. On the one hand, there has been a growing expectation by third parties, such as the United States, countries where EU missions are deployed and international organizations such as the African Union, that the EU shares the responsibility of monitoring international security. On the other hand, international organizations directly involved in global and regional security governance expect the EU to participate too. This chapter explores the extent to which there is congruence between the current global security architecture and the Union’s ambition to assert its identity on the international scene as a security actor. It identifies certain factors which are inherent in the genesis of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and which have imposed a constraint on its development, preventing it from achieving the Union’s ambition and meeting the expectations of other security actors.

For about more than a decade, the European Union (EU) has been dealing with particular dedication with security and defense issues. In particular, these issues have become increasingly relevant since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The Treaty of Lisbon, which was ratified in 2009, established the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as successor to the ESDP and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), whose particularities and potential will be the main object of this work.