The Simultaneous Effect Dividend Policy and Debt Policy

This study aims to test the agency theory in privatized Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises. The agency problem in this study was proxied by firm value (Tobin's Q) while the agency problem control mechanism was proxied by institutional ownership, leverage, and dividend policy. This study examines the interchangeable relations between the three variables. The data used in this study are secondary data sourced from the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research sample is all SOEcompanies that meet the criteria and are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2013-2017 observation period. The analytical tool used in this study was 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Square) with panel data techniques and simultaneous models. The results showed that dividend policy and institutional ownership have a substitution relationship in reducing agency problems, whereas leverage and dividend policy, as well as institutional ownership and leverage, do not have a substitute relationship in reducing agency problems.

This research examines the influence of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, profitability, and leverage on dividend policy, with liquidity as a moderating variable in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This research design uses a quantitative approach with secondary data as a sample of 22 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2021. The sampling technique is purposive sampling. The data analysis technique uses multiple linear regression analysis and residual tests for moderating variables, which are carried out with the help of the EViews program. This research shows that institutional ownership, profitability, and leverage variables significantly affect dividend policy. Meanwhile, managerial ownership does not have a significant effect on dividend policy. Liquidity as a moderating variable can moderate the influence of leverage on dividend policy. However, it cannot moderate the impact of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and profitability on dividend policy. Keywords: managerial ownership, institutional ownership, profitability, leverage, liquidity, dividend policy

According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), shareholders are called principal while the manager who runs the business is called the agent. The manager who is elected by the shareholders actually has to act on behalf of the shareholders but there are some conflict between them (agency conflict). The causes of that kind of conflict deal with the decision making related to the activity of cash flow (financing decision) and how the finance gained is invested (investment decision). The policy of optimal investment structure is not only influenced by the amount of debt and equity, but also by the percentage of share. The objects of this research are manufactures during 2005-2006. The sample consist of 49 companies. The analysis is using double linear regression. The result shows that both managerial ownership and institutional ownership have significant impact and negatively related to the company’s debt policy. The findings also show that managerial ownership and institutional ownership may reduce agency conflicts which finally minimizes yhe agency cost of debt. Future researches are expected to develop the methodology and the research variables so that the result will be more accurate. Besides, this research can be developed and widened from regional to international, so that the result will be more creative

The frequent occurrence of conflicts of interest between shareholders and management, causing agency problems. One way to overcome this issue is to include managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of ownership structure on agency costs. The structure of ownership consists of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership,and foreign ownership. The population in this research is manufacturers listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) with a sample of 102 companies taken by purposive sampling method. To test the hypothesis, the research uses multiple regression analysis with a significance level of 0.05. The results show that managerial ownership and institutional ownership have no significant effect on agency costs. Likewise, government ownership and foreign ownership also have no significant effect on agency costs.

A company founded is of three objectives, that is to say, to obtain maximum profit, to prosper the owner of the company, and to maximize the value of the company. The purpose of financial management itself is to help the achievement of the company goals. However, sometimes there is a conflict of interests between the owner and management which is called an agency problem that can be reduced with various mechanisms, one of which is the dividend policy. The present study examined what effects the debt to equity ratio, cash ratio, and return on assets, growth rate, and institutional ownership would have on the dividend policy of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2017. Being familiar with the effect of debt to equity ratio, cash ratio, and return on assets, growth rates and institutional ownership on dividend policy of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2017 is the aim of this study. The type of data used is entirely secondary data that was quantitative. Documentation is the method used in gathering data on this study. Data were analyzed using logistic regression models. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that Return on Assets has a positive effect on dividend policy of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2017, while Debt to Equity Ratio, Cash Ratio, growth rate, and institutional ownership have no effect on the company's dividend policy in 2013-2017.

The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production

This study tries to see the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, liquidity, profitability, and debt policy on dividend policy. Managerial ownership is measured by the ratio of the number of shares owned to total shares; institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of share ownership in the ownership structure, the current ratio is measured by dividing assets and current liabilities, debt policy is measured by dividing total debt by total equity, profitability is measured by dividing net income with total assets. Profitability is calculated by dividing net income by total assets. This study uses purposive sampling by taking data from 20 mining companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011-2019. The technique of testing the hypothesis with multiple regression. This study proves that institutional ownership and debt policy affect the company's dividend policy. Meanwhile, managerial ownership, liquidity, and profitability do not affect dividend policy.

A company is to get optimal profits that can improve the welfare of the owners and managers of the company. The main objective is reflected in the value of the company. This study aims to examine whether institutional ownership influences dividend policy, whether dividend policy influences the value of the company, and whether institutional ownership and dividend policy influence the value of the company. The research population is companies that go public and are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The research sample was 94 companies whose shares were included in the LQ 45 index that distributed dividends. The research period is for 3 years, namely 2013 - 2015 using report data in the form of performance summaries issued by the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) every August. Data testing uses classical assumption testing and hypothesis testing using linear regression analysis. The results of the study show that institutional ownership does not affect dividend policy, dividend policy does not affect the value of the company, and institutional ownership and dividend policy does not affect the value of the company.

This study aims to determine the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership on agency costs in non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2017. The independent variables are managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership. The dependent variable is the agency cost which is proxied as sales and general administration expenses. This study uses secondary data in the form of annual financial reports of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2017. The sample in this study consisted of 64 non-financial companies which were taken using a purposive sampling method. Data analysis used multiple linear regression analysis. The results of this study indicate that managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership have a significant negative effect on agency costs.

Does Governance Structure Have a Say on Dividend? Evidence from Australian Listed Firms

This paper investigates whether corporate governance has an impact on dividend policy in Australian listed firms. The empirical studies of corporate governance and dividend policy in the Australian context tend to have a limited scope and the findings are mixed. Unlike the existing literature, this paper provides a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms. Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period of 2005 to 2011 and the panel data approach, this study finds that dividend payout is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with board size, board independence, institutional ownership and use of a Big-4 audit firm (CEO duality and managerial ownership). Moreover, dividend yield is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with managerial ownership (foreign ownership). These findings suggest that dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms are complementary i.e. firms paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in good governance practices as well as having strong monitoring and control systems in place and therefore both dividend policy and corporate governance are considered as effective tools in reducing agency costs.

This paper adopted logistic regression model to examine the relationship between level of managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict which are proxied by level of risk, firms leverage and firms dividend policy. The study covers a period of 5 years from 1997 through 2001. The study is based on the 100 blue-chip stocks, majority of which are derived from CI components. The findings suggest a positive and significant association between level of level of risk at lower level and managerial ownership while a negative and significant association is also evidenced between risk at higher level and managerial ownership concentration. While debt policy which serves as positive monitoring substitute for agency conflict is found to be positive and significant explaining the level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, dividend policies, which also serve as monitoring, substitute to reduce agency conflict between manager and external shareholders do not appear to have any significant impact on managerial ownership. On the other hand, the level of institutional ownership, which serves as external monitoring force, is found to have inverse impact on level of managerial ownership concentration. This is marginally significant at 10 level (p=.12). The findings, in part explain the argument that the managerial ownership help reduce agency conflict between outside equity holders and managers.

The study titled liquidity, profitability, insider ownership, institutional ownership and growth of the company on dividend policy company property sector, real estate and building construction to determine the influence of the five variables on dividend policy on the company's property sector, real estate and construction of buildings. This research was conducted during the period 2010-2014. The populations in this study are all companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the study period of data collection method using purposive sampling, in order to obtain 6 companies. This study used panel data regression analysis with a model Fixed Effect and the tool to analyze the data used Eviews 8. Testing the hypothesis using by the coefficient of determination, t-test statistics and F-test statistics.The results showed that liquidity does not affect the dividend policy, profitability does effect on dividend policy, insider ownership does not affect the dividend policy, institutional ownership does affect the dividend policy, the company's growth does not effect on dividend policy. The implication of this research for the company to consider profits as a main consideration to dividend policy as well as the company continues to invest despite profit increase or decrease.

Dividend policy is the disagreeing desire of the company between managers and shareholders. The company retains cash to increase the company's growth; on the other hand, shareholders expect a reasonably high dividend. This study analyses the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, capital structure, investment prospects, and sales growth on dividend policy. The type of data used in this research is secondary data from the 2017-2021 financial reports. The technique in this study uses panel data regression. Samples were taken using a purposive sampling technique of 71 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The results show that managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and sales growth do not affect dividend policy. Capital structure has a significant negative effect on dividend policy. Investment opportunities have a significant positive effect on dividend policy.

This study aims to determine and analyze 1) the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend policy and value of the firm; 2) the effects of dividend policy mediated in order of causality between corporate governance mechanisms and value of the firm. The sample used was the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange with the observation period starting in 2000 to 2007. The results showed that: 1) corporate governance mechanisms in istitutional ownership represented by institutional ownership have a positive and significant impact on dividend policy represented by dividend payout ratio; 2) corporate governance mechanisms are represented by institutional ownership, independent boards, and board’s size have a positive effect and significant impact on dividend policy, represented by Tobin's q; and 3) the dividend policy does not mediate the relationship of causality between corporate governance mechanisms (which are represented by boards institutional ownership and board’s size) with Tobin's q. Key Word : corporate governance mechanism, value of the firm, boards independent, dividend payout ra