The Special Case Thesis

Bali, as a province with strong roots in local cultural traditions and significant economic importance for Indonesia, is striving to balance modernity and tradition, economics, especially mass tourism, and cultural identity. This is why Universitas Warmadewa, one of the largest Balinese universities, chooses the theme ‘Local Wisdom and Business Law’ for its international conferences each year.As a non-Indonesian legal scholar, this theme presents two challenges for me. Firstly, I am not an expert in tourism economics and can only approach the topic from a traditional market law perspective, theoretically. Secondly, the terms used in Indonesian legal discussions may seem vague and unclear from a German perspective, as the legal discussion in Indonesia integrates traditional legal phenomena pragmatically into the applicable legal system. This may also be historically conditioned because since independence Indonesia has to handle a legal pluralism in law, which also finds its cause in the legacy of the colonial era.When speaking on the legal perspective of ‘local wisdom’, several questions are unclear to me:What exactly is local wisdom and how can it be defined?Where does it fit into the Indonesian legal system?What role can local wisdom play in contemporary law?Local wisdom may be understood as part of traditional customary law or Adat, at least in terms of its influence on legal issues, as the conference theme suggests. The terminology around ‘customary law’, ‘Adat’, ‘indigenous law’, or ‘living law’ is still a problematic issue in Indonesian scientific discussion and should only be briefly mentioned in this presentation. The term ‘Adat law’ was originally not used in Indonesian society and was first systematically used by the Dutch. Van Vollenhoven, considered the ‘father of Indonesian Adat law’ by Indonesian scholars, defined Adat law as law that is not based on codified legal rules from the legislator. This definition is still used by contemporary Indonesian scholars. Adat law in this sense contains sanctions, making the character of ‘law’. It was characterized by Van Vollenhoven as dynamic and flexible folk law, which combines the term with the often-used term of ‘living law’. There are numerous discussions in Indonesian literature about Indonesian customary law, its functions, and significance, but the terminology has not been clearly defined and the role of religious law is also subject to numerous publications.Therefore, having read various contributions on the topic, I am left confused because some of them discuss the existence of legal principles of living customary law and describe them as “national Indonesian principles,” which can replace parts of the post-colonial Indonesian law, but they do not clearly identify these principles. The topic seems to be of almost patriotic importance to Indonesia, making it particularly difficult for foreign scholars to approach the subject in presentations before Indonesian colleagues. My contribution should be seen in light of this difficulty, as a first observation of the phenomenon from a foreign perspective.The term Adat is already difficult to comprehend, and this is even more true for the term “local wisdom” in a legal context. So, what is the “Local Wisdom” that I am asked to talk about? The Terms of Reference of our conference describe the meaning of “local wisdom” mainly as the clash of market actors in local Balinese tourism that can lead to conflicts, which the law should resolve. These conflicts are said to occur because local communities and institutions, based on a kind of traditionally grown trust, seek to build and maintain their business relationships in the tourism industry. This trust, which one could call “traditional good faith,” meets the need to regulate contractual arrangements more formally in terms of contract law (“more official...instead of just relying on promises or good faith”).In this sense, local wisdom is an aspect of good faith. Based on this understanding of the term, I have no systematic issues with the term “local wisdom.” However, it should be noted that good faith and contract, as a predictable shaping of legal relationships between market actors, should not be seen as opposites. It is possible and necessary to resolve disruptions in contractual relationships in light of good faith and, if necessary, adapt contractual regulations. Here, “local wisdom” should not be understood as a unique source of good faith, but as a general aspect that can influence the expectations of the contracting parties and their trust in shaping the law. This raises the question of which factors should be taken into account by the non-local contracting party in good faith, and which should not. It is a question of the concrete assessment of the structure of interests and the balance of the contract, how to allocate risk and assign external aspects to the contracting parties and which aspects should be considered subsequently.This is a theoretical matter, and it is unlikely to play a significant role in practice since local market actors and communities have the freedom, within the framework of private autonomy, to incorporate their traditional interests into the contract negotiations. This allows for traditional interests to participate in the “equivalence justice” of the contract. However, if the traditional interests of the local community result in unacceptable consequences for the contract’s execution, the question of whether these reasons can lead to a change in the contract’s basis may arise. In civil law systems, the clausula rebus sic stantibus is regulated as a limitation of the pacta sunt servanda principle and falls under the principle of good faith (bona fides). If the invocation of “local wisdom” by one party leads to the other party having to agree to an adjustment, it would have to be examined.I would like to give you an example of this, which seems credible even if no prove about the issue can be delivered due to the ‘popular’ source: A person without Indonesian citizenship acquired the right to use a plot of land with a house in Bali ten years ago. Since foreigners cannot acquire land ownership in Indonesia themselves, the foreigner had agreed on a legal arrangement with an Indonesian citizen resident in Bali, in which the Indonesian acquired ownership (hak milik) of the land with the foreigner’s money and agreed on right to use for the foreign partner. After ten years, the foreigner wanted to sell the property again to move to his country of origin. The agreement with the Indonesian partner stipulated that the Indonesian partner must agree to the sale of the plot on the wish of the foreign partner and would receive 10% of the sale amount in the event of a sale. In the case described, however, the Indonesian partner seems to have refused to sell the property on the agreed terms. He was not satisfied with the 10% share and demanded a 70% share instead. As justification for this, he argued that the contract terms should be changed because he had spiritually enhanced the property over the years through certain religious rituals and this required a revaluation of his shareholding.It is not known whether the case was heard in an Indonesian court and how it was finally settled. Assuming the case had occurred as described, from the perspective of Indonesian civil law, it is clear that no change in the business basis of the contract occurred as a result of the Indonesian partner’s spiritual acts, which can lead to an adjustment of the agreement between him and the foreign contractual partner. Just as local communities depend on their interests in cultural identity being taken into account even in legal relations with partners coming from outside, foreign investors must be able to rely on certain standards of contractual obligation. The principle of good faith would be grotesquely overstretched if local contracting partners could use fuzzy notions of ‘local wisdom’ to make contractual arrangements more flexible in their favour.Another example of the clash between traditional legal customs and supra-regional legal ideas in highly traditional markets with supra-regional economic importance, such as Bali, is the handling of legal disputes and methods of dispute resolution. The trust of traditional communities in supra-legal ties of interest in business relationships, as mentioned in the Terms of Reference to this Conference, meets a systemic trust in formal contractual regulations of non-local actors. The reference points of trust of the respective groups of market actors thus differ. This also affects dispute resolution. According to Sulastriyono, the voluntary character of traditional customary law has the advantage over civil law methods of litigation and dispute resolution of a ‘win-win’ solution, which leads to greater acceptance of the solution by the parties to the conflict. In theory, this is undeniable. However, it is questionable whether this acceptance can also be achieved among contract participants who do not originate from the respective culture, because the existence of sufficient advantages for a party may well depend on the integration of the party in the respective local society. Moreover, the indisputable advantages of consensual dispute resolution can also be well integrated in state procedural law via mediation mechanisms.Cases such as the one outlined one above would in principle be likely to erode the confidence of foreign investors in Indonesian law in general if courts do not rule clearly and draw clear boundaries here. The example seems to be a particularly extreme case, but it shows how important it is to clearly determine the meaning and possible role of terms such as ‘local wisdom’ and ‘tradition’ for use in law. Culturally related aspects are prone to serve as a tool for discrimination against individuals and companies that do not belong to the respective cultural environment. The difficulty, for example, of establishing an intellectual property right on cultural heritage follows not only from the contrast between individual subjective rights and collective subjective rights. It follows above all from the problem of determining the collective rights holders who are to benefit from ‘their’ cultural heritage. Who is a member of a certain culture? Is there a generational link or does it depend on the integration of the individual into his or her living environment? If the legal system does not want to fall back to abstruse considerations of ‘blood identity’, what remains is the assignment of such claims to territorial authorities or the state itself, whose task it is to protect cultural diversity on its territory. This is the path that the Indonesian legislature had taken in Art 38 Law No 28/2014 on copyright law.The misuse of cultural aspects carried into the application of law is also visible in another aspect: In another paper I have pointed out the problem that the concept of traditional customary law in Indonesian law and the position of Adat law in the hierarchy of norms seems in need of clarification. Shidarta notes that there is no sufficient clarity about the relationship between Adat law and state law and thus no consistent system of Indonesian law as a whole. Accordingly, the maturation of an independent Indonesian legal system suffers to this day from the internal conflict with the colonial legacy of existing state law based on Dutch civil law and the lack of a consistent overarching pluralistic concept of law. This is seen by Shidarta as a major reason why the systematic positions of customary law, Islamic law and western law within national law are not clearly defined and why a clear hierarchical determination of the various sources of law in relation to national law is lacking. The doubts about the systematic location and certainly also the failure to establish the principles of traditional customary law as original Indonesian law after the attainment of independence instead of the sources of law inherited from the colonial period are probably due - in addition to the idea of the state founders of an Indonesian unitary state (‘eenheidstaat’) - above all to the disagreement about the concept of customary law, which is formally understood in the sense of a binding source of law defined during the colonial period, or as post-colonial Adat law in the sense of traditional customary rights of various Indonesian ethnic groups either with a binding character or as norms of social order based on voluntariness. In this respect, too, different definitions of the term can be found in the literature:There is thus generally a more philosophical recognition of the importance of traditional customary law in the sense that customary law reflects the actual sense of law of the people and the Indonesian people as a nation. The latter statement seems problematic to me because the statement only applies with regard to the significance of customary law as a source of law, but not to the content of the individual customary laws of the various ethnic groups, in which different legal customs apply in each case. It therefore seems questionable to me whether Adat law can be understood in the sense of an alternative to Indonesian state law. In my opinion, Adat as a source of concrete legal norms has a supplementary development perspective in the communal area. Here it can certainly have an influence on economic life in the regions if it is applied consistently and transparently, and its importance would grow especially if the autonomy of municipal territorial units were strengthened, and a strong federalism were developed. However, a scientific inventory of norms and principles of local customary law is then required, and a clear formulation of such norms is needed, because it must be ruled out that the invocation of undefined, non-transparent or arbitrarily formulated Adat rules unduly restricts the freedom of market actors and are used as protectionist instruments in the provinces.In this sense, I believe that the postulate that Indonesian law must simply recognise Adat law as it has grown and as it is applied alive within the Indonesian local societies falls short, because the compatibility of social rules based on voluntariness and constantly changing with the overall legal system based on the rule of law is at least debatable. In other words: either one renounces the legal certainty and predictability of legal norms in the area of traditional customary law. This could then constitute a breach of the constitutionally enshrined principle of the Rule of Law. Or one formulates clear norms based on traditional legal principles, which have the character of binding legal norms and applies them in the sense of subsidiarity in the local environment with priority over central state law in certain predefined aspects. Then the rules of the hierarchy of norms must be correspondingly clear. However, the question of the hierarchy of norms then no longer presents itself as a problem of the nature of Adat or customary law because the latter would have lost its character as actual customary law. The advocates of a strong recognition of Adat by state law will, however, reject this path because they see the advantage of traditional customary law over state law precisely in its flexibility and ability to change. This flexibility would no longer be readily available through an integration of traditional principles into a local classical law in the sense of imperative norms.A clear hierarchy of norms defined by constitutional law seems indispensable, because such local customary law cannot displace state law without further ado, but only if the principle of subsidiarity and the better regulation of local circumstances by local law indicates otherwise. This would also be in line with the philosophical assessment of local customary law as the law that best captures the living conditions of the people in its cultural area of application. The importance of the principle of subsidiarity should generally be given more attention in the discussion on legal pluralism in Indonesia. This can not only ensure greater recognition of traditional customary law, but also enable the transparency necessary for the predictability of the law.Insofar as Adat is to be understood as the source of ‘abstract normative’ aspects, as certain common Indonesian legal values and principles in the sense of a ‘pan-Indonesian’ legal order and, as such, is to find its way into an independent state Indonesian civil law, legal scholarship in Indonesia will also have to identify and clearly define these principles. In doing so, it will be necessary to determine which principles of traditional customary law in the various regions of the archipelago are suitable as overarching legal principles, so that they can possibly have an identity-forming effect in a national private law. This difficult process might lead to reform of the Indonesian Civil Law which meets the special requirements of a socially and culturally integrated legal system.Indonesia as a state with a unified internal market needs a cross-cultural private law and commercial law. Consideration of the interests of local communities and traditions is of importance in a multicultural state. The Indonesian constitution therefore emphasises the specifics of traditional rights and thus guarantees Adat its own status in the legal system. However, there seems to be a lack of a clear hierarchy of norms in the legal system and a clear definition of the nature of Adat. A hint of a certain hierarchy between Adat and state law is indeed found in agricultural law (Art. 5 Law No. 5/1960 on the Basic Regulations of Agrarian Principles) and in forestry law (Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry). Adat is recognised here but must harmonise with state law. It is therefore likely to be in a relationship of subsidiarity to state law. The fundamental assertion of the primacy of state law over other co-existing legal systems is also in line with the view of Indonesian legal scholars such as Sunaryati Hartono. Referring to Griffiths’ formulation of “weak legal pluralism”, where co-existing legal systems are subordinated to a dominant formalistic national law, it can be stated that the Indonesian legal system follows this model.In my opinion, the integration of traditional customary law into the legal system should not be done as a mere tolerance of state law towards deviating regulations of facts in certain regions. From my perspective as a foreign observer, this seems to lead to significant problems for the development of the Indonesian economy and for investment. In particular, this seems to me to be the case for Bali. Local Wisdom can be incorporated into the contractual relations of the parties within the framework of private autonomous arrangements. A ‘creative’ qualification of protectionist measures against outside market actors or the justification of the failure to sanction breaches of contract or violations of law against outsiders as ‘Adat’ or ‘protection of local traditions’ should be consistently avoided.Incidentally, it seems to me that in contract law there is no real opposition between state law and traditional customary law. Either the parties trust each other, in which case state law does not prevent an agreement based on good faith. Or they do not, in which case only state contract law can lead to proper solutions. The same applies to traditional dispute resolution methods, to which the parties to the conflict can easily submit. In contrast, the integration of customary law as independent Indonesian legal principles or as legal norms at the local or municipal level into Indonesian law would require considerable academic effort. For this, the principles concerned would have to be clearly identified, systematised, and formulated to be able to substantiate a claim to validity beyond the respective local communities. The mere reference to historically evolved convictions of local communities is too vague. The term ‘local wisdom’ seems to me to be problematic in this sense to accurately describe the question of the collision of traditional customs and expectations of outside market actors, especially since it is already conceptually positively evaluative. Finally, it should not be forgotten, that the continental European codifications are culturally neutral and in big parts based on the Roman law. Roman law itself was not developed under the cultural framework of northern and middle European regions, however it served well as source for the modern European codifications. These codifications are working fine until these days in different nations without obvious incompatibilities with local traditions. The amount of a ‘Volksgeist’ after the idea of Friedrich Carl von Savigny within the Private Law does not play a big role in the contemporary discussion as law should be seen in a pragmatic way as a viable tool to organize the modern society. Indonesia is an important economically emerging nation. As such it might be a good idea to keep an internationally compatible private law, which might be carefully adapted to certain peculiarities of the Indonesian society. The use of general clauses as entrance doors for local legal convictions seems to be a good way for that and a clearly defined legal hierarchy with a constitutionally based legal subsidiarity principle seems important. In contrast, the foundation of modern law on nationalistic, local, or indigenous traditional customs should only be done with extreme caution, if at all. The contemporary discussion on the role of Adat in Indonesian law shows the great difficulty of determining viable legal rules that can enter a future reformed Indonesian private law as ‘originally Indonesian’. The criticism against Von Savigny’s ‘Volksgeist’ idea also applies here: Defining who the ‘people’ are and what constitutes their common identity is already hardly rationally possible in a non-multi-ethnic state, even more in a multi-ethnic state. National identity-forming circumstances are hardly suitable as common principles for pluralistic societies.

Academic argumentation refers to a concrete form of theoretical thinking embodied in academic works. It is a process of exposition of scientific materials to illustrate academic issues and proves that academic opinions have a true value. Academic argumentation is also an inference method and form exploited by countless preconditions to withdraw conclusions. In academic papers, authors are likely to use practical arguments to convince their target audiences by highlighting the positive or negative results that a particular standpoint has. Current research on pragmatic argumentation in institutional contexts mainly concentrates on the legal and political domains. Few researchers pay enough attention to pragmatic argumentation used in academic argument, let alone formulate proper soundness criteria for evaluating its reasonableness. Given all this, within the framework of Pragma-dialectics, this paper analyzes and evaluates the pragmatic argumentation typically used in the paper How Applied Linguistics is the same as other science in the Applied Linguistics. The general goal of this research is to reveal how pragmatic argumentation is used in academic argument. Based on the institutional preconditions of academic argument and the general pragma-dialectical soundness criteria for pragmatic argumentation, this study puts forward specific criteria for evaluating pragmatic argumentation in case of academic argument. This paper aims to evaluate the use of pragmatic argumentation in How Applied Linguistics is the same as other science and finds that academic argument may sometimes fail to keep the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness and consequently commits derailed fallacies, when they overwhelmingly pursue the persuasive effects of pragmatic argumentation and its extensions. This research is of both theoretical and practical significance. In theory, this study develops a pragma-dialectical research framework for academic argument, thus expanding the research perspectives and methods of academic argument. Meanwhile, the scope of institutional contexts of Pragma-dialectics is extended by studying academic argument. In practice, this study enlightens academic researchers who are responsible for international communication on how to use pragmatic argumentation both reasonably and effectively. More importantly, it provides a crucial analytic tool for readers to interpret academic argument appropriately and improve their critical thinking abilities.

Background: Advancements in generative artificial intelligence (AI) and large language models (LLMs) have introduced new possibilities in democratizing access to professional services. Malaysia's non-Muslims can rely on AI-driven tools to draft their wills without legal assistance, but empirical evaluations of LLM chatbots' reliability are absent. Methods: Grounded in the Technology Acceptance Model, this study assesses the accuracy, legal validity, comprehensibility, and reliability of five prominent LLM chatbots, namely ChatGPT 3.5, ChatGPT 4.0, Claude Sonnet, Gemini Pro, and Microsoft Copilot. Results: ChatGPT 4.0 consistently outperformed other models across all complexity levels in succession and drafting-related question tasks, showing the highest reliability and accuracy. Gemini Pro performed well for introductory and intermediate queries, particularly in drafting simple wills. In contrast, Copilot and Claude Sonnet exhibited high variability and struggled with complex queries. Across all chatbots, performance declined significantly with increased query complexity. Qualitative assessment reveals inconsistencies, misinterpretations, and occasional legal inaccuracies, particularly when prompts contain incomplete information. Conclusion: While specific LLM chatbots, particularly ChatGPT 4.0, demonstrate potential as reliable tools for basic estate planning, their limitations in handling complex legal instructions underscore the need for caution. By shedding light on the role of AI in legal contexts, this research significantly enriched both scholarly and practical dialogues, enhancing our understanding of AI’s potential to revolutionize the legal landscape, particularly in estate planning.

Since the 19th century, modern law has been based on strategies of rationalizing acts of speech as well as on specific forms of communication. For the law to function as such, it is necessary to inhibit or regulate disturbances to this particular framework as, for instance, caused by emotions. From this circumstance ensues one of modern literature's engagements with the law, displaying an interest not only in emotion scenarios which take effect in the legal context but also in the related epistemological conditions. Literature refers to law and emotions in order to elaborate on epistemological, social, and cultural issues. The chapter stresses and discusses the fact that language plays a decisive role for all three components. In investigating law-literature-emotion relations, the following questions arise: What part does the legal concept play in literature in the context of emotion? What kind of language/vocabulary is used in legal discourses and practices? After an introduction into general problems, the relationship between law, emotion, and language is examined with regard to current positions. This chapter is followed by a discussion of the potential of literature in this constellation. In order to also reflect practical possibilities, the paper proposes a methodological model for analysis.

The complex relationship between language and law is a focus of sociolinguistic research, particularly in the study of legal terminology in different linguistic communities. Traditional sociolinguistic and normative-stylistic methods of analyzing legal terminology in the context of the Uzbek and English languages ​​play a significant role in understanding the complexity of legal discourse. This article explores the historical context, key figures, illustrative examples of Uzbek and English legal terms, influencers, perspectives and possible future developments in relation to this area of research. This study of language and law has become an area of growing interest for linguists, legal scholars and policymakers. The use of language in legal contexts is very concrete, precise and sometimes incomprehensible to the subject. Legal language is used as a way of expressing laws, regulations, rules and contracts, and its interpretation can determine the outcome of legal disputes, influence public policy and create social norms. Sociolinguistics, as it pertains to the legal context, encompasses not only the vocabulary used in legal frameworks, but also how cultural nuances shape these terminologies. Normative-stylistic analysis further enriches this study by highlighting the stylistic choices that influence clarity, persuasiveness, and authority in legal discourse. When we compare Uzbek and English legal terms, it becomes evident that cultural influences significantly affect the development of these lexicons. Methodological approaches to the analysis of legal language reveal both similarities and divergences between the two languages, and address the challenges inherent in translating complex legal concepts across language boundaries. The article reveals the need for a comprehensive study of the sociolinguistic and normative-stylistic method of analyzing and studying English and Uzbek legal terms in order to develop a common system of legislative language.

This study investigates the critical role of the concept of equivalence in translation, especially in legal contexts. It addresses the theoretical and practical implications of translation equivalence, highlighting the lack of consensus among scholars regarding its definition. The research examines the types of equivalence prevalent in legal translation, explicitly using the Arabic version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Legal translation involves translating legal texts, such as the UDHR, from one language, such as French, to another, such as Arabic. This process is intricate due to the complex nature of legal texts, multifaceted legal concepts, and the distinct meanings embedded in legal language. The study highlights that equivalence, a heavily debated term in translation studies, is interpreted differently across theoretical perspectives, including linguistic, functional, and interpretive approaches. In the context of legal translation, functional equivalence is the most relevant type, particularly in the Arabic translation of the UDHR, as it aligns well with legal translation components such as text nature, legal discourse, and system compatibility (Sarcevic, 1997). The notion of equivalence takes several forms; however, linguistic and grammatical equivalence is less attainable due to significant language differences. For this reason, the study primarily focuses on functional equivalence from a Sarcevic perspective, facilitating measurement through criteria such as equivalent juridical force, contextual adaptation to target legal norms, terminological fidelity, and pragmatic effect, without assessing overall translation correctness, as the UN recognizes this version. It employs qualitative methods, discourse analysis, and content analysis to explore equivalence in the UDHR's Arabic translation, aiming to clarify the relationship between the source and target texts by applying these operational criteria to judge realization.

Problem setting. In the Ukrainian scientific space, the issue of differentiating the concepts of “scientist” and “scholar” gains particular significance due to the peculiarities of legal regulation, societal perception of science, and the systemic impact of scientific and technical activities on the country’s economy and development. These two terms are often used synonymously; however, their conceptual differences have important implications for regulating labor relations, grant policies, and the status of scientific workers. In Ukrainian legislation, particularly in the Law of Ukraine “On Scientific and Scientific-Technical Activities,” the term “scientist” is used as a general concept for individuals engaged in scientific research, while “scholar” is more often associated with scientific degrees, titles, and academic status. The problem is particularly relevant for Ukraine due to the low level of funding for science, brain drain, and the ambiguous public attitude towards the role of science in the modern world. The lack of clear delineation between these concepts in the legal and professional spheres complicates the formation of a national strategy for the development of science, as well as the establishment of clear criteria for supporting specific categories of scientific workers. For example, in the international context, there is often a clear distinction between researchers, who engage in applied or experimental studies, and scientists, who primarily work in fundamental research. In Ukraine, this issue remains unresolved and requires both legal and societal discussion. Analysis of recent research and publications in the field of legal and conceptual differentiation of the terms “scientist” and “scholar” in the context of contemporary scientific and technical activities indicates that these issues are actively explored at both international and national levels. In particular, scholars such as P. Robert and A. Rey have focused on the linguistic and legal aspects of these terms in the context of science and technology, investigating the evolution of the concepts of “scientist” and “scholar” in historical and legal contexts. Other researchers, including Duden, have addressed the legal definitions and regulations concerning academic and scientific activities in various countries, and their interconnections with legislation. Overall, it can be concluded that international research is primarily focused on the legal and linguistic differentiation of the concepts of “scientist” and “scholar,” which contributes to a clearer understanding of their roles in contemporary scientific and technical activities at the international level. Purpose of research is to investigate the legal and conceptual differentiation of the terms “scientist” and “scholar” in the context of modern scientific and technical activities, emphasizing their legal regulation and impact on the development of science and technology in Ukraine and beyond. Article’s main body. The differentiation between the terms “scientist” and “researcher” remains a subject of ongoing discussion in both linguistic and legal contexts. While in Ukrainian, the term “вчений” (scientist) originates from the root “вч,” historically associated with knowledge and learning, “науковець” (researcher) is a more recent formation that reflects the professional and functional nature of scientific activity [1]. In the global context, different languages and legal systems approach this distinction with varying degrees of specificity. In English, the terms “scientist” and “researcher” are distinguished based on their scope of application. “Scientist” typically refers to individuals engaged in natural or technical sciences, emphasizing expertise within a particular field. Conversely, “researcher” is a broader term that includes individuals conducting studies across various disciplines, regardless of their level of academic recognition. This approach ensures inclusivity, covering doctoral candidates, earlycareer researchers, and professionals involved in applied research. French terminology exhibits a similar distinction, where “scientifique” encompasses both meanings but requires additional clarifications to define an individual’s role. “Chercheur” corresponds to “researcher” and applies to anyone involved in research activities, irrespective of their scientific domain. Furthermore, hierarchical distinctions such as “professeur” or “directeur de recherche” indicate specific academic or research statuses, demonstrating the French system’s tendency toward contextualizing terms based on professional recognition. Conclusions and prospects for development. The differentiation of terms related to scientific and research activities plays a crucial role in legal and academic discourse. The linguistic and legal distinctions between “scientist” and “researcher” not only reflect cultural and historical differences but also impact the regulatory framework governing scientific work. Future research should focus on standardizing these definitions across international legislation to ensure clarity in scientific and academic communications. Additionally, further comparative legal studies could contribute to refining terminology, enhancing cooperation between researchers and policymakers on a global scale.

Legal discourse is characterised by unique grammatical, lexical and stylistic features which are meant to enhance clarity and precision in the legal content. However, from a critical perspective, some of the discursive and stylistic features used alienate the common person and elevate judges and lawyers to an ideological pedestal. This study undertook a Critical Discourse Analysis of Kenya Supreme Court judgements on election petitions and civil cases with a view to investigate the discursive features used to represent legal ideology. The study was guided by Critical Discourse Analysis theory and a qualitative research design was used. The population for this study comprised the judgements made by the Kenya Supreme Court since its inception in 2010. Purposive sampling was used to identify five judgements on election petitions and civil cases. Guided by the CDA theory, features representing legal ideology were explored and discussed. The features include use of lexical stylistic features, performative verbs, legitimation, presuppositions, argumentation, interrogative forms, metaphors, precedence and predication. These features were meant to create precision and authority in the Supreme Court judgements. However, from a critical perspective, it was imminent that the features led to elevation of judges and lawyers as custodians of justice while the ordinary person was excluded from the legal process. The insight from this study is applicable to Forensic Linguistics and legal drafting. Judges and lawyers ought to use language in such a way that the common person is not excluded. Technical terminology should be used when necessary more so in contexts that involve only the legal personnel. In legal contexts that involves the ordinary person, plain language should be used.

When should states publicly attribute cyber intrusions? Whilst this is a question governments increasingly grapple with, academia has hardly helped in providing answers. This article describes the stages of public attribution and provides a Public Attribution Framework designed to explain, guide, and improve decision making of public attribution by states. Our general argument is that public attribution is a highly complex process which requires trade-offs of multiple considerations. Effective public attribution not only necessitates a clear understanding of the attributed cyber operation and the cyber threat actor, but also the broader geopolitical environment, allied positions and activities, and the legal context. This also implies that more public attribution is not always better. Public attribution carries significant risks, which are often badly understood. We propose the decision maker’s attitude towards public attribution should be one of ‘strategic, coordinated pragmatism’. Public attribution – as part of a strategy – can only be successful if there is a consistent goal, whilst the avenues for potential negative counter effects are assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Objective: This research aims to clarify the legal provisions governing administrative decisions and their legal structure. It seeks to analyze the fundamental elements that distinguish administrative decisions from similar concepts while exploring their legal validity and limitations. Method: The study employs a qualitative legal analysis method, focusing on the formal and objective pillars required for an administrative decision to be legally valid. This involves a comparative examination of relevant legal frameworks and administrative practices. Results: The research identifies the distinct elements of administrative decisions that differentiate them from other legal concepts. Additionally, it highlights the mechanisms by which administrative decisions are terminated, either through cancellation or withdrawal, ensuring their alignment with public interest and the continuity of public services. Novelty: The study provides a comprehensive legal perspective on the structure and termination of administrative decisions, offering insights into their binding authority and unique characteristics. It contributes to a deeper understanding of how administrative actions serve public interests while maintaining legal validity.

The purpose of the study is to clarify the specifics of the phraseological representation of legal concepts that have colour elements in their composition in the English and Russian legal discourse. The subject of the study is phraseological units with colour designation in English and Russian, used in legal texts. By studying the phraseological fund of the language, the general and specific features of the worldview of representatives of the compared linguistic cultures are clarified. The application of the means of colour designation in the phraseological component of the legal discourse contributes to the establishment of the peculiarities of the national-cultural mentality. The following methods were used in the course of the study: classification method, semantic method, modeling, quantitative method of processing the results obtained. The scientific novelty of the work consists in the study of legal phraseological units with a colour component that have not previously been considered when comparing English and Russian. As a result of the work carried out, we received information for the first time that the system of colour designation in the transmission of English legal concepts by metaphorical or metonymic transfer is much more developed than similar phraseological units in the Russian language. This phenomenon is explained by the development and stability of the common law system based on the principle of historicism and continuity, as well as the possibility of fixing the figurative perception of legal concepts in formal legal discourse. A significant part of the examples selected for the study demonstrates psycholinguistic patterns in their formation and functioning in language, and more specifically, in legal texts.

Impacting on Intimacy: Negotiating the Marriage Equality Debate

In my article, I present the person metaphor as the constitutive term for the theory of artificial persons. We have been dealing with various manners of reading the nature of the legal person, and consequently of law in general, especially private law (Privatrecht), since Roman times to this day. The point of departure for my deliberations, in which I try to demonstrate the nature of metaphorical expressions used in building legal theories, is a statement by Paul Kirchhof, who demanded that metaphorical expressions be eradicated from positive (statutory) law. In my article, I ask whether the demand can also be applied to theoretical deliberations of lawyers on the nature of law. Based on examples from legal discussions on the nature of the legal person, I formulate the claim that Paul Kirchhof’s demand should be applied only to positive law texts. Metaphorical expressions have no raison d’etre in such texts, especially if they are meant to serve as terms. A different situation occurs where a metaphorical expression is the basis for building a legal system and relations among its components. At this phase of developing law, metaphorical expressions give rise to similarities on which its functions depend. Therefore, at the stage of structuring the meanings of legal terms, corresponding to the vagueness of the metaphor are the important processes of defining and then using legal terms.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2175-7968.2017v37n2p288Debra Russel, presidente da World Association of Sign Language Interpreters (WASLI) desde 2011, é uma renomada pesquisadora da área de interpretação de ASL-Inglês (American Sign Language[1][-Inglês) em contextos jurídicos. No ano de 2002, Debra publicou o livro intitulado Interpreting in legal contexts: Consecutive and simultaneous interpretation, o qual contribuiu significativamente para a formação de intérpretes de línguas de sinais que atuam no domínio jurídico. Nesse trabalho, organizado em cinco capítulos, verificam-se diversos temas pertinentes e frequentes no cotidiano dos intérpretes que atuam em diferentes espaços da área jurídica.[1] Língua de Sinais Americana é a tradução de American Sign Language (ASL).

The gendering of organisations and management has been established through an analytical approach (Broadbridge and Hearn 2008), even if it is frequently questioned. However, much less attention has been given to the notion of ‘the gendered corporation’. Debates on gender and gendering corporations have been superseded, even undermined by discussions on ‘diversity’, in both theory and in practice (Hearn and Collinson 2006). The notion of diversity is now widely in use in both management and analytical discourses, sometimes critically, often less so. At the same time, the concept of intersectionality (Davis 1981, Crenshaw 1989, 1991, Collins 1990, Meekosha and Pettman 1991, McCall 2005, Meekosha 2006) remains far less developed in studies of organisations, perhaps because it, in some ways, challenges any simple approach to or prescription of promoting diversity. Perhaps a key issue is that diversity can mean almost anything to anyone, and for that reason it can function as an empty, and perhaps profoundly ideological signifier, while the concept of intersectionality complicates and demystifies ideology. Thus the notion of ‘the gendered intersectional corporation’ is not, or at least rarely, discussed.