The Truth in Psychiatry and Neurosciences

268 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Anatomy of Disillusion: Martin Heidegger's Notion of Truth. By W. B. Macomber . (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. xi+227. $7.00) The general questioning of philosophy today by itself, its scrutiny of its principles , methods, and intentions seems to reflect a crisis in philosophy, a crisis which comes into focus in regard to the question, what is L,~ath?Whereas many Anglo-American philosophers have more or less accepted various forms of the correspondence theory of truth and have been satisfied that propositional h'~aths are the only truths we can have, Heidegger has been interested in a~.~rtaining the ground of the L~uth of propositions, the essence of truth~ Macomber's analysis of Heidegger's conception of truth is sympathetic, occasionally bold, and generally tolerant in the face of Heidegger's most paradoxical pronouncements. Basically, Heidegger has two "arguments" against what he describes as the traditional theory of truth (the view that truth is adaequatio intellectus et rei, a theory which underlies Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: the correspondence theory of truth), the one logical, the other existential. Heidegger axgues that the traditional conception of truth has achieved the status of a self-evident dictum, a rigid doctrine. The question he raises is, what are the conditions for the possibility of this notion of truth? Although it is often assumed that the correspondence between judgment and things is a natural conception of truth, Heidegger claims that it is the product of an historical-cultural tradition since even Das Natilrliche ist immer geschichtlich. There is an ontological ground for this theory of truth, an accessibility of phenomena to the activity of discovery. Hence, Heidegger is concerned with a search for the ground of truth in the openness (Lichtung) which is the source of meaning in Dasein's experience (p. 24). The logical tracing of the assumption of correspondence between judgment and things leads to the question of Dasein's encounter with Seiendes, with "innerworldly beings." The nature of truth must be sought in worldliness--the condition of all human experience--in the ontologischen Bedeutung of the immediate, nontheoretical involvement of Dasein with the world in which he finds himself (p. 35). Propositional truth is possible because DaseLn is itself 'in' truth. The logical analysis of the basis of the truth of correspondence leads to a phenomenological analysis of the active discovery of truth, the encounter with the 'event' of truth, a description of the existential 'encounter' with truth. In his interpretation of the emergence of truth by virtue of a breakdown in life, a failure of instrumentality (e.g., the image of the broken hammer), Macomber insists upon a ~polarity in Heidegger's writings between beauty and instrumentality which seems strained (p. 49). Instrumentality, as well as the comportment towards art works, is a significant aspect of Dasein's being and, on occasion (in his essay Das Ding), Heidegger eliminates the distinction between the two (e.g., he describes the emergence to presence of the lgeing of a common utensil [a pitcher] in terms of its function). In discussing the notion that "nothing" is more primordial than negation Macomber seems to be led to make some rather exaggerated claims. Thus, for example, he claims that the concept of nothing plays the same role in human experience (for Heidegger) as the Platonic ideas insofar as the encounter with nothing enables us to understand what it means to be (p. 57). The Platonic form (eidos) is atemporal while nothingness is encountered within the horizon of temporality. To overemphasize the 'nothing' as the basis of intelligibility seems to undermine the interpretative activity of Dasein who wrests meaning from phenomena, to neglect the constituting activity of human understanding . In his treatment of Heidegger's notion of das Nichts Macomber is quite uncritical. He claims that the notion of nothing is like Aristotle's conception of nous BOOK REVIEWS 269 which does not have a nature of its own, which is no-thing. Then he adds that it resembles Kant's thing-in-itself except that the ding-an-sich is extratemporal whereas das Nicht is temporally conditioned. How, one may wonder, can what is not...

Literary works cannot be construed simply as one among other discourses with the primary intention of advancing truths. This argument, along with the argument against the Theory of Novelistic Truth, is based on a conception of truth and truth-telling which is located within a nexus of activities such as making judgements, reasoning, providing evidence, questioning, debating, falsifying, and so forth: within a practice, as we have called it, of enquiry. There is clearly a conceptual link between this notion of truth and that of knowledge. What is known is true, and what is not true does not constitute knowledge but mere opinion. Knowledge is achieved by marshalling evidence supporting whatever truth-claim is being made. These conceptions of knowledge and truth are basic to the concept of science and they guarantee what may be called the cognitive value of the insights achieved in science. This is so not merely in the natural sciences, but also in the social sciences and in history. The doubts that have been raised about the scientific status of these latter disciplines concern just the applicability in these disciplines of these notions of truth and knowledge. And what has been established so far in this discussion is that they cannot simply be presumed to explain the cognitive status of literature. There are two possible ways out of this impasse. One is to redefine the concepts of knowledge and truth-seeking, at least loosening the connection with supportive evidence and argument. The other is a more radical redefinition of the whole notion of cognitive value, severing any necessary connection with the concepts of knowledge and truth. This chapter focuses on the first alternative.

Can Tarski's definition of truth be taken to be an analysis of truth – i.e., a method of defining formal truth predicates that are capable of playing the role of truth in all theoretical contexts in which that notion is needed? It is argued that although Tarski's truth predicates can play many of the roles demanded of truth, they cannot play the role of truth in theories of meaning and interpretation. Crucial to the argument is the observation that there is a conceptual connection between our ordinary notions of truth and meaning, in virtue of which statements of the truth conditions of sentences provide some information about their meanings. Since there is no corresponding connection between Tarski's notion of truth and the notion of meaning, statements of the Tarski‐truth conditions of sentences provide no information about meaning. The chapter closes with a detailed defense of Tarski's model‐theoretic analysis of logical truth and logical consequence against John Etchemendy's objections to it.

What is the role of a notion of truth in our form of life? What is it to possess a notion of truth? How different would we be, if we did not possess a notion of truth? Gulliver’s description of three peoples encountered during his fifth travel will help me to answer. One might say that the basic anti-realist tenet is that we should explain the notion of truth by connecting it with our practice of assertion. In this sense the outcome of my commentary of the fifth part of Gulliver’s Travels will amount to a non-reductive anti-realist conception of truth. It can be called a dialectical conception of truth because it focuses on a particular way of resolving disagreements: an epistemically virtuous practice of verbal exchange that cares for truth. The main thesis is that an implicit awareness of the epistemically virtuous practice is a necessary condition for being in full possession of the notion of truth. The commentary will also involve an argument against deflationism and a critique of some claims made by Huw Price.

Nietzsche's Pragmatism: A Study on Perspectival Thought

In the preceding chapters, I have outlined the development of Nietzsche’s concern with a conception of truth that aimed at the ‘real world’ or thing-in-itself. Nietzsche attacks this conception of truth both because he considers the idea of the ‘real world’ or thing-in-itself to be meaningless and because it is defined in opposition to and thus inherently devalues, appearance, sense experience, the corporeal and the multiplicity of perspectives that make up life. The reification of this notion of truth implies a culture that is fundamentally ascetic and life-denying. Countering this notion of a non-perspectival truth, premised on the ‘real world’, Nietzsche considers all knowledge to be inherently perspectival. I have shown how he develops his cultural critique of the conception of truth as the ‘real world’ in terms of an analysis of the perspectives that have required, and gained power from, this ascetic interpretation. Nietzsche develops a theory of the will to truth that, in serving various drives and interests, has been associated with the ascetic ideal. The will to truth is shaped in a contingent, historical process but also comes to influence and shape that process itself. It contains, therefore, the possibility of being transformed by, and of transforming, the context of interrelating drives in which it operates.

Some years ago, Strawson argued that the presence of ambiguous terms in a language made some of Quine's claims about the adequacy of the theory of reference quite untenable ([8]). In this paper, I would like to argue that the presence of ambiguous terms does raise a question about Quine's claims that a Tarski definition can be given for a regimented language adequate for serious purposes, and about his claim that the Tarski paradigm adequately clarifies the notion of truth in ordinary language. I shall also argue that the presence of ambiguous terms raises a difficulty for Davidson's program of using a Tarski-like analysis to give a theory of meaning for natural languages. In the end, their presence raises a question about the Tarski material adequacy itself, the condition which straightforwardly and intuitively is said to guarantee that the notion of truth being defined is a notion of truth.

1.施萊爾瑪赫(Friedrich Schleiermacher)對於詮釋學發展的貢獻 施萊爾瑪赫在詮釋學發展的歷史上做了一個決定性的轉向，當他提出來「普遍的詮釋學」(Universal Hermeneutics)，詮釋學將應用於所有文本的詮釋。當傳統詮釋學包含了理解、說明以及應用時，施萊爾瑪赫所注意的是詮釋學為「理解的藝術」。施萊爾瑪赫也引入心理學的詮釋，可以藉其穿透文本作者的個體性和靈魂。他要詮釋學成為系統化，且批評先前的詮釋學只是「規則的合併」以及缺乏系統的一致性。毋寧說，它們是處理不同問題組合的方法。施萊爾瑪赫的詮釋學指向避免文本的誤解。這部份最後的討論是高達美對施萊爾瑪赫的批評。 2.狄爾泰(Wilhelm Dilthey)對哲學詮釋學的貢獻 狄爾泰寫了關於施萊爾瑪赫的論文，包括了新教詮釋學的歷史，自宗教改革以來作為第二參考的書籍。他是個博學的學者且在很多主題上有所論述。對於我們的目的而言，狄爾泰是個具有熱情的生命哲學家，他置放了人文和社會科學在一個和自然科學平等的立足點，藉由奠基在詮釋學上發展了一個基本的方法論。但是在科學的競爭之下，他找尋”Allgemeingultigkeit”，一個普遍的有效性，這樣做他朝向了給予太多的基礎到科學上思想的方法。他仍然是個哲學詮釋學主要發展的人物。 3.海德格(Martin Heidegger)對哲學詮釋學之前以及在《存有與時間》的貢獻 哲學詮釋學發展的決定性轉向是在海德格，這位與生俱來，有原創性的哲學家的早期作品。他在弗萊堡(Freiburg)是胡塞爾(Edmund Husserl)的助手，且在胡塞爾的現象學創立了一個有用的超越傳統哲學的方法，但是他仍然太過於依存於胡塞爾科學的有效性。 第一部份：海德格早期的演說：《存有學－事實性的詮釋學》 這本書在海德格過世後才出版(1988)在1999 年才出版英文翻譯，海德格這一系列藉由事實性詮釋學的存有學給了我們一個關於他的詮釋學理解意義。他規避了傳統詮釋學的意義，回到了古希臘hermeneueinc和hermeneia的慣用法。他嘗試超越當代客體性的限制，經由回返到古希臘時期一般語言的慣用法。詮釋學遇到以口說詮釋的荷馬，發表，翻譯和解釋。他的詮釋學歷史的說明在柏拉圖和亞里斯多德之後是個奠基在希臘慣用法豐富性的遺失與衰微。但是詮釋學對海德格來說是個接近某物的方法，這些早期的演講詮釋學成了接近事實性的方法，是前詮釋理解的領域作為此有(Dasein)面對著生活。 最後詮釋學成為對於此有自我理解的方法，但是在寫給他學生Engelbert Kerbs的信，海德格也強調了認識的歷史特質。我們從我們在歷史的情境理解，我們的理解形成的結構是經由歷史形塑概念甚至是我們的語言。在狄爾泰的詮釋學他也強調理解的歷史基礎。海德格從狄爾泰採取這個觀點。海德格在他的演講定義詮釋學為「事實性的參與，接近，審問和說明的一致方法。」詮釋學是詮釋不只是理解作為認識的消極過程，而是積極的參與、審問和接近。事實性本身是詮釋的，它透過問題和答案理解某物。海德格走回我們理解必要條件的因素，理解的「前結構」。他說這個前有的部份，屬於認知和理解的本質，我們理解某物「為」某物，且我們理解它在一個特定的歷史情境。更進一步，我們了解它在一個期待的存在視域，一個經由不確定性喚起的視域，經由未來基礎問題的視域，那是「可能性存有」的視域，對於特殊存有在特殊時空可能的視域。這些早期海德格的作品已經發現可能性存有的意義。 所有這些都領導我們到一個新的人文科學的概念。除了作為一個具有理性的動物，如亞里斯多德所言，人是一個包含可能未來的存有，包含時間性的存有。人是尋找了解他們自身的存有。海德格說到，詮釋學提供一個對於人新概念的觀點。第二部份：存有與時間(Being and Time)(1927) 詮釋學首次提到是在《存有與時間》的第七節，海德格已詮釋現象學為如其所是。他發現了「現象學描述的意義作為在詮釋學倚靠的方法，此有的現象學的logos具有hermeneuein的特質，此有的現象學是使用這個字基本含意的詮釋學，它指示了詮釋的工作。」在第二個意義，海德格在詮釋學裡發現對於此有存有意義揭蔽的方法。第三個意義是詮釋此有為連續地使它的未來成為可能，它的未來存有。 第31節對詮釋學很重要，因為此有的存有被表明為理解。理解是人存在的中心過程，在第32節標題是「詮釋和理解」，詮釋建築在理解上。它視察周遭的世界且理解事物作為這個或那個，總是從未作為純粹的知覺。正如海德格所言，「視力的觀看總是已經理解和詮釋」，換言之，沒有純粹的知覺優先於詮釋，總是有發問和詮釋的視域。 第44節，海德格也談論真理，在它的現代形式作為是真的陳述，是從總是在進行的理解和詮釋較深的過程所導出的。但是當真理被正確的定義為存有的聯結，因此它進入基礎存有學的視域。它是存有的開顯，這種洞察是引導他走向藝術觀點的部份，在下個演講將會討論。

In this article, the author examines the concept of truth by M. Heidegger in light of social and epistemological issues. He believes that “truth as unconcealment” is a more productive approach than the theory of correspondence or coherence since it can capture a number of socio-humanitarian concepts where verification is complicated. The author believes that Heidegger’s existential-historical thought about the “essence of truth” receives a logical continuation in the “esoteric initiative” or “sygetics”, which — if it is explicated in relation to the social attitudes and imperatives of the thinker — means the strategy of minimizing the public sphere and returning to one’s own. With regard to the institutional (re)production of knowledge, this means a chance for philosophy and scientific research to start a new existence on the other side of academic, professional education, i.e. outside the modern university. Finally, Heidegger’s concept of truth questions the scientistic image of science and philosophy. It shows that genuine knowledge cannot totally depend on the requirement of rational reconstruction of propositions.

Providing a concise and accessible introduction to the work of the celebrated twentieth century German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, this book focuses on the aspects of Gadamer’s philosophy that have been the most influential among architects, educators in architecture, and architectural theorists. Gadamer’s philosophy of art gives a special place to the activity of play as it occurs in artistic creation. His reflections on meaning and symbolism in art draw upon his teacher, Martin Heidegger, while moving Heidegger’s thought in new directions. His theory of interpretation, or philosophical hermeneutics, offers profound ways to understand the influence of the past upon the present and to appropriate cultural history in ever new forms. For architects, architectural theorists, architectural historians, and students in these fields, Gadamer’s thought opens a world of possibilities for understanding how building today can be rich with human meaning, relating to architecture’s history in ways that do not merely repeat nor repudiate that history. In addition, Gadamer’s sensitivity to the importance of practical thinking – to the way that theory arises out of practice – gives his thought a remarkable usefulness in the everyday work of professional life.

Hermeneutics was born and developed in the West, specifically in response to the theological problem of Christianity, and always claimed to be an effective solution to the interpretation of Scripture. With existence of various schools, hermeneutics has also various shades and resulted different interpretations. Such as Schleiermacher, followed by Wilhelm Dilthey and Emilio Betti as initiators of hermeneutics methodology. Martin Heidegger and Gadamer followed with their ontological hermeneutics, and continued by Habermas with his critical hermeneutics. After that, the critical ontological hermeneutics initiated by either Paul Ricoeur, or Rudolf Bultman with his theological hermeneutics, and Derrida with his deconstructive hermeneutics. Among those schools, the writers interested in reviewing the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur which represents a distinctive theory of interpretation. His idea considered to be a bridge of the fierce debate between methodological traditions and philosophical traditions represented by Emilio Betti and Hans Georg Gadamer. The thought of Ricoeur was also claimed as a mediator between the positions of the romantic tradition of Schleiermacher and Dilthey with philosophy hermeneutic by Martin Heidegger. In another side, he was placed as a combination between the two great philosophical tradition, that’s German phenomenology and France structuralism. Furthermore, the thought of Ricoeur is a revision to the thought of Dilthey about explanation (erklaren) and understanding (verstehen). Through this paper, the writer will attempt to unravel the thought of Paul Ricoeur, and in the end, will clearly known the position of Ricoeur among other hermeneutics initiators.

The article considers the relevance of quality training of future teachers of natural sciences in modern conditions, which is due to the processes of reforming all links of the education system, global changes in the European labor market, the development of world science and pedagogical practice, as well as the shift of emphasis from the accumulation of knowledge to the mastery of methods of activity. The main strategic tasks and requirements for the quality of the educational process and the professional level of modern teachers are analyzed. The need for future teachers to master new functions, new content of activities, search and introduction of modern methods of teaching and learning was determined. Special attention is paid to the formation of ten key competencies among graduates of general secondary education institutions. The article deals with scientific studies of the problems of the individual's scientific research activity, which focuses on the formation of research skills in various categories of subjects. The importance of the formation of scientific-research competence in the system of training future specialists, researched by many Ukrainian and foreign scientists, is emphasized. The multidimensional process of scientific research activity in the formation of the personality of future technology teachers, which includes the development of research skills, independence and competences, is analyzed. The essence and theoretical justification of the students' research activity is defined, which involves the analysis of the concepts «scientific activity» and «research activity», especially in the context of the organization of such activity in higher education. The distinction between the concepts of «scientific activity», «scientific-organizational activity», «scientific-pedagogical activity» and «scientific-technical activity» is outlined. It is emphasized the need to refer to the reference-source base to clarify the specifics of the interpretation of the term «scientific-research activity».  The article examines the importance of research activity in the context of personality formation of future technology teachers. The role of innovative learning technologies, such as problem presentation, heuristic methods, game methods and case methods, in the development of critical thinking, research skills and independence of students is analyzed. The growing importance of information and communication technologies in education requires from future teachers the ability to critically evaluate and use online resources to ensure the quality of learning and active scientific research. The training of future technology teachers should include the development of skills to work in a hybrid research environment, using both traditional and digital resources. Developed research competence is a key aspect of improving the quality of the educational process and includes a system of motives, states, special attitudes, research knowledge, skills and abilities. 

The intuitionistic conception of truth defended by Dummett, Martin Lof and Prawitz, according to which the notion of proof is conceptually prior1 to the notion of truth, is a particular version of the epistemic conception of truth. The paradox of knowability (first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963) has been described by many authors2 as an argument which threatens the epistemic, and the intuitionistic, conception of truth. In order to establish whether this is really so, one has to understand what the epistemic conception of truth really is. So I shall start inpart I with a description of the matter at issue between theepistemic conception of truth and the opposite position, therealistic conception of truth. Inpart II I shall very briefly describe the paradox. Inpart III I shall try to answer the question which appears in the title of this paper: “What can we learn from the paradox of knowability?”. My conclusion will be that the paradox of knowability is not a refutation of the epistemic conception of truth, but helps us to better formulate (and understand) such a view.

The notion of practical wisdom is one of Aristotle's greatest inventions. It has inspired philosophers as diverse as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Elizabeth Anscombe, Michael Thompson, and John McDowell. Now a leading scholar of ancient philosophy offers a challenge to received accounts of practical wisdom by situating it in the larger context of Aristotle's views on knowledge and reality. That happiness is the end pursued by practical wisdom is commonly agreed. What is disputed is whether happiness is to be found in the practical life of political action, in which we exhibit courage, temperance, and other virtues of character, or in the contemplative life, where theoretical wisdom is the essential virtue. C. D. C. Reeve argues that the dichotomy is bogus, that these lives are in fact parts of a single life, which is the best human one. In support of this view, he develops innovative accounts of many of the central notions in Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology, including matter and form, scientific knowledge, dialectic, educatedness, perception, understanding, political science, practical truth, deliberation, and deliberate choice. These accounts are based directly on freshly translated passages from many of Aristotle's writings. Action, Contemplation, and Happiness is an accessible essay not just on practical wisdom but on Aristotle's philosophy as a whole.

I have been invited to speak to you about as experience. (1) This is a subject I would scarcely have chosen myself, and I even hesitated to accept an invitation that involved speaking about my own experience. For the end result of intellectual endeavor is actually all that should be made public, not the inner process leading to it; what can be of more than private interest about the latter? I think that what is expected of me in surveying my past is to glean from my own experiences something like paradigmatic features that lie beyond the sphere and thus reveal something about contemporary thought in general. Approached for this purpose in the evening of a long life devoted to the study of philosophy, I shouldn't disappoint this expectation--taking into account the danger that what Nietzsche called cursed ipsissimosity might play its tricks upon one. I therefore accepted this disquieting task. My hesitation is heightened by the fact that Max Weber, who in 1919 gave a celebrated address entitled als Beruf (Scholarship as a Vocation), is looking over my shoulder, so to speak. The echo of his title was probably intentional on the part of my hosts, but I hope it does not leave me open to comparison with Weber's incomparable example. In contrast to the more objective nature of the word vocation in Weber's address, the reference to personal experience in my title forces me to enter the subjective, autobiographical sphere with all its unique and accidental qualities. I shall attempt here to use memories as guideposts leading to reflections of a more general nature. Unlike the narrower Anglo-American sense of the word science, the German Wissenschaft in my title also embraces the humanities and the social sciences; and it must primarily be these, including philosophy, that my assignment encompasses. The wissenschaftlich character of these disciplines is different from that of the exact sciences dealing with nature; nowhere else has so much thought been given to this difference as in Germany. In Heidelberg an audience scarcely needs to be reminded that at the turn of the century Heinrich Rickert made a distinction between a field of inquiry whose goal is explanation and one whose goal is understanding. In addition, I must mention Wilhelm Dilthey, whose lifework focused on the concept of experience. And then there is the philosophical theory of hermeneutics, which was not developed until my time and whose Nestor, Hans-Georg Gadamer, is still among us. These are the names of philosophers, and they point to the quite different character of philosophy as a discipline. Going beyond the specialized individual sciences, philosophy reflects--as the preceding examples indicate--upon their differing approaches to knowledge and their conception of truth, and in the process philosophy becomes itself a highly developed specialty. This self-mirroring of knowledge on a new level of truth can in principle be repeated at will in the form of ever new reflections on reflections. As concerns understanding, the cognitive approach of the humanities, it is clear that personal experience, understood as empathy with the object--itself the concrete embodiment of experience--is an indissoluble part of the intellectual process from start to finish, pervading the entire interpretation. How else can one study history, for example--the history of art, literature, religion, politics, of all the past thoughts, feelings, and actions of humankind? We must use our imagination; what has been experienced must be re-experienced. For here one subject encounters another subject, which no matter how alien and far removed in historical time, still remains human and thus approachable by us, albeit open to endless interpretations. But why should this encounter take place, why should the past be re-experienced? Goethe answered this question with the following words: Those unable to give themselves an account of the past three thousand years Must remain in the dark, naive, And live from day to day. …