The Wisdom of Strategic Voting

Numerous studies investigate how personality traits and individual characteristics influence vote choice. However, the effect of risk attitudes on the proclivity to cast a strategic vote has not been tested yet. This article tests whether the likelihood of defecting from one’s preferred party is influenced by attitudes towards risk. I argue that the utility stemming from expressing a preference by opting for the favored party is a sure thing, whereas the utility stemming from an instrumental choice depends on some probabilities, and consequently that strategic voting is riskier than sincere voting. Using survey data from the United Kingdom and Canada, I find that risk-averse voters are less likely to vote strategically than risk-acceptant ones.

How widespread is strategic voting in two-round electoral systems, and which types of voters are most likely to engage in such behavior? While runoff elections are common in presidential systems around the world, research on strategic voting in these settings remains limited. This paper explores four different types of strategic behavior that are possible in two-round systems, including some types, such as “strong-to-weak” strategic voting, which are not possible in single-shot elections. We use a nationwide survey to assess the incidence and correlates of strategic voting in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, where thirteen candidates competed in the first round. We find evidence of “weak-to-strong” strategic voting at a similar rate to that documented in single-round elections in other countries. We find little evidence of other types of strategic voting. Furthermore, we show that voters’ confidence in their predictions of the likely electoral outcome and their ideological preferences strongly predict strategic voting. These results point to the importance of accounting for voter beliefs and attitudes in addition to objective voter characteristics to explain strategic voting.

Approval voting (AV) has been defended and criticized from many different viewpoints. In this paper, I will concentrate on two topics: preference intensities and strategic behavior. A voter is usually defined as voting sincerely under AV if he or she gives a vote to all candidates standing higher in his or her ranking than the lowest-ranking candidate for whom he or she gives a vote. There are no ‘holes’ in a voter’s approval set.1 Since this kind of behavior is extremely rare, it has been claimed that approval voting makes strategic voting unnecessary (Brams and Fishburn 1978). On the other hand, Niemi (1984) has argued (see also van Newenhizen and Saari 1988a,b), that even though strategic voting may be rare under AV, even incere voting may require a considerable amount of strategic thinking under this rule. If strategic voting is defined by the fact that a voter gives his or her vote to a candidate who is lower in his or her ranking than some candidate for whom he or she does not vote (see, e.g., Brams and Sanver 2006), I will be studying strategic behavior but not strategic voting under AV here.KeywordsPublic ChoiceVote RuleStrategic BehaviorVote ShareSincere BehaviorThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Strategic voting in British elections

Majority Runoff Elections: Strategic Voting and Duverger's Hypothesis

The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters’ behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there may exist an equilibrium in which three candidates receive votes. Its characteristics challenge common beliefs: (i) neither sincere voting by all voters nor pushover tactics (i.e., supporters of the front-runner voting for a less preferred candidate so as to influence who will face the front-runner in the second round) are supported in equilibrium, and (ii) the winner does not necessarily have democratic legitimacy since the Condorcet winner may not even participate in the second

The literature on strategic voting has provided evidence that some electors support large parties at the voting booth to avoid wasting their vote on a preferred but uncompetitive smaller party. In this paper we argue that district conditions also elicit reactions from abstainers and other party voters. We find that, when ballot gains and losses from different types of responses to the constituency conditions are taken into account, large parties still benefit moderately from strategic behaviour, while small parties obtain substantial net ballot losses. This result stems from a model that allows for abstention in the choice set of voters, and uses counterfactual simulation to estimate the incidence of district conditions in the Spanish general elections of 2000 and 2008.

Models of strategic candidacy analyze the incentives of candidates to run in an election. Most work on this topic assumes that strategizing only takes place among candidates, whereas voters vote truthfully. In this paper, we extend the analysis to also include strategic behavior on the part of the voters. (We also study cases where only candidates or only voters are strategic.) We consider two settings in which strategic voting is well-defined and has a natural interpretation: majority-consistent voting with single-peaked preferences and voting by successive elimination. In the former setting, we analyze the type of strategic behavior required in order to guarantee desirable voting outcomes. In the latter setting, we determine the complexity of computing the set of potential outcomes if both candidates and voters act strategically.

This paper seeks to prove that under a large class of group decision rules some sincere voting situations will be unstable because of strategic manipulation by single individuals. The concept of stability used is weaker than the stability concepts figuring in many earlier contributions in this area, insofar as under the concept used here any individual, while disrupting a given voting situation, considers the possibility of retaliation by other individuals. DUMMETT AND FARQUHARSON [2], Murakami [7], Farquharson [3], Sen [14], Gibbard [4], Satterthwaite [13], and Pattanaik [10, 11, and 12] have discussed various aspects of the problem of stability in voting. The general conclusion which emerges from these writings seems to be that stability of all possible sincere voting situations (which implies the absence of strategic distortion of preferences by voters) is an extremely rare feature of democratic group decision procedures. However, the notion of stability or equilibrium underlying many of these contributions is a simple one and does not take into account several phenomena usually associated with strategic voting such as the possibility of counter-coalitions when a coalition (of one or more individuals) threatens to disrupt a voting situation. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces a less demanding notion of stability which takes into account the possibility of formation of countercoalitions when an individual seeks to influence the outcome in his own favor by strategic manipulations in voting. Secondly, using this very weak notion of stability, it is shown that, while under the changed definition the possibility of having unstable sincere voting situations because of strategic voting by single individuals is somewhat reduced, invulnerability of all possible sincere voting situations to voting maneuvres of single individuals still remains a very rare property among democratic group decision rules based on pairwise comparisons. We lay down the basic notation and some preliminary definitions in Section 1. In Section 2 we introduce a notion of stability taking into account the possibility of counter-coalitions. Using this very weak definition of stability, in Section 3 we show that under most democratic group decision rules based on pairwise comparisons, there is the danger of having unstable sincere voting situations owing to strategic manipulations by single individuals. We conclude in Section 4.

“The evidence renders it undeniable that a large amount of sophisticated voting occurs – mostly to the disadvantage of the third parties nationally – so that the force of Duverger's psychological factor must be considerable.” William H. Riker (1982:764). For as long as voting procedures have been used to decide important and controversial issues, there have been legislators and electors willing to vote strategically. Theoretical interest in strategic voting dates at least to Pliny the Younger (see Farquharson 1969) and probably earlier. In this chapter, I build on rather more recent and formal treatments of the strategy of voting: those framed in the decision-theoretic and game-theoretic traditions. Most of this work has appeared in the last thirty years and focuses on the behavior of legislators (e.g., Farquharson 1969; McKelvey and Niemi 1978; Miller 1980; Shepsle and Weingast 1984; Banks 1985; Austen-Smith 1987; Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987). This chapter focuses on the other, less well-trodden, branch of research into strategic voting, that dealing with the behavior of voters in mass elections. There are of course many ways to conduct a mass election. This chapter deals in particular with elections in electoral districts that satisfy the following criteria: (1) There is one seat to be filled in the district; and (2) there is only one round of voting, after which the victor is decided. There are many electoral systems that satisfy these criteria: the Anglo-American first-past-the-post system; the Australian alternative vote system; the approval voting system; and so on.

Choice experiments, a survey methodology in which consumers face a series of choice tasks requiring them to indicate their most preferred option from a choice set containing two or more options are used to generate estimates of consumer preferences to determine the appropriate allocation of public resources to competing projects or programs. The analysis of choice-experimental data typically relies on the assumptions that choices of the non-status quo option are demand-revealing and choices of the status quo option are not demand-revealing, but, rather, reflect an underlying behavioral bias in favor of the status quo. This paper reports the results of an experiment demonstrating that both of those assumptions are likely to be invalid. We demonstrate that choice experiments for a public good are vulnerable to the same types of strategic voting that affect other types of multiple-choice voting mechanisms. We show that owing to the mathematics of choice-set design, what actually is strategic voting often is misinterpreted as a behavioral bias for the status quo option. Therefore, we caution against using current choice-experimental methodologies to inform policy making about public goods.

Two dynamic rational choice models of primaries are analyzed that demonstrate both reformers and their critics are right about primaries. Primaries can provide public instruction and a better informed electorate, and they can be poorly designed lotteries: A “recognition” and learning model describes how changing media coverage affects voters' knowledge about candidates and their subsequent voting behavior. A “strategic” voting model describes the dynamic implications of strategic voting and “horse-race” coverage by the media. We find that the recognition model has the normatively appealing dynamic of information leading to broadly self-interested outcomes while the strategy model has the unappealing behavior of a lottery the odds of which are fixed by the media's harsh judgments of who's winning and who's losing.In coming to these conclusions, this paper illustrates a number of methodological points such as the usefulness of macromodels based upon assumptions about individual behavior, the analysis of macromodels using methods from electrical engineering, the strengths and limitations of analytical results versus simulations for understanding dynamic models, and the use of “ideal type” recognition and strategic voting models to clarify the systemic consequences of individual risk aversion and strategic voting. More generally, the paper shows how models can be used as narratives or parables for organizing disparate observations, refining our intuitions, and directing our research efforts.

We introduce incomplete information to a multiparty election under proportional representation: each voter knows her preferences and votes strategically to maximize her payoffs, but is uncertain about the number and the preferences of the other voters. Parties are assumed to be purely office motivated and, hence, the resulting governments are always minimum winning. In this framework, we prove (a) generic existence of equilibria where only two parties receive a positive fraction of the votes and therefore lead to single-party governments and (b) generic inexistence of equilibria that lead to coalition governments. That is, contrary to common wisdom, a proportional rule is found not to promote sincere voting and to be favorable towards single-party governments. The existence of two-party equilibria that lead to single-party governments is robust to parties having ideological concerns.

From Ballot-Boxes to Barracks: Votes, Institutions, and Post-Election Coups

In this paper I study strategic voting behavior in the Argentine Senate election for the City of Buenos Aires in 2013. I estimate and analyze the voter transition matrix between the primary and general elections using a Bayesian hierarchical model for ecological inference, utilizing a rich data set of ballot box data. The results show that strategic behavior is not widespread among the electorate in Buenos Aires. In particular, at least 75 % of voters who had the opportunity to avoid vote wasting by behaving strategically did not. I also find high levels of vote wasting when analyzing other provinces during the same election cycle. These results suggest that these electorates might be composed of a mixture of voters with strategic and expressive motivations, where the expressive factions dominate.