Three principles to understand cognition

This paper discovers that current variational principle and Noether theorem for different physics systems with (in) finite freedom systems have missed the double extremum processes of the general extremum functional that both is deduced by variational principle and is necessarily taken in deducing all the physics laws, but these have not been corrected for over a century since Noether's proposing her famous theorem, which result in the crisis deducing relevant mathematical laws and all physics laws. This paper discovers there is the hidden logic cycle that one assumes Euler-Lagrange equations, and then he finally deduces Euler-Lagrange equations via the equivalent relation in the whole processes in all relevant current references. This paper corrects the current key mistakes that when physics systems choose the variational extreme values, the appearing processes of the physics systems are real physics processes, otherwise, are virtual processes in all current articles, reviews and (text) books. The real physics should be after choosing the variational extreme values of physics systems, the general extremum functional of the physics systems needs to further choose the minimum absolute extremum zero of the general extremum functional, otherwise, the appearing processes of physics systems are still virtual processes. Using the double extremum processes of the general extremum functionals, the crisis and the hidden logic cycle in current variational principle and current Noether theorem are solved. Furthermore, the new mathematical and physical double extremum processes and their new mathematical pictures and physics for (in) finite freedom systems are discovered. This paper gives both general variational principle and general Noether theorem as well as their classical and quantum new physics, which would rewrite all relevant current different branches of science, as key tools of studying and processing them.

Google's project to digitize five of the world's greatest libraries will dramatically extend their search engine reach in the future. Current search-engine philosophy, which asserts that ”any search starts with a question to be answered,” will need to be advanced in terms of Peirce's philosophy: ”Any inquiry begins by creating an hypothesis to be tested, or with abduction.” As conceptual structures researchers prepare to meet access challenges in the world of large Internet knowledge stores, they have a solid foundation in Peirce's theorized stages of inquiry: abduction, deduction, and induction. To indicate how conceptual structures tools must augment collaborative, Internet-based inquiry, we imagine a future scenario in the context of a user-centered testbed, where Peirce scholars apply Peirce's pragmatic theory in their complex manuscript reconstruction work. We suggest that games of inquiry can be developed to formalize user collaboration and technology needs, for improved specification of tool requirements in the testbed context.

The normal phenotype of the glomerular filtration barrier (GFB) and the mechanisms that underlie it have intrigued physiologists, microvascular biologists, and renal physicians for decades, especially because, in health, the multilayered barrier differentially restricts the passage of molecules of

Macro-BIM adoption: Conceptual structures

Pediatric Patient-Reported Outcome Instruments for Research to Support Medical Product Labeling: Report of the ISPOR PRO Good Research Practices for the Assessment of Children and Adolescents Task Force

UC Berkeley Phonology Lab Annual Report (2009) Toward a dynamical interpretation of hierarchical linguistic structure Sam Tilsen 1. Introduction Hierarchy is one of the most important concepts in the scientific understanding of language. From early structuralist approaches of the mid-1800s, through the paradigm shift to generative grammar in the mid-1900s, and onward to the present, connected-object (“branching”) schemas have been used to represent hierarchical constituency relations between linguistic units. Syntactic trees are the most prominent instantiation of such schemas, but similar arboreal schemas have been applied extensively in nearly all domains of linguistic theory. Recently, an alternative conception of hierarchical structure has arisen, which is based upon interactions between waves, or coupled oscillatory systems. This paper presents a synthesis and extension of such approaches, with the aim of advancing a general wave theory of linguistic structure. This wave theory provides a coherent conceptualization of diverse linguistic phenomena, is cognitively plausible, and is a parsimonious theory. Many syntactic and phonological patterns in language can be understood to arise from general principles of wave interaction. Section 1.1 will consider how hierarchy has traditionally been conceptualized and represented in linguistics, and section 1.2 will describe some previous research which leads the way to a wave-based, dynamical systems perspective on linguistic structure. Section 2 will introduce some general principles regarding how hierarchical structure can be conceptualized with dynamical systems, beginning with systems of two waves, then treating systems of three waves, which can be generalized to more complex systems. This is followed in section 3 by several applications of the theory to phonological and syntactic patterns. These include an examination of how segments interact with syllables and how stress interacts with words, as well as a proposal for dynamical modeling of recursive syntactic patterns and syntactic dislocation phenomena. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the cognitive plausibility of this approach, and delineates some issues to guide further development of the theory. 1.1 Hierarchical Structure In this paper we are interested in a structural notion of hierarchy, in which concepts of ranking, relation, and containment play important roles. In order to organize our

I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and Godel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Godel’s sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems.

This paper provides a synopsis of the results of a two year research project to specify a Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) methodology for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). A framework of nine elements is used to structure the specification. These elements are the conceptual basis, scope, structure, tools and techniques, participants, outputs, and delivery mechanism. The paper describes the conceptual basis of the methodology. The specification of each element was based on experiences from action research projects undertaken with a number of small and large companies, surveys and interviews conducted with a number of industrialists, published methodologies and literature.

In this paper I introduce some of the principles which rule meaning making in visual artworks — both in regard to construction and interpretation of meaning. The approach is naturalistic in that aesthetic meaning construction is claimed to rest on features and structures which are intrinsically significant for the visuo-cognitive system in plain, everyday perception: the artist exploits such features, and so doing he transforms the automatisms of perception into a rhetoric of aesthetic intuition. Section 1 of the paper consists of a phenomenological characterization of the aesthetic object as such (in its difference from everyday objects). In the core of the present work, section 2, I give concrete examples (with a general import) of the meaning making tools used in visual art and their roots in everyday perception. The central concern here is to show how purely spatial relations can become significant, or, in other words, how conceptual meaning can be anchored in perception, or, finally, how artists can encode meaning in shape. The final section discusses the general principles ruling the semiotics of the visual artwork and addresses a couple of methodological issues.

Seven and nine year olds were asked to draw two three‐dimensional objects (a cube and a wedge). When there was disjunction between their knowledge of the object's structure and its appearance (cube), they depicted the invariant rather than the variant features and produced rectangular solutions. When differences between the structure and the appearance of the object were minimised (wedge) most children drew a converging form. They could also accurately copy a two‐dimensional converging form. However, the children's knowledge of what the line drawing was supposed to represent did have an effect: in particular, they drew fewer converging obliques when the same line drawing was called a ‘building block’ (a rectangular object) than when it was called a ‘shape’ or a ‘house’ (an object known to contain obliques). A similar pattern of results was observed in a second experiment in which a selection task was used.

This talk will be about different kinds of understanding, including especially that provided by deductive and inductive inference. Examples will be drawn from Galileo, Kepler, and Fermat. Applications will be given to the physicist’s problem of inferring the laws of nature, and to the restricted case of inferring sequences in Sloane’s Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences.While there is much theory and understanding of deductive inference, there is relatively little understanding of the process of inductive inference. Inductive inference is about hypothesizing, hopefully inferring, the laws of physics from observation of the data. It is what Kepler did in coming up with his three laws of planetary motion.Once laws are in place, deductive inference can be used to derive their consequences, which then uncovers much of the understanding in physics.This talk will define inductive inference, state some of its open problems, and give applications to a relatively simpler but still largely unexplored task, namely, inferring a large natural class of algorithmically generated integer sequences that includes (as of this writing) 20in Sloane’s Encyclopedia of integer sequences.KeywordsArtificial IntelligenceCommunication NetworkOpen ProblemProblem ComplexityComputer GraphicThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

2 - Metals

I am very grateful to Richard Nelson and Jack Vromen for kindly commenting on my Economics and Utopia and for making such thoughtful and interesting remarks. Both authors raise several important points, but for reasons of space I shall have to confine myself to those that I see as most important. It is interesting that many of their points concern the state of modern economics. Both Nelson and Vromen pick up one of the main themes of Economics and Utopia: that mainstream economics is limited in its capacity to appraise differences between different types of socio-economic system and variations within types. They do not address other aspects of my argument in that book, concerning for example the possible futures for capitalism itself. Vromen poses a number of questions or criticisms and I shall answer these in the first section. Both Nelson and Vromen discuss the state of modem economics and the degree to which it has failed to address some of the big questions concerning capitalism and its future. I discuss their arguments in the second section. In the third and final section I add some remarks of my own concerning the general state of the social sciences, building on some of the more general arguments concerning the future of capitalism that I raised in Economics and Utopia. RESPONSES TO VROMEN I find myself in agreement with much of what Vromen writes. For instance, when he argues that it is important to distinguish between variety in context and variety in substance, I concur without reservation. He also raises some important questions concerning my use of the principle. I agree entirely that, as I have defined it, it refers to impurity of subsystem, and it cannot be transferred without modification to questions of impurity of motive. Vromen questions whether mainstream economics is either an attempt to erect general economic principles applicable to all economic systems, or a more exclusive reflection of a market-based economy. He detects a possible contradiction in my own view when he asks: how can Hodgson maintain at one and the same time that the scope of mainstream economics is not limited to any particular set of socio-economic systems and that its scope is limited to socio-economic systems in which and figure prominently? I welcome the opportunity to respond here. In my view, mainstream economics (especially since Lionel Robbins) is preoccupied with an universalist attempt to erect general economic principles applicable to all economic systems. But this attempt is largely a failure. Part of the reason for this failure is that all economic history is survey through conceptual lenses that have their origin in one type of system only: market society. Even when some economists analyse non-market phenomena, such as feudalism, the modern family, or the interior of important organizations such as the firm, they see implicit contracts and markets everywhere. They analyze these phenomena with a conceptual toolkit that relates more appropriately to the world of commodities, instrumental rationality, and exchange. But even in the modern world there is much that does not fit this vision. And especially from a broad, historical view, much more is ill suited for these theoretical instruments. As I have explained at greater length in a m ore recent volume (Hodgson 2001), such a view of the limitations of mainstream economics was shared (to some extent) by John Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot, Alfred Marshall, Max Weber, Werner Sombart and Frank Knight. All these writers saw the conceptual tools of mainstream economics as having their place, but this place was exclusively the analysis of a market-based economy. However, I would go further and argue that the core tools of mainstream economics are also limited in their analysis of real markets. I am not suggesting that we have to throw everything mainstream out of the window. …

We describe a way of constructing models for the continuum which does not require an underlying structure of points. With a condition of spatial homogeneity the models have the mathematical structure of a sheaf.

Human digital twins are computational models of the human actions involved in interacting and operating technical artifacts. Such models provide a conceptual and practical tool for artificial intelligence designers when they seek to replace human work with intelligent machines. Indeed, digital twins have long served as models of technical and cyber-physical processes. Human digital twins have such models as their foundations but also include models of human actions. As a result, human digital twin models enable technology designers to model how people interact with intelligent technical artifacts. Yet, development of human digital twins is associated with certain conceptual problems. To clarify the basic idea, we constructed a human digital twin for Minsky’s M-Machine. The abstract conceptual structure of this machine and its generality allowed us to analyze the general properties of human digital twins, their design, and their use as tools in designing intelligent technologies.