Toward model theory through recursive saturation

The notions of recursively saturated and resplendent models grew out of the study of admissible sets with urelements and admissible fragments of Lω1ω, but, when applied to ordinary first order model theory, give us new tools for research and exposition. We will discuss their history in §3.The notion of saturated model has proven to be important in model theory. Its most important property for applications is that if , are saturated and of the same cardinality then = iff ≅ . See, e.g., Chang-Keisler [3]. The main drawback is that saturated models exist only under unusual assumptions of set theory. For example, if 2κ = κ+ then every theory T of L has a saturated model of power κ+. (Similarly, if κ is strongly inaccessible, then every T has a saturated model of power κ.) On the other hand, a theory T like Peano arithmetic, with types, cannot have a saturated model in any power κ with ω ≤ κ ≤ .One method for circumventing these problems of existence (or rather non-existence) is the use of “special” models (cf. [3]). If κ = Σλ<κ2λ, κ < ω, then every theory T of L has a special model of power κ. Such cardinals are large and, themselves, rather special. There are definite aesthetic objections to the use of these large, singular models to prove results about first order logic.

If is a countable recursively saturated structure and T is a recursively axiomatizable theory that is consistent with Th(), then it is well known that can be expanded to a recursively saturated model of T [7, p. 186]. This is what has made recursively saturated models useful in model theory. Recursive saturation is the weakest notion of saturation for which this expandability result holds. In fact, if is a countable model of Pr = Th(ω, +), then can be expanded to a model of first order Peano arithmetic P just in case is recursively saturated (see [3]).In this paper we investigate two natural sets of Turing degrees that tell a good deal about the expandability of a given structure. If is a recursively saturated structure, I() consists of the degrees of sets that are recursive in complete types realized in . The second set of degrees, D(), consists of the degrees of sets S such that is recursive in S-saturated. In general, I() ⊆ D(). Moreover, I() is obviously an “ideal” of degrees. For countable structures , D() is “closed” in the following sense: For any class C ⊆ 2ω, if C is co-r.e. in S for some set S such that , then there is some σ ∈ C such that . For uncountable structures , we do not know whether D() must be closed.

In this paper we show that using implicative algebras one can produce models of set theory generalizing Heyting/Boolean-valued models and realizability models of (I)ZF, both in intuitionistic and classical logic. This has as consequence that any topos which is obtained from a Set-based tripos as the result of the tripos-to-topos construction hosts a model of intuitionistic or classical set theory, provided a large enough strongly inaccessible cardinal exists.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2301.11740

Ehrenfeucht’s lemma asserts that whenever one element of a model of Peano arithmetic is definable from another, they satisfy different types. We consider here the analogue of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma for models of set theory. The original argument applies directly to the ordinal-definable elements of any model of set theory, and, in particular, Ehrenfeucht’s lemma holds fully for models of set theory satisfying V=HOD. We show that the lemma fails in the forcing extension of the universe by adding a Cohen real. We go on to formulate a scheme of natural parametric generalizations of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma, namely, the principles of the form EL(A,P,Q), which asserts that P-definability from A implies Q-discernibility. We also consider various analogues of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma obtained by using algebraicity in place of definability, where a set b is algebraic in a if it is a member of a finite set definable from a. Ehrenfeucht’s lemma holds for the ordinal-algebraic sets, we prove, if and only if the ordinal-algebraic and ordinal-definable sets coincide. Using a similar analysis, we answer two open questions posed earlier by the third author and C. Leahy, showing that (i) algebraicity and definability need not coincide in models of set theory and (ii) the internal and external notions of being ordinal algebraic need not coincide.

In this paper we study the notion of a D-saturated model, which occupies an intermediate position between the notions of a homogeneous model and a saturated model. Both the homogeneous models and the saturated models play a very important role in model theory. For example, the saturated models are the universal domains of the corresponding theories in the sense that is used in algebraic geometry (one can also notice that the algebraically closed fields of infinite transcendence degree, which are the universal domains in algebraic geometry, are the saturated models of the theory of algebraically closed fields); this means that the saturated models realize all what is necessary for the effective study of the corresponding theory.The D-saturated models proved to be useful in various situations. Naturally the question arises on the conditions under which a model is D-saturated. In this paper we indicate some conditions of such sort for weakly o-minimal models and models of stable theories. Namely, for such models we prove that homogeneity and a certain approximation of Dsaturation imply D-saturation.

We prove that the satisfaction relation $\mathcal {N}\models \varphi [\vec a]$ of first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having the structure $\mathcal {N}$ and the formulas $\varphi $ all in common. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and the same standard model of arithmetic $\left \langle {\mathbb N},{+},{\cdot },0,1, <\right \rangle $ , yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same $\left \langle {H}_{\omega _2},{\in }\right \rangle $ or the same rank-initial segment $\left \langle {V}_\delta ,{\in }\right \rangle $ , yet disagree on which assertions are true in these structures. On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure ${\mathbb N}=\{\,{0,1,2,\ldots }\,\}$ itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.

We study some properties of descriptive set theory which translate from the ideals of enumerability degrees to admissible sets. We show that the reduction principle fails in the admissible sets corresponding to nonprincipal ideals and possessing the minimality property and that the properties of existence of a universal function, separation, and total extension translate from the ideals to some special classes of admissible sets. We first give some examples of the admissible sets satisfying the total extension principle. In addition, we define a broad subclass of admissible sets admitting no decidable computable numberings of the family of all computably enumerable subsets. We mostly discuss the minimal classes of admissible sets corresponding to the nonprincipal ideals of enumerability degrees.

The Scott process of a relational structure $M$ is the sequence of sets of formulas given by the Scott analysis of $M$. We present axioms for the class of Scott processes of structures in a relational vocabulary $\tau$, and use them to give a proof of an unpublished theorem of Leo Harrington from the 1970's, showing that a counterexample to Vaught's Conjecture has models of cofinally many Scott ranks below $\omega_{2}$. Our approach also gives a theorem of Harnik and Makkai, showing that if there exists a counterexample to Vaught's Conjecture, then there is a counterexample whose uncountable models have the same $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_{1}, \omega}(\tau)$-theory, and which has a model of Scott rank $\omega_{1}$. Moreover, we show that if $\phi$ is a sentence of $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_{1}, \omega}(\tau)$ giving rise to a counterexample to Vaught's Conjecture, then for every limit ordinal $\alpha$ greater than the quantifier depth of $\phi$ and below $\omega_{2}$, $\phi$ has a model of Scott rank $\alpha$.

James H. Schmerl. Peano models with many generic classes. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, vol. 43 (1973), pp. 523–536. - James H. Schmerl. Correction to: “Peano models with many generic classes”. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, vol. 92 (1981), no. 1, pp. 195–198. - James H. Schmerl. Recursively saturated, rather classless models of Peano arithmetic. Logic Year 1979–80. Recursively saturated, rather classless models of Peano arithmetic. Logic Year 1979–80 (Proceedings, Seminars, and Conferences in Mathematical Logic, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, 1979/80). edited by M. Lerman, J. H. Schmerl, and R. I. Soare, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 859. Springer, Berlin, pp. 268–282. - James H. Schmerl. Recursively saturatedmodels generated by indiscernibles. Notre Dane Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 26 (1985), no. 1, pp. 99–105. - James H. Schmerl. Large resplendent models generated by indiscernibles. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 54 (1989), no. 4, pp. 1382–1388. - James H. Schmerl. Automorphism groups of models of Peano arithmetic. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 67 (2002), no. 4, pp. 1249–1264. - James H. Schmerl. Diversity in substructures. Nonstandard models of arithmetic and set theory. edited by A. Enayat and R. Kossak, Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 361, American Mathematical Societey (2004), pp. 45–161. - James H. Schmerl. Generic automorphisms and graph coloring. Discrete Mathematics, vol. 291 (2005), no. 1–3, pp. 235–242. - James H. Schmerl. Nondiversity in substructures. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 73 (2008), no. 1, pp. 193–211. - Volume 15 Issue 2

A set J of Turing degrees is called an ideal if (1) J ≠ ∅, (2) for any pair of degrees ã, , if ã, ϵ J, then ã ⋃ ϵJ, and (3) for any ⋃ ϵ J and any , if < ⋃, then ϵ J. A set J of degrees is said to be closed if for any theory T with a set of axioms of degree in J, T has a completion of degree in J.Closed ideals of degrees arise naturally in the following way. If is a recursively saturated structure, let I() = { for some ā ϵ }. Let D() = {: is recursive in d-saturated}. (Recursive in d-saturation is defined like recursive saturation except that the sets of formulas considered are recursive in d.) These two sets of degrees were investigated in [2]. It was shown that if is a recursively saturated model of P, Pr = Th(ω, +), or Pr′ = Th(Z, +, 1), then I() = D(), and this set is a closed ideal. Any closed ideal J can be represented as I() = D() for some recursively saturated model of Pr′. For sets J of power at most ℵ1, Pr′ can be replaced by P.Assuming CH, all closed ideals have power at most ℵ1, but if CH fails, there are closed ideals of power greater than ℵ1, and it is not known whether these can be represented as I() = D() for a recursively saturated model of P.In the present paper, it will first be shown that information about representation of closed ideals provides new information about an old problem of MacDowell and Specker [6] and extends an old result of Scott [8] in a natural way. It will also be shown that the representation results from [2] answer a problem of Friedman [1]. This part of the paper is aimed at convincing the reader that representation problems are worth investigating.

Using models of Peano Arithmetic, we solve a problem of Sikorski by showing that the existence of an ordered field of cardinalityλ with the Bolzano-Weierstrass property forκ-sequences is equivalent to the existence of aκ-tree with exactlyλ branches and with noκ-Aronszajn subtrees.

In the proof of the consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis and the Axiom of Choice with the other axioms of set theory, Godel [ l ] introduced the notion of a constructible set and showed that the constructible sets form a model for set theory. These sets are intuitively those which can be reached by means of a transfinite sequence of several simple operations. He then showed that the Axiom of Choice and Continuum Hypothesis held in the collection of constructible sets. If the original universe of sets is sufficiently rich in ordinal numbers, it will follow that every set is constructible, in which case we say that the Axiom of Constructibility is satisfied. This axiom implies the two axioms previously mentioned. However, from one point of view it may seem that this notion of constructibility does not intuitively correspond to what is meant by constructive since it may happen that all sets in the universe are constructive. In this paper we show that a more restricted notion of construction will yield a class of sets which form a minimal model for set theory. In this manner we prove the consistency of a stronger form of the Axiom of Constructibility. We observe that the idea of a minimal collection of objects satisfying certain axioms is well known in mathematics, for example, in group theory one often considers the subgroup generated by a collection of elements, and in measure theory we define the Borel sets as the smallest y) holds, then there exists a set B consisting of precisely those y. Since much of the proofs of the theorems we state follow quite closely the arguments of [ l ] , we shall be rather brief. Our main result is

In this third and last paper on inner models we consider some of the inherent limitations of the method of using inner models of the type defined in 1.2 for the proof of consistency results for the particular system of set theory under consideration. Roughly speaking this limitation may be described by saying that practically no further consistency results can be obtained by the construction of models satisfying the conditions of theorem 1.5, i.e., conditions 1.31, 1.32, 1.33, 1.51, viz.:This applies in particular to the ‘complete models’ defined in 1.4. Before going on to a precise statement of these limitations we shall consider now the theorem on which they depend. This is concerned with a particular type of complete model examples of which we call “proper complete models”; they are those complete models which are essentially interior to the universe, those whose classes are sets of the universe constituting a class thereof, i.e., those for which the following proposition is true:The main theorem of this paper is that the statement that there are no models of this kind can be expressed formally in the same way as the axioms A, B, C and furthermore it can be proved that if the axiom system A, B, C is consistent then so is the system consisting of axioms A, B, C, plus this new hypothesis that there exist no proper complete models. When combined with the axiom ‘V = L’ introduced by Gödel in (1) this new hypothesis yields a system in which any normal complete model which exists has for its universal class V, the universal class of the original system.

There is an infinite set T of Turing-equivalent completions of Peano Arithmetic (PA) such that whenever M and N are nonisomorphic countable, arithmetically saturated models of PA and Th(M), Th(N)∈T, then Aut(M)≇Aut(N).

We introduce a tool for analysing models of$\text {CT}^-$, the compositional truth theory over Peano Arithmetic. We present a new proof of Lachlan’s theorem that the arithmetical part of models of$\text {CT}^-$are recursively saturated. We also use this tool to provide a new proof of theorem from [8] that all models of$\text {CT}^-$carry a partial inductive truth predicate. Finally, we construct a partial truth predicate defined for a set of formulae whose syntactic depth forms a nonstandard cut which cannot be extended to a full truth predicate satisfying$\text {CT}^-$.