Towards a Common Security and Privacy Requirements Elicitation Methodology

Modeling Security and Privacy Requirements: a Use Case-Driven Approach

Software systems are becoming more complex, interconnected and liable to adopt continuous change and evolution. It’s necessary to develop appropriate methods and techniques to ensure security and privacy of such systems. Research efforts that aim to ensure security and privacy of software systems are distinguished through two main categories: (1) the development of requirements engineering methods, and (2) implementation techniques. Approaches that fall in the first category usually aim to address either security or privacy in an implicit way, with emphasis on the security aspects by developing methods to elicit and analyse security (and privacy) requirements. Works that fall in the latter categories focus specifically on the later stages of the development process irrespective of the organisational context in which the system will be incorporated. This work introduces a model-based process for security and privacy requirements engineering. In particular, the authors’ work includes activities which support to identify and analyse security and privacy requirements for the software system. Their purpose process combines concepts from two well-known requirements engineering methods, Secure Tropos and PriS. A real case study from the EU project E-vote, i.e., an Internet based voting system, is employed to demonstrate the applicability of the approach.

Privacy and security in teleradiology

Telemedicine and Application Scenarios: Common Privacy and Security Requirements in the European Union Context

With the development of software technology, software security is receiving more and more attention. Security requirement is a key stage in the process of software development. In the present research, we propose a method to elicit security requirements; that is developed based on safety knowledge base. In the method, we perform analysis based on the asset, threat and Common Criteria security function components. Then, we summarize the relationship of the three. Based on this, we establish a safety knowledge base. Starting from the functional requirements of the application system, the system assets will be analyzed and matched automatically based on the established safety knowledge base, and finally we elicit the security requirements. The approach is very effective for the purpose of security requirement analysis, and elicits security requirements easily and efficiently. It will be very helpful for security software development.KeywordsSecurity RequirementsAssetThreatSecurity Functional ComponentCommon Criteria

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. "As a result of increasing interconnectivity, information systems and networks are now exposed to a growing number and a wider variety of threats and vulnerabilities. This raises new issues for security." OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks, July 25, 2002, at p. 7, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/22/15582260.pdf. 2. Although not the subject of this article, it is important to note that countries are also enacting cybercrime legislation to make clear that certain online activities are illegal and to assist law enforcement in efforts to prosecute cyber criminals. To that end, the Privacy and Computer Crime Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Science & Technology Law has recently undertaken a project to develop a Model Cybercrime Law for the UN International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) Cybersecurity Work Programme to Assist Developing Countries. See also the International Guide to Combating Cybercrime published by this Committee, available at http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=ST202003. 3. See the Appendix for a compilation of some of the key laws and regulations governing information security. 4. See, e.g., EU Data Protection Directive and HIPAA, cited in the Appendix. 5. See, e.g., E-SIGN, UETA, and UN Convention cited in the Appendix. 6. See, e.g., Kimberly Kiefer and Randy V. Sabett, Openness of Internet Creates Potential for Corporate Information Security Liability, BNA Privacy & Security Law Report, Vol. 1, No. 25 at 788 (June 24, 2002); Alan Charles Raul, Frank R. Volpe, and Gabriel S. Meyer, Liability for Computer Glitches and Online Security Lapses, BNA Electronic Commerce Law Report, Vol. 6, No. 31 at 849 (August 8, 2001); Erin Kenneally, The Byte Stops Here: Duty and Liability for Negligent Internet Security, Computer Security Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 2000. 7. See, e.g., Wolfe v. MBNA America Bank, 485 F.Supp.2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007); Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service, Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4846 (D. Minn. February 7, 2006); and Bell v. Michigan Council, 2005 Mich. App. Lexis 353 (Mich. App. February 15, 2005) (all affirming a negligence cause of action). See also, In Re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77236 (D. Mass. October 12, 2007) (rejecting a negligence claim due to the economic loss doctrine, but allowing a negligent misrepresentation claim to proceed). 8. See, e.g., American Express v. Vinhnee, 2005 Bankr. Lexis 2602 (9th Cir. Bk. App. Panel, 2005); Lorraine v. Markel, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 33020 (D. MD. May 4, 2007). 9. Available at www.pcisecuritystandards.org. 10. Available at www.cabforum.org. 11. ISO/IEC 27001, Information Technology—Security Techniques—Information Security Management Systems—Requirements (October 2005) (hereinafter "ISO/IEC 27001"), available for purchase at http://www.standards-online.net/InformationSecurityStandard.htm. 12. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (hereinafter "EU Data Protection Directive"). 13. See statutes listed in the Appendix. 14. See statutes listed in the Appendix. 15. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 and 1320d-4, (providing that "each person … who maintains or transmits health information shall maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards: (A) to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information; (B) to protect against any reasonably anticipated: (i) threats or hazards to the security or integrity of the information; and (ii) unauthorized uses or disclosures of the information; and (C) otherwise to ensure compliance with this part by the officers and employees of such person," at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2(d)(2). 16. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act ("GLB"), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (November 12, 1999), at §§ 501 and 505(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805, providing that "[E]ach financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information." 17. See, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB"), Public Law 106-102, §§ 501 and 505(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805, and implementing regulations at 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part 208, Appendix D (Federal Reserve System), 12 C.F.R. Part 364, Appendix B (FDIC), 12 C.F.R. Part 568 (Office of Thrift Supervision) and 16 C.F.R. Part 314 (FTC). 18. Final HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Part 164. 19. There have also been efforts in the United States to pursue comprehensive federal privacy similar to the approach taken by many other countries. See e.g., Microsoft position paper at www.microsoft.com/presspass/download/features/2005/PrivacyLegislationCallWP.doc. Although it remains to be seen whether that approach will ultimately be adopted, it is clear that the combination of U.S. state and federal law has, in effect, imposed a comprehensive obligation of security with respect to all personal information held by all companies. 20. See, e.g., FTC enforcement actions regarding In the Matter of Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc.; In the Matter of Petco Animal Supplies, Inc.; In the Matter of MTS, Inc., d/b/a Tower records/Books/Video; In the matter of Guess?, Inc.; FTC V. Microsoft; and In the Matter of Eli Lilly and Company cited in the Appendix. 21. See, e.g., FTC enforcement actions regarding In the Matter of CardSystems Solutions, Inc.; United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc.; In the Matter of DSW Inc.; and In the Matter of BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. cited in the Appendix. 22. See list in the Appendix. 23. See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service, Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4846 (D. Minn. February 7, 2006) and Bell v. Michigan Council, 2005 Mich. App. Lexis 353 (Mich. App. February 15, 2005). 24. 205 Mich. App. Lexis 353 at ∗16 (Mich. App. 2005). 25. 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4846 at ∗9 (D. Minn. 2006). 26. Wolfe v. MBNA America Bank, 485 F.Supp.2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). 27. In Re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77236 (D. Mass. October 12, 2007), at pp. 28–29. 28. Ibid. 29. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines the term "information system" to mean "any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information, and includes—(A) computers and computer networks; (B) ancillary equipment; (C) software, firmware, and related procedures; (D) services, including support services; and (E) related resources." Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, at Section 1001(b), amending 44 U.S.C. § 3532(b)(4). 30. See, e.g., Australia, Information Privacy Principles under the Privacy Act 1988, Principle No. 4, available at www.privacy.gov.au/publications/ipps.html; AICPA and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), Generally Accepted Privacy principles, Principle No. 8, available at http://infotech.aicpa.org/Resources/Privacy/Generally+Accepted+Privacy+Principles; APEC, Privacy principles, Principle No. 7, available at http://austlii.edu.au/∼graham/APEC/APECv10.doc; US-EU Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, available at www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm; Direct Marketing Association, Online Marketing Guidelines, available at www.the-dma.org/guidelines/onlineguidelines.shtml. 31. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (hereinafter "EU Data Protection Directive"). 32. EU Data Protection Directive, Preamble at Para. 46. 33. EU Data Protection Directive, Article 17(1). 34. See statutes listed in the Appendix. 35. See statutes listed in the Appendix. 36. See generally, Bruce H. Nearon, Jon Stanley, Steven W. Teppler, and Joseph Burton, Life after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Merger of Information Security and Accountability, Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 45, 379–412 (2005). 37. American Express v. Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437; 2005 Bankr. Lexis 2602 (9th Cir. December 16, 2006). 38. Ibid., at p. 444. 39. Ibid., at p. 445. 40. Ibid., at pp. 446–447. 41. Ibid., at p. 449. 42. See, e.g., National Association of Corporate Directors, Information Security Oversight (2007). 43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 302. 44. See, e.g., GLB Security Regulations (Federal Reserve) 12 C.F.R. 208, Appendix D-2.III(A). 45. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section 164.308(a)(2). 46. See, FTC Decisions and Consent Decrees listed in the Appendix, including Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. 27(a), p. 7; Eli Lilly Decision at II.A. 47. FISMA, 44 U.S.C. 3544(a). 48. E. Michael Power and Roland L. Trope, Sailing in Dangerous Waters: A Director's Guide to Data Governanc e , American Bar Association (2005), p. 13; Roland L. Trope, "Directors' Digital Fiduciary Duties," IEEE Security & Privacy, January/February 2005 at p. 78. 49. Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 50. Bell v. Michigan Council, 2005 Mich. App. Lexis 353 (Mich. App. February 15, 2005), at pp. 11–13 (noting that harm was foreseeable, but Board took no action). 51. Securing Cyberspace: Business Roundtable's Framework for the Future, Business Roundtable, May 19, 2004 at pp. 1, 2; available at www.businessroundtable.org/pdf//20040518000CyberSecurityPrinciples.pdf. The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. corporations with a combined workforce of more than 10 million employees in the United States. See www.businessroundtable.org. 52. Information Security Governance: A Call to Action, Corporate Governance Task Force Report, National Cyber Security Partnership, April 2004, pp. 12–13, available at www.cyberpartnership.org/InfoSecGov4_04.pdf. The National Cyber Security Partnership (NCSP) is led by the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), TechNet, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in voluntary partnership with academicians, CEOs, federal government agencies, and industry experts. Following the release of the 2003 White House National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the National Cyber Security Summit, this public–private partnership was established to develop shared strategies and programs to better secure and enhance America's critical information infrastructure. Further information is available at www.cyberpartnership.org. 53. GLB Security Regulations (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B, Part III.A and Part III.F. 54. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002) 44 U.S.C. Section 3542(b)(1); GLB Security Regulations (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part II.B; HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section 164.306(a)(1); Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4. 55. See, e.g., 44 USC 3532(b)(1), emphasis added. See also FISMA, 44 U.S.C. Section 3542(b)(1). Most of the foreign privacy laws also focus their security requirements from this perspective. This includes, for example, the EU Privacy Directive, Finland's Privacy Law, Italy's Privacy Law, and the UK Privacy Law. Also in this category is the Canadian Privacy Law. 56. Although they often focus on categories of security measures to address. See, e.g., HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Part 164. 57. See, e.g., FDA regulations at 21 C.F.R. Part 11 (procedures and controls); SEC regulations at 17 C.F.R. 257.1(e)(3) (procedures); SEC regulations at 17 C.F.R. 240.17a-4 (controls); GLB regulations (FTC) 16 C.F.R. Part 314 (safeguards); Canada, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, Schedule I, Section 4.7 (safeguards); EU Data Privacy Directive, Article 17(1) (measures) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf. 58. See, e.g., HIPAA 42 U.S.C. 1302d-2, and HIPAA Security regulations, 45 CFR 164.306; COPPA, 15 U.S.C. 6502(b)(1)(D), and COPPA regulations 16 C.F.R. 312.8; IRS Rev. Proc. 97-22, sec. 4.01(2); SEC regulations 17 C.F.R. 257. See also UCC Article 4A, Section 202 ("commercially reasonable" security procedure), and Microsoft Consent Decree. 59. "Appropriate" security required by: HIPAA 42 U.S.C. 1302d-2, and HIPAA Security regulations, 45 CFR 164.306; EU Data Protection Directive, Article 17(1). 60. EU Data Protection Directive, Article 17(1) (emphasis added) 61. See, e.g., Belgium—Belgian Law of 8 December 1992 on Privacy Protection in relation to the Processing of Personal Data, as modified by the law of 11 December 1998 Implementing Directive 95/46/EC, and the law of 26 February 2003, Chapter IV, Article 16(4); Denmark—Act on Processing of Personal Data,; Act No. 429 of 31 May 2000 (unofficial English translation), Title IV, Part 11, Section 41(3); Estonia—Personal Data Protection Act; Passed February12, 2003 (RT1 I 2003, 26, 158), entered into force October 1, 2003, Chapter 3, Sections 19(2); Greece—Law 2472/1997 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (as amended by Laws 2819/2000 and 2915/2001); Article 10(3); Ireland—Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003; Section 2.-(1)(d) and First Schedule Article 7; Lithuania—Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, January 21, 2003, No. IX-1296, Official translation, with amendments April 13, 2004, Article 24(1); Netherlands—25 892—Rules for the protection of personal data (Personal Data Protection Act) (Unofficial translation); Article 13; Portugal—Act on the Protection of Personal Data (transposing into the Portuguese legal system Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data), Article 14(1); Slovakia—Act No 428 of July 3, 2002 on personal data protection; Section 15(1); Sweden—Personal Data Act (1998:204); issued April 29, 1998, Section 31; and UK—Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, Part I, Seventh Principle. 62. See, e.g., Finland—The Finnish Personal Data Act (523/1999), given on 22.4.1999, Section 32(1); Germany—Federal Data Protection Act as of January 1, 2003, Section 9; Hungary—Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and Public Access to Data of Public Interest, Article 10(1); Italy—Personal Data Protection Code, Legislative Decree No. 196 of 30 June 2003, Sections 31 and 33; Spain—Organic Law 15/1999 of December 13 on the Protection of Personal Data, Article 9. 63. 5 USC Sec. 552a. 64. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d)(10) (emphasis added). 65. 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2(d)(2). 66. See, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB"), Public Law 106-102, §§ 501 and 505(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805, and implementing regulations at 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part 208, Appendix D (Federal Reserve System), 12 C.F.R. Part 364, Appendix B (FDIC), 12 C.F.R. Part 568 (Office of Thrift Supervision) and 16 C.F.R. Part 314 (FTC) (emphasis added). 67. Cal. Civil Code § 1798.81.5(b). 68. See UN Convention at Article 9(3), 9(4), and 9(5). 69. ISO/IEC 27001, Information Technology—Security Techniques—Information Security Management Systems—Requirements (October 2005). See text at footnotes 157–169, infra. February 1, 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part 208, Appendix D (Federal Reserve System), 12 C.F.R. Part 364, Appendix B (FDIC), 12 C.F.R. Part 568 (Office of Thrift May 16 C.F.R. Part 44 U.S.C. Section 45 C.F.R. 164. See of the on by of the Technology and Homeland Security of the Committee on the United States 21, 2007 at p. (noting that FTC under the GLB Act as a for the obligation to maintain reasonable and appropriate available at See also, of the the on Information and the Committee on U.S. House of on April 21, 2004, at p. 5 (noting that is an of reasonable and appropriate measures in of the available at See, e.g., FTC Decisions and Consent Decrees listed in the Appendix. See, e.g., National Association of Insurance for Information Model available at in at See, e.g., Consent Decrees listed in the Appendix. 78. See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service, Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4846 (D. Minn. February 7, 2006) and Bell v. Michigan Council, 2005 Mich. App. 353 (Mich. App. February 15, 2005). Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service, Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4846 (D. Minn. February 7, 2006). Bell v. Michigan Council, 2005 Mich. App. Lexis 353 (Mich. App. February 15, 2005). Committee on available at See, e.g., Italy—Personal Data Protection Code, Legislative Decree No. 196 of 30 June 2003, B, § Act No 428 of July 2002 on personal data § the Appendix, Act, B, Section Act, Section the Appendix, Act, Article Act, Section Act, 16(4); Act, Section 41(3); Act, Section Act, Section 32(1); Act, Section 9; Act, Article 10(3); Act, Article 10(1); Act, Article 24(1); Act, Article 13; Act, Article 14(1); Act, Section 15(1); Act, Article 9; Act, Section 31; UK Act, Schedule 1, Part I, Seventh Act, Article 7. the Appendix, Act, Schedule 2, Section Act, Act, Schedule 1, 4.7 Principle 7, Act, Section Act, Section Act, B, Sections and Act, Sections 17 and the Appendix, Act, Section A Security § Act, Section Decree the Appendix, Decree the Appendix, Act, Section Principle 4; Act, Article Act, Article Act, Sections and Act, Section Act, Section Act, Section Act, B, Sections and Act, Sections 17 and Bruce & Digital Security in a & at p. See, e.g., HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section See, e.g., Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. p. Eli Lilly Decision at II.B; GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B, Part See, e.g., Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; Eli Lilly Decision at See, e.g., FISMA, 44 U.S.C. Sections and GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B, Part See, e.g., In Electronic July 30, Financial Council, 2; available at See, e.g., Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; GLB Security Regulations (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part Eli Lilly Decision at II.B; HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Information Security Management Act of 2002 44 U.S.C. Section See, e.g., Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Information Security Management Act of 2002 44 U.S.C. Section See, e.g., GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part Information Security Management Act of 2002 44 U.S.C. Section See, e.g., Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part See, e.g., GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section See, e.g., HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section See, e.g., United States v. Cir. See, e.g., Inc. v. also v. or of to with and of See, e.g., HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part and Part FISMA, 44 U.S.C. Sections and Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; Ziff Davis Assurance of HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 CFR Section and and on HIPAA Security of & Section of Science & Technology Law, No. April 2003, at p. 2, available at See, e.g., HIPAA regulations 45 C.F.R. Sections and GLB Regulations, 12 C.F.R. 208, Appendix and 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B, Part Microsoft Consent at p. 4. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Sections and GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section and Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. 25, p. 6. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. p. 5 and Para. 25, p. 6. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. 25, p. 6. GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. 25, p. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Sections and Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. 25, p. 6. Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. 25, p. 6. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, and 26, pp. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part See, e.g., FISMA, 44 U.S.C. Section HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. p. 5. Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. p. 7. HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4. FISMA, 44 U.S.C. Section Eli Lilly Decision at GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B, Part Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. and p. 7; Eli Lilly Decision at HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. and p. 7; Eli Lilly Decision at GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30, Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section and GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section Microsoft Consent Decree at II, p. 4; Eli Lilly Decision at Microsoft Consent Decree at p. 5. Ziff Davis Assurance of Discontinuance, Para. p. 7. See, e.g., of the of the of National on 21, at See, e.g., GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part See, e.g., GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. Section and GLB Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part Wolfe v. MBNA America Bank, 485 F.Supp.2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). See Bell v. Michigan Council, 2005 Mich. App. Lexis 353 (Mich. App. February 15, 2005). See Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service, Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4846 at (D. Minn. February 7, 2006) that a was the to and a of a was not a of a of reasonable The Financial is a of U.S. federal agencies, that the Board of of the Reserve Insurance the National the of the of the and the of Thrift on on in an Internet 8, 2006 at p. available at on on in an Internet 8, 2006 at p. available at Guide for the Guidelines Information Security December available at Information Security July available at See National Institute of and Management Guide for Information Technology No. available at ISO/IEC 27001, Information Technology—Security Techniques—Information Security Management Systems—Requirements (October 2005) (hereinafter "ISO/IEC ISO/IEC § for is the and of International and is of a of the of with and a in that the The American National Institute the United States. See, The also in and in related to including The of make its with the United States. See ISO/IEC 27001, § (emphasis added). ISO/IEC 27001, § ISO/IEC 27001, § ISO/IEC 27001, § 164. ISO/IEC 27001, § ISO/IEC 27001, §§ and 6. ISO/IEC 27001, §§ and 8. ISO/IEC 27001, §§ ISO/IEC that with an International not in from legal p. 1. EU Data Protection Directive, Article 8. Article Data Protection on the processing of personal data to health in health February 15, at pp. available at (emphasis in See list of state laws in Report, Security and Laws of 15, 2005 at Appendix available at Code, § Rev. Stat. Available at www.pcisecuritystandards.org. See list in the Appendix. See, e.g., 16 CFR Section Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § HIPAA security regulations to in the Act Security Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 30 Appendix B, Part security regulations to information in the financial Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1001(b), amending 44 U.S.C. § and § amending 44 U.S.C. § information and information systems from unauthorized and regulations, 21 C.F.R. Part 11. See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 1798.81.5(b). See April 2, the Matter of of the Act of of Information and Information Services, No. No. April 2, at available at (hereinafter Wolfe v. MBNA America Bank, 485 F.Supp.2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). in an Internet 12, 2005 available at This was by an on on in an Internet 8, available at of No. 25, The is an See, e.g., HIPAA Security Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § at p. 6. Ibid., at p. 3. Ibid. v. National 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 2007), at p. 13. See, e.g., on of Security Breach Personal of Privacy of April 2006 (hereinafter at pp. at note , at p. a of such in the United States and a of the number of individuals Privacy at IRS Rev. Proc. § See list of statutes in the Appendix. on for Access to Information and Part of A to Appendix, at 12 C.F.R. Part 30 (OCC), 12 C.F.R. Part (Federal Reserve System), 12 C.F.R. Part (FDIC), and 12 C.F.R. Part 568 (Office of Thrift 29, Vol. No. 29, at p. (hereinafter the maintains personal information that the not in the laws the to the or of the information, than the individuals of any of the security of the See, e.g., Code § Rev. Stat. § Code, § Stat. § Code § 2007 The also any combination of of information that to or the such as and or and See, e.g., Breach to the of & Financial Services, December 15 USC Section This that with the of at 15 USC Section and are of in this and are of in this See, and of a Duty to Information Security Computer & L. See and to Law the Protection of Personal BNA Privacy & Security Law Report, 19, p. May See at on the of the Framework for Electronic and Services, with focus on the 26, available at Science and Technology Committee, House of Internet of July 24, at Para. of the Privacy of Canada, for in to Privacy available at See Privacy Breach of the Privacy available at Privacy available at See, of the Privacy to the Law of February at available at Available at Available at to information to state

Modeling of Internet of Healthcare Things (IoHT) smart-system-based blockchain in terms of security and privacy requirements is considered a multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) problem. Even though literature reviews have evaluated IoHT smart-system-based blockchain, informational ambiguity, vagueness and uncertainty remain open issues. In addition, the early MCDM techniques used to model IoHT smart systems-based blockchain have substantial theoretical shortcomings. First, the tuning parameters used produce different modeling outcomes. Second, the use of optimization theory increases the complexity of the modeling and decreases the stability of the results when the alternative numbers increases. Third, distance measurement and binary decision matrix are incompatible. Fourth, the modeling method used cannot prioritize the evaluation criteria. Therefore, this article extends the fuzzy weighted with zero inconsistency (FWZIC) method with interval-valued spherical fuzzy sets (IvSFSs) for weighting security and privacy requirements. Then, the developed IvS-FWZIC method is integrated with the complex proportional assessment method to model IoHT smart-system-based blockchain. IoHT smart-system-based blockchains 15 and 11 are selected as alternatives under remote patient monitoring systems and telemedicine systems, respectively. These alternatives are evaluated by six security and privacy requirements (criteria). The stability and robustness of the proposed methods are assessed by conducting sensitivity analysis and Spearman’s rho and comparison analysis. Researchers and developers of IoHT smart-system-based blockchain can propose more secure, private solutions with the help of this work’s implications.

User's digital identity information has privacy and security requirements. Privacy requirements include confidentiality of the identity information itself, anonymity of those who verify and consume a user's identity information and unlinkability of online transactions which involve a user's identity. Security requirements include correctness, ownership assurance and prevention of counterfeits of a user's identity information. Such privacy and security requirements, although conflicting, are critical for identity management systems enabling the exchange of users' identity information between different parties during the execution of online transactions. Addressing all such requirements, without a centralized party managing the identity exchange transactions, raises several challenges. This paper presents a decentralized protocol for privacy preserving exchange of users' identity information addressing such challenges. The proposed protocol leverages advances in blockchain and zero knowledge proof technologies, as the main building blocks. We provide prototype implementations of the main building blocks of the protocol and assess its performance and security.

To enjoy the full benefits of cloud computing, it is necessary to have built-in security, privacy, compliance and legal requirements for the cloud implementation and use. Each industry has its own risk levels that it could work within. A company, which is planning to use public cloud services, should be conscious of the regulations and industry risks and need to monitor it and abide by the same. This is due to multi-tenant and open to all nature of public cloud. A thorough risk analysis must be done initially with a public cloud provider. The main objective is to identify the existing vulnerabilities and to implement the measures to counter those threats. There are a variety of risks such as vendor lock-in, non-compliance, poor provisioning, unauthorized access, loss of control, Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations, Internet attacks, etc. To alleviate the risks, there are several measures that could be deployed. This paper deals with mitigation mechanism, security requirements and various risks associated with public cloud.

Security requirements play a vital role in the software development process to gain secured software. The security levels of each software system can be varied depending on multiple factors, such as information processing or storing in the software system, business criticality of the software system, or features and functions of the system. However, the understanding of these factors has not been done early and has little or no involvement from the business users (end-users or system owners), who have the best understanding of how the system should be used in their business and the business impacts. As a result, the system design is done without awareness of these factors. Most of the time designing the system to address security concerns is done late in the development lifecycle, which causes extra money, effort, and time from the development team. In this paper, we propose a framework to help elicit the security requirements from business users based on the survey questions. The framework recommends a set of security requirements and implementation methods that are suitable for the business operations of the system. Two web applications with 12 business users for each application were selected to experiment with the effectiveness of the framework. The framework's suggested results were tested for conformity against a set of security recommendations from four security experts. We found that the security requirements and recommendations from the framework have an average 89% conformity for the WFMS system and a 93% conformity for the ASMS system with the expert recommendations.

Given the wide distribution of software and its current growth, security is inevitable, and software systems have become more complex. To avoid the complexity and protect valuable assets of software systems, researchers, and practitioners in the fields of security requirement engineering (SRE) and security assurance advise incorporating security requirements early in software development life cycle (SDLC). Nowadays, security requirements specification and identification are an active research area for ensuring the effectiveness of software systems. However, security requirement identification is a challenging task due to sheer numbers of threats and attacks to a software system. Previous researchers have identified different SRE techniques, each looking at the same problem from a different perspective. Therefore, a literature review conducted on SRE techniques. We compared and analyzed different SRE techniques to find the most suitable SRE techniques for researchers and practitioners. Selected SRE techniques compared based on various parameters, such as different attributes, requirement elicitation, requirement analysis, project size, and integration of standards. The literature also indicates that among SRE approaches, security quality requirements engineering (SQAURE), secure tropos, security requirements engineering process (SREP), and comprehensive lightweight application security process (CLASP) are the most used SRE approaches that focus on activities such as threats, security requirements identification, and security objectives identification. Unfortunately, several SRE approaches fail to explicitly integrate the security standard and security assurance perspective. Three questions developed for this study: Question 1 is based on comparison of existing SRE approaches, Question 2 is based on SRE with security requirements elicitation and analysis, and Question 3 highlights the incorporation of security requirements assurance by SRE approaches implicitly or explicitly. The researcher must work with the developer to easily adopt SRE approaches to elicit and ensure security requirements for the software system.

We investigate privacy-preserving Public-Key Infrastructures (PKIs) with additional security, privacy, and performance requirements meant to support vehicular networks. While conventional PKIs are a cornerstone for identity management in certain security applications, they do not offer the privacy properties that vehicular networks demand. Over the last few years, there have been efforts to generalize conventional PKIs to meet these new privacy and security demands. One particular example is the class of multiple certificate PKIs where each vehicle is given multiple short-lived and anonymous certificates that can function as credentials until the vehicle is due for, say, the next inspection or dealership visit. While such PKIs offer attractive security and privacy properties, achieving acceptable performance has remained an open problem thus questioning their practicality.In this paper, we formally define and investigate the efficient certificate revocation list (CRL) search problem for multiple certificate PKIs, which asks whether it is possible to efficiently test CRL membership of a given certificate in the same order of computational complexity as in conventional PKIs (that is, by a simple and fast binary search over the set of revoked PKI members). Any solution to this problem is of particular interest when it does not introduce unacceptable compromises on other important properties such as security and privacy. We start by formally defining vehicular networks and a number of security, privacy and performance requirements for them. Then we demonstrate that for PKIs based on general classes of efficient algorithms, containing binary search over totally ordered sets and approximate nearest neighbor search over metric spaces, a solution to the efficient CRL search problem can be used to violate privacy. Finally, we present and analyze new solutions that simultaneously solve the efficient cRL search problem and satisfy privacy requirements by allowing all vehicles to locally (i.e., with minimal help from the CA) and consistently (i.e., with the same results across all vehicles) manage their CRLs. Using these ideas, we can maintain security and privacy properties while reducing the CRL membership testing time to logarithmic in the number of revoked vehicles, which is essentially the same performance that one obtains with conventional PKIs where privacy is not required.

Modular Open Source Identity Platform (MOSIP) aims to provide system uniqueness, interoperability, affordability, and privacy-bydesign while preventing vendor lock-in. These features benefit citizens of developing nations. If an adversary with malicious intent exploits the system, they could breach security and privacy requirements, thereby causing reputational damage. As a result, it is necessary to understand and re-design the system by implementing security and privacy measures. This paper performs threat analysis and risk assessment for the pre-registration, registration, and authentication phases of MOSIP. STRIDE/DREAD methodology is applied for each phase to identify, quantify and analyse threats. We have identified appropriate measures and proposed a suitable risk mitigation strategy based on the requirements of each stage. Researchers can use this study to understand the threats and develop novel safeguards systematically. This research would contribute to developing a system that adheres to security and privacy requirements, and is therefore more resilient and reliable. Such attempts would help in developing the capability to assess the system trustworthiness for developing nations, benefiting the broader digital economy.

New and useful tools that facilitate the harmonization and interconnection of health data have become a requirement for monitoring and preventing illness and also for sharing medical knowledge. Nowadays, cloud-based solutions can support collaborative data science platforms and deliver all types of processing operations through the network service chain. In this article we deal with healthcare-related data management and exchange, and we propose security and privacy requirements together with a novel microservices approach. We investigate how cloud computing can be adopted within healthcare systems. The interoperability of existing technologies will improve the quality of life and the efficiency of healthcare systems by making them more personalized and centered on patients, together with reducing operational costs and medical errors. To have a socially acceptable health network service chain, the security and privacy issues need to be analyzed and addressed. We explore the the security and privacy requirements and implications, and also discuss existing methods, and in the end propose an architecture of a secure manager for cloud-based healthcare-related data management and exchange.

In practical applications, the owner of an RFID-tagged item canchange. In this paper, we propose a new RFID ownership transfer protocol using elliptic-curve cryptography. The paper first considers security and privacy requirements in the ownership transfer process. Then the paper provides a detailed description of our ownership transfer scheme outlining various protocol phases. Key features of the proposed scheme are that it allows controlled delegation and authorisation recovery, and the ownership transfer is achieved without a trusted third party. We describe a security analysis of the proposed scheme and demonstrate that it meets the desired security and privacy requirements. We also illustrate the performance results and show that our scheme is feasible for lightweight RFID tags.