- Book Chapter
3
- 10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_17
Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint
- Jan 01, 2019
- Clément Massart + 1 more +1
Inspired by the literature on side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations, we describe a framework for the analysis of location privacy. It allows us to revisit (continuous) re-identification attacks with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. Our results highlight conceptual differences between re-identification attacks exploiting leakages that are internal or external to a pseudonymised database. They put forward the amount of data to collect in order to estimate a predictive model as an important – yet less discussed – dimension of privacy assessments. They finally leverage recent results on the security evaluations/certification of cryptographic implementations to connect information theoretic and security metrics, and to formally bound the risk of re-identification with external leakages.
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