Ukraine and an Integrated Deterrence Strategy

The article analyses the renewed relevance of nuclear deterrence in Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and presents arguments that nuclear policy is not exclusively the domain of the major powers. The author argues that Europe does not need to emulate American strategies or larger arsenals, but rather an adapted approach focused on a reliable second-strike capability, command and control resilience, and strong conventional deterrence. She attributes a special role to small and medium-sized European countries, which can use diplomacy, political pressure, and the stigmatization of nuclear threats to raise the political cost of nuclear use and thus weaken the credibility of Russian nuclear blackmail.

Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s. Report of the European Security Study

: A central tenet of the U.S. Navy's new Maritime Strategy is that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. This emphasis on war prevention has generated new research on maritime contributions to deterrence. OPNAV N51 (Director, Strategy and Policy Division) asked CNA to identify and analyze how maritime capabilities, assets, and operations contribute to conventional deterrence in the current and emerging international security environment. Deterrence has always been one of the central strategic principles of war prevention. But now, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of a new generation of security challenges, deterrence strategies need to be updated. This study examines one aspect of deterrence that has traditionally been overlooked - conventional deterrence. Our objective is to analyze how U.S. non-nuclear capabilities can be used to deter conventional aggression, and to examine the role of maritime power in preventing conventional conflicts.

The dynamics of the India–China relationship have undergone a significant transformation in recent years, with mistrust and suspicion clouding the bilateral ties. This article argues that India’s strategic deterrence posture towards China has shifted from denial to punishment following the 2020 Galwan crisis, which resulted in casualties on both sides. The study aims to examine the measures taken by India post-2020 that demonstrate this shift in strategy and the implications for the overall India–China relations. This article contends that India has applied punitive measures in the military, economic and diplomatic domains to deter China’s actions along the border, with the goal of raising the overall cost for China. The theoretical framework of deterrence is employed to analyse the shift from denial to punishment, highlighting the importance of military capability, credibility and communication in enhancing a state’s deterrence posture. This article also discusses the evolution of deterrence theory in the post-Cold War era, with the emergence of technologically advanced conventional weapons altering the nature of modern conflict. The study concludes that the shift towards deterrence by punishment is likely to intensify competition between India and China, making it the new norm in their bilateral relations. The findings contribute to the understanding of India’s evolving conventional deterrence posture towards China and its multidomain approach to deterrence.

ABSTRACTThis study contributes to the debate on the role of nonnuclear (conventional) deterrence in international security by examining the Israeli practice of this strategy. By analyzing a case outside of Western strategic thought, which traditionally has dominated deterrence theory, it demonstrates how strategic thinking evolves differently in various ideational realms. The article highlights the impact of strategic culture on the Israeli conceptualization of deterrence, explores its deficits, and yields lessons for theoreticians and practitioners from the challenges of intra-war coercion operations. The study introduces the innovative term “culminating point of deterrence,” calls for improving analytical techniques for deterrence evaluation, claims that successful conventional deterrence perpetuates political conflict, stimulates the adversary's dangerous innovations, and argues for a tailored approach not only for formulating deterrence strategy, but also for exploring deterrence policies of different actors. The findings of the study are applicable beyond the Israeli case and are relevant to actors utilizing coercion strategies.

Cyber capabilities, whether used alone or in combination with other military tools, offer an opportunity to influence an adversary’s decision-making.