Understanding CEDAW Cities: A Descriptive Analysis

Introduction Hate speech – that is, speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin – poses vexing and complex problems for contemporary constitutional rights to freedom of expression. The constitutional treatment of these problems, moreover, has been far from uniform as the boundaries between impermissible propagation of hatred and protected speech vary from one setting to the next. There is, however, a big divide between the United States and other western democracies. In the United States, hate speech is given wide constitutional protection, whereas under international human rights covenants and in other western democracies, such as Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, it is largely prohibited and subjected to criminal sanctions. The contrasting approaches adopted by the United States and other western democracies afford a special opportunity to embark on a comparative analysis of the difficult problems posed by hate speech and of the various possible solutions to them. As we shall see, in the United States, hate speech and the best ways to cope with it are conceived differently than in most other western democracies. This is due, in part, to differences in social context, and, in part, to differences in approach. It may be tempting, therefore, to endorse a purely contextual approach to hate speech encompassing a broad array of diverse constitutional responses ranging from American laissez faire to German vigilance. Given the trend toward globalization and the instant transnational reach of the Internet, however, a purely contextual approach would seem insufficient, if not downright inadequate. For example, much neo-Nazi propaganda is now generated in California and transmitted through the Internet to countries like Canada or Germany where neo-Nazi groups have established a much more significant foothold than in the United States. Inasmuch as such propaganda generally amounts to protected speech in the United States, there seems to be little that can be done to limit its spread beyond American soil. Does that justify calling for a change of constitutional jurisprudence in the United States? Or, more generally, do present circumstances warrant a systematic rethinking of constitutional approaches to hate speech?

This study deter- mined human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) seroprevalence and factors associated with HIV infection among street-recruited injection drug users and crack cocaine smokers. An analysis was performed on HIV serologies and risk behaviors of 6402 injection drug users and 3383 crack smokers in 16 US municipalities in 1992 and 1993. HIV seroprevalence was 12.7% among injection drug users and 7.5% among crack smokers. Most high-seroprevalence municipalities (>25%) were located along the eastern seaboard of the United States. In high-seroprevalence municipalities, but not in others, HIV seroprevalence was higher for injection drug users than for crack smokers. Among injection drug users, cocaine injection, use of speedballs (cocaine or amphetamines with heroin), and sexual risk behaviors were independently associated with HIV infection. Among crack smokers, sexual risk behaviors were associated with HIV infection. Injection drug users and crack smokers are at high risk for HIV infection.

The question whether in a liberal democracy religion may serve as a basis of law-making should be desaggregated into two distinct questions. First, is religion a morally legitimate basis of law-making in a liberal democracy? Second, is religion a constitutionally legitimate basis of law-making in the United States? My focus in this article is on the second question, which, as a question about constitutional legitimacy, should not be confused with the first question, which is about moral legitimacy. Like other liberal democracies, the United States is committed to the right to freedom of religious practice. Unlike most other liberal democracies, however, the United States is also committed to the non-etablishment of religion. According to the constitutional law of the United States, law-makers and other government officials may neither prohibit the `free exercise' of religion nor `establish' religion. Does the non-establishment norm ban religion as a basis of law-making? More precisely, should the non-establishment norm be understood to ban laws for which the only discernible rationale — or, at least, the only discernible rationale other than an implausible secular rationale — is religious?

Two decades after the publication of Talal Asad's Formations of the Secular (2003), secularism is in a global state of crisis. From the standpoint of secularism's liberal proponents, the rising tide of right-wing populisms from the United States and Brazil to Eastern Europe and India threatens liberal freedoms and democracy all over the world. In an age when liberal democracies struggle to uphold the rule of law and multiculturalism is losing its popular mandate to neofascist aspirations of nationhood, the vanguards of the liberal order have found renewed faith in the redemptive promise of secularism. Far from engaging in an honest reckoning of the consequences of neoliberal governance in perpetuating economic inequalities, class divides, racial resentment, and xenophobia, liberal elites are ever more convinced of the need to rehabilitate secularism as a bulwark against the scourge of authoritarian populism and religious obscurantism. It would seem that the last thing we need at this crucial historical juncture is a critique of secular formations of individual freedom, multicultural assimilation, democratic representation, just war, and human rights, among others. To those who find it imperative to salvage secularism, such critiques are not only untimely but also play into the hands of nefarious interests bent on sabotaging liberal democracy. Recourse to fearmongering becomes an effective tactic of shutting down critiques of secularism: if you are so suspicious and disparaging of the liberal freedoms you enjoy under the secular state, would you rather live in a theocracy or tolerate another right-wing demagogue in the White House?

Under what conditions can populist leaders achieve success in different democratic systems? What opportunities do other political players have against autocratic intrigues? Are the formal institutions of the United States strong enough to resist President Trump’s violation of norms? These are the main questions of this volume, which collects various approaches to examine the impact of populism on liberal democracy. Since November 2016, one camp of scholars has interpreted Trump’s political rise and doings as a series of attempts to destroy liberal democracy, while another other camp is relatively sanguine thanks to its solid faith in the political institutions of the United States. As an important example of the former, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) book How Democracies Die focuses on the ongoing erosion of democratic norms, like “mutual toleration” between political competitors and “forbearance”, as a minimum level of cooperation. They argue that if unwritten rules are violated, the system of democracy will be undermined. The authors of this volume also express their concerns about political processes, but most of them belong to the latter, more optimistic group. According to Kurt Weyland and Raúl Madrid, President Trump can do serious damage in some policy areas (such as environmental and foreign policy). But he cannot achieve major institutional transformations and undermine American democracy. Despite the great virtue of the moderate and systematic approach of the book, there is a feeling that scientists in the two camps are still speaking past each other. Weyland and Madrid’s analysis propounds a cross-national framework for studying populists in government, which emphasizes the role of the political institutions and the parties but slightly underestimates the softer aspects of politics, such as democratic norms. As experts of democratic processes and populism in various regions, the authors aim to offer comparative lessons from Europe and Latin America, where populism was able to achieve significant political success. Unlike these regions, the United States’ political and social context does not favor populist actors. In the introduction, Weyland and Madrid determine four types of obstacles that prevent further expansion of populism. First, the separation of powers is linked to the federal and presidential system of government. Sovereign institutions and almost equal power relations between the two parties in Congress make it difficult to concentrate power. The next impediment to autocratic maneuvers is the stable and cohesive two-party system, which means for Trump not only a strong opposition but a decentralized Republican party, on which he has no direct influence. The massive polarization of American politics has helped the president seize power, but at the same time, it precludes him from further strengthening. Third, prevailing political and social cleavages, the percentage of ethnic groups and classes of the electorate are not favorable to a populist shift because there is no way for Trump to build a broad coalition. Finally, the absence of a crisis does not allow Trump to appear as a savior of the nation. Based on these barriers, Weyland and Madrid predict a democratic backlash “in which the leaders of both parties agree to enact reforms designed to prevent future violations of democratic norms” (p. 33). However, not all authors share this optimistic view, some of them more explicitly warn the dangers of the American populist phenomenon. Including the introduction and conclusion, the book consists of seven chapters. The individual studies highlight different aspects of the analytical framework presented above (e.g. party systems and strategies, social cleavages). The first three chapters provide comprehensive insights on populist cases from Latin America, East-Central and Western Europe and draw illuminating assumptions concerning Trump’s presidency. In the following, the focus is on the United States and the likely impacts on the public sphere of Trump's politics. We begin the examination of the book with the political context in which populist leaders gain power. The story of a populist ascension usually starts within a state of emergency: countries of Latin America and East-Central Europe were suffering a prolonged crisis when a political leader emerged and took power. As Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser examines, after the takeover, a personalistic “strongman” implemented economic reforms and at the same time promoted broad institutional transformations, and even introduced new constitutions (Chapter 1). As the cases of Fujimori and Chávez show, effective crisis management or increasing welfare expenditures can legitimize the efforts of populist presidents to govern without constraint. Among the countries studied the Netherlands and the United States are notable exceptions. Populists got power in developed democracies in the absence of a social crisis by bringing deeply divisive issues to the forefront such as immigration, Islam, and national identity. It is important to note that their impact on the political systems is more limited than the impact of populist counterparts in weaker democracies. How could populist leaders concentrate so much power in their hands? Kevin Deegan-Krause presents East-Central European ethno-nationalistic versions of populism where the concentration of power in parliamentary systems allowed for populist leaders to hijack democratic institutions (Chapter 2). Filling public institutions with functionaries, making uneven political conditions by legislation, state capture, eliminating independent media, intimidation of critics and opponents—are only a few devices from the toolbox to dismantle democratic pluralism. Weak institutions of Latin American and East-Central European democracies were unable to resist these radical transformations. The political structure of the United States is different because the system of checks and balances disperses power among political actors. This arrangement of horizontal accountability normally precludes that the President circumvents either the legislature or the jurisdiction. Trump has serious power of appointment, and he can violate democratic norms. But his position is weaker than the position of populist leaders in European parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, as Deegan-Krause and Bonikowski argue in their chapters, Trump’s transgressive style and the unpredictable consequences of his actions can erode formal institutions. Institutional weakness cannot be understood without the assessment of political power relations. As Orbán’s supermajority illustrates, a hegemonic populist actor can shape institutions in his image, thereby making them dysfunctional. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove show a different constellation, where the governing party is not in the dominant position (Chapter 3). The “parliamentary system of government forces the chief executive to forge a majority support coalition, which is not easy to do in Italy’s multi-party system” (p. 97) or in the Netherlands. Most European and Latin American populist leaders have risen in a fragmented party system with low legitimacy. Many can rely on a loyal, highly personalized party (e.g. Berlusconi, Mečiar, Orbán) which works as an effective machinery for obtaining political resources. In contrast, Trump came to power in a well-established two-party system with limited influence on the Republican Party. Moreover, there is an apparent cleavage inside the GOP between the old party elite, who lost its gatekeeping role, and the movement-based membership (Tea Party), who puts controversial cultural issues at the forefront. According to Kenneth Roberts, the high level of ideological and party polarization not only demoralizes, but it tends to politicize public institutions, and ultimately, it will erode the legitimacy of the system (Chapter 5). Escalating polarization and “movementization” led to radical changes in the electoral arena, because “they sorted voters into rival and increasingly hostile partisan camps, strengthening partisan identities” (p. 137). The social and ethnic structure of the United States prevents the formation of a broad social coalition for Trump. As Bart Bonikowski presents, the American president’s rhetorical style combines an exclusionary view of nationalism with anti-elite and authoritarian components which undoubtedly distorts political discourse and increases polarization (Chapter 4). This type of populism can be attractive for less-educated voters who make up a smaller part of the electorate, while in turn, the educated electorate and ethnic minorities stigmatized by Trump may also be mobilized to support Democrats. In this sharply divided political field, moralistic political views and antagonistic partisan identities reinforce social and political cleavages. According to Verbeek and Zaslove, one of the most important positive effects of populism on liberal democracy is to integrate those voices of those felt excluded. New issues and movements could reach out to disenchanted political orphans to rise above an outsider-leader who looks like “one of us”, but on the negative side, moralistic and militant rhetoric deepen further existing divisions and produce new ones. Polarization is one of the main motifs of the book that turns up chapter by chapter. As Madrid and Weyland state in the conclusion, “the high levels of political polarization in the United States pose a significant obstacle to efforts by Trump to obtain the electoral dominance that other populists have used to consolidate power and transform their countries’ political institutions” (p. 169). This antagonism in the US suitably explains why we should not be afraid of a rapid autocratic turn, but it is not reassuring when we think of the destruction of democratic norms. Formal institutions can function as fortresses (for a while), but as Roberts finds, the extent of democratic deterioration largely depends on the strategy of Republicans. Most likely the party leadership will stand by Trump, not only supporting him in legislation and appointments but also defending his anti-democratic behavior. So, is the glass of water half-full or half-empty? The answer depends on whether the emphasis is on the institutions or the action. The great value of this volume is that it presents different views and aspects of populism that the readers can compare with each other. It is highly recommended to scholars interested in the theories of populism and democracy.

La democracia liberal –como sistema y como “estado de las cosas”– y el orden internacional después de 2001 pasan por una crisis de alcance mundial. El autor afirma que la ruptura con los logros de la democracia liberal, si sólo se halla integridad en ideas o regímenes políticos “puros” y no se tiene en cuenta los bienes imperfectos, es un error que podemos pagar muy caro. ¿Tenemos claro hacia dónde va el mundo? En primer lugar se presenta un recorrido de lo sucedido desde la caída del Muro de Berlín hasta el 11 de septiembre de 2001 y a continuación se analiza la reacción tras estos hechos, tanto en los Estados Unidos de América como en la Unión Europea. En la parte más reflexiva y propositiva, el autor hace una crítica de los “paradigmas de la equidistancia” y de la llamada “política del apaciguamiento”. En la conclusión, reacciona vigorosamente contra quienes critican irreflexivamente la democracia liberal. La desaparición o deterioro de ésta conllevaría la pérdida de la libertad y de la posibilidad de la justicia.

Analyses the political and legal power of 'the people' in contemporary democratic societiesPresents interdisciplinary perspectives from legal theory, political theory, and the history of ideasBrings together an international range of contributors from Europe, North America and Latin AmericaProvides in-depth analyses of contemporary problems that afflict constitutional democracies globallyIncludes a lead essay by Benjamin Arditi, a leading global expert on populism and popular sovereigntyRecent social and political developments, including the presidential elections in the United States, antidemocratic state policies in Hungary and Poland, and the political climate in the rest of Europe have brought questions relating to the position and composition of 'the people' in constitutional democracies to the forefront. This book confronts these questions head on as leading scholars across the fields of law, legal theory, political theory and history explore the contemporary problems facing constitutional democracies.With a strong focus on constitutional law, this book examines the legal as well as the political power of 'the people' in constitutional democracies. Bringing together an international range of contributors from the USA, Latin America, the UK and continental Europe, it explores the complex relationship between constitutional democracy and 'the people'. Contributors explore this relationship through the lens of radical democracy, engaging with the work of key figures such as Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt, Claude Lefort and Jacques Rancière

On the evening of March 31, 1948, fighting words rang out from the podium at New York's Hotel Astor. Some 900 guests had assembled to hear various speakers hold forth on what one called the “tyrannous and murderous regime” of the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, the victor in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39).1 All present knew that many thousands of Spaniards once allied with the Second Spanish Republic (the left-leaning government Franco had toppled) were still reduced to refugee status. Helping these refugees, who sought only basic material comforts, simply reflected the “true American spirit,” this speaker observed. Further, roiling debate in the United States over Spain and a host of other conflicts proved that civil liberties were fast deteriorating at home. Summing up his resistance to the status quo, the speaker ended by quoting what was then believed to be Patrick Henry's “second-most famous utterance”: “If that be treason, let them make the most of it!”2 The crowd at the Hotel Astor applauded enthusiastically.The individual at the podium was none other than Olin Downes, the senior music critic for the New York Times. This influential figure, often quoted but little studied, began his career as a music critic in 1906, writing for the Boston Post.3 In 1924, he went to the Times, where he remained the rest of his career. Committed to bringing classical music to a broad public, he supervised the concerts at the 1939–40 World's Fair in New York City and oversaw the quiz program on Saturday afternoon Metropolitan Opera broadcasts. Downes was also popular on the lecture circuit and wrote several books. His musical opinions ultimately placed him in the conservative camp, particularly his defense of the traditionally oriented Jean Sibelius.4 Yet Downes's politics were anything but conservative. Among the causes he championed was that of democracy in Spain. The Spanish Civil War and its aftermath in the United States were but one piece of a bigger problem, however. The fate of the refugees—tagged as “Reds” by the political right—was intertwined with the suppression of civil liberties in the United States thanks to the machinations of the powerful HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee), itself abetted by political stagnation and public apathy.Various scholars have analyzed the experiences of Aaron Copland, Marc Blitzstein, Paul Robeson, and Leonard Bernstein in this environment.5 Downes, however, has been largely overlooked.6 This essay draws on previously untapped primary sources to weigh his activism vis-à-vis Spain alongside its subsequent repercussions and historical import. I detail Downes's support for Republican Spain during the Civil War and then explore his work on behalf of Spanish refugees through the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (JAFRC), the first organization to be subpoenaed by the HUAC.7 I also survey his speech-making by interpreting his rhetorical strategies and the traditions they represent. By analyzing Downes in this light—along with the reactions of his superiors at the New York Times—I hope to enrich our understanding of musical life in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s while highlighting the impact of the Spanish Civil War in classical music circles, a topic few musicologists have explored.8 My analysis thus sheds light on McCarthyism, an era of unrelenting media-generated chicanery, anti-democratic impulses, and howling tribalism that parallels our own day.From mid-July 1936, when Franco's military rebellion began, Downes followed the news from Spain. Franco was attacking the legally elected Second Spanish Republic, established five years earlier.9 Despite claims to the contrary, the Republic was not communist. Nor did it ban religion, even if rhetoric from some of its leaders, coupled with anticlerical violence by vigilantes, clouded its intent merely to separate church and state. All the Western democracies except Mexico declared neutrality while the hastily assembled International Brigades (including the Abraham Lincoln Brigade from the United States) defended Republican Spain, fighting alongside the Soviet Union.10 Italy and Germany aided Franco, a grim dress rehearsal for World War II. Seen as a beacon for human rights and democracy, the Republican cause beckoned artists and intellectuals worldwide.11 Pro-Republican sentiment was particularly fervent in New York's artistic circles, where dancers, musicians, actors, and writers organized fund drives, gave benefit performances, and created works of art inspired by the conflict.12Downes's initial involvement was modest. He had little prior connection to Spain, having once lectured at Madrid's Residencia de Estudiantes and written favorably of the music of Manuel de Falla.13 Nonetheless he became a sponsor of the Musicians Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, an affiliate of the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy (NACASD), formed in September 1936.14 (Another affiliate was the American Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy, founded by Dr. Edward Barsky, a communist Jew from Brooklyn and one of Downes's future associates.) The cellist Pablo Casals, vehemently anti-Franco, served as honorary chair of the Musicians’ Committee.15 Mainly, it undertook fundraising and released various statements to the media, including the declaration that the civil war was “one of the decisive conflicts of world history.”16 Musicians elsewhere in the United States followed the Committee's lead: as late as January 1939, when the Republic's defeat was all but certain, a headline in the New York Times proclaimed “160 Musicians Denounce Aid to Forces of Aggression” and petitioned the Roosevelt administration to end the embargo against Republican Spain. Among the signatories was Downes.17As the war ground to an end, some 500,000 refugees trudged across the Pyrenees to suffer in overcrowded camps.18 On April 1, 1939, when Franco declared victory, the United States, along with Great Britain and France, recognized his regime, in hopes of dissuading Franco from joining up with Germany. Despite the basis for this move, Downes and other supporters of the Republic condemned it, shocked at the idea of conferring legitimacy on a leader who had earlier cozied up to Hitler and Mussolini.19 In the ensuing years, Downes became involved with several organizations. One was the Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign, on whose Executive Board he sat.20 Another was the Musicians’ Committee to Aid Spanish Refugees, which he sponsored along with many of the individuals shown in figure 1 and also included Robeson, Howard Hanson, Charles Wakefield Cadman, Elizabeth Sprague Coolidge, and the violinist and conductor Albert Stoessel.21 At the invitation of the colorful and outspoken Milton Wolff, a Civil War veteran from New York, Downes also became involved with the Action Committee to Free Spain.22 Its sponsors included Marian Anderson, Claudio Arrau, Alexander Brailowsky, Alexander Kipnis, Fritz Mahler, Nathan Milstein, Grigor Piatigorsky, Artur Schnabel, Copland, and Bernstein.23Although Downes agreed to serve on the organization's Artists and Scientists Committee, he warned Wolff of certain realities. “The most unfortunate thing about my job,” Downes explained, “is that as music reviewer I have constantly to attend evening performances and then write and work while other people sleep.”24 He once complained to another activist for Republican Spain, the author Dorothy Parker, with whom he evidently enjoyed some familiarity. “Why in hell do you always put your important meetings on Thursday evening?” Downes demanded, noting that Thursdays were “the one evening” on which he was never available because the Philharmonic Symphony, “virtually a must,” performed on that night.25 He also lent his name to Citizens to Safeguard the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, chaired by the journalist Vincent Sheean, and the (Provisional) American Committee for Spanish Freedom. The latter (its name appears as such on letterhead), sought to end diplomatic relations with the “Axis government of Spain.” Its secretary asked Downes to sign a statement that opened with the defiant words “World War Two began in Spain in 1936.”26 Given his predilection for strong language, Downes likely did so.Mainly, however, Downes concentrated on JAFRC, established in 1942 with tax-exempt status. Barsky, the communist doctor he so admired, was at the helm.27 When Roosevelt died in April 1945, JAFRC found hope in his successor, Harry S. Truman, who equated Franco with Hitler and Mussolini and withdrew the U.S. ambassador from Spain.28 Months later, JAFRC sponsored a rally in Madison Square Garden at which several Broadway stars protested the Franco dictatorship, among them Sono Osato of Bernstein's On the Town.29 Downes may well have been present, since he later acknowledged attending “some public rallies” of JAFRC.30 One speaker was the British political theorist and Labour Party chair Harold Laski, broadcast from London via the radio station WJZ. Because Laski criticized the Vatican's policy toward Franco, the Bergen County (New Jersey) prosecutor charged WJZ with broadcasting attacks on religion, a misdemeanor.31 This was all the provocation the HUAC needed to begin its multi-year investigation of JAFRC. On December 10, 1945, Barsky and Helen R. Bryan, JAFRC's Executive Secretary, were ordered to appear in Congress bearing all the organization's financial records and “communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries.”32 JAFRC's Executive Board voted to defy the subpoena, whereupon the HUAC voted to hold all in contempt.33Although not directly involved, Downes kept up on these events, often dashing off hasty missives of support to Barsky and Bryan. He also organized “Music Salute,” a benefit concert for Spanish refugees that took place in May 1947 at New York's Ziegfeld Theater. To attract a broad public, Downes solicited classical and popular artists.He also took care to avoid any hint of communism. When the folk singer John Jacob Niles expressed concern about political risk, Downes informed him that the project was strictly humanitarian, writing, “Not being a communist myself I could not possibly tell you if there will be communists present in the audience or on the stage on this occasion. The purpose of the meeting is entirely nonpolitical . . . But if you have any doubt as to the company in which you find yourself then you certainly ought not to participate. This is a question that every man must decide for himself.”34 Also seeking reassurance was the Hungarian-born opera singer Miklos Gafni, a concentration camp survivor.35 In a series of letters, Downes had explain to Gafni's booking agency, Fadiman Associates, that the funds from “Music Salute” would be distributed through the Unitarian Service Committee in Paris.36 He also told Edwin Fadiman (brother of the well-known author and media personality Clifton Fadiman) that the “absolutely non-political” event would seek only to aid those “starving outside Spain's borders.” To be sure, Downes allowed that he might “refer to the evil results of the tyranny of Francoism in Spain” in his introductory speech.37 Fadiman also managed the First Piano Quartet, a four-piano act—later featured alongside television hosts Ed Sullivan and Lawrence Welk—whom Downes invited to participate as well; the Quartet expressed similar concerns.Both Gafni and the Quartet were persuaded, the latter appearing onstage with their four Steinways in tow. Also featured on the “novelty program” were two dance numbers, one by the team Mata and Hari (Meta Krahn and Otto Ulbricht), who combined acrobatics with Isadora Duncan's techniques. Other performers included the composer Marc Blitzstein, the pianist Gaby Cassedesus, and the violinist Albert Spalding. Among the singers were Gafni, Kipnis, and two African Americans: Muriel Smith, of Carmen Jones fame, and Carol Brice, who had recently recorded Manuel de Falla's El amor brujo with Fritz Reiner and the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra. A light-hearted skit performed by the cast members of Call Me Mister (music and lyrics by Harold J. Rome) capped the evening's entertainment.38 Downes introduced each act and, in a brief speech, a copy of which he sent Casals, explained the dire circumstances in Spain.39 Meanwhile, JAFRC's list of sponsors was growing, now including more musicians: Grigor Piatigorsky, Yehudi Menuhin, and Hazel Scott.40Besides “Music Salute,” Downes helped organize fundraising dinners and, as noted above, was sometimes a featured speaker. These events did not always go according to plan. In March 1946, he coordinated a dinner at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, which he would co-chair with the actor and director Margaret Webster.41 Over 900 people responded to the invitation, on which words from Abraham Lincoln's Cooper Union speech of February 27, 1860, figured prominently: “let us have faith that right makes might.” Among the guests were Serge Koussevitzky and the choreographer Agnes de Mille.42 The conductor Walter Damrosch would sit beside Downes and Webster on the dais, both of whom were scheduled to speak.43By any standard, Downes's organizing proved successful: the event brought in $60,000 (approximately $735,000 today).44 Yet for reasons of time, he was unable to deliver his prepared comments. He confided his displeasure to Bryan. Praising her “tremendous work” and “fighting like a tiger” on behalf of JAFRC, he allowed that alongside her Herculean efforts his exclusion from the podium was but a petty concern.45 Nonetheless, Downes lamented the time spent working on his speech, adding that as “a considerably overworked man” he had sacrificed many hours to “formulate something decent to say for the Spanish dinner.” As he put it, “I regretted having no chance to stand up and be counted myself in the proceedings of the evening and say what I have long wished to say—or part of it—on phases of the subject that did not overlap what other speakers of the evening treated so ably . . . I wanted to speak for the plain American . . . ”46In fact, this was to be Downes's political persona. Despite his status in the “highbrow” world of classical music, as an activist he sought to represent the worker, the housewife, the teacher—any ordinary citizen entitled to justice via the legal channels of U.S. democracy. In so presenting himself, Downes drew on a well-tested strategy. Not only was it central to the rhetoric of the Popular Front in the 1930s but the figure of the “plain American” or “average citizen” surfaced later, in more mainstream political circles.47 In May 1942, Roosevelt's vice president Henry Wallace extolled a people's movement that, in the postwar period, would construct an “economic peace that is just, charitable, and enduring.”48 He set forth these aspirations in the widely circulated speech “The Century of the Common Man,” from which Copland derived the title of his celebrated fanfare. With that potent phrase, moreover, Wallace challenged the media magnate Henry R. Luce, whose jingoistic paean to “the American century” had appeared in Life magazine a few for the of Also was who that if such an were earlier for world like both believed in the man and for Wallace when the latter for president as the of the Party in In Downes on behalf in where he informed that “one of the reasons the people must Henry Wallace to put an end to this so in our a to the In Downes to about the as was so the in for noted is a strong because itself has the of that no a than with the as In May 1948, Downes took up these at on to Wallace than of the in what has been as a noted above, Downes also called forth from U.S. In Patrick Henry at he was he the that the for justice in the United States was no from any prior of Further, as Wallace and the Party had such was A the American Party of the United States had a similar when its leader for president in the is of the not a communist himself, Downes the of and civil both in U.S. democracy and the so in our public proved more for as JAFRC was On March 31, a an against for her to over JAFRC Parker, Barsky, and the Executive that JAFRC's could well end up at the and the were asked Downes if he would Downes's was “I with you not only one but one In the was in the one of the all Board members of with most Board members to except Barsky, who and was Downes to Barsky, “I doubt if five years would have believed that such a of justice could have place our American and of He also to during the the however, To that end, JAFRC more fundraising Downes would no be In his of March (the speech quoted at the of this he the and of the as her to from her also a Musicians Robeson, Kipnis, Anderson, and were on the as were the and journalist and the and Helen to her was at when at presenting at the Downes on his the public of “the of was when some of the strategies Downes as to “the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee been out in the two years for such attacks by he that the in Spain, such as and of were the liberties the HUAC sought most to in the United The speech Barsky called Downes a and and a told him that his speech was to those of . . . and of his powerful rhetoric and various invited Downes to Among them was the of JAFRC in which he on May the Executive Secretary, asked him to on and the Downes, however, was more to present as a “plain citizen” than as a for the In his to he to his speech on behalf of “I if and the is the subject for he it is so in your on the ground of my in the artistic But as I told the . . . I was not present as a music or as a political or as a or of and but . . . as one plain citizen to other plain about our and our . . . in most in our his Downes a in where he the stage with who performed the title in the a at the Republican and HUAC of On 1948, Downes a similar public in Great joining up with and the both later By the had to hear JAFRC's only up Downes, who scheduled another speech in this time in As he told Bryan, he would speak on “the of justice . . . brought about through the efforts of that . . . The a her to events, including a dinner for the Boston of to place on The composer was among the and would Downes be to He her in the now her as and adding the I this to your to the folk a it by it to at at the musical Downes that her was still in the Downes on civil But he was about his with the Times. that he was in the program as critic of the New York he told Executive for the Boston politics my own and entirely separate from my with the adding “I on this Downes had to be more than the media had on his The Times a on a dinner sponsored by the Citizens Committee of the and at which Downes was of and at which several speakers (including the . . . in the of In Downes the in a about four members of the about to serve for of whereupon Downes a statement of He appeared on the in connection with the Committee for the First of the formed a on communists in his name also figured in an for the on and Civil on Also the news was a rally for Henry at which “the was by Olin Downes, music critic for the New York to Downes's more for his music the Times in By the composer had been on of communist On February the Times an defense by several by the composer not a critic for the Times. that 1948, the world may the United States, and the Soviet with since their artists to a certain no one say what that Downes, no for Soviet took up similar in his own by which appeared the He the that would have for as a composer if politics and had him Downes was about his own this time in human when including our do to democracy while that they do not in democracy at but only in politics and no at of in the . . . it to that this art and as the on Downes was for the of the Times, who Downes to his Downes, is the one to I have to you to yourself to that piece Downes would have had to “If had been for would you have to it in this of the To be sure, Downes as a him music But he Downes's own words at say that he have for as a composer if politics and had him that a and then it to for the of the music and your that had to speech, financial and the of the Downes to a however, a Olin February that opened with the Downes my Some with ultimately Downes the music critic of the Times and not the of the political I like it that you to to music in what you write for the New York Times and I would a to that Downes and no took a Downes managed to a even while over a fundraising dinner for the Spanish refugees, this time at the Astor on March He invited several to including Carol Brice, whom he could from El amor the “Music Salute” of two years however, Downes but a of Downes was also scheduled to participate in a to Barsky but had to out at the His were in by the one of the to in March when Downes over the and for World at the Waldorf Astoria He both served on the program and the which he introduced with a The featured Copland, the and Jacob the and the Helen Soviet the among them Downes On March the first of the the New York on claims that various intellectuals had been to their to the all part of of As the “the of what these and music could do . . . is by at a and Yet no individual is quoted and only Downes, who not be for is He no time in writing to Helen the president of the of these Downes that not one or was in the thus whatsoever of the quoted Downes also out that the for the to to the however, of Olin A wrote that Downes was with the . . . to Downes the is not in this to the but as a political for the Soviet that Downes had no working at the Times, to supporters in “a to a to Downes, out that since their of February 1948, Downes had up to their that he to

It is tempting to assume that liberal democracies have always targeted racial discrimination and hate crimes for specific punishment. But meaningful laws only materialized starting in the 1960s and 1980s respectively. This chapter focuses first on the development of American anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s and hate crime laws in the 1980s and 1990s. Looking closely at this history shows how the country most committed to freedom in some domains was the quickest to forego it in others, and just how extensive its laws against racist opinion-as-motive have become. It then turns to developments in Europe. Many European governments have followed in the United States’ footsteps by establishing laws against racial discrimination and hate crimes, although seldom with similar vigor. Looking in depth at the United States, Britain, and Germany demonstrates the origins, spread, and limits of penalizing racist opinion-as-motive in liberal democracies. Ultimately, this chapter also reveals the internal tensions and transnational differences among countries that attempt to balance upholding freedom and fighting racism in a variety of domains.

Problem, research strategy, and findings: There has been a dramatic resurgence of bed bug infestations in the United States since the early 2000s. Bed bugs pose significant public health and economic concerns, but cities have been hampered in their response by the ambiguity of current public health and housing regulations toward bed bugs. In this study, I analyze municipal ordinances for more than 8,000 local governments, describe the responses of cities to the bed bug crisis, and examine the different approaches that cities have taken and the political–ecological processes underpinning these varying approaches. Few municipalities have addressed bed bugs in their codes. Most cities that have addressed bed bugs have sought to clarify that bed bugs are to be treated like other pests but, rather than crafting policies specific to bed bugs, have relied on existing code enforcement procedures. Only a handful of U.S. cities have taken a comprehensive approach to addressing the bed bug epidemic. Interests representing apartment owners have pushed back strongly against municipal and state action, complicating the response. It is still too early, and monitoring data are insufficient, to conclusively evaluate the success of municipal ordinances, but I describe potentially successful approaches based on considerations of public health response to infectious disease. Takeaway for practice: Because human dwellings are the habitat of bed bugs, infestations are intimately tied to issues of housing affordability, insecurity and quality, eviction, and mobility. Cities should consider passing ordinances that specifically recognize bed bugs in the sections of their code that address public health, property maintenance, and landlord–tenant rights and responsibilities. Ordinances should be tailored to the specific challenges in addressing bed bug infestations and should include provisions for tenant protection, enforcement, and monitoring.

Research has conceptualized system justification as an overall perception of legitimacy of the status quo. However, there is mixed evidence to determine whether individuals construe political systems and values that uphold them as part of such status quo. We reasoned that if individuals construe the status quo as encompassing the political system and its values in the United States, system justification should predict support for current political institutions and liberal democracy. Relying on a representative survey and an experiment (N = 1994), we found that system justification was related to support for current institutions but not liberal democracy principles, even when making salient different components of the status quo (i.e. economic inequality and liberal democracy). Results suggest that researchers studying legitimacy of intergroup settings or political institutions should measure legitimacy of those institutions rather than general perceptions of fairness, as individuals might not construe the status quo as encompassing those institutions.

This research discusses the education system in the United States and at the end of the discussion a little comparison with the education system in Indonesia. Because of its focus, the discussion of this paper is more directed at the implementation of education systems and policies in the United States including; how the level of education in the United States, management, curriculum, learning evaluation, teacher quality, education funding and education quality assurance practices, which are applied in developing education. The approach used through the method used by the author in conducting this research is through descriptive qualitative methods by searching for various data from documents and literature in the form of; literature, articles, books, other supporting websites including podcasts and video interviews on YouTube that have been directly involved in education in the United States. It is assumed that since the United States declared independence from Great Britain on 4 July 1776, the form of government of the Federal Presidential Constitutional Republic and Liberal Democracy with three branches of government, namely, executive, legislative and judicial, has progressed in various aspects including in the aspect of education. In this context, of course, progress in various fields in Indonesia is far behind compared to the United States, especially in the field of education. From this analysis, it is not wrong if Indonesia continues to improve and take valuable lessons from the United States experience in the education system in this contemporary era.

Maximizing donors' gifts: A comparison of actual and expected solid organ yield among VCA donors.

Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech

"Abstract The regional factor has always played an important role in the political developments of various countries and political experiences, as this factor constituted the role of the direct incubator for all the successful and failed experiences of political development throughout our time. The process of democratization is considered one of the most important political experiments of our time, which gained wide momentum after the Second World War. Especially after the peoples of the world realized the importance and preference of this system compared to the rest of the political systems. After the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed a remarkable trend towards liberal democracy, exhilarated by the euphoria of the victory of the Western camp led by the United States of America over its eastern historical opponent (led by the Soviet Union). Liberal democracy and its sovereignty over the world, rather they unleashed an unbridled optimism that says: ""The peoples and societies of the world are moving towards adopting the model of liberal democracy, because it is the model most responsive to the aspirations of human freedom and the release of his energies."" "