US Special Forces: an other within the self

This report sheds new light on the CIA and US Special Forces' covert campaign alongside Afghan Northern Alliance leader General Dostum's horse-mounted Uzbeks during 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003 and 2005 the author traveled over the Hindu Kush Mountains to the plains of Northern Afghanistan and lived with the legendary Northern Alliance opposition leader General Dostum. His aim was to recreate Dostum's campaign alongside the CIA and Special Forces to seize the holy city of Mazar i Sharif from the Taliban in November 2001. Based on interviews with Dostum and his Uzbek commanders, this article recreates this proxy offensive that saw the Northern Alliance opposition break out of the mountains, seize this shrine town and bring the Taliban house of cards falling down in a matter of weeks. Up until now the indigenous Afghan Uzbeks, who played a crucial role as a ‘boots on the ground’ fighting force for Centcom, have been cast as a mere backdrop for American heroics. Now their side of the story and their links to the mysterious shrine of Mazar i Sharif are for the first time revealed.

: The purpose of this paper is to analyze and suggest possible roles for special operations forces in homeland security and homeland defense. The paper reviews the obstacles to the use of military forces in the domestic environment under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and then introduces special operations and special operations forces competencies. The paper then analyzes the current National Strategy for Homeland Security and injects suggestions for using special operations forces to bolster the Strategy. After an overview of United States Northern Command, the Department of Defense's supported command for the homeland defense mission, the paper recommends establishing a sub-unified organization under Northern Command to provide special operations command and control, planning, and mission execution. Underlying the entire discussion is the critical need to incorporate special operations forces early in the campaign plan, rather than waiting for mission execution to blend them into the force structure. Regardless of the role special operations forces play or the structure that exercises their command and control, commanders will reap the benefits these highly specialized forces provide only if they understand who they are, what they do, and how to integrate them into the missions of homeland security and homeland defense.

: The nature of the Global War On Terror (GWOT) has driven U.S. Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to unprecedented levels of cooperation on the battlefield, and the historical conventional mistrust of SOF is being overwritten today by successful combined SOF/CF operations. The joint force and the Services must continue to improve the ability of SOF to conduct C2 and integrate C2 with their own capabilities. Integrated SOF and CF command and control is a base requirement for maximizing SOF effects in the irregular and asymmetric environments characteristic of the GWOT. This paper will analyze the C2 integration between SOF and CF in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the current main effort of SOF and the U.S. military, and make recommendations for force-wide changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities as appropriate. Command and control of all aspects of SOF is too broad of a subject to explore in this paper. This paper concentrates on the C2 issues that most pertain to units conducting integrated ground operations, primarily Army Special Forces (SF), Navy SEALs, and U.S. Army and Marine conventional forces.

: The article introduces the United States as the sole superpower. As such the U.S. is obligated to assist other countries in need or threatened by adversaries, as long as it's in our national interests. Future U.S. military involvement will not necessarily be driven by what our armed forces perceive to be a threat to our national security or interest, but how American society at large and our elected officials view threats, determine our national interests and how we wage war as a nation. Special operations forces today are global, joint and versatile. They operate world wide, with little fanfare, often in parts of the world where disease, poverty and civil strife riddle the countryside. They serve in extremely harsh, as well as permissive, environments, under the cover of darkness and increasingly, in the high-tech realm of cyberspace. They can operate as a cohesive joint service team or as a single service unit. A hallmark is frequent operations with coalition forces and other foreign militaries. Special operations forces support conventional forces in major conflicts, and they respond to conflicts or crises such as insurgencies, subversion, sabotage, narcotics trafficking and terrorism. They are not structured or expected to win wars single- handedly, but they can help prevent and deter them. As part of a theater joint task force, they can enable conventional forces to achieve victory. By anticipating changes in world development, analyzing our special operations force employment trends and examining American societal and cultural trends, will help prepare special operations forces for the future. Also in preparing for the future means considering what DoD's expectations will be for the use and role of special operations forces. General Shelton expects we will need special operations forces more th% ever in traditional roles, but they must also prepare for nontraditional environments and more sophisticated threats.

Combat capabilitie sofunits of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the involvementin the OOS and capacity building (acquisition of newones) during the preparation for dutyinthe NATO Response Force wereanalyzed. There sults of the basictraining course for the spy of the National Guard of Ukraine are given. Special units of the Armed Forces play an important role in the implementation of the Joint Forces operation in eastern Ukraine. During the performance of specific tasks, special forces units not only conducted reconnaissance (special measures) at important enemy targets, but also provided for the deployment of units of the Armed Forces to fire. The experience of recent armed conflicts shows that the most effective fire defeat of the enemy is possible with the maximum integration of means and forces of detection (intelligence). The tool for such integration, as well as for increasing the combat capabilities of special forces (Special Operations Forces), is the involvement in the NATO Operational Force and Capabilities Concept (hereinafter referred to as the Concept). The concept of NATOꞌs operational forces and capabilities is, in essence, a clear set of requirements for the unit involved in the assessment and sets a clear goal for the unit's command. With each assessment, the unit is faced with more and more requirements, for which the unit must be qualitatively transformed in accordance with NATO guidelines and act in accordance with their protocols. Protocols are a unified procedure and are the same for all types of troops. Since the last assessment, the unit has achieved its main goal ‒ full interoperability with NATO units and the ability to perform tasks in any operational area as efficiently as possible.

THE RECENT WAR in Iraq was, among other things, a powerful advertisement for the effectiveness of the United States' storied special operations forces. Americans are just now learning what role these commandos played in the conflict, but already it has emerged that, during the early days of the fighting, they managed to secure crucial airfields in western Iraq, protect the country's oil fields from saboteurs (fewer than lo Iraqi oil fields were ignited, compared to the more than 700 Kuwaiti fields that were set ablaze in 1991), and, most famously, rescue Private Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital. Yet these achievements, although impressive, do not fully explain the unprecedented prominence currently enjoyed by special operations forces within the U.S. military. True, such troops may have been well suited to the kind of missions they were given in Iraq. But they also happen to fit precisely into the model of a leaner, more flexible military that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is fighting to create at the Pentagon. And Rumsfeld has made no secret of his plans to thrust special forces into the lead role in the war on terrorism, by using them for covert operations around the globe. The special forces' success in Iraq has also obscured a more ominous consequence of their newfound popularity: that expanding their role in the way Rumsfeld intends could be very dangerous for U.S. foreign policy. Thanks to the vagueness of U.S. law governing covert action,

Aim of the Study: The aim of this study is to analyze the oversight role of Pakistani News Media in relation to Intelligence Agencies of the country, during the Abbottabad Raid of 2 May 2011, an intelligence failure, while assessing applicability of normative model of Claudia Hillebrand in our local context. In new democracies like Pakistan, this effective watchdog role is a must yet ironically has become extremely difficult. After the GWOT this informal oversight of civil society, media being part of is the only hope, which must deliver, especially when formal oversight by the parliament or legislature has not been effective or existent. Methodology: This study conducted analysis of news reports of The Dawn, The News, The Express Tribune, and The Nation, in light of OBL hunt by US Special Forces. Due to the nature of high context culture of the country/media, the qualitative method of discourse analysis of Teun .A Van Dijk was used to analyze the media text, press reports or stories. Findings: The study results presented a dismal position of media in the enshrined role of oversight or monitoring. The deficiencies identified are of capacity, resources/expertise, will, and precedence. Conclusion: Security lapses and Intelligence Failures have been inevitable even to world powers, but their continued neglect can easily lead to National or Collective Failure, which all countries must try to avoid at all costs.

The killing of Osama bin Laden by US Special Forces on 2 May 2011 raises several questions of international law with regard to the legality of this particular operation and the permissibility of targeted killings of international terrorists in general. In this article it will be argued, on the basis of an analysis of the applicable international law, that the killing of bin Laden cannot be justified under international humanitarian law because there is no armed conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. Even if one were to assume the existence of such an armed conflict, bin Laden's killing would only have been lawful if Al Qaeda were to be considered an organised armed group within the meaning of international humanitarian law and bin Laden could have been killedquamembership of this group. Otherwise, his killing could only have been lawful if he was (still) taking a direct part in hostilities. In any case, in the absence of an armed conflict, under the applicable legal regime of peacetime, the killing could only be justified in a situation of self-defence or an immediate danger for others. As this situation apparently did not exist, the killing of bin Laden amounted to an extrajudicial execution. On another note, the operation may also have violated international law by failing to respect Pakistan's territorial sovereignty. Ultimately, this depends on the recognition of a (pre-emptive) right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, in particular taking into account the immediacy criterion.

: Special Operations Forces (SOF) within a Joint Task Force are controlled by a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Presently, JSOTF headquarters are formed around the core of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), a service SOF headquarters, such as a Special Forces Group, or from a composite staff. These methods have significant shortcomings; the TSOCs ability to support SOF throughout the theater is reduced, a Special Forces Group is not trained or staffed to run a JSOTF at the component command level, and a composite staff element requires a substantial amount of time to operate effectively. This paper suggests an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters that avoids these pitfalls. The recommendation is to establish a standing JSOTF headquarters within each TSOC. Included is an analysis of the major benefits and drawbacks of the proposal, an examination of alternative and interim solutions, and a proposed organizational structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters. Forming standing JSOTF headquarters is a controversial issue. No unit or service is anxious to give up personnel to support an organization whose role is invisible to most except during a crisis. Some will contend that there is no real problem. JSOTFs formed in the past where ad hoc and they managed to get the job done. Our country, though, has now been attacked on its own shores and as a consequence, the nation is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism. Winning this war is our military's top priority, but to win it, we must be agile and global in depth. Standing JSOTF headquarters would give SOF an almost immediate command and control capability that is effective at the earliest moments of a crisis. They could provide this capability without detracting from the TSOCs ability to support other, perhaps simultaneous SOF operations in the theater. SOF will lead the military's war on terrorism.

To investigate resilience in American Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel. A qualitative descriptive exploratory design was used to interview Special Forces and Navy SEAL participants about their perspectives on and experiences of resilience. Assumptions that high resilience inversely correlates with suicide risk in SOF drove our primary research questions and study focus. Questions were based on Holling's theory of ecological resilience. Participants provided insightful and detailed data of their resilience and were often self-effacing or self-critical. Responses indicated that although quite resilient, SOF personnel express their resilience in ways known to become pathological and precipitate suicidality if left undetected. Extracted subthemes indicated commitment to others over self and a nexus of trait variables linked to suicidality. Estimated neurotrauma from repetitive blast exposures should be incorporated in future models. Findings challenge prevailing beliefs that dysfunctional behaviors and suboptimal resilience drive SOF suicide. Results herein justify future research and changes to command postures and U.S. Department of Defense initiatives regarding relationships between and among variables of resilience, neurotrauma, and suicide in SOF. [Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and Mental Health Services, 63(5), 26-38.].

Special Forces Algorithm: A novel meta-heuristic method for global optimization

ABSTRACTThis case study describes the unconventional warfare techniques used by Allied special operations forces during their campaign against Axis occupiers of Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1945. The Yugoslavia campaign was destined to be among the first in a series of twentieth-century unconventional warfare efforts, culminating in the campaign conducted by the United States and United Kingdom covert and special operators. This region of the Balkans was extremely active with occupying German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and various client government militaries pitted against largely unconventional forces to include Soviet backed partisans under Tito and loyalist Chetniks backed by Allied Forces. The planning considerations, preparation, and precise military actions conducted during this conflict continue to reemerge in contemporary discussions on special operations theory. The experiences of the past continue to enable successes in the evolution of modern special operations forces that began with the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS and employment of special operations forces in Yugoslavia during World War II.

Musculoskeletal injury mitigation is a priority in military organisations to protect personnel health and sustain a capable workforce. Despite efforts to prevent injury, inconsistencies exist in the evidence used to support these activities. There are many known limitations in the injury surveillance data reported in previous Special Operation Forces (SOF) research. Such studies often lack accurate, reliable, and complete data to inform and evaluate injury prevention activities. This research aimed to achieve expert consensus on injury surveillance methods in SOF to enhance the quality of data that could be used to inform injury prevention in this population. A Delphi study was conducted with various military injury surveillance stakeholders to seek agreement on improving surveillance methods in SOF. Iterative questionnaires using close and open-ended questions were used to collect views about surveillance methods related to injury case definitions and identifying essential and optional data requirements. Consensus was predefined as 75% group agreement on an item. Sixteen participants completed two rounds of questionnaires required. Consensus was achieved for 17.9% (n = 7) of questions in the first-round and 77.5% (n = 38) of round two questions. Several challenges for surveillance were identified, including recording injury causation, SOF personnel’s injury reporting behaviours influencing accurate data collection, and surveillance system infrastructure limitations. Key military injury surveillance stakeholders support the need for improved data collection to enhance the evidence that underpins injury prevention efforts. The consensus process has resulted in preliminary recommendations to support future SOF injury surveillance.

This study provides an examination of approaches to United States Government (USG) resourcing interventions on a national scale that enhance psychology support capabilities in the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. A review of Congressional legislation and resourcing trends in the form of authorizations and appropriations since 2006 demonstrates how Congress supported enhanced psychology support capabilities throughout the Armed Forces and in SOF supporting innovative command interests that address adverse affects of operations tempo behavioral effects (OTBE). The formulation of meaningful metrics to address SOF specific command interests led to a personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) analysis in response to findings compiled by the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) Task Force. The review of PERSTEMPO data at subordinate command and unit levels enhances the capability of SOF leaders to develop policy and guidance on training and operational planning that mitigates OTBE and maximizes resourcing authorizations. A major challenge faced by the DoD is in providing behavioral healthcare that meets public and legislative demands while proving suitable and sustainable at all levels of military operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. Current legislative authorizations offer a mechanism of command advocacy for resourced multi-functional program development that enhances psychology support capabilities while reinforcing SOF readiness and performance.

Mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) exposure in military Service Members may lead to impaired brain waste clearance which increases neurological disease risk including amyloidopathies. Perivascular spaces (PVS) are part of the glymphatic pathway which support brain waste clearance, especially during sleep. Greater magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)-visible PVS burden has been previously observed in patients with neurodegenerative diseases and animal TBI models. PURPOSE: To determine the association between PVS burden (number and volume) and mTBI history in Special Operations Forces (SOF) combat Soldiers. METHODS: In this cross-sectional study, participants underwent neuroimaging to capture T2-weighted (T2w) whole brain three dimensional volumes obtained on a Siemens 3T Biograph mMR or 3T MAGNETOM Prisma scanner (TR/TE = 3200/400ms, slice thickness = 1mm, FoV = 256mm x 256 mm). The PVS segmentation was performed using a previously validated, multi-scale deep convolutional encoder-decoder neural network. All T2w images were skull stripped and a custom T2w atlas with segmented cerebral white matter and subcortical gray matter labels was registered to each subject using Advanced Normalization Tools to minimize misidentifying thin tubular structures in the skull, brainstem, cerebellum, and cortex as PVS. Only PVS clusters within the white matter mask were quantified for analyses. Binary mTBI history was self-reported (“yes” or “no”). Due to non-normal PVS metric distribution, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were used to determine group differences in PVS outcomes. RESULTS: In total, 223 healthy SOF combat Soldiers (age = 33.1±4.3yrs) were included for analysis and 123 (55.16%) reported mTBI history. Soldiers with mTBI history had greater PVS number (z = 2.506, P = 0.013) and PVS volume (z = 2.419, P = 0.016). CONCLUSIONS: We found mTBI history is associated with increased PVS burden in SOF combat Soldiers that are clinically recovered from mTBI. This may indicate ongoing physiological post-mTBI changes that could lead to impaired waste clearance via the glymphatic system. Future studies should determine how sleep influences PVS burden following mTBI exposure and if PVS number and volume are meaningful neurobiological outcomes for neurodegenerative disease risk. Funded by US Special Operations Command