Using resource public key infrastructure for secure border gateway protocol

Despite its critical role in Internet connectivity, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) remains highly vulnerable to attacks such as prefix hijacking, where an Autonomous System (AS) announces routes for IP space it does not control. To address this issue, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) was developed starting in 2008, with deployment beginning in 2011. This paper performs the first comprehensive, longitudinal study of the deployment, coverage, and quality of RPKI.We use a unique dataset containing all RPKI Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) from the moment RPKI was first deployed, more than 8 years ago. We combine this dataset with BGP announcements from more than 3,300 BGP collectors worldwide. Our analysis shows the after a gradual start, RPKI has seen a rapid increase in adoption over the past two years. We also show that although misconfigurations were rampant when RPKI was first deployed (causing many announcements to appear as invalid) they are quite rare today. We develop a taxonomy of invalid RPKI announcements, then quantify their prevalence. We further identify suspicious announcements indicative of prefix hijacking and present case studies of likely hijacks.Overall, we conclude that while misconfigurations still do occur, RPKI is ready for the big screen, and routing security can be increased by dropping invalid announcements. To foster reproducibility and further studies, we release all RPKI data and the tools we used to analyze it into the public domain.

Examining the Jurisdictions of Internet Routes to Prevent Data Exfiltration

The border gateway protocol (BGP) is the default inter domain routing protocol used on the internet for exchanging information between autonomous systems. Available literature suggests that BGP is vulnerable to session hijacking attacks. There are a number of proposals aimed at improving BGP security which have not been fully implemented. This paper examines a number of approaches for securing BGP through a comparative study and identifies the reasons why these proposals have not been implemented commercially. This paper analyses the architecture of internet routing and the design of BGP while focusing on the problem of BGP session hijacking attacks. Using Graphical Network Simulator 3 (GNS-3), a session hijack is demonstrated and a solution which involves the implementation of route filtering, policy-maps and route-maps on CISCO routers representing ASes is carried out. In the end, a workable industry standard framework for securing and protecting BGP sessions and border routers from exploitation with little or no modification to the existing routing infrastructure is demonstrated.

The security of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the standard routing protocol for inter-domain routing in the Internet, has been an increasingly intent focus of concern for many years. In the last few years, the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) has undertaken several efforts to specify security solutions for BGP. The IETF has chartered work to analyze BGP vulnerabilities, to investigate threat models for routing protocols in general, and to specify requirements for BGP security. Most recently, the IETF has begun work on securing the origination of prefix advertisements. Unauthorized origination of prefix advertisements has been the most frequent root cause of publicly noted routing incidents for the history of the Internet. Also, authorization of origination of prefix advertisements is the common basis to almost all suggested security solutions. Because the Global Information Grid (GIG) uses BGP for inter-domain routing and VPN provisioning just as the commercial Internet, the GIG is subject to the same BGP vulnerabilities. Security solutions to the vulnerabilities of BGP should be deployed and used in the GIG, in order to protect the GIG routing system internally and at interconnection points to the Internet. It is important that the GIG be aware of standards based security solutions and be involved in the development of new standards. This paper discusses the current status of BGP security standards, how they are evolving, and how the security of BGP relates to the GIG.

The Internet Route Registry (IRR) and Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) both emerged as different solutions to improve routing security in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by allowing networks to register information and develop route filters based on information other networks have registered. RPKI is a crypto system, with associated complexity and policy challenges; it has seen substantial but slowing adoption. IRR databases often contain inaccurate records due to lack of validation standards. Given the widespread use of IRR for routing security purposes, this inaccuracy merits further study. We study IRR accuracy by quantifying the consistency between IRR and RPKI records, analyze the causes of inconsistency, and examine which ASes are contributing correct IRR information. In October 2021, we found ROAs for around 20% of RADB IRR records, and a consistency of 38% and 60% in v4 and v6. For RIPE IRR, we found ROAs for 47% records and a consistency of 73% and 82% in v4 and v6. For APNIC IRR, we found ROAs for 76% records and a high consistency of 98% and 99% in v4 and v6. For AFRINIC IRR, we found ROAs for only 4% records and a consistency of 93% and 97% in v4 and v6.

: The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is used to distribute routing information between autonomous systems (ASes), is a critical component of the Internet's routing infrastructure. It is highly vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks due to the lack of a secure means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of BGP control traffic. The Secure BGP projects designed a secure, scalable, deployable architecture (S-BGP) for an authorization and authentication system that addresses most of the security problems associated with BGP. This contract final report includes the following documents concerning S-BGP: Lessons Learned from the Secure BGP Proof-of-Concept Implementation; Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP); Design and Analysis of the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP). The last two items discuss the vulnerabilities and security requirements associated with BGP, describe the S-BGP countermeasures, and explain how they address these vulnerabilities and requirements. In addition, the papers provide a comparison of this architecture with other approaches that have been proposed, analyze the performance implications of the proposed countermeasures, and address operational issues.

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is used to distribute routing information between autonomous systems (ASes), is a critical component of the Internet's routing infrastructure. It is highly vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks, due to the lack of a secure means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of BGP control traffic. This paper describes a secure, scalable, deployable architecture, S-BGP, for a system that addresses most of the security problems associated with BGP. The paper discusses the vulnerabilities and security requirements associated with BGP, describes the S-BGP countermeasures, and explains how they address these vulnerabilities and requirements. The paper also provides a comparison of this architecture with other approaches that have been proposed, analyzes the performance implications of the proposed countermeasures, and reports on prototype implementation experience.

We present an evaluation methodology for comparison of existing and proposed new algorithms for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) anomaly detection and robustness. A variety of algorithms and alert tools have been proposed and/or prototyped recently. They differ in the anomaly situations which they attempt to alert or mitigate, and also in the type(s) of data they use. Some are based on registry data from Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and Internet Routing Registries (IRRs) - an example is the Nemecis tool. Others such as the Prefix Hijack Alert System (PHAS) and the Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP) are driven by BGP trace data. The trace data is obtained from Reseaux Internet Protocol Europeens - Routing Information Service (RIPE-RIS), Routeviews, or a BGP speaker where the algorithm operates. We propose a new algorithm that combines the use of both registry and trace data, and also makes some key improvements over existing algorithms. We have built an evaluation platform called TERRAIN (Testing and Evaluation of Routing Robustness in Assurable Inter-domain Networking) on which these algorithms can be tested and empirically compared based on real and/or synthetic anomalies in BGP messages. We will present a variety of results providing interesting insights into the comparative utility and performance of the various BGP robustness algorithms.

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the defacto inter-domain routing protocol in the Internet. It was designed without an inherent security mechanism and hence is prone to a number of vulnerabilities which can cause large scale disruption in the Internet. Route leak is one such inter-domain routing security problem which has the potential to cause wide-scale Internet service failure. Route leaks occur when Autonomous systems violate export policies while exporting routes. As BGP security has been an active research area for over a decade now, several security strategies were proposed, some of which either advocated complete replacement of the BGP or addition of new features in BGP, but they failed to achieve global acceptance. Even the most recent effort in this regard, lead by the Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) working group (WG) of IETF fails to counter all the BGP anomalies, especially route leaks. In this paper we look at the efforts in countering the policy related BGP problems and provide an analytical insights into why they are ineffective. We contend a new direction for future research in managing the broader security issues in the inter-domain routing. In that light, we propose a naive approach for countering the route leak problem by analyzing the information available at hand, such as the RIB of the router. The main purpose of this paper was to position and highlight the autonomous smart analytical approach for tackling policy related BGP security issues.

Inter-domain routing protocol routes network reachability information between autonomous systems (ASs) in the network. Network reachability information contains the details about the neighbors of the ASs and it contains messages used to maintain the connection between ASs. On one hand, given the size and the rapid growth of the Internet, any inter-domain routing protocol should satisfy basic desirable algorithmic properties, such as scalability, robustness and rapid convergence by Griffin, T., and Wilford, G. 1999. On the other hand, for economic reasons inter-domain routing should support policy routing, where Internet service providers (ISPs) have the flexibility to implement a wide variety of private routing policies that ISPs choose not to reveal. Moreover, the routing protocol should provide sufficient information to enable ISPs to make informed policy decisions. Border gateway protocol (BGP) by Goodell, G. et al. (2003) is the inter-domain routing protocol that is currently being used. BGP has a number of problems which includes scalability and large convergence time by Labovitz, C et al. (2000). This paper explains in detail the alternative to BGP which is the hybrid optimized link-state path-vector routing protocol (HLP) [1] and gives a comparison based on the simulation of these protocols. The comparison shows us that HLP overcomes some of the important problems faced in BGP.

Border gateway protocol (BGP) version 4 is routing current Internet for more than 20 years. BGP is the only protocol that has proven its routing capability of such size network with continually growing nature. Although BGP is scalable and network layer reachability information it lacks quality of service metrics like latency. BGP routing decision algorithm uses as-path length between autonomous systems (AS) as main factor for most of its best-path calculations. Because of more affordable peering architectures as-path length is generally decreasing in worldwide internet network resulting in less efficient routes for real-time internet protocol traffic. This study proposes future internet architecture consisting of multiple AS which provide latency aware routing in software defined network (SDN). For highest reliability there are bilateral latency measurements between each pair of connected autonomous systems. Latency measurement results are stored in distributed decentralized blockchain network where each AS holds its share. Each AS hosts an SDN instance for interconnection with neighbor SDN controllers over AS border. SDN instances processes latency measurement data from blockchain network, validates data integrity and manages latency aware routing for real-time data flows.

In this paper, we investigate the issues related to the use of a BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) backbone to provide connectivity between mobile nodes, with a specific focus on nodes within an airborne network domain. Research efforts have developed multiple MANET (Mobile Ad hoc Network) protocols to provide routing for mobile nodes. In an airborne network environment, however, there may not be a dense enough concentration of nodes within radio range to provide the connectivity needed for effective use of a MANET protocol. In addition, aircraft within radio range of other nodes will experience intermittent and varying quality radio signals due to banking, interference, or Doppler effects. BGP is the de facto standard in use today to provide terrestrial internetworking routing among Autonomous Systems (AS) despite well known problems. BGP configuration can be complex and has convergence issues but the BGP capability to handle large numbers of routes makes it invaluable. In addition to its use in terrestrial internetworking, BGP has been identified as the routing protocol for the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) Network. Given the BGP networks in a satellite network above and a terrestrial network below an airborne network, it is important to understand the issues of connecting via BGP for airborne nodes. This paper summarizes the results of lab experiments evaluating use of a BGP network for an alternate routing path between aircraft when there is no other connectivity within their airborne routing domain.

Internet is known as the net of networks. It is a huge decentralized network composed by smaller inter-connected networks named autonomous systems (AS). The autonomous systems's interconnection is done by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Several tools have been proposed to monitor BGP problems. Even though there is no long term indicator to rank Internet routes's health based on long term BGP problems long term periods. This paper quantifies the reach ability from several places in the world to many networks. We present a new model to measure network soundness, by quantifying the routing reach ability to a network. The metric is the percentage of the network that is present in the routing tables of selected routers around the world. A systematic monitoring system based on the analytic model is presented. Finally, we analyze the impact of the Chilean 2010 earthquake on the national network infrastructure, based on our model.

BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) is one of the core internet backbone protocols, which were designed to address the large-scale routing among the ASes (Autonomous System) in order to ensure the reachability among them. However, an attacker can inject update messages into the BGP communication from the peering BGP routers and those routing information will be propagated across the global BGP routers. This could cause disruptions in the normal routing behavior. Specially crafted BGP messages can reroute the traffic path from a source ASN to a specific destination ASN via another path and this attack is termed as AS Path Hijacking. This research work is focused on the detection of suspicious deviation in the AS path between a source and destination ASNs, by analyzing the BGP update messages that are collected by passive peering to the BGP routers. The research mainly focuses on identifying the AS Path Hijacking by quantifying: (1). How far the deviation occurred for a given AS Path and (2). How much credible is the deviated AS path. We propose a novel approach to calculate the deviation occurred by employing weighted edit distance algorithm. A probability score using n-gram frequency is used to determine credibility of the path. Both the scores are correlated together to determine whether a given AS Path is suspicious or not. The experimental results show that our approach is capable of identifying AS path hijacks with low false positives.

Current Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) serves for worldwide internet backbone connections between different Autonomous Systems (AS) on the routing level. Continuously in real-time changing environment core routers calculate routing decisions based on path-vector database entries. AS path-vector database may contain multiple paths for various Internet Protocol (IP) prefix destinations where smallest entity in the path-vector is AS. In real world AS can be internet service operator, university or any other organization willing to participate in internet network via multi-homed uplinks. Unfortunately, internal part of AS is hidden in path-vector database thus excluding factors like latency, packet loss or throughput from influencing routing decisions. With easier virtual presence possibilities leading European internet operators has direct BGP connections called peering with mostly every other largest operators thus narrowing routing decision objectivity because mostly routing decisions are taken based on AS path length which tends to one. In this paper, a method of measuring latency is proposed and analyzed through lab measurements. The results of this study permit to discuss about requirements and possibilities to extrapolate this technique from small testbed to worldwide routed networks.