Vatican Reaffirms Moral Permissibility of Xenotransplantation.

Scholars distinguish cultures of authority from cultures of justification in constitutional law. In cultures of authority, a public official’s jurisdiction—or authorization to act—legitimizes the restriction of constitutional rights. In cultures of justification, by contrast, it is the logic and reasonableness of governmental decision-making that legitimize such restrictions. Traditionally, scholars have conceptualized a culture of justification as a culture of persuasion—one grounded in rationality, reason-giving, and engagement with applicable law and the parties’ arguments. They argue that the global expansion of proportionality analysis reflects a shift away from cultures of authority and toward cultures of justification. Drawing on justificatory defenses in criminal law, this article introduces a second conception of justification in constitutional law: justification as moral permissibility. In criminal law, justifications form a category of defenses that recognize how presumptively wrongful conduct can be morally permissible under certain conditions. This article contends that we gain a deeper understanding of a culture of justification—and of proportionality analysis in constitutional adjudication—when we unite the two conceptions: justification as persuasion and justification as moral permissibility. The core argument is that proportionality analysis fosters both cultures of justification. The state commits a presumptive wrong when it restricts fundamental rights. Proportionality analysis ensures that the state not only provides a rational and persuasive justification for limiting rights, but also does so in a morally permissible manner. Justification as moral permissibility elucidates how each stage of proportionality analysis—proper purpose, rational connection, necessity, and balancing—safeguards individuals against distinct forms of governmental wrongdoing. The proper purpose requirement guards against direct discrimination, patronization, and indignity. The rational connection test prevents needless rights violations, protects against arbitrariness, and reveals insincere state motives. The necessity requirement counters excessive coercion and the deflation of rights. The balancing stage prevents instrumentalization and indirect discrimination. Ultimately, this article’s unified account shows how the twin conceptions of justification—as persuasion and as moral permissibility—underpin the structure, role, and argumentative force of proportionality analysis in constitutional adjudication.

In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic has become highly politicized and highly moralized. The current study explored whether participants’ (N = 118) endorsements of binding (promoting group cohesion) versus individualizing (promoting care for individuals) moral foundations explained partisan differences in views and behaviors regarding COVID-19. Participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire before they indicated how morally permissible they thought it was to violate COVID-19 mandates, report others’ violations, or not get vaccinated. Additionally, they indicated their own prevention behaviors. Results show that endorsement of both individualizing and binding foundations explain partisan differences in moral permissibility ratings. Political conservatism predicted greater endorsement of binding foundations which in turn predicted seeing COVID-19 violations and not getting vaccinated as more morally permissible, and predicted fewer self-reported prevention behaviors. Endorsement of individualizing foundations predicted seeing violations as less morally permissible and reporting others’ violations as more morally permissible.

Is what we’re morally permitted to do grounded in our subjective situation? Subjectivists maintain that it is. Objectivists deny this. I shall offer two arguments for Objectivism about moral permissibility.

Beginning with the set of Hohfeldian elements, it is possible to design any number of molecular combinations that may come closer to approximating what we mean by a moral right than any of those elements in isolation. In the last chapter, we looked at the particular molecule favored by Choice Theory of legal rights, and considered the question whether that molecule was also distinctive of moral rights. Another common suggestion about moral rights (and moral, rather than legal, rights will be the focus of this chapter) is that a person X’s moral right to φ is a precise bundle of Hohfeldian elements consisting of a moral claim-right against interference by Y with X’s φing, a moral claim-right against interference by Y with X’s not φing, coupled with X’s moral permissions both to φ and not to φ – that is, with the absence of a moral duty either to φ or not to φ. This is to be taken as a proposed stipulation of what is to be understood by talk of a moral right. The force of such rights will be brought out (in part) by unpacking what is meant by interference. The scope of the right will be brought out by specifying the range of persons and entities Y who are duty-bound not to interfere. And the substance of the right will be the action, φing, that the right-holder has a moral option to do or omit. Further, we can pose the question of the alienability or prescriptability of a moral right as a question about what powers and liabilities exist with respect to the core bundle.

End-of-Life Decision Making, Organ Donation, and Critical Care Nurses

Green purchasing behavior refers to the potential of consumers to reduce the impact on the environment and the excessive loss of natural resources in the procurement process as far as possible under the premise of meeting their own needs. This behavior is not only helpful in alleviating environmental problems but also is an important way to achieve sustainable development. However, whether consumers will increase non-green or excessive compensatory consumption behaviors due to the “moral permission” psychological tendency, present after purchasing green products, is an important question in the current research. This study explores the effect of green purchase intention on compensatory consumption behavior, with special attention to the moderating role of pro-environmental behavior in this relationship. With the increasingly severe global environmental problems, green consumption, as a pro-environmental behavior, has gradually become the focus of social attention. By analyzing the relationship between consumers’ green purchase intention and their subsequent compensatory consumption behavior, this study further reveals the important role of pro-environment behavior in the consumption decision-making process.

How is love different from lust or infatuation?  Do love and marriage really go together “like a horse and carriage”?  Does sex have any necessary connection to either?  And how important are love, sex, and marriage to a well-lived life? In this lively, lucid, and comprehensive textbook, Raja Halwani pursues the philosophical questions inherent in these three important aspects of human relationships, exploring the nature, uses, and ethics of romantic love, sexuality, and marriage.  The book is structured in three parts: Love begins by examining how romantic love differs from other types of love, such as friendship and parental love. It asks which properties of love are essential, whether people have a choice in whom they love, and whether lovers have moral obligations to one another that differ from those they owe to others Sex demonstrates the difficulty in defining sex and the sexual, and examines what constitutes good and bad sex in terms of pleasure, 'naturalness', and moral permissibility.  It offers theoretical and applied ethical approaches to a wide range of sexual phenomena Marriage traces the history of the institution, and describes the various forms in which marriage exists and the reasons why people marry.  It also surveys accounts of why people should or should not marry, and introduces the main arguments for and against gay marriage. Features include: suggestions for further reading online eResource site with dowloadable discussion questions a clear, jargon-free writing style.

This article discusses the extremism as a social phenomenon – a complex and multifaceted. It represents a complex social phenomenon, characterized by a commitment to extreme views and actions, including many forms of radicalism and an integral part such phenomenon as terrorism. terrorism. Extremist behavior and terrorism has an antisocial character, since it is based on the principle of «the end justifies the means», expresses aspiration to achieve the goal by the shortest route, denies another the rights of individuals. Extremism in behavior incompatible with personal culture, cultural development of the individual. Significant signs of extremist behavior is irresponsible attitude of the individual to himself, people, society, law and civic irresponsibility and moral permissiveness.

This paper makes the case for the permissibility of post-conflict amnesties, although not on prudential grounds. It argues that amnesties of a certain scope, targeted to certain categories of perpetrators, and offered in certain contexts are morally permissible because they are an acknowledgment of the difficulty of attributing criminal responsibility in mass violence contexts. Based on this idea, the paper develops the further claim that deciding which amnesties are permissible and which ones are not should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Against what seems to be an increasingly popular assumption of some international actors, just as "blanket" amnesties (i.e. very broad and general amnesties that foreclose criminal prosecution for all kinds of perpetrators and all kinds of wrongdoing) are impermissible, so is an absolutist rejection of all types of amnesties.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Jason T. Eberl and Matilda Ajibola’s paper shifts the discussion of moral enhancement from abstract debates about moral permissibility and moral value to a cautious analysis of the feasibility, effectiveness, and potential risks of moral enhancement technology based on the current state of scientific research. This paper provides a response to the question of whether we can biotechnologically construct a morally better human: it is impossible for biomedical moral enhancement to shape a “virtuous person”, because it bypasses the reflection, practice, and struggle that are necessary for the cultivation of virtue and thus fails to fulfil the fundamental criterion for moral subjectivity. However, while traditional methods can help individuals acquire genuine and stable virtues, both biotechnological interventions and traditional education may face the same dilemma: the difficulty of truly accessing the internal structure of individual moral subjectivity while promoting external norms.

Psychopaths are notorious for their antisocial and immoral behavior, yet experimental studies have typically failed to identify deficits in their capacities for explicit moral judgment. We tested 20 criminal psychopaths and 25 criminal nonpsychopaths on a moral judgment task featuring hypothetical scenarios that systematically varied an actor's intention and the action's outcome. Participants were instructed to evaluate four classes of actions: accidental harms, attempted harms, intentional harms, and neutral acts. Psychopaths showed a selective difference, compared with nonpsychopaths, in judging accidents, where one person harmed another unintentionally. Specifically, psychopaths judged these actions to be more morally permissible. We suggest that this pattern reflects psychopaths' failure to appreciate the emotional aspect of the victim's experience of harm. These findings provide direct evidence of abnormal moral judgment in psychopathy.

This study examines the effect of making judgments in public (vs. private) on the moral permissibility and willingness to engage in three types of potentially repugnant markets (organ sale, prostitution, marijuana). An experiment was conducted where participants responded to a series of questions about repugnant markets and their answers were either publicly revealed to the group they were in, using their name and photo, or kept fully anonymous. There was no effect of making judgments in public for markets for organs or drugs. For prostitution, however, subjects judged it as substantially less permissible and reported lower willingness to engage in the activity (assuming it was legal) when asked in public compared to when asked anonymously. These effects were mainly driven by male participants. Our study confirms that social signaling plays an important role when understanding when and why people judge certain markets as morally (un)permissable.

When it is considered to be in their best interests, withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment from non-competent physically ill or injured patients – non-voluntary passive euthanasia, as it has been called – is generally accepted. A central reason in support of the procedures relates to the perceived manner of death they involve: in non-voluntary passive euthanasia death is seen to come about naturally. When a non-competent psychiatric patient attempts to kill herself, the mental health care providers treating her are obligated to try to stop her. Yet it has been suggested that death by suicide can be a part of the natural course of a severe mental illness. Accordingly, if the perceived naturalness of the deaths occurring in connection with non-voluntary passive euthanasia speaks for their moral permissibility, it could be taken that a similar reason can support the moral acceptability of the suicidal deaths of non-competent psychiatric patients. In this article, I consider whether the suicidal death of a non-competent psychiatric patient would necessarily be less natural than those of physically ill or injured patients who die as a result of non-voluntary passive euthanasia. I argue that it would not.

Moral decision making and moral judgment in multiple sclerosis.

Although medical assistance in dying (MAiD) is legally permitted in Canada under defined statutory conditions, this legal framework does not determine when it is morally permissible for a healthcare professional to provide MAiD. This paper explicitly examines the normative distinction between legal and ethical MAiD practice. It argues that the medically related eligibility criteria, such as incurability, irreversible decline, and intolerable suffering, do not function as objective medical criteria but instead presuppose and reinforce patient autonomy. As a result, MAiD assessments are often reduced to procedural confirmations of autonomy rather than substantive medical assessments. Thus, autonomy has become the de facto justification for the provision of MAiD, even though Canadian law does not regard autonomy alone as a sufficient condition. This paper examines the discretionary structure of MAiD practice and demonstrates that every decision to provide MAiD involves a normative judgment on the part of the healthcare professional. To guide that judgment, an ethics framework grounded in the fiduciary duties of healthcare professionals is proposed. Using the four core principles of healthcare ethics, this framework holds that it is morally permissible for a healthcare professional to provide MAiD only when: 1) the patient is autonomous, understood in terms of capacity, voluntariness, and informed consent; 2) the intervention satisfies the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence; and 3) the request arises from a context of justice, in which a medical condition renders the patient unable to act on their autonomous wish to die without assistance.