Verifying Visual Properties in Sentence Verification Facilitates Picture Recognition Memory

Prior studies have indicated that post-encoding stress can protect memories from the effects of forgetting, and this has been taken as evidence that stress facilitates memory consolidation. However, it is not known whether stress acts by directly influencing the strength of the underlying memories or whether it influences the generation process that plays a critical role in tests such as free recall. To address this issue, we examined the effects of stress produced by skydiving on recognition memory for negative and neutral pictures. Relative to a non-stress control condition, post-encoding stress in males was found to increase recognition memory for neutral pictures. However, stress was not found to improve recognition for emotional pictures, nor was it found to influence recognition memory in female participants. Additional analysis of recognition performance suggested that stress increased familiarity-based recognition rather than recollection. This study indicates that stress can improve familiarity-based recognition, thus showing that stress directly increases the strength of the underlying memories.

To determine whether the advantage of picture memory over word memory would be maintained over repeated tests with the same material, eight subjects participated in six sessions of a recognition memory experiment. In each session after the first, half of the studied items and half of the lures from the previous session were switched to the opposite category. Recognition memory, whether measured by hits, false alarms, A′, or confidence ratings, remained at a constant high level across the six sessions, and pictures maintained their advantage over words. There was a small sequential advantage of maintaining an item in the same category from one session to the next, but this was only reliable for new items. We concluded that the advantage of pictures over words in memory is not because of their novelty, and that situational familiarity of the type manipulated here does not appear to operate analogously to naturally occurring familiarity.

Based on previous research by Goldstein and Chance in which poor recognition memory for abstract visual patterns was reported, this study compared recognition memory for pictures of everyday concrete objects, regular abstract stimuli as employed by Goldstein and Chance, and diverse abstract stimuli. A (3) x 2 design (stimulus type x test order) analysis of variance design was used. The subjects (N = 31) first viewed 30 target stimuli, followed by an immediate recognition test in which for 30 paired target and distractor stimuli shown they indicated which one they had seen previously. Concrete pictures were recognized with near perfect accuracy, and above the level for diverse abstract pictures; these in turn were better identified than regular abstract items, on which performance resembled that found by Goldstein and Chance. It is concluded that stimulus discriminability, rather than representational meaningfulness, may be crucial in picture recognition.

Three experiments studied the effects of voluntary and involuntary focus of attention on recognition memory for pictures. Experiments 1 and 3 tested the conceptual-masking hypothesis, which holds that a visual event will automatically disrupt processing of a previously glimpsed picture if that event is new and meaningful. Memory for 112-ms pictures was tested under conditions where the to-be-ignored 1.5-s interstimulus interval contained a blank field; a repeating picture; a new picture; a new, nonsense picture; or a new, inverted picture each time. The blank field, repeating picture, and new, nonsense picture did not disrupt memory as much as a new, meaningful picture, supporting the conceptual-masking hypothesis. Experiment 2 studied voluntary attentional control of encoding by instructing subjects to focus attention on the brief pictures, all pictures, or the long pictures in a sequence. Recognition memory for pictures of both durations showed a striking ability of observers to process pictures selectively. The possible role of these effects in visual scanning are discussed.

Investigations were conducted into the effectiveness of color in picture recognition memory. In the study phase, half of the pictures were presented in color and the other half in black and white. In the test phase, half were presented in the same color mode as the study pictures and the other half in the other mode. In immediate and 1‐week‐delayed tests, the recognition performance was highest when color pictures were used in both the study and test phases. The recall for the color mode of the study pictures, however, was not as good, even with the color pictures. This suggests that the effectiveness of color in picture recognition is not necessarily due to the memory for colors in the pictures themselves, but is probably due to the distinctiveness of features highlighted by the colors. We also found that in the recall performance for the color mode it was more difficult to detect the deletion of colors than to detect their addition.

Negative emotional stimuli are associated with increased recognition accuracy but decreased memory for the associative context, an effect coined as "tunnel memory" (Steinmetz & Kensinger, 2013). Recently, Stewardson et al. (2023) found that social cues enhance both recognition and associative memory and weaken the effects of negative emotion on memory, suggesting potentially distinct mechanisms underlying how adaptively relevant information is processed and retained when social cues are present. In this study (conducted in 2023-2024), we sought to replicate these findings and use eye tracking to explore attention as a mechanism underlying this divergence. As predicted, both negative images and social cues enhanced recognition memory, with differential effects on associative memory (diminishing for negative, enhancing for social). Negative pictures with few social cues were associated with a "tunneling" of both memory and attention, that is, better recognition but poorer associative memory alongside more frequent, longer fixations on the picture and reduced picture-object saccades. By contrast, social cues led to a partial tunneling of attention-that is, more frequent but shorter fixations and fewer linking saccades-and yet enhanced both picture recognition and associative memory. Perhaps most striking, negative emotion's effects on memory and attention were significantly attenuated when social cues were present. These findings suggest that differences in how negative versus neutral content is processed and retained depend on the social context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

The spatial arrangement of artworks is recognized as one of the key elements of exhibition design. The underlying assumption is that the layout can strengthen the impact of individual exhibits, because the way visitors visually engage with artworks affects how they are cognitively processed. This paper explores the influence of the exhibits’ visual properties on the visitors’ attention and their memory of artworks. Attention was recorded with the use of mobile eye-tracking and memory was measured by an unanticipated recognition test immediately after the visit. The paper analyses both the total amount of attention spent on interacting with each artwork, as well as the strategy through which attention was allocated: through primarily longer (“diligent”) looks, versus primarily shorter (“distracted”) glimpses. Results of two experiments demonstrate that the visibility and co-visibility of artworks affected the amount of attention allocated to them, and the strategy of attention allocation. While the amount of attention contributed to improving the recognition memory of pictures, the strategy of attention allocation did not. These findings demonstrate the power of the exhibition’s visual properties to influence the experience of museum visitors but also highlight the visitors’ ability to employ alternative viewing strategies without diminishing the cognitive processing of artworks.

Interference in picture naming by task-irrelevant words in Stroop-like paradigms has been interpreted as evidence of automatic semantic processing of unattended words. However, this effect may have been due to attentional rather than automatic processing. To test this hypothesis, subjects were instructed either to ignore task-irrelevant words (selective attention) or to attend to them (divided attention). Three separate dependent measures (interference in picture naming, recognition memory, and confidence ratings) provided converging evidence about subjects’ attentional strategies. It was predicted that semantic interference would occur in the divided attention condition, but not when subjects attended selectively to the picture and ignored the word. Contrary to predictions, semantic interference occurred in both instruction conditions. Implications for future research on automaticity are discussed.

Is our knowledge about the appearance of objects more closely related to verbal thought or to perception? In a behavioural study using a property verification task, Kosslyn (1976) reported that there are both amodal and perceptual representations of concepts, but that amodal representations may be more easily accessed. However, Solomon (1997) argued that due to the nature of Kosslyn's stimuli, subjects may be able to bypass semantics entirely and perform this task using differences in the strength of association between words in true trials (e.g., cat-whiskers) and those in false trials (e.g., mouse-stinger). Solomon found no evidence for amodal representations when the task materials were altered to include associated false trials (e.g., cat-litter), which require semantic processing, as opposed to associative strategies. In the current study, we used fMRI to examine the response of regions of visual association cortex while subjects performed a property verification task with either associated or unassociated false trials. We found reliable activity across subjects within the left fusiform gyrus when true trials were intermixed with associated false trials but not when true trials were intermixed with unassociated false trials. Our data support the idea that conceptual knowledge is organised visually and that it is grounded in the perceptual system.

We investigated the effects of color on picture recognition memory using 240 color photographs of rooms, which were categorically homogeneous and difficult to verbalize. In the learning phase, subjects were shown 60 color photos and 60 grayscale photos for 5 seconds each. After a 30-minute delay, the testing phase began, in which 120 old photos and 120 new photos were presented, one at a time. In Experiment 1, half of the old color photos were rendered in grayscale, and half of the old grayscale photos were presented in color. Recognition performance was best for C/C, and became lower for G/G, C/G, and G/C in this order. Experiments 2 & 3 examined whether representations of colors in memory are tied to representations of spatial location. Ten male and ten female subjects participated in each experiment, totaling 40. In the testing phase, half the old color and old grayscale photos were left-right reversed. For grayscale photos, reversal had no effect on recognition, suggesting that memories of grayscale shapes are only weakly bound to spatial location. In females, reversal had no effect on recognition of color photos, which was better than recognition of grayscale photos (p< .01). In males, recognition of unaltered color photos was better than recognition of unaltered grayscale photos (p< .01), but recognition of left-right reversed color photos was no better than recognition of unaltered or reversed grayscale photos. This sex difference was evidently not due to differences in intentional memory strategies. These results suggest that in males, colors are bound to spatial location in picture memory. The female recognition of scenes, on the other hand, may rely on representations of objects that are more spatially independent.

Dual coding of knowledge in the human brain.

Recent studies in neuroimagery and cognitive psychology support the view of sensory-motor based knowledge: when processing an object concept, neural systems would re-enact previous experiences with this object. In this experiment, a conceptual switching cost paradigm derived from Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003, 2004) was used to investigate sensory-motor simulation in children’s conceptual processing. Adults and 7-year-old children performed a property verification task involving visual and motor properties of manipulable artifacts. Verification times were compared for target trials preceded by a trial in which the property either involved the same modality or a different one. By 7 years of age, results revealed a modality switching cost with longer verification times in the different modality than in the same modality condition. In addition, the switching effect did not interact with age or property modality type. Results support an embodied view of concepts in both adults and children.

This study investigated age-related differences in recognition memory for emotional and neutral pictures. Younger and older participants were asked to rate pictures according to their emotional valence, arousal, and visual complexity. Two weeks later they had to recognise these pictures and the states of awareness associated with memory were assessed with the “remember/know/guess” paradigm. We found that, although the influence of emotion on recognition accuracy (as assessed by d′) was similar in both age groups, the tendency for positive and negative pictures to create a rich recollective experience was weaker in older adults. In addition, “remember” responses were more often based on a recollection of emotional reactions in older than in younger participants. We suggest that the elderly tend to focus on their feelings when confronted with emotional pictures, which could have impaired their memory for the contextual information associated with these stimuli.

This paper explores the verbal representations of the WEAPON concept in Old English and Old Icelandic texts, examining how irrational knowledge structures, or "nano-myths," are embedded within the inner form of the concept's names through etymological analysis and interdisciplinary comparisons. These "nano-myths" serve as interpretational and categorizational filters, providing insight into the conceptual underpinnings of these language units. The study emphasizes the role of cognitive models as the basis for these conceptual verbalizations. The analytical approach used in this research is rooted in the theory of myth-oriented semiosis, which forms a key component of the interdisciplinary methodology known as "M-logic." This approach involves reconstructing the cognitive premises underlying these language units and mapping them against a universal model of an open system to identify patterns and variations. The identified models are then compared to ascertain the differences and similarities in conceptual representation between Old English and Old Icelandic. The paper's synthetic interpretations suggest that the set of conceptualized semantic features, organized within the hierarchical plane of the universal model, helps define the allomorphic contours of the respective semantic spaces in the two worldviews. The instrumental component of the isomorphic frame-type structure, which reflects the synergetic dynamics of these semantic spaces, is extended in distinct ways in the Old English and Old Icelandic contexts. This differentiation contributes to the allomorphic structure observed in these worldviews, indicating a unique approach to the concept of weapons in each linguistic tradition.

Previous research demonstrated a massive capacity of visual long-term memory (VLTM) for meaningful images. However, the capacity and limits of a "pure" VLTM that is independent of conceptual information still need to be determined. In the encoding phase of three experiments, participants viewed hundreds of images depicting real-world objects, along with visually similar images that were stripped of their semantic meaning. VLTM was evaluated using a four-alternative-forced-choice test including old and new images and their counterpart mirror transformations. The results revealed superior memory for meaningful than for meaningless stimuli and importantly, there was no hint of a massive VLTM for the meaningless items. Furthermore, when examining memory recognition of visual properties per-se (i.e., original/mirror state), memory was overall poor, and practically negligible for the meaningless items. Taken together, our findings suggest that meaning is critical for massive VLTM and for the ability to store visual properties.