War on the horizon

The humanitarian sector has formulated a collective strategic intent to localize. This involves delegating responsibilities and transferring capacities and resources to national and local actors. However, progress is slower than expected. Strategy execution is hard, and translating a general strategic intent to the actual way humanitarian organizations operate is not obvious. To suggest remedies for the slow progress, this paper investigates drivers and barriers for international humanitarian organizations (IHOs) to localize their logistics preparedness capacities. It is essential to understand IHOs' perspectives as they are global and powerful actors in the humanitarian sector and by far represent the largest recipients of donor funds. We focus on logistics since it constitutes key activities of strong local contextual character, such as procurement, warehousing, and transport. By interviewing practitioners from a representative set of large IHOs, and connecting the empirical insights with relevant theory, we unravel reasons that hinder localization. These include IHOs' strategic choices due to context-sensitive benefits of localization, mandated expectations on IHOs, the lack of internal drivers for IHOs to localize, and resistance to localize due to IHOs’ desire and motives for continued engagement in humanitarian aid. Based on these insights, actionable propositions are developed to help accelerate progress toward localization.

Background. The war in eastern Ukraine that began in 2014 and subsequent military actions, including a full-scale invasion in 2022, have caused disruption of epidemiological systems, significant population displacement, deterioration of living conditions, and destruction of infrastructure and health care facilities. As a result, favorable conditions were created for the spread of infectious diseases among the civilian and military population of Ukraine. Purpose – the purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the epidemiological features of the spread of infectious diseases among the population in the context of martial law in Ukraine from 2014 to the present. The main factors contributing to the increased risk of infectious diseases and measures that can be taken to minimize it are discussed. Materials and methods. The analysis is based on open sources of information, reports of international organizations, and research by scientists from Ukraine and abroad. The report uses data on outbreaks of infectious diseases, statistics on visits to medical institutions, and an analysis of the socio-economic impact of the war on the healthcare system. For this purpose, methods of comprehensive epidemiological analysis were used. Results. It has been established that hostilities have led to an increase in cases of infectious diseases, such as leptospirosis, measles, tuberculosis, HIV, COVID 19 and others. The situation is particularly critical in the temporarily occupied and frontline areas, where access to medical care is limited. Mass migration of the population has worsened the situation with timely vaccination of the population and prevention of infectious diseases. Conclusions. The war in Ukraine has significantly affected the epidemiological situation in the country. In order to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, joint efforts of governmental and non-profit organizations are needed, as well as access to medical care for all categories of civilian and military population in need, and public awareness campaigns.

The material is a publication of an annotated excerpt from the memoirs of General Pyotr Semyonovich Makhrov about the events of the Civil War in Ukraine from the autumn of 1918 to the winter of 1919. The manuscript of Makhrov’s memoirs is kept in the Bakhmetev archive of Columbia University in the USA. This valuable testimony of an informed contemporary of crucial historical events is an important source on the history of the First World War, the Civil War in Russia and Ukraine, and Russian mili- tary emigration, and covers the period from the late nineteenth century to the fi rst half of the twentieth century. Makhrov was an offi cer of the Russian army, a graduate of the Nicholas General Staff Academy, a man of liberal views, and brilliantly wielded a pen. In 1918, Makhrov lived in Ukraine in Poltava and was an eyewitness to a series of sig- nifi cant events, including several changes of power. The memoir covers in detail the life of Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo P. Skoropadsky, the German occupation, the anti-Hetman uprising, the fall of the Hetmanate, the rampant ataman, and the establishment of the power of the Directory of Ukrainian People’s Republic in late 1918. The memoirs represent the view of a military man who was critical of the new Ukrainian state and was focused on the ideology of the White movement. Much attention is paid to the be- haviour of offi cers in the varied conditions of independent Ukraine and in its collapse.

Does the Russian war in Ukraine presage a change in the rules of the game for secessionisms around the globe? In this article, we explore how the Russian war in Ukraine and the contested international order from which it emerges can affect state contestation and secessionist movements through changing opportunities in the international order. International recognition plays a crucial role in state creation. The Great Powers of a given historical moment have the capacity to raise sovereignty expectations since having “friends in high places” has been essential to obtaining statehood, alongside de facto control of the territory. However, the liberal international order in place since 1945 has given way to a more contested landscape that opens new opportunities for different recognition patterns, which change how secessionists evaluate their optimal strategy for state contestation. The effects have already been notable in conflicts such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo, and many other territorial disputes, even “frozen conflicts” over the globe, from Western Sahara to Taiwan. We explore how Russia has created and exploited secessionist claims in eastern Ukraine to justify military aims in the Russian war in Ukraine. Based on a detailed review of the evolution of these claims, we draw different scenarios on the potential effects of a changing world order on state contestation. Our research suggests that the theoretical understanding of secession and secessionists’ optimal strategies need to be reviewed, taking into account the changing contested international order.

The recent surge of false information accompanying the Russian invasion of Ukraine has re-emphasized the need for interventions to counteract disinformation. While fact-checking is a widely used intervention, we know little about citizen motivations to read fact-checks. We tested theoretical predictions related to accuracy-motivated goals (i.e., seeking to know the truth) versus directionally-motivated goals (i.e., seeking to confirm existing beliefs) by analyzing original survey data ( n = 19,037) collected in early April to late May 2022 in nineteen countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. Survey participants read ten statements about the Russian war in Ukraine and could opt to see fact-checks for each of these statements. Results of mixed models for three-level hierarchical data (level 1: statements, level 2: individuals, and level 3: countries) showed that accuracy motivations were better explanations than directional motivations for the decision to read fact-checks about the Russian war in Ukraine.

During the next stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, started with a full-scale military invasion to Ukraine, the signs of growing xenophobia and ethnic hatred Ukraine has been found, which is the aim of this study. The research methods are based on monitoring of the ethnic and ethnopolitical components of the Russian- Ukrainian war – official and political statements, media reports on crimes based on ethnic hatred, systematic analysis of opinion polls that reflect the ethnicity of the war parties and case studies - analysis of individual situations, which illustrate the rapid degradation of interethnic Russian-Ukrainian cooperation during the Russian war. Despite the high level of xenophobia researching, the convection war waged by Russia against Ukraine has not yet been studied in the current context of total digitalisation, which allows tracking ethnic hatred crimes in real time. Despite the fact that any conventional war is a priori accompanied by an increase in xenophobia and ethnic hatred, as citizens of both states during hostilities in the status of combatants and civilians are being killed, the Russian-Ukrainian war is complicated by a number of circumstances that exacerbate the atmosphere of ethnic hatred and lead to an increase in xenophobia. Although no official increase in xenophobia has been recorded during the Russian-Ukrainian war, as it has not yet been measured, a number of factors analyzed in the article point to an unprecedented rise in Russophobia in Ukrainian society in response to the Russian military invasion. The degree of ethnic hatred is increased by anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and intentions to denationalize Ukraine by the Russian military and political leadership (to destroy the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian nation), war crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, non-compliance with humanitarian law during the war to intimidate and increase casualties increase civilians, which leads to a humanitarian catastrophe in the settlements of Ukraine. Capture and deliberate destruction of infrastructure, which provides basic needs and livelihoods of people, makes it impossible to maintain normal, decent living conditions in Ukraine. The actions of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine show all the signs of a crime of genocide. Although xenophobia is a destructive phenomenon, an obstacle to democratic development, it has been suggested that defensive Russophobia and ethnic hatred of Russia and Russians are at the core of the consolidation and resilience of Ukrainian society to achieve victory over Russia, a necessary component of preserving the state subjectivity of Ukraine. Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, xenophobia, genocide.

The full-scale war in Ukraine has triggered a significant wave of forced migration among scientists, leading to brain drain and disruptions in research continuity. Understanding the dynamics of this migration is crucial for policymakers, academic institutions, and international organizations. Artificial Intelligence (AI) plays a significant role in analyzing large datasets, tracking migration trends, and predicting future developments. This paper explores how AI technologies can be leveraged to study the forced migration of scientists, assess its impact on global research, and propose strategies for mitigating negative consequences. In this paper presents AI solutions for supporting displaced scientists in forced migration, highlighting how AI-driven tools can facilitate scientific integration, career continuity, and knowledge retention in host countries.

Purpose Foreign governments do not always welcome international humanitarian organizations responding to a disaster in their country. Many governments even impose restrictions on humanitarian supply chains through import barriers, travel restrictions or excessive bureaucracy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze these restrictions and try to identify the government characteristics that best explain the tendency to impose such restrictions. Design/methodology/approach Through a multiple case study among four international humanitarian organizations the authors identify and analyze the restrictions imposed on humanitarian supply chains in 143 different programs. The authors compare the average number of restrictions per country with different governmental and socio-economic situational factors. Findings The authors find that state fragility, a combination of government ineffectiveness and illegitimacy, is the characteristic that best explains the tendency of a government to impose restrictions on humanitarian supply chains. Practical implications Knowing that fragile states tend to impose a high number of restrictions helps humanitarian organizations to prepare adequately before entering a country with a fragile government. The organization can, for example, anticipate possible concerns and establish trust with the government. Commercial companies starting to do business in such country can learn from this knowledge. Originality/value Multiple studies have mentioned the strong impact of governments on humanitarian supply chains, but no paper has yet analyzed this problem in detail. The paper is the first to identify the characteristics that explain the number of restrictions governments impose on humanitarian supply chains, and what humanitarian organizations can do to address them.

Food vs Biofuel

Not only do the authors in this special issue address three different problems humanitarian organizations could encounter while doing their job, they also show that each problem is characterized by a need to find balance. A balance between security and the speedy deliverance of aid; a balance between what is needed, what can be asked for and what can be processed; and a balance between humanitarian norms and values and professional conduct when facing regulations that go against the grain of humanitarian aid. Though no solution has yet been found for any of the problems, the articles show the diverse ways in which humanitarian aid workers try to find a balance. That in and by itself could be helpful for humanitarian aid workers when they discuss and decide on how to deal with these issues.

Journal Article Russia's war on everybody and what it means for you; The Russia conundrum: how the West fell for Putin's power gambit—and how to fix it Get access Russia's war on everybody and what it means for you. By Keir Giles. London: Bloomsbury. 2022. 264pp. £20.00. Isbn978 1 35025 508 1. Available as e-book.The Russia conundrum: how the West fell for Putin's power gambit—and how to fix it. By Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Martin Sixsmith. London: WH Allen. 2022. 352pp. £20.00. Isbn978 0 75355 923 9. Available as e-book. Natia Seskuria Natia Seskuria Royal United Services Institute, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 99, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 872–873, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad038 Published: 06 March 2023

This paper investigates the current state of small and medium business in Ukraine. The protracted nature of the war in Ukraine significantly destabilizes the activities of the subjects of this sector and leads to the deterioration of its development indicators. In particular, a decrease in quantity of active entities small and medium business, a decrease in the rate of registration of new entities, a shortage of own working capital in most small and medium enterprises will have a negative impact on the national economy. The main obstacles to the recovery and development of business activity during the period of validity of state of war are identified. It is the lack of financial resources; continuation of hostilities; interruptions in electricity, water and heat supply; destruction of logistics; increase in production costs; insufficient quantity of paying customers. The peculiarities of state support of small and medium business in Ukraine during the war are considered. The problems hindering the development of national small and medium business in the conditions of war are identified. It is the absence of a program document on the development of the small and medium business sector; low level of access to finance by small and medium business entities; insufficiently developed state financial support programs for IT startups; inefficiency of industrial parks. Proved, that the prospects of the development of small and medium business largely depend on ensuring the implementation of an effective state policy to stimulate its development. In this context, the priorities of the state policy in the sphere of stimulating the development of small and medium business in the conditions of the war in Ukraine are substantiated. It is the development of the State program for promoting the development of small and medium business in Ukraine, coordination of strategies and programs for the development of small and medium business at the state, regional and local levels; attraction of money from international financial organizations and international donors; creation of conditions for increasing the level of access of small and medium enterprises to finance; expansion of state grant support for IT startups; implementation of mechanisms of tax benefits for entities that resume their activities in the de-occupied territories; expansion and creation of new industrial parks with developed engineering and transport infrastructure, creation of favorable conditions for the development of small and medium business within the industrial park.

COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the world, with millions of infections and deaths, healthcare systems overwhelmed, economies disrupted, and daily life changed. Simulation has been recognized as a valuable tool in combating the pandemic, helping to model the spread of the virus, evaluate the impact of interventions, and inform decision-making processes. The accuracy and effectiveness of simulations depend on the quality of the underlying data, assumptions, and modeling techniques. Ongoing efforts to improve and refine simulation approaches can enhance their value in addressing future public health emergencies. The Russian full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has created a significant humanitarian and public health crisis, with disrupted healthcare services, shortages of medical supplies, and increased demand for emergency care. The ongoing conflict has displaced millions of people, with Spain ranking 5th in the world for the number of registered refugees from Ukraine. The research aims to estimate the impact of the Russian war in Ukraine on COVID-19 transmission in Spain using means of machine learning. The research is targeted at COVID-19 epidemic process during the war. The research subjects are methods and models of epidemic process simulation based on machine learning. To achieve the study's aim, we used forecasting methods and built a model of COVID-19 epidemic process based on the XGBoost method. As a result of the experiments, the accuracy of forecasting new cases of COVID-19 in Spain for 30 days was 99.79 %, and the death cases of COVID-19 in Spain – were 99.86 %. The model was applied to data on the incidence of COVID-19 in Spain for the first 30 days of the war escalation (24.02.2022 – 25.03.2022). The calculated forecasted values showed that the forced migration of the Ukrainian population to Spain, caused by the full-scale invasion of Russia, is not a decisive factor affecting the dynamics of the epidemic process of COVID-19 in Spain. Conclusions. The paper describes the results of an experimental study assessing the impact of the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine on COVID-19 dynamics in Spain. The developed model showed good performance to use it in public health practice. The analysis of the obtained results of the experimental study showed that the forced migration of the Ukrainian population to Spain, caused by the full-scale invasion of Russia, is not a decisive factor affecting the dynamics of the epidemic process of COVID-19 in Spain.

The year 2023 was characterized by the continuation of the major conflict in Ukraine and its amplification at the European level, as well as by the exacerbation of global crises, such as the energy, food and refugee ones. The major conflict, started in February 2022, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, continued without a break in 2023, being amplified by the support given by the West (NATO, the EU and G7) to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and by some BRICS states and G20 to the Russian forces, thus becoming an international war conducted through proxies. The Kremlin's ‘Special Military Operation’ was launched and conducted under a new Allied strategic approach of the competition continuum on the operating environment, in which there is no longer a clear distinction between peace and war, only different degrees of violence in the relations between state and/ or non-state actors, depending on the pursued political goals. As a result, many military 8 experts see this conventional war in Ukraine as a continuation of the hybrid war started by the Kremlin in 2014, with the deterrence phase taking place in 2021. Moreover, the events and conflicts that have unfolded since the beginning of this century until now have shown us that conventional operations no longer have the scope of the conventional wars of the last century, nor can they fulfill, on their own, strategic objectives and the national interests of regional powers. Thus, Kremlin decided to give a special touch to the Military Art, combining conventional operations with hybrid actions, as specified by the vision of the head of the Russian General Staff, General Valeri Gherasimov, regarding the new Russian military doctrine of ‘active defense’ and ‘limited actions’. In turn, the conventional operations carried out by both belligerents in Ukraine went beyond the meaning of military doctrines and manuals, carrying out innovative actions on tactics and techniques adapted to different periods of the war. This new approach to the Military Art has been amplified by the use of cutting-edge products of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as hypersonic missiles or recconaisance and combat drones. Even though this year also does not mark the end of the war in Ukraine, and no participant can claim victory so far or declare that they have achieved their political goals, there are new lessons identified for the military domain that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment as well. This document represents a continuation of my 2022 and 2023 specialised studies related to post-industrial society and artificial intelligence, as well as conventional and hybrid aspects of the first year of the Russian war in Ukraine.

The Russian war in Ukraine has changed global geopolitical priorities and the policies of individual countries. The consequences of this ongoing war will be felt for decades to come, including the militarisation of states and the strengthening of political-military alliances. This article explores the effects of this conflict through the lens of energy welfare, which is used as an essential litmus test for the transforming economies of the Visegrad Group (V4) countries in Central Europe. Energy security and the energy transition have become critical topics, and energy security and its impact on social welfare affect the sensitive areas of policy choices that will determine the direction of development in this part of Europe. The V4 countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – illustrate a wide range of domestic and geopolitical orientations that place individual countries in different decision-making situations. The ideological and political forces determine the scope for achieving energy welfare and are, therefore, the subject of this article. Based on macroeconomic and survey data results, the article’s primary research query examines how the V4 countries’ reliance on Russian fossil fuels affects their political attitudes and societal perceptions of the conflict in Ukraine, and the implications for their energy security and welfare in the face of the European Green Deal efforts. The different strategies adopted by the four countries considered translate into energy transition pathways to a low carbon economy described in the European Green Deal and strategies to provide energy at a reasonable price at the expense of a coherent European policy towards Russian aggression.