War Termination and the Gulf War: Can We Plan Better?

: The effective application of operational art is critical to the successful termination of a limited war by the U.S. Despite this role, guidance regarding the application of operational art to termination in a limited war is meager. This paper focuses on the high-level bridge between the strategic and operational levels that is necessary to achieve successful termination. Theoretical synopses regarding the unique characteristics of limited war, war termination theory, and negotiating theory are provided. Practical issues/steps regarding the bridge from the strategic to the operational level are explored based upon the noted theories. The validity of the practical thought in the paper is tested through an examination of termination in the Korean War. Based upon arguments in the paper, it is clear that successful termination in a limited war cannot be achieved without the effective application of operational art at the strategic/operational level of war. It is also clear that the operational commander is uniquely positioned to review the ability of the military instrument to deliver the political object. Recommendations entail an expansion of doctrine to include a broader discussion of war termination issues. War termination, Limited war, Operational art, Strategy, Operational commander.

: The U.S. Merchant Marine is in trouble. It lacks the infrastructure, the ships, and the personnel to perform the mission laid out for it in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. National policies have largely ignored the importance of this vital asset, and now it is time to readdress the issue. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 calls for the merchant marine to act as a and military auxiliary in times of war or national emergency. Certainly, the 1990-91 Gulf War was such an emergency but if one infers from the wording of the Act that this naval auxiliary's task is to carry the majority of war materiel to the battle zone, then one must conclude that during the Gulf War the merchant marine fell grossly short of its mission. In time of national crisis, the operational commander will need force sustainment. That sustainment will rely on ocean-going cargo ships. The first wave of those ships is rightly placed in government ownership, but the bulk of the materiel needed in a crisis must be moved on U.S. merchant ships. The United States will not fight its next major war against a cooperative enemy, nor will we fight it with virtually the whole world on our side. Our potential future adversaries have learned well the lessons taught by the Gulf War; they will not repeat Saddam Hussein's mistakes. We must solve the merchant marine problem soon, or we will not be able to sustain the fight on our own in a major war.

When we think of recent armed conflicts, such as those in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia or Rwanda, we realize that one profound difficulty shared by them was how they ended. The process of war termination—of resolving successfully serious outbreaks of armed conflict between national groups—is fraught with fragility and complexity, featuring often competing claims of security and justice.Only recently have we begun to understand how crucial the issue of war termination is, with regard not only to bringing particular conflicts to an end but also to mitigating further devastations in the future. Whereas past attention focused obsessively on the beginning of war, and/or on proper conduct during wartime, it is becoming clear that the ending of war deserves equal time with regard to critical analysis, historical application and the creative construction of proposals for amelioration. There are only a handful of works on this important and topical, yet neglected, issue.This article proposes to contribute to the sparse literature by constructing a theory of war termination. The article will offer reasonable responses to questions of what constitutes justice, security and legality in the aftermath of war. The inquiry will proceed first by examining the status quo with regard to war termination, undertaking an examination of its few strengths and many weaknesses. Then, the account will fashion a more satisfactory set of laws to regulate state conduct during the immediate aftermath of a particular war. These universal and abstract norms, once constructed, will be applied to a recent and concrete case, namely, that of the lengthy termination process of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The theory will next shift its attention away from short-term principles, regulating the endings of particular wars, towards those longer-term rules and institutional reforms required to transform the international system itself into one in which the incidence and destructiveness of war will be diminished. Before concluding, attention will be paid to defeating doubts about the laws forwarded as a plausible theory about securing justice and peace when wars end.

: This paper will briefly examine the last 150 years of war and the military-media relationship to see what impact that relationship has had on the nation's ability to wage war. The examination will expose some of the key successes, failures, and consistencies throughout history concluding with a close look at the most recent war, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the advent of the embedded reporter . The Operational Commander is wise to review media relations and the successes and pitfalls of past conflicts, and to examine closely the results of Operation Iraqi Freedom so as to completely understand the media before developing a plan for media relations in a future operation.

: This study addresses a corps requirement for reconnaissance and security through the criteria of doctrine, capability and organization. The study uses the criteria to describe how Army doctrine shapes a corps requirement for a reconnaissance and security organization, the capabilities such an organization requires, and the actual organizational structure of the reconnaissance and security force the Army designed. The case studies for analysis are the II Field Force, Vietnam and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Operation TOAN THANG 43; VII Corps and 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Operation DESERT STORM; and V Corps in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The first two case studies represent different eras in the U.S. Army's history which saw corps-sized formations employ a dedicated reconnaissance and security organization. These case studies establish the Army's previous experience with armored cavalry regiments against different enemies and on different types of terrain. The last case study, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, addresses a corps operating without a dedicated reconnaissance and security organization. The set of criteria to analyze the case studies are doctrine, capability, and organization. The main findings indicated the need for corps to have a dedicated reconnaissance and security organization. Although transformation in its final stages, the Army is still in a period of transition between the Army of Excellence and Modularity in terms of doctrine, organization, material, and leadership. The U.S. Army?s experience in Cambodia in 1970 and Kuwait in 1991 demonstrated the importance a corps reconnaissance and security organization had during the execution of division and corps attacks. Regardless of the terrain or weather conditions, the armored cavalry regiments supporting division and corps-sized organizations, respectively, were able to locate the enemy and deve

Part 1 The Gulf War and the International Order: Reflections on the Gulf War Experience - Force and War in the UN System, Richard Falk The United Nations in the Gulf War, Robert Springborg Bush's New World Order - A Structural Analysis of Instability and Conflict in the Gulf, Yasumasa Kuroda The European Community's Middle Eastern Policy - The New Order of Europe and the Gulf Crisis, Friedemann Buettner and Martin Landgraf Regional Co-operation and Security in the Middle East - The Role of the European Community, Timothy Niblock Japan - An Economic Superpower in Search of Its Proper Political Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Yasumasa Kuroda. Part 2 The United States and the New World Order: Between Theory and Fact - Explaining US Behaviour in the Gulf Crisis, Shibley Telhami The New World Order and the Gulf War - Rhetoric, Policy, and Politics in the United States, Enid Hill The Making of the New World Order - The Role of the Media, Malcolm Hayward Defeating the Vietman Syndrome - The Military, the Media, and the Gulf War, Andrew T. Parasiliti. Part 3 The Gulf War and the Middle East Order: Iraq and the New World Order, Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett Iran and the New World Order, Scheherazade Daneshkhu The Gulf War, the Palestinians, and the New World Order, Cheryl A. Rubenberg Israel and the New World Order, Meir Porat Jordan and the Gulf War, Kamel S. Abu Jaber Syria, the Kuwait War, and the New World Order, Eberhard Kienle Imagining Egypt in the New Age - Civil Society and the Leftist Critique, Raymond W. Baker Turkey, the Gulf Crisis, and the New World Order, Tozun Bahcheli. Part 4 Political Trends and Cultural Patterns: The Middle East in the New World Order - Political Trends, Louis J. Cantori Islam, Democracy, and the Arab Future - Contested Islam in the Gulf Crisis, Raymond Baker Islam at War and Communism in Retreat - What Is the Connection? by Ali A. Mazrui Global Apartheid? Race and Religion in the New World Order, Ali A. Mazrui Democracy Died at the Gulf, Richard A. Falk.

: During Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Phase I), the Combatant Commander's logistical management organizational structure proved to be inadequate both in its organizational structure and subject matter expert manning level to execute an efficient logistical support effort. With the waning of Cold War era symmetrical warfare and the emergence of adversaries who attempt to exploit the United States military strength by employing asymmetrical warfare, the Department of Defense (DOD) must develop logistics organization that is dynamic, mobile, adaptable and able to keep pace with the needs of deployable forces employed by Combatant Commanders. order to improve joint logistics efforts, the in theater logistics structural organization must be transformed and linked to the strategic level organization to provide the best possible support to Combatant Commanders. Increased logistical support will permit Combatant Commanders an increased freedom of action enabling them to achieve operational objective(s) within their area of responsibility (AOR). Following the establishment of U.S. Transportation Command as the single distribution process owner (DPO) and the establishment of the U.S. Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC), the logistics organization was capable of bridging the gap between strategic and theater logistics to establish a more efficient organization. Due to the overwhelming success of the newly established U.S. Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC), in 2004, it should be used as a model to develop tailored Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers (JDDOCs) for the four remaining Combatant Commands.

This article presents the results of an analysis of public attitudes toward war for the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq wars. In total, 61 surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization starting in August 1950 (near the beginning of the Korean War) and ending February 2006 (middle of the Iraq War) were analyzed. This article examines the social characteristics of those people who are more or less likely to oppose war and is a continuation of our earlier work analyzing the Iraq War. The research reported here was arrived at answering the following question: Are there some groups (e.g., Democrats) who are more likely to oppose war? Using binary logistic regression methods, this research analyzes why some groups are more likely than others to oppose or support war. This cross-sectional analysis studies groups by age, education, gender, race, religion, party identification, and political ideology, in their general likelihood to oppose war. In addition, this analysis studies respondents’ attitudes toward war, which includes whether the respondent was a hawk or a dove, an internationalist or isolationist, and optimistic or pessimistic about the war's outcome. Several traditional expectations on war attitudes, including a “race gap” and a “liberal–conservative gap,” were unfounded. In some cases where correlations were found, the relationship could be explained predominately by the correlation of demographic characteristics with partisanship. This study has demonstrated, over time, just how much more powerful party identification has become in the United States. This trend analysis is the closest look at U.S. public opinion on wars after World War II since the ground-breaking and prize-winning work of John Mueller (1973, 1994).

: Air traffic control must be fully integrated in a theater of operations to enable an operational commander to most effectively achieve tactical, operational, and strategic aims. The international aviation environment is increasingly complex and unreceptive to military operations perceived as jeopardizing safety or infringing on airspace access. Integrating air traffic during operations other than war (OOTW) is particularly problematic due to the high volume and complexity introduced by civil aircraft in a more permissive environment. Aircraft mishaps involving civil aircraft are so visible that a single incident can damage the credibility of the United States and legitimacy of an operation. A global movement led by the International Civil Aviation Organization, affiliated with the UN, is aggressively addressing international aviation safety problems - including the perceived dangers and intrusiveness that military operations present to civil aircraft. A lack of understanding and focus on air traffic functions contributed to the Black Hawk fratricide incident during Operation Provide Comfort, resulted in inadequate situational awareness during Operation Desert Storm, and have inadequately prepared AWACS to handle the complex and evolving airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fully integrating military and civil air traffic in a theater of operations can improve the operational commander's ability to shape the battlespace, achieve unity of effort, reduce fratricide, respond more effectively to evolving conditions, and positively shape international opinion.

Spinal cord injury (SCI) is an area of key interest in military medicine but has not been studied among the US Army Special Forces (SF), the most elite group of US soldiers. SF soldiers make up a disproportionate 60% of all Special Operations casualties. The objective of this study was to better understand SCI incidence in the SF, its mechanisms of acquisition, and potential areas for intervention by addressing key issues pertaining to protective equipment and body armor use. An electronic survey questionnaire was formulated with the close collaboration of US board-certified neurosurgeons from the Mount Sinai Hospital and Cleveland Clinic Departments of Neurosurgery, retired military personnel of the SF, and operational staff of the Green Beret Foundation. The survey was sent to approximately 6000 SF soldiers to understand SCI diagnosis and its associations with various health and military variables. The response rate was 8.2%. Among the 492 respondents, 94 (19.1%) self-reported an SCI diagnosis. An airborne operation was the most commonly attributed cause (54.8%). Moreover, 87.1% of SF soldiers reported wearing headgear at the time of injury, but only 36.6% reported wearing body armor, even though body armor use has significantly increased in post-9/11 SF soldiers compared with that in their pre-9/11 counterparts. SCI was significantly associated with traumatic brain injury, arthritis, low sperm count, low testosterone, erectile dysfunction, tinnitus, hyperacusis, sleep apnea, posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Only 16.5% of SF soldiers diagnosed with SCI had been rescued via medical evacuation (medevac) for treatment. A high number of SF soldiers self-reported an SCI diagnosis. Airborne operations landings were the leading cause of SCI, which coincided with warfare tactics employed during the Persian Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other conflicts. A majority of SCIs occurred while wearing headgear and no body armor, suggesting the need for improvements in protective equipment use and design. The low rate of medevac rescue for these injuries may suggest that medical rescue was not attainable at the time or that certain SCIs were deemed minor at the time of injury.

: This paper analyzes the guidance in the current Focused Logistics Campaign Plan and assesses the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) and service policies on materiel consolidation and air clearance authority. The paper argues that developing common DoD and services policies for materiel consolidation and air clearance will result in a more effective joint distribution system. After Operation Desert Storm the U.S. Army took the lead in reviewing its supply chain process in order to implement improvements through more effective practices and policies. This process improvement program was called Velocity Management (VM). VM has enabled the Army to significantly reduce its peacetime CWT for high-priority materiel. Customer wait time segments span the entire strategic and theater distribution system. Policy and practices implemented at the strategic level significantly impact the effectiveness of the theater distribution system and defense transportation system. Using RAND studies and current DoD policy this SRP analyzes current joint guidance Army Velocity Management materiel consolidation guidance for the Army and Marine Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom and a comparison of our services air clearance policies. This analysis demonstrates the need for the DoD to update and standardize policy for materiel consolidation and air clearance.

Characteristics and Outcomes of Lymphoid Malignancies in Veterans Exposed to Burn Pits

Over the past 8 years we have used 8-week MBCT groups adapted for PTSD, as well as longer PTSD exposure-based groups incorporating MBCT techniques and “curriculum” with combat veterans seeking treatment for PTSD of various ages who served in a number of combat deployments. We have provided MBCT with veterans who served in Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Kuwait, and Iraq (“Operation Desert Storm,” 1991), Afghanistan (“Operation Enduring Freedom/OEF,” 2001–2015), and Iraq (“Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF,” 2003–2010, “Operation New Dawn, OND,” 2010–2015). Many of these veterans also had major depression and/or chronic pain issues in addition to PTSD. We have been very interested that the majority of veterans who participated said they found the groups and the mindfulness techniques useful, and most report they often enjoy doing the mindfulness exercises. Most have also shown a high level of engagement, and the dropout rate from MBCT in younger OEF/OIF veterans has tended to be lower than is usual for this population.

: This paper examines the development of ballistic missile defense and the concepts that operational commanders should consider to counter growing threats posed by potential adversaries possessing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In Desert Storm, the Scud missiles launched served primarily as terror weapons, as they were not militarily very significant, due to their poor accuracies, conventional warheads, and low launch rates. But, with accelerating technological advances and strong pressures for proliferation of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and WMD, regional aggressors will likely resort to using TBMs as a relatively cheap, effective warfighting means. We must anticipate facing more sophisticated, challenging scenarios. Moreover, in the next regional contingency/conflict, it is not likely the enemy win allow us five months for a secure, orderly buildup instead, he may try to quickly interfere with our political and military preparations. Although Patriot appeared successful in the Gulf War, it is inadequate; and regional CINCs must advocate, acquire, integrate, and exercise new systems for theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). Preparation is key. Also, all CINCs must cooperate to deter aggressors from acquiring and employing WMD, realizing that TBMs in one theater could be launched against targets in another, and that TBMs carrying WMD could have strategic implications. Our forces must not only attempt to deter and deny the enemy; they must also be able to defend against any TBMs launched.

: Desert Storm brought to light the potential capability of theater ballistic missiles. During the War, SCUD missiles were used by the Iraqis in an attempt to alter the strategic balance. Fortunately, coalition forces were able to negate the effect of the ballistic missiles through air attacks and the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. Based on the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed & theater missile defense (TMD) doctrine to serve as a guide to operational commanders for countering ballistic missiles in the future. This doctrine calls for unity of effort at the operational level by coordination of the component commanders. Past experience points to the fact that a common commander is necessary for unity of effort. Therefore, because of the large number of joint forces required to counter ballistic missiles and the need to work towards a common objective, the TXD doctrine should reflect the requirement for a missile defense commander. (MM)