Waste-to-energy: How Europe can avoid sleepwalking into a landfill catastrophe and achieve net zero

The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the cornerstone of the EU’s attempt to decarbonise economic production in Europe. This paper questions the power and class relations that are built into the EU’s choice to address the climate crisis through the legal construction of emissions trading. Drawing on Marxist theory, the paper argues that the cost of emission allowances imposed by the ETS is a form of climate rent . In both the choice of this system and its implementation, the EU prioritises capital accumulation in order to protect the competitiveness of EU firms on the global market. This paper argues that the ETS thus jeopardises the progress of decarbonisation on two grounds. First, the EU’s implementation of the ETS has tended to increase the economic wealth of capital by redistributing economic value away from workers and towards the capitalist class. By raising the cost of essential goods, the ETS will likely damage the reputation of climate action and thus jeopardise public support for decarbonisation. Second, the ETS is part of the EU’s indirect approach to climate policy, which seeks to shape the actions of private capital in the direction of climate objectives. However, the severity of climate change calls instead for the use of law and public power to directly and consciously shape the rapid decarbonisation of society.

Carbon Trading: Who Gets What, When, and How?

The performance of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) and other cap-and-trade schemes has been under scrutiny because of their inability to create a stable price for gre...

What explains the choice of corporate political strategy in environmental politics? Drawing on recent models of actor strategy formation in political economy, this article argues that basic material interests of firms are translated into strategies in the context of institutional environments. I advance a typological model that posits how distributional effects—positive versus negative—and perceived regulatory pressure—low versus high—interact in leading firms to adopt one of four ideal-type strategies: opposition, hedging, support, and non-participation. This article examines the model through the case of corporate strategies in the making of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme. The article contributes to theory-building on business strategy in environmental politics by offering a probabilistic explanatory model, and it flags hedging strategies as an increasingly prevalent form of business behavior.

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is the first large‐scale international emissions trading system and a “cornerstone” in EU climate policy. A key element in the ETS implementation process is deciding upon the ceiling (“cap”) for the emissions included in the ETS. Over time, a significant change and centralization of this model has taken place. In order to understand this development, we need to acknowledge the increasing acceptance of stronger centralized governance among the member states due to ETS pilot phase problems; take into consideration frustration in the European Commission over complex and differing National Allocation Plans; and add the fact that the Kyoto Protocol target was getting nearer and a good performance of the “flagship” ETS was becoming increasingly important. Hence, although the case supports the importance of acknowledging the multilevel character of the EU, it still emphasizes the key role of changes in member states' interests and positions for understanding outcomes.

Reducing greenhouse gases emissions is one of the major environmental challenges of the modern world. The European Union (EU) has set itself ambitious reduction targets. Proper monitoring of emissions and its valuation is necessary to achieve this goal. In addition, valuation (in monetary terms) will help to raise awareness of the climate change costs among society. The aim of this article is to present international comparisons within the EU covering the monitoring and valuation of aggregate emissions of selected greenhouse gases in general and in agriculture. The study uses Eurostat data for the years 2007-2015. The evaluation was based on the average annual price of carbon dioxide allowances under the European Union Emissions Trading System. Leipzig stock market data were used to determine the price. The study compares the total greenhouse gas emissions and its value in different EU countries. These results show that the largest emitters in the EU are Germany, United Kingdom, France. A comparison of per capita and per GDP emissions results in an almost reversal of this order. The share of agriculture in greenhouse gas emissions was 11% in 2015 and ranged between countries from 3% (Malta) do 32% (Ireland). The results show also that the decline in value is greater than the decrease in emissions. This is due to the dramatic change in the price of allowances. The decrease in quantity of agricultural emission was 0,5%, whilst the decrease in value was 55,5% between years 2008 and 2015.

Techno-economic evaluation of medium scale power to hydrogen to combined heat and power generation systems

The EU Response to COVID-19: From Reactive Policies to Strategic Decision-Making.

To implement the European Union (EU) Climate Law’s newly established 55% greenhouse gas reduction objective for 2030, the EU Commission suggests a wave of reforms to the European energy and climate legislation. The contribution aims to describe the EU Commission’s 16 initial legislative and strategic proposals regarding the major pillars of the European energy and climate legislation and intends to give an overview on the suggested reforms. By comparing the legal status quo with the legal framework de lege ferenda as presented by the Commission’s proposals, the planned major changes to the legal structures are identified. To achieve the 55% greenhouse gas reduction objective for 2030, all existing legal climate and energy acts are planned to be tightened by amending their targets as well as scopes and revising their structures. The suggested reforms concern the existing EU emissions trading system, effort sharing system between the Member States, energy taxation, energy efficiency and renewable energies. Additionally, the implementation of new instruments, such as the second EU emissions trading system for the sectors buildings and transport, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund, is proposed. The design of the package shows that the Commission still generally pursues a climate legislation characterized by a mix of instruments and policies being both price based and regulatory. So, even though the major proposed change—the introduction of a second separate emissions trading system—would strengthen the role of carbon pricing, the Commission still relies on a mix of instruments without defining a leading instrument.

Although emission reductions from international aviation and shipping are not accountable under the national emissions registries of CO2-equivalent emissions set up under Kyoto-Protocol, the European Union (EU) has taken all efforts to include the emissions of international transport into the international emission reduction commitments. There are two arguments against unilateral measures by the EU for the reduction of greenhouse gases, both in the field of aviation and maritime transport. One argument is that any action that is aimed at the regulation of greenhouse gases emitted outside the territory of the EU amounts to unlawful extraterritorial action. Other objectors point out, that under the UNFCCC all activities related to greenhouse gas emissions in the field of aviation and maritime transport have been referred to the competent international organisations i.e. ICAO and IMO, and this decision taken in UNFCCC should be understood to be binding on the Member States of the UNFCCC. Keywords:European Union (EU); greenhouse gas emissions; ICAO; IMO; international aviation; international shipping; Kyoto-Protocol; UNFCCC

In 2013, the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) entered Phase III. The majority of emission permits in Phase III are auctioned instead of being allocated for free as in Phases I and II. Using a difference‐in‐differences method, we show that this change has led to an increase in the financial distress risk of the EU‐ETS‐regulated firms when compared to unregulated firms, suggesting that the EU‐ETS imposes a significant financial burden on regulated firms. This result is robust to an array of validation tests, alleviating concerns that it is driven by unobserved factors. In additional analyses we show that the increase in distress risk of regulated firms during Phase III can be explained by, (i) an additional climate regulation cost to purchase pollution permits and (ii) a low average environmental score that possibly (via high sustainability risk) lowers investors expectations regarding firms’ performance. Our findings also show that the distress risk increase is higher for regulated firms operating within countries with lower control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice accountability before the EU‐ETS implementation.

The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a cornerstone of EU climate policy, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from various sectors. This article examines the EU ETS with a focus on its potential application to maritime transport.I will analyse the EU "cap and trade" principle, discussing its effectiveness in reducing emissions across covered sectors. The case study of Greece demonstrates the challenges faced by Member States in implementing the EU ETS, particularly in the maritime sector.Our analysis reveals that while the EU ETS has shown significant emission reductions potential, challenges remain in maintaining market stability and optimizing allocation mechanisms. Future reforms aim to expand coverage, including shipping emissions, increase ambition, and potentially incorporate carbon removals.This article’s aim is to contribute to the ongoing debate on climate policy effectiveness by providing a comprehensive review of the EU ETS regulatory conditions and their implications for emission reductions efforts in the maritime sector.

The European Commission has decided that the aviation sector will be included in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2012. This has significant impacts on the business and the strategy of airlines. All of a sudden, airlines must possess emission rights in order to be able to operate their aircraft. Given the uncertainty over how exactly the EU ETS is going to be implemented in the next few years and the unexpected fluctuations in prices of fuel and the CO2 emission rights, airlines are faced with a multifaceted challenge: how to best incorporate EU ETS in the business strategy of an airline? In order to support airlines with this complex process, in this research project a strategy model with different regulatory scenarios is developed, with which the exposure of an airline to EU ETS can be calculated. The model has been piloted in an airline to determine how future airline strategy should be adopted based on the regulatory environment. It is clear from the analysis of the different scenarios, that every regulatory scenario has its own optimal strategy, ranging from increasing fuel efficiency to using alternative types of fuel.

Member states and interest groups, as key political actors, play crucial roles in the decision-making process of the European Union (EU). This study examines the relationship between the variation in political actors’ preferences and decision-making procedures, emphasizing the roles of interest groups and member states as critical stakeholders. This research employs a process-tracing method, analyzing two case studies—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)—to investigate the causal mechanisms linking preference heterogeneity to the duration of decision-making processes. The findings reveal that preference heterogeneity functions as a multidimensional factor, encompassing not only disagreements but also the interplay of diverse interest group demands and the strategic positioning of member states within institutional frameworks. By identifying the specific mechanisms of these interactions, this study underscores the importance of accounting for varying levels of issue salience and their impact on procedural dynamics when devising legislative strategies.

As Europe is not on track in meeting its 2020 energy savings target, there has been quite some debate to make the energy savings target binding instead of indicative. Although the final draft text of the Energy Efficiency Directive left the option of a binding target explicitly open for the period beyond 2014, this statement has watered down in the adopted Directive: If still not on track mid-2014, the European Commission will propose “further measures.” In this paper, we argue that a binding energy savings target could be the first EU legal initiative to look beyond 2020 serving as a beacon for other policies such as for renewables and greenhouse gases that need redefinition after 2020. We therefore explore four possible design options of a binding savings target and assess their feasibility. We conclude that a binding target at Member State level (opposed to an EU-wide target like for the EU Emission Trading System (ETS)) is the most feasible. A binding target at Member State level would ensure political accountability and commitment to deliver results while providing flexibility to choose and apply the most suitable tools to achieve the target. It could provide a framework to guide ambitious and coherent implementation of EU energy efficiency policies, as well as the strengthening of national policies. Furthermore, binding targets at Member State level will make Member States take an ambitious position in Brussels when new energy or CO2 performance standards for appliances and transport modes are to be set. A Member State binding target applied to end-users (excluding ETS companies) is a design option that covers the vast majority of the cost-effective energy savings potential, maintains the flexibility for ETS companies, and supports the most cost-effective achievement of a greater share of renewables.