Welfare effects of preferential trade agreements under optimal tariffs

The most remarkable evolution in the field of international investment law is undoubtedly the massive proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), either in the form of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) of Custom Unions (CUs). PTAs increasingly, as will be pointed out, contain provisions on the liberalization and/or protection of foreign investment, and may then be referred to as Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements (PTIAs). PTAs differ substantially in terms of the extent to which they cover investment. Agreements in the area of trade and investment either contain explicit provisions on the protection, and possibly the liberalization of foreign investment, or are aimed essentially at the regulation of trade in services and/or goods, in which case the provisions on investment are usually less extensive than in the former or even completely absent. BITs and modern PTAs which include investment protection (and liberalization) provisions, which may then be categorized as PTIAs, follow the first approach, and thus contain extensive provisions on both the liberalization and the protection of foreign investment (PTIAs), while the majority of the traditional PTAs follow the second approach, containing only a framework or framework provisions committing to further liberalization, protection and promotion of investment. This contribution aims to analyze the interrelationship between the network of bilateral investment treaties and PTIAs with respect to the protection of foreign investment. In doing so, this contribution will examine the differences in the content and rationale of PTIAs as compared to BITs, and in particular how substantive investment protection and investment dispute settlement are dealt with in PTIAs and BITs. Finally, this contribution will address whether conflicts between PTIAs and BITs are possible, and if so, how these conflicts may be addressed.

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.

One of the most relevant features in the context of international trade in recent decades is the increase in the depth of trade agreements. The aim of this article is to explore the heterogeneous effect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on bilateral trade flows including their depth in addition to other agreement characteristics such as the geographical scope of the member countries, their degree of development, or their nature. To measure depth, we follow the most recent works that propose indirect instead of direct measures. Once we control for depth, our results reveal that (i) the positive effect of regional PTAs is notably larger for deep agreements whereas the shallow interregional agreements do not seem to increase bilateral trade flows; (ii) North–North PTAs only boost trade when they exhibit a high depth level; and (iii) the depth is not a relevant factor for plurilateral agreements and those that consist of the adhesion of a country to an existent PTA.

Chapter 7 A Free Trade Area and its Neighbor's Welfare: A Revealed Preference Approach

Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade

This chapter discusses the multilateral rules that are relevant to regional integration. In particular, it documents the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions that relate to free trade agreements (FTAs) under the GATT and General Agreement on Trade in Services, customs unions, and preferential trade agreements, referred to as ‘FTAs’ where discussed collectively. The chapter highlights not only the rules themselves but also ways in which the rules are inadequate or do not function as the drafters intended. In addition, the chapter addresses a number of WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions that clarify aspects of the legal interplay between FTAs and the multilateral rules. Throughout, the chapter offers commentary on the efficacy of the applicable rules and identifies areas in which the rules require further clarification.

This paper studies the effect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on multilateral trading system using a sequential bargaining game. The study considers two formats of PTAs, i.e., when the PTA tariffs are specified before the formation of PTAs and when PTA members have to negotiate PTA tariffs after the formation of PTAs. The study finds that PTAs with specified tariffs can be building blocks to multilateral liberalization while PTAs without specified tariffs are stumbling blocks. The paper also concludes that PTAs can eliminate bargaining inefficiency called forward manipulation when PTA tariffs are specified before PTA negotiation.

Export diversification is one of the important pillars of the trade policy of developing countries. Pakistan has embarked on a geographical export diversification policy by signing preferential and free trade agreements. The gravity model is used to check whether Pakistan’s policy of preferential trade has a positive impact on its export growth. The estimation results indicate an insignificant relationship between preferential trade and export growth, and therefore implies that the agreement may have international political significance but not the economic. DOI : 10.7176/JESD/10-24-15 Publication date: December 31 st 2019

Beginning in 2001, the Doha Rounds afforded World Trade Organization (WTO) members the opportunity to develop equitable trade rules between the developed and developing member states. The WTO has been successful in advancing multilateral international trade; however, since the Doha Rounds stalemate, it has witnessed the development of more than 300 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and over 500 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). This article attempts to answer two questions: (1) has the failure of the Doha Rounds contributed to the proliferation of PTAs and FTAs, and (2) are these agreements threatening the regulatory authority of the WTO, which, in turn, reduces its ability to effectively promote and govern free trade, and its mission?

The study analyses the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by India on the changes in the trade volumes of member states. The article analyses the benefits of the economic integration of export earnings to meet the import demands. It is found that FTAs improve economic activities among the signing countries. This article highlights the role of FTAs in the economic activities of countries signing the trade agreement. Post FTAs, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of exports increased and imports reduced. This research will help researchers identify the areas and countries where FTAs are desirable and help improve economic activities. JEL Codes: F15

European Union and ACP-Countries : are preferential trade agreements to be taken for granted ? Exports of developing countries may be differently stimulated. First, devel-oping countries' exports may benefit from gradual cuts in custom-duties negociated under the auspices of the GATT. Second, developing countries' exports may be favoured by preferential trade agreements like those granted by the European Union towards the ACPs. The theoretical issues of the effects of preferential trade agreements rely on the Viner's analysis of trade flows creation and diversion. The Viner's analysis is however limited to the welfare costs and benefits of the donor. Moreover, those kinds of cost-benefit analyses are by definition static. In this article, we propose a theoretical and econometrical analysis of the Yaounde and Lomé conventions effects on the ACPs' manufactured exports. From a theoretical point of view, the exports of tnanufactured goods depend on the income of import buyers, on sectorial capacity and competitiveness indicators. The two latter variables are either unobservable or unavailable on a panel of developing countries. We substitute the sectorial capacity indicator by a domestic income indicator, making further additional econometric assumptions that allow us to estimate a log linear function of the export rates of ACP's. We secondly substitute the sectorial by a global competitiveness indicator : the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). The use of the latter is only allowed if we control for labor and human capital endowments. The finally estimated export rate estimated function depends – positively on the income of OECD countries, human capital endowments and – negatively on the REER and the labor force. Preferential trade agreements are taken into account by binary dummies denoting ACP membership. We check separately the effects of the Conventions on the manufactured goods exports of ACPs to the European countries and to the world. Explanatory variables have the predicted effect. ACP-countries do perform better than other developing countries when they export to European countries. But the latter positive effect is more prevalent under the early conventions. Moreover, ACP-countries do not perform significantly better than other developing countries when they export towards European and non-European countries. We notice however that the Yaoundé convention granting reciprocal trade advantages has solely favoured the ACPs' exports. Some pieces of explanation are proposed. Trade agreements may have postponed economic reforms in ACP-countries, that appeared to be necessary in the face of emerging exporting countries in the South-Asia and South America. Trade agreements appear to have allowed for the durability of distorsions. In last ive diagnose more for a trade flows diversion instead of a stimulation that may question the relevance of trade agreements.

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of non-tariff barriers on the Free Trade Agreement. Currently, it has achieved significant export effects by signing free trade agreements with many countries in Korea. However, most countries have implemented non-tariff barriers to protect their industries. This study analyzes the effects of non-tariff barriers in counterpart countries that have signed a free trade agreement. Design/methodology/approach - For analysis, first, prior studies were summarized, and second, the current status of free trade agreements and non-tariff barriers were identified. And, based on the current situation, the relationship between non-tariff barriers and export volume was analyzed. The targets of analysis are the United States, China, and Vietnam, which are Korea s three largest exporters. As for non-tariff barriers, anti-dumping tariffs, countervailing tariffs, and emergency import restrictions were analyzed as import regulatory measures. Findings - In the case of the United States, it can be seen that the decline in textiles, steel and electronics sectors is even greater. In the case of China, it can be seen that exports declined after imposing non-tariff barriers in the steel sector. Finally, it can be seen that exports declined after Vietnam implemented a non-tariff barrier on the steel sector. It was found that non-tariff barriers offset the effects of the Free Trade Agreement. Research implications or Originality - Currently, Korea has free trade agreements with numerous countries. However, after the free trade agreement entered into force, the number of annual average import regulation investigations for Korean products is on the rise. In the end, the implementation of non-tariff barriers is offsetting the effects of free trade agreements. Therefore, when signing a free trade agreement, it is necessary to thoroughly prepare for import regulatory measures such as the insertion of provisions of non-tariff barriers.

Purpose - This paper explains why free trade agreements (FTAs) are more popular than customs unions (CUs) in respect of tariff coordination. Design/methodology - This paper employs an equilibrium theory of trade agreements with tariff coordination. I set up three-country partial equilibrium model with competing exporters. Domestic and exporting firms decide their optimal production under given tariffs and each country levies its tariff under the trade agreements. I found stability of implicit tariff coordination and preference of each country between an FTA and a CU. Findings - I demonstrate that two FTA members can keep their external tariffs higher than separately decided external tariffs by keeping the status-quo. This implicit tariff coordination can benefit each member through trade diversion. In a CU, each member country must have a common optimal external tariff and it must incur costs because each country may seek different external tariffs for their own national welfare. The benefit of implicit coordination in an FTA and the cost of explicit coordination in a CU account for the popularity of the FTA. Originality/value - This paper uses the idea of implicit tariff coordination in trade agreements. In a CU, tariff coordination is explicit and mandatory. All member countries must have a single common external tariff for each good. On the other hand, in an FTA, each country establishes its external tariff with the goal of maximizing its own welfare. However, each country can also coordinate “implicitly” by keeping the status-quo after establishing an FTA.

As part of its growth strategy, Bangladesh instituted a trade liberalization process in the early 1990s which gained momentum in later years. Trade grew from 24.4 to 45% of GDP between 1980–81 and 2007–08, an indicator of increased liberalization as well as the growing importance of the external sector in Bangladesh. Apart from its unilateral liberalization, Bangladesh participates in three different regional trade agreements (RTAs): the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Free Trade Area (BIMSTEC FTA). In addition, Bangladesh signed preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with the member countries of the Developing 8 (D8). Because of the growing importance of RTAs, this study investigates their contribution to the export flows from Bangladesh using the gravity model that has become the primary tool for estimating the trade effects of regional integration. Regression results of bilateral exports for 40 countries from 1992–2009 indicate two crucial aspects. Firstly, all the RTAs consistently maintained statistically significant negative signs, except the BIMSTEC FTA and SAFTA, which showed insignificantly positive and insignificantly negative effects respectively. Secondly, the intensity of negative effects and the level of significance have shown a declining trend as the status of those blocs has changed from political or economic cooperation agreements to preferential agreements and from preferential agreements to free trade agreements. Thus, the intensity of tariff liberalization and the degree of sectoral coverage seem to be the important determinants of the RTAs’ performance. Therefore, experts expect that full-fledged implementation of FTA provisions and the elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers might result in a higher degree of integration.

This paper gives an overview of the progress of regionalism in East Asia and examines the background of the recent embrace of trade agreements by China, Japan, and South Korea. It discusses the progress toward free trade agreements (FTAs) within East Asia and offers reasons for their slow development. The impacts of eight hypothetical East Asian FTAs are estimated using a computable generalized equilibrium model. The model predicts that countries will benefit from both bilateral FTAs and regional FTAs (such as a Northeast Asian FTA and an East Asian FTA); however, greater economic benefits would be gained under regional FTAs than under bilateral FTAs. Although the simulation used in the study estimates that a Northeast Asian FTA and an East Asian FTA would bring a similar level of economic benefits, results indicate that greater benefits would accrue under an East Asian FTA. Discussions of a Japan–ASEAN FTA are under way, after talks of an FTA between ASEAN and China blossomed in late 2000. China and Japan are competitively promoting bilateral FTAs with ASEAN. As discussions of an FTA with ASEAN heat up in China and Japan, South Korea has also begun reviewing the economic feasibility of an FTA with ASEAN. If China, Japan, and South Korea competitively pursue bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, this may result in several important problems, including spaghetti bowl effects, a hub-and-spoke dilemma, or struggles for regional leadership. This paper tries to show that an East Asian FTA covering the whole region is economically desirable and stresses that East Asian countries should introduce a regionwide FTA, rather than multiple bilateral or subregional FTAs. An East Asian FTA can be realized only in the long term because of economic, political, and social obstacles. East Asia, which already lags behind other regions in terms of regionalism, should not passively wait for the establishment of an East Asian FTA, which is likely to take some time to be established.