What can animal communication teach us about human language?

Evolving pragmatics

Referentiality and Concepts in Animal Cognition

The question about when and how language emerged in human evolution has been a major and intriguing question since at least the classical Egyptian times. It is reported that the Pharaoh Psamtik took two children to be raised by deaf-mutes, in order to find out what was the first and natural language.When these childrenwere later observed, one of them said something that sounded like bekos, the Phrygian word for bread. From this, Psamtik concluded that Phrygian was the first and original language. During the following centuries, the origin of language continued as a most intriguing and polemic question. Different approaches and interpretations were proposed throughout the history. At a certain point, the debate became so complex and hot, that in 1866 the Linguistic Society of Paris banned discussion of the origin of language, arguing that it to be an unanswerable problem. Contemporary research on linguistics, archeology, comparative psychology and genetics has significantly advanced in understanding the origins of human language (e.g., Bickerton, 1990; Corballis, 2002, 2006; Enard et al. 2002; Mallory, 1989; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999; Ruhlen, 1994; Swadesh, 1967; Tallerman, 2005). Different disciplines have contributed from their own perspective to make human communication system more comprehensible. Thepurposeof thispaper isnot to furtherreviewanddiscuss thehistoricalorigins of language, but to relate what is known (or supposed) on the origins of language, withcontemporaryneurologyandneuropsychologydata,particularly,with thearea of aphasia. Aphasia knowledge can potentially alsomake a significant contribution to the understanding about the origin and evolution of human language.

Syntax has been found in animal communication but only humans appear to have generative, hierarchically structured syntax. How did syntax evolve? I discuss three theories of evolutionary transition from animal to human syntax: computational capacity, structural flexibility and event perception. The computation hypothesis is supported by artificial grammar experiments consistently showing that only humans can learn linear stimulus sequences with an underlying hierarchical structure, a possible by-product of computationally powerful large brains. The structural flexibility hypothesis is supported by evidence of meaning-bearing combinatorial and permutational signal sequences in animals, with sometimes compositional features, but no evidence for generativity or hierarchical structure. Again, animals may be constrained by computational limits in short-term memory but possibly also by limits in articulatory control and social cognition. The event categorization hypothesis, finally, posits that humans are cognitively predisposed to analyse natural events by assigning agency and assessing how agents impact on patients, a propensity that is reflected by the basic syntactic units in all languages. Whether animals perceive natural events in the same way is largely unknown, although event perception may provide the cognitive grounding for syntax evolution. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

Many of the chapters in this book will approach human language with an eye to its unique features, such as recursive syntax, or a large learned lexicon. We propose to take a wider view, seeing human language as one among many animal communication systems, and focusing on the selective pressures affecting the origin and maintenance of such systems. The possibility that human language arose from animal communication through a process of evolutionary change demands that we attend to the conceptual problems at the heart of our current understanding of animal signaling. In doing so we may throw light upon not only the origins of human language, but also its character.

ABSTRACTThe comparative study of communicative behaviour in non‐human animals, especially primates, has yielded crucial insights into the evolution of human language. This research, mostly focused on the species and population level, has improved our understanding of the various socio‐ecological factors that shape communication systems. However, despite the inherent flexibility of human communication, the impact of individual variation on non‐human communication systems has often been overlooked, along with its potential to shed light on the roots of human language. While the eco‐evolutionary relevance of genetic and phenotypic differences between individuals is well established, animal communication studies have traditionally focused on group averages and treated outliers as noise. In this review, we address this gap by providing a comprehensive overview of the sources of individual variation in animal communicative behaviour (e.g. physiological, sociodemographic, or personality traits), across parameters such as signal forms, repertoires, and usage strategies. In particular, recent evidence from comparative work underscores the potential evolutionary significance of individual plasticity in communicative behaviour. We argue for an explicit focus on within‐individual variation and propose advancing the study of animal communication through multi‐level approaches that integrate intrinsic and environmental factors, as well as between‐ and within‐individual variation. Such approaches not only refine our view of complexity in animal communication systems and their implications for social evolution, but also help trace the evolutionary trajectory of human language through comparative studies.

In this article we suggest a way to settle the classical nature vs nurture debate through a naturalized idea of language’s structures and functions. This idea involves two essential conditions: the first is that we must be able to describe the species-specificity of human language in naturalistic terms; the second is that we must estimate linguistic behaviors on the comparative basis of the adaptive selection, rather than referring only to their functional and social uses in human societies. In other words, if we are able to establish the ethologic species-specificity of language, then the resulting philosophy of language should take into account the “price of language”, that is not only its “inner” potentials (traditionally described as “cultural”), but also its high “external” risks (traditionally considered as “natural”). In this work, we use the origin of human language as a way to show that the nature vs nurture debate is unfounded. The balance between what is conveyed by the phylogenetic structure and what is recapped at every ontogenetic restart can be different , but each animal species acquires and conveys data to co-specifics always using dedicated procedures: in biology culture is any mechanism that allows to acquire information from the members of one's own species through social systems. Thus, we can consider culture as an expression of the biological possibilities of Homo sapiens .

Many animals produce vocal sequences that appear complex. Most researchers assume that these sequences are well characterized as Markov chains (i.e. that the probability of a particular vocal element can be calculated from the history of only a finite number of preceding elements). However, this assumption has never been explicitly tested. Furthermore, it is unclear how language could evolve in a single step from a Markovian origin, as is frequently assumed, as no intermediate forms have been found between animal communication and human language. Here, we assess whether animal taxa produce vocal sequences that are better described by Markov chains, or by non-Markovian dynamics such as the 'renewal process' (RP), characterized by a strong tendency to repeat elements. We examined vocal sequences of seven taxa: Bengalese finches Lonchura striata domestica, Carolina chickadees Poecile carolinensis, free-tailed bats Tadarida brasiliensis, rock hyraxes Procavia capensis, pilot whales Globicephala macrorhynchus, killer whales Orcinus orca and orangutans Pongo spp. The vocal systems of most of these species are more consistent with a non-Markovian RP than with the Markovian models traditionally assumed. Our data suggest that non-Markovian vocal sequences may be more common than Markov sequences, which must be taken into account when evaluating alternative hypotheses for the evolution of signalling complexity, and perhaps human language origins.

What an irony it is, that the supposed attempt to bring homo sapiens down a few notches in the natural order has taken the form of us humans hectoring another species into emulating our instinctive form of communication, or some artificial form we have invented, as if that were the measure of biological worth. The chimpanzee’s resistance is no shame on them; a human would surely do no better if trained to hoot and shriek like a chimp, a symmetrical project that makes about as much scientific sense. (Pinker 1994, p. 351) What is the significance of attempting to get members of other species to learn human languages or their variants? Such studies are often considered to be of more dubious value than studies of natural communication in a species in its own environment. There is a big difference between comparing such natural forms of communication to human language, and comparing extremely unnatural forms, such as bonobos who have learned an English based form of artificial symbolic representation. I will argue today that even the most unnatural experiments can be of vital use in reasoning about the origins of human language. My argument rests on two points, first, the fundamental importance and the structure of comparative studies, and second, the crucial role of development in understanding claims about language capacities. These days, more and more people buy the idea that comparative studies are useful, even including Chomsky, in a recent paper he coauthored with Hauser et al. (2002). But an understanding of capacities is also essential, as I shall argue. Claims of human uniqueness have been ubiquitous in discussions of the evolution of language. One of the most vocal recent advocates of this view is Steven Pinker. Pinker argues that human language capacity should be understood as a ‘module’ that evolved in the hominid line – that is, it is uniquely human. Included in this module are capacities to produce and consume language, which includes the ability to hear and parse syntax, as well as the syntactical and semantic abilities necessary for producing sentences. (1994, p. 373) This whole suite of behaviors is called the language instinct, which is modular in its structure.

Karen McComb

This book proposes a new theory of the origins of human language ability and presents an original account of the early evolution of language. It explains why humans are the only language-using animals, challenges the assumption that language is a consequence of intelligence, and offers a new perspective on human uniqueness. The author draws on evidence from archaeology, linguistics, cognitive science, and evolutionary biology. Making no assumptions about the reader's prior knowledge he first provides an introductory but critical survey of all sources of evidence for language evolution. He then considers what language itself reveals about its own and human origins and evolution. He shows that certain central aspects of language do not, unexpectedly, reflect what they are used for, are maladapted for their function. He considers why this should be, and argues that these odd aspects of language reveal important clues about its evolutionary origin. The Origins of Complex Language fulfils the promise of its title. In doing so it turns upside down conventional theories about the relation between cognition and expression, truth and reference, and the co-evolution of mind and body. Original in conception, brilliantly executed, stylishly written, this book will attract a wide range of readers interested in the evolution and origins of language.

Most scholarly speculation on the origin of human language has centered around speech. However, the growing understanding of sign languages on human development has transformed the debate on language evolution. David F. Armstrong s new book Show of Hands: A Natural History of Sign Language casts a wide net in history and geography to explain how these visible languages have enriched human culture in general and how their study has expanded knowledge of the human condition.Armstrong addresses the major theories of language evolution, including Noam Chomsky s thesis of an innate human organ for language and Steven Pinker s contention that there is language and not-language without any gradations between gesture and language. This engrossing survey proceeds with William C. Stokoe s revival of the early anthropological cognitive-linguistic model of gradual development through the iconicity of sign languages. Armstrong ranges far to reveal the nature of sign languages, from the anatomy of early human ancestors to telling passages by Shakespeare, Dickens, and Pound, to the astute observations of Socrates, Lucretius, and Abbe de l Epee on sign communication among deaf people. Show of Hands illustrates the remarkable development of sign languages in isolated Bedouin communities and among Australian indigenous peoples. It also explores the ubiquitous benefits of Deaf Gain and visual communication as they dovetail with the Internet and its mushrooming potential for the future.

This work is an entry into the fierce current debate among psycho-linguists, neuroscientists, and evolutionary theorists about the nature and origins of human language. A prominent neuroscientist here takes up the Darwinian case, using data seldom considered by psycho-linguists and neuro-linguists to argue that human - though more sophisticated than all other forms of animal communication - is not a qualitative different ability from all forms of animal communication, does not require a quantum evolutionary leap to explain it, and is not unified in a single language instinct. Using clinical evidence from speech-impaired patients, functional neuro-imaging, and evolutionary biology to make his case, Philip Lieberman contends that human is not a single separate module but a functional neurological system made up off many separate abilities. Language remains as it began, the author argues: a device for coping with the world. But in a blow to human narcissism, he makes the case that this most remarkable human ability is a by-product of our remote reptilian ancestors' abilities to dodge hazards, seize opportunities, and live to see another day.

Vocal functional flexibility: what it is and why it matters

Semantic communication in vervet monkeys and other animals