What Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters and How They Could Have Been Avoided

It takes usually 3 to 4 years on an average to build a complex oil and gas facility from concept to commissioning. All critical features of the facility are decided during the early stages of the project. In fact the concept stage can be called as the stage when the DNA of the facility is cast. During rest of the project all that is being done is to develop and translate this DNA to reality. Very little can be done in later stages to correct safety problems buried in concept itself. Are we paying enough attention to process safety during this stage? Projects are implemented under several constraints and process safety sometimes takes a backseat. While there are several methods of Process Hazard Analysis by which process hazards are checked during design, how far are they effective? As the project accelerates towards completion all focus will be usually on the schedule. Are project teams able to see the compromises made on process safety during the fast track implementation? This paper will review the current practices for ensuring process safety during project implementation. Further it will present case histories of projects where hazards where buried deep inside design in spite of safety reviews that were carried out. The paper will argue the case for deeper understanding of process safety and the need for better management of the same during project implementation. Summary of latest research on the subject from diverse fields of Technical Safety, Behavioral Science and Systems theory will be included in the paper. In conclusion, the paper will provide better ways of understanding the complex issues and demonstrate several important factors that will help in ensuring process safety during project implementation.

The Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers has developed a twelve-element model management system for process safety. Concord has worked with CCPS to develop performance measures for two of the elements, namely “Management of Change” and “Training”. A unique feature of the measures is that they continuously assess the performance of the elements, a feature somewhat analogous to the control of a plant. This contrasts with an audit evaluation which captures a snapshot of the management system performance at a particular instant of time. Of special interest here is the method used to build the measures which employed chemical plant process safety experts performing the functions for which they are accepted as experts. For instance, analysis of the management systems used a method well known to chemical engineers for assessing chemical process safety, the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) (AIChE/CCPS 1985) process. Further, synthesis of the performance measures employed process safety experts in a role they perform in their professions - assessment of the level of performance of various demonstrations of process safety management systems. This methodology is believed to be a reliable way of obtaining information from experts. That method is described in this paper.

Workforce perceptions of human factors as indicators of plant reliability and process safety

18 - Safety Systems

Energy, economic, environment assessment and process safety of methylchloride plant using Aspen HYSYS simulation model

Chapter 5 - Modeling and Simulation: The Essential Tools to Manage the Complexities

An MILP model for safe multi-floor process plant layout using the domino hazard index

Risk analysis and prediction is a primary monitoring strategy to identify abnormal events occurring in chemical processes. The accidental release of toxic gases may result in severe problems for people and the environment. Risk analysis of hazardous chemicals using consequence modeling is essential to improve the process reliability and safety of the refineries. In petroleum refineries: toluene, hydrogen, isooctane, kerosene, methanol, and naphtha are key process plants with toxic and flammable chemicals. The major process plants considered for risk assessment in the refinery are the gasoline hydrotreatment unit, crude distillation, aromatic recovery, continuous catalytic reformer, methyl–tert–butyl–ether, and kerosene merox units. Additionally, we propose a threat and risk analysis neural network for the chemical explosion (TRANCE) model for refinery incident scenarios. Significantly, 160 attributes were collected for the modeling on the basis of the significance of failure and hazardous chemical leaks in the refinery. Hazard analysis shows that the leakages of hydrogen and gasoline at the gasoline hydrotreatment unit, kerosene at the kerosene merox plant, and crude oil at crude-distillation units were areas of profound concern. The developed TRANCE model predicted the chemical explosion distance with an R2 accuracy value of 0.9994 and MSE of 679.5343.

The liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry employs a variety of release prevention and control techniques to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of accidental LNG releases. A study of the effectiveness of these release prevention and control systems is being performed. Reference descriptions for the basic types of LNG facilities were developed. Then an overview study was performed to identify areas that merit subsequent and more detailed analyses. The specific objectives were to characterize the LNG facilities of interest and their release prevention and control systems, identify possible weak links and research needs, and provide an analytical framework for subsequent detailed analyses. The LNG facilities analyzed include a reference export terminal, marine vessel, import terminal, peakshaving facility, truck tanker, and satellite facility. A reference description for these facilities, a preliminary hazards analysis (PHA), and a list of representative release scenarios are included. The reference facility descriptions outline basic process flows, plant layouts, and safety features. The PHA identifies the important release prevention operations. Representative release scenarios provide a format for discussing potential initiating events, effects of the release prevention and control systems, information needs, and potential design changes. These scenarios range from relatively frequent but low consequence releases to unlikely but large releases and are the principal basis for the next stage of analysis.

A brief description along with a number of case histories of each of the different types of ground treatment procedures used during the construction works associated with the extensions to the Madrid Metro over the last eight years are described in this paper. An account is given of how different adverse conditions and situations can be overcome by means of these grouting techniques, ensuring at all times the safety of the excavation processes, be they using tunnelling machines or when excavating by hand, be they under buildings, roadways or pipelines

The objective of this report is to describe results obtained during the first year of funding that will lead to the development of an artificial neural network (ANN) fault - diagnostic system for the real - time classification of operational transients at nuclear power plants. The ultimate goal of this three-year project is to design, build, and test a prototype diagnostic adviser for use in the control room or technical support center at Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC); such a prototype could be integrated into the plant process computer or safety - parameter display system. The adviser could then warn and inform plant operators and engineers of plant component failures in a timely manner. This report describes the work accomplished in the first of three scheduled years for the project. Included herein is a summary of the first year's results as, well as individual descriptions of each of the major topics undertaken by the researchers. Also included are reprints of the articles written under this funding as well as those that were published during the funded period.

13 - Safety, Health, Environment, Disposal, Recycling, and Economics

Safety showers and eyewash stations are equipment used for primary washing if their operator is exposed to hazardous chemicals. Therefore, safety showers and eyewash stations should be installed to ensure operator safety in process plants with excessive hazardous chemicals. International guidelines related to safety showers and eyewash stations are introduced in ANSI Z358.1, BS EN 15154, and German DIN 12899-3:2009, but only mechanical specifications regarding safety showers and eyewash stations are suggested. As such, there are currently no engineering guidelines, books, or technical journal papers requiring safety showers or eyewash stations and their efficient deployment. Thus, this study conducted risk assessment from an industrial hygiene perspective, suggesting which process equipment requires a safety shower and eyewash, including their economical and efficient deployment for operator safety. In industry, safety showers and eyewash stations are considered part of the process safety field; this study attempted to contribute to the safety improvement of operators by applying risk assessment of the industrial hygiene field. More studies are needed that contribute to operators’ safety by incorporating industrial hygiene fields for other process safety fields, including safety showers and eyewash stations.

In 2007 BAPCO won the prestigious Robert W Campbell award for integrating safety into its primary business processes. The team who reviewed BAPCO processes on behalf of the Awarding agency made specific reference to the excellent quality of HAZOPs that BAPCO had conducted and reported. Such commendation for BAPCO HAZOPs did not come by chance. BAPCO has a very strong and rich tradition in this field; arguably the pioneers in this region. Bert Lawley, inventor of the HAZOP process, published his first paper on the topic in 1976; BAPCO conducted their first HAZOP meeting in as early as 1981! The traditional P&ID (Piping and Instrument Diagram) line-by-line guideword-based HAZOP remains a very powerful tool in the armory of modern designers and engineers in minimizing hazard and operability related concerns from process plants in continuous as well as batch operations. Nonetheless, BAPCO have strengthened its effectiveness through developing some best practices of our own and adopting some recommended by other well-known authorities such as the American Institute of Chemical Engineers’ Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). One noteworthy best practice developed by BAPCO is the adoption of a comprehensive list of "Global Parameters." This is generally referred to as the last Node in HAZOPs and it addresses unit-wide or plant-wide concerns related to civil and structural integrity, instrumentation philosophy, fire water system, fireproofing, environmental concerns, reliability, emergency shutdown systems … the list goes on (currently there are 50 items under Global Parameters that BAPCO HAZOPs take into account). In addition to the Global Parameters mentioned above, this paper describes the following best practices that we apply to our HAZOPs: use of specific checklists which will captures all the items that are not covered under Global Parameters, review of emergency inventory isolation block valves, modeling of gas blow-by scenarios, and overpressure protection. HAZOP is a continually improving and evolving process in BAPCO. Our recent contacts with reputable engineering consultants have given us feedback regarding current best practices with EPC companies. We in BAPCO are committed to striving for excellence.

This paper summarizes the results of a joint industry project (EQE, 1995) with development funding from the United States Minerals Management Service (MMS) to develop and implement on a trial basis a methodology to evaluate offshore platform topsides equipment and appurtenances for seismic loads. Voluntary peer review was provided by several operators with platforms in seismic regions. The methodology has been tested on a trial basis on several platforms located in different regions of the world. A screening evaluation criteria has been developed, focusing largely on lessons learned from earthquake experience of onshore processing facilities. Guidance is given that can be used in a methodical visual review of the platform, coupled with limited analytical checks to governing codes. A method of limiting and prioritizing the scope of the review by focusing on critical elements is defined, using process safety management techniques. Introduction The primary focus of this paper is to present the overall evaluation methodology, screening evaluation criteria, and methods of documentation for evaluation of topsides equipment and systems for seismic loads. This paper presents background information with regards to requirements for seismic evaluation of topsides, and the details of the methodology. It also presents results of trial assessments of several platforms utilizing the methodologies presented in this paper. The development project has defined a detailed methodology for platform topsides seismic evaluation that is intended to be cost-effective, yet consistent with the intent of API RP 2A. The trial assessments have demonstrated the methodology on a trial basis and provided a means for critical review of the methodology. Background A great deal of effort has been expended in recent years to address the requalification of offshore platforms. Although the primary focus has been on the platform structures, i.e., jackets, the risks associated with topsides equipment and topsides have also come under increased scrutiny. In December 1992, the Operations Working Group at the International Workshop on Seismic Design and Reassessment of Offshore Structures, held in Pasadena, CA, developed a detailed brief which included recommendations for focused efforts to improve the practice of seismic reassessment. The first recommendation was for the development of assessment procedures for existing equipment, including a practical "checklist" reflecting post-earthquake experiences from onshore refineries and processing plants. API has incorporated topsides seismic provisions into the 19th and 20th Editions of RP 2A. The guidelines and commentary give guidance as to primary areas of emphasis for evaluations as well as guidance for how to evaluate existing equipment, including a recommendation that field inspections of equipment and piping be performed by experienced personnel. Section 17 of RP 2A recommends that the 20th edition topsides provisions be used to evaluate equipment on existing platform. Other forums have addressed the issue, such as the MMS and California State Lands Commission Workshop on Public Policy Issues on Seismic Requalification of Offshore Platforms, held in Camarilla, CA, in November, 1993, and the Workshop on Assessment and Requalification of Offshore Production Structures held in New Orleans in December 1993. All of these forums have included input from industry representatives, regulatory authorities, and engineering specialists.