Which rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

This chapter provides a critical discussion of the mediatization of policy in general, and of EU foreign and security policy in particular. A common argument in public debate and research is that the media logic is increasingly affecting how policy is formulated. Brommesson and Ekengren are critical of this (as they see it) oversimplified perspective, and they analyse EU foreign and security policy from the opposite point of view in this chapter. Foreign policy is usually described as a conservative policy area, in as much as it is informed by a long-term perspective, and foreign policy is not the subject of public debate to the same extent as other policy areas. Based on this reverse perspective, the authors ask whether policy actors are actually taking advantage of the opportunities provided by mediatization to strengthen long-term policy objectives. The chapter sheds light on the relationship between policy and mediatization through a comparative analysis of two important strategy documents of EU foreign and security policy: the European security strategy of 2003 and the EU global strategy of 2016. The authors discuss the overarching question of whether the formulation of EU foreign and security policy is dominated by media logic, in other words, whether this policy has been mediatized.

This chapter analyses the variations in foreign, security, and defence policy as well as the consequences of a possible fragmentation on the positioning of the Union as a united global force. Since ‘security and defence policy’ is separated from ‘foreign and security policy’, one of the key questions concerns the dividing line between the two areas. Is it possible for Member States not to participate in the security and defence integration or does the single legal order of the Union prevents this variation? A second question concerns the more general possibilities for closer or enhanced cooperation. And, finally, a third question is to what extent the proposed new EU Constitutional Treaty further consolidates the somewhat fragmented legal regime on differentiation in the area of foreign, security, and defence policy.

Participation in international crisis management is an established part of Finland’s foreign and security policy. Finland’s international crisis management policy has been characterised by an emphasis on a comprehensive approach that acknowledges the need to coordinate diverse military and civilian measures to contribute to lasting peace and security. Simultaneously, international crisis management has played an instrumental role in reconciling Finland’s diverse and at times incongruent foreign and security policy objectives. Specifically, active and comprehensive engagement in crisis management has served as a way to foster key foreign and security policy partnerships while allowing Finland to maintain its self-perception as a neutral peacekeeping force. As a NATO member, the role of international crisis management in Finland’s foreign and security policy may evolve, both due to changes in internal foreign and security policy priorities as well as amid the broader shifts in the strategic environment of international crisis management. This chapter discusses the key characteristics, conditions and subsequent continuities and evolution in Finland’s contribution to international crisis management in times of uncertainty and sweeping changes.

This chapter examines the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It tells the story of increasing co-operation between member states on foreign policy matters, first with European Political Co-operation (EPC) and, since the 1990s, with CFSP and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The chapter highlights the internal dynamics and external events that drove the member states towards such co-operation and considers the most recent example of such efforts: the 2017 attempt to create a system of permanent structured co-operation (PESCO). However, it is noted that the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and there remains a reluctance from member states to push much further integration, given states’ keen desire to remain sovereign in this area. Finally, the chapter considers the EU’s status as a ‘power’ in international relations, noting that it has diminished in important respects since 2003, but remains an important economic power.

The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.

The European Union’s (EU’s) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is scarcely two decades old, yet a considerable and diverse body of literature has emerged during this time. CSDP can best be thought of as the functional crisis management end of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which it is an integral part. It covers both the military and civilian aspects of crisis management, with the majority of overseas missions being civilian in nature. Yet, it is the growth of the military dimension that has spurred extensive debate about the nature of the EU’s actorness and whether it can still be thought of as a civilian power par excellence. Much of the research has been driven by the application of the main theoretical approaches in international relations to CSDP. The result is an extensive, but occasionally cacophonous, body of literature. Given the relative youth of CSDP there are inevitably gaps in the literature, especially the question of how CSDP relates to other policy fields in the external relations of the EU and whether the “D” in CSDP will remain indefinitely silent.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) in a classical sense entails focusing on agents (individuals or groups of individuals). In the case of the European Union (EU), FPA becomes more problematic. Firstly, the question arises of what a foreign policy of the EU really means. This article defines EU foreign policy in a wider sense, namely along the lines of what is known as EU's external action. It focuses however on the security aspect of the EU's external action – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its defence dimension, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, a problem of identifying agents arises in the EU setting in large part because of the complex institutional setup of the CFSP/CSDP. Although final decisions are made at the level of the Council, the policy itself is drafted and prepared at lower levels of policy-making (working parties, committees and agencies) based in Brussels. This article proposes a discursive institutionalist model of analysis, applicable to any organization of the policy process. After presenting the model's ontological and epistemological positions, as well as theoretical underpinnings, the article elaborates on the different levels of information processing and meaning construction by actors and their role in setting the overall foreign policy discourse by shaping the coordinative discourses1 during this early phase of the policy-making process.

Rediscovering the past to build a secure future is better realized by understanding the role of history in policy making. Today, while Nepal’s national security policies remain silent about the geopolitical threats, it is timely to rediscover the guidelines on national security strategies introduced in Divya Upadesh, a Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah. Currently, Nepal inability in escaping the geostrategic challenge of accommodating the interest of major powers is explicitly visible in the fiasco created by the Nepali political parties in the context of Nepal’s uncertainty over US-sponsored MCC project, which is today perceived in Nepal as hostile to China-led BRI. Historically, Nepal has successfully balanced its two Gulliverian neighbors. But, today, Nepal is not in a position to evade the repercussions triggered by Sino-Indian rivalry at the regional front and Sino-US strategic competition at the global level. On the backdrop of their conflicting interest—strategic, security, economic—Kathmandu faces the geostrategic challenges of accommodating the interest of major powers. Although Nepal’s integrated foreign policy of 2020 mentions of the changed geopolitical context, pragmatic policy recommendations, as indicated by foreign policy behavior, are missing. Constitutional guidelines on Nepal’s foreign policy and national security alone are not sufficient. Thus, drawing lessons from history could be of help to formulate the national security strategies in order to better cope with the external threats. The rationale behind considering Divya Upadesh is to make Nepali policy makers realize that the national security strategies and policies that Nepal adopted in a usual/normal context won’t be able to fulfill the requirements of the uncertain strategic milieu against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ brewing between the United States and China. In the late 18th century when P.N Shah was introducing a comprehensive national security policy for the first time, the external environment wasn’t much favorable. After his death, however, instead of paying heed to his guidelines, expansionism ended up to territorial loss, adventurism led to Himalayan wars, appeasement led to increasing British influence in Nepal. After 1950, guidelines in Divya Upadesh have been more confined to history books and classrooms lectures. While Nepal lionizes its act of balancing India and China though the policy of non-alignment and equidistance, foreign and security policy makers never paid attention to reinvent the lesson for the same. Thus, this qualitative study recuperates the relevance of effective balancing as advocated by PN Shah in addressing the challenges surfaced while accommodating the interests of major powers. Most of the available literature on Divya Upadesh are either translated English versions, or limited to the analysis of the unification process. The relevance of an intersection of foreign policy and national security in Divya Upadesh is not unveiled by any of the available literature. Apprehending the same research gap, this study explores the contemporary significance of Divya Upadesh while devising the national security policies and strategies. Firstly, the contemporary challenges to Nepal’s national security prompted by Kathmandu’s struggle in accommodation of the interest of major powers is discussed; secondly, the policy of ‘balancing’ counseled by Prithivi Narayan Shah is emphasized as an apt and relevant in dealing with the contemporary challenges emanating from the neighborhood and beyond. Thirdly, “meticulous diplomacy,” is highlighted to offer economic shape to the act of balancing. Finally, it has been realized how studying history means studying causes, and as such, turning the pages of Divya Upadesh, policy makers discover the causes of Nepal’s failure in accommodating the interest of major powers.

This chapter analyzes the key drives underpinning continuity and change in Polish foreign and security policy from 1990 to 2019. This period has marked a significant shift in Poland’s position on the European continent. From a country under Russian tutelage during the Cold War, Poland has ‘returned to Europe’, joining the EU (2004) and NATO (1999). As this chapter will highlight, while the core of Poland’s foreign and security policy has remained focused on Poland’s territorial integrity as sacrosanct, how this has been operationalized by Poland’s policy-making elites has fluctuated. This not only relates to shifts in government, but also to external drivers, not least the behavior of Poland’s neighbor Russia. In particular, Poland’s pro-active approach to participating in international military operations, whether in the context of NATO, CSDP or US coalitions of the willing, marking it as a ‘go to player’ in European defense (Whitney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 24), has been replaced by a territorial defense focus. This has been accompanied by a fortified Atlanticism and a skeptical Europeanism. Overall, however, this chapter will demonstrate that Polish foreign and security policy has shown remarkable continuity and that changes can primarily be found in how policies are designed, actioned or prioritized.

Research Highlights and Abstract Through an analysis of recent foreign policy discourse, in particular the UK approach to stabilisation, the article identifies distinctive similarities and continuities in the patterns of ethically-minded foreign policy, employed by the 1997–2010 Labour government and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition. The article makes a fresh engagement with the concept of Good International Citizenship, arguing for a much more overt engagement, by policymakers, with the concept, to help address some of the shortcomings associated with both Labour and the Coalition's attempts to incorporate ethical obligations into British foreign policy. This article examines the interaction between the idea of Good International Citizenship and the recent evolution of UK foreign and security policy. Good International Citizenship centres on the mediation of ethical commitments to national interest, to the promotion international order, and to the wellbeing of vulnerable non-citizen populations. Whilst ethical commitments to non-citizens have become overt components of British foreign policy, recent UK governments have struggled to reconcile these with commitments to the national interest and a stable international order. The article argues that the more direct affirmation of Good International Citizenship as a narrative and ethos of practice for UK foreign policy might help further the increasingly open discussion on the ethics and UK foreign policy. As a framework for dialogue and public debate, the concept provides a means by which ethical commitments in the traditionally closed world of foreign policy might be opened up to wider critical scrutiny.

The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope covering all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the “face and voice” of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service and 140 EU delegations in other countries and international organizations. Because foreign policy is normally the business of sovereign states, the exceptional nature of the CFSP has long been a subject of inquiry. The CFSP has particularly puzzled advocates of the traditional theories of European integration and international relations, who have failed to appreciate what the EU does in the field of high politics. Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless. Its presence and the gradual increase in “actorness” have also raised questions about whether the EU presents a different type of actor, a civilian or normative power, which derives its influence from nontraditional sources of power. Under the assumption that the EU has some actorness, the Europeanization of foreign policy has become an area of interest. Member states can act through the EU structure to achieve more impact internationally, can adjust national foreign policy on the basis of EU positions, and are socialized into greater European coordination. The relationship between national and EU foreign policy is thus a significant topic of debate. Finally, governance perspectives increasingly provide insight into the organization of the CFSP. How the member states and the EU institutions collectively coordinate, define, and implement EU foreign policy is not only an important question in itself but also matters for policy outcomes.

The replacement of European Political Cooperation (EPC) by a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the terms of the 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU) promised to create a much more effective European foreign policy within the context of a new commitment to external policy as a whole, including for the first time security and defence policy. Under TEU, it will be recalled that the EC was transformed into an EU constructed upon three ‘pillars’, the second of which contained CFSP. Thus CFSP immediately became one of the new Union activities and may appropriately be labelled Union foreign policy. An intergovernmental approach to foreign policy was reinforced by the pillar structure, but it was envisaged that CFSP would be integrated into other Union activities in ways that appeared to resolve continuing debates between integrationists and intergovernmentalists.

Despite acute international tensions, the EU has failed to exert influence, especially in security matters most requiring heroic leadership. The EU has no defence responsibility or capability, and seeks indirect influence through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Anglo-French European Security and Defence Policy, and through other policies. The main actors are the Council Secretariat and the Political and Security Committee, but lack of clear institutional lines of authority results in disputes, notably over relations with NATO and policy implementation despite the efforts of the High Representative for foreign policy. Because foreign and security policy are member state responsibilities, the EU is condemned to leaderlessness and concentration on non-military tasks and ambitious schemes are unrealistic. It should reduce institutional overlap to achieve greater coherence in action.

Research Highlights and Abstract This article Contributes to the debate on British Foreign and Security Policy; Contributes to the literature on the British National Security Strategy; Links international relations literature with domestic policy formation literature; Introduces the concept of ‘legitimacy’ to foreign and security policy analysis. The publication of the Britain's first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 marked a formal shift away from the secret state of the Cold War to the highly public protective state of today. This article is interested in the question of why the NSS and related framework have taken this particular public and explicit form. Both mainstream and critically minded academics have argued that contemporary security discourses and policies are techniques of power and governance and that the public nature of the policies is vital to this function. In this article, I argue that there has been a transformation in the nature of the British state from a representative state in which the state's authority was legitimated through a number of political mechanisms of representation, to one in which state elites and institutions need to forge new kinds of relationships with the governed. This is a key development that has been noticed in political, sociological and legal theoretical literature but as yet hardly addressed in international relations and security studies. This transformation of the state, I will argue, is intimately linked to the form and content of contemporary security policies. The contemporary state is undergoing a process of an erosion of legitimacy, which has a direct impact upon the capacity of the state to govern. In this context, policies take on the role of trying to bridge the legitimacy gap. I will argue that this shift in the state leads to a different understanding of contemporary security policies as representative of a decreasing ability to govern security, a state that is losing legitimacy and authority; that is in effect, losing its sovereignty. This article argues that British national security strategies and policies are representative of this.