Why Are There so Many or so Few Parties?

In this article the development of new political organizations in Russia is discussed. The authors acknowledge the fact that the new parties and organizations are still weak and not well organized. bur they nevertheless play a significant role in the preservation of democracy in Russia. Several stages in the party creation process can be discerned. Before the 1991 attempted coup d'état the Communist Party of the Soviet Union still played a dominant role, while a number of smaller political organizations emerged. After the dissolution of the CPSU. the centre groupings dominated the political scene. Gradually. the level of political polarization increased. as evidenced by the 1993 elections which spelled victory for the post‐communists and ultra‐nationalists. Using sartori's definitions, the authors analyse the party and organizations with the help of a left‐right continuum, which portrays some differences in Russian politics without covering all cleavages. The important regional differences in party formation are illustrated with empirical data from the Murmansk region. During the Gorbachev period a number of informal organizations emerged which gradually developed into parties critical of the CPSU. Initially, social democratic organizations were strong on the Kola Peninsula, but they declined in importance due to internal disagreement. In the 1993 elections, the largest parties in this region were the ultra‐nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and the market‐oriented Russia's Choice. In Russia as a whole, the post‐election period manifested itself in increasing political polarization and successive retreat from the marker‐reform policies. Clearly, the road to a well‐functioning system of parties in Russia is still a long one.

No modem democracy has existed without some type of political party. In fact, it is scarcely imaginable how democratic governance could function in nation-states with millions of inhabitants without political parties to frame electoral options, aggregate and articulate social demands, and translate them into public policy.' Given their centrality to modern democratic governance, political parties and party systems have received significant attention from scholars interested in democratic transitions. The literature on democratization has been engaged in an ongoing debate between structuralists and transitionists.2 In regards to party development during regime change, structuralists have focused on social prerequisites for the formation of a competitive party system and social cleavages upon which political parties can build their constituencies.3 The literature on transitions has tended to tie party formation to founding elections, emphasizing the importance of the timing and sequence of elections, the impact of electoral systems, and the favorable influence of elite pacts.4 Relatively little attention has been given to party building. Political parties are not born as nationwide organizations with networks of local organizations stretching across a state's territory. They typically start out as small, geographically concentrated organizations or as cliques of governing elites in the capital. Only with time, effort, and luck do parties expand their influence and organization, eventually contesting elections in all of a state's regions and at national, state, and local levels of electoral competition. This study addresses party building in democratization by examining the factors affecting elite partisanship in the Russian Federation. Russia is a particularly interesting case because its long history of Communist Party rule has produced a strong antiparty sentiment among elites and voters alike. The nascent Russian party system is a fluid conglomeration of parties with little continuity from one election to another. With the partial exception of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), even those parties that have shown some staying power lack the organizational form, coherent ideological program, and reliable social constituency of parties in established democracies and many democratizing states. Russian voters display a general lack of party identification. According to survey research, 78 percent of Russian voters do not have a party identification, compared with 13 percent in the United States and 8 percent in Great Britain.5 The weakness of Russian parties has

The transition of the Indonesian government from a centralized to a decentralized one, marked by the granting of autonomy to the regions to manage their regions, raises political problems. One of the political problems is the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level. The emergence of political dynasties in regional elections at the sub-national level in Indonesia has experienced a significant increase. For this reason, this article will research the emergence of political dynasties in regional elections at the sub-national level in Indonesia. The method used in this research is the literature study method. A literature study is related to data collection methods that involve reviewing literature, reading and taking notes, and processing research materials. The results of this study indicate that, apart from weak regulations, another aspect that causes the emergence of political dynasties is the process of political recruitment by political parties that nominate candidates based on the capacity of candidates as regional heads. Nominations for regional heads by political parties are based on the local community's political culture, which wants to maintain the status quo. Political parties carry out unfair political recruitment to nominate candidates for regional heads so that they nominate candidates from political dynasties by using the image of their predecessors, which makes the emergence of political dynasties more and more common in Indonesia, especially at the sub-national level. Therefore, the recruitment of political parties to elect regional head candidates is highly dependent on the political culture of the local community. The link between society's political culture and political recruitment has led to the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia.

Considerable evidence suggests that social diversity increases the number of political parties. While a vast literature examines this relationship by measuring social diversity as ethnic fragmentation, the convenience of capturing the level of social heterogeneity by using alternative indicators has been traditionally overlooked. In this article, I offer new evidence that documents the impact of social diversity on party system size by proxying the former as the number of social classes. Using both objective class positions and subjective class identifications and employing two different datasets that cover democratic legislative elections around the world between 1981 and 2015, I find that the effective number of social classes has a positive effect on party system fragmentation when the average district magnitude in a democracy is high. Given the difficulty to test these effects in a cross-country environment net of unobserved heterogeneity, I examine the robustness of the findings in Spain between 2000 and 2016, an ideal case due to large differences in district magnitude and a changing party system. Overall, the results suggest that high levels of social diversity are likely to increase party system fragmentation when the electoral system is permissive enough.

In this article, I explore the nature of party systems that have emerged in Africa in the wake of the adoption of democratic political systems after 1990. Although political parties help shape core democratic processes and institutions, parties and party systems have received relatively scant attention in the scholarly literature on democratization in Africa. I argue that party systems in most African countries are built on quite a different foundation from the one that undergirds both advanced industrial democracies and the theories about party systems generated by their experiences. I assess the strengths and limitations of the comparative literature on party system development in the light of African experiences, and argue for a more critical examination of concepts from that literature that have been widely used to assess the prospects and progress of party system institutionalization, including pluralism, system fragmentation and volatility.

The topic of electoral volatility was not at the center of academic work in Latin America until Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully’s seminal 1995 work Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium). Preceding analyses primarily focused on explaining the breakdown of democratic politics in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. Conventional wisdom that departed from the classic work of Sartori in Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), maintained that stable party systems are crucial for the durability of democracies, focusing his attention on aspects such as party system polarization and fragmentation. Mainwaring and Scully shift the discussion, arguing that previous literature on the region neglected and inadequately conceptualized an equally important property of party systems: their level of their institutionalization. According to Mainwaring and Scully, party system institutionalization (PSI) is formed by four different dimensions. The first is stability in the patterns of party competition. Thus, institutionalized party systems are those in which actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that practices and organizations will prevail into the foreseeable future. Mainwaring’s 2018 work, Party Systems in Latin America (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium), argues that this is the only relevant dimension in PSI, while considering that the other three are just underpinnings that facilitate it. So according to this work, an institutionalized party system is the one in which a stable set of parties interacts regularly in stable ways. This stability of interparty competition is traditionally measured with the Pedersen volatility index, a comprehensive measure of the net systematic shift in levels of electoral support for parties across elections. As volatility is negatively correlated with this important dimension of party system institutionalization, conventional wisdom holds that political representation deteriorates when there is persistent high volatility. To this debate, the well-cited 2006 article by Mainwaring and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization” (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium), adds the idea that this lack of stability in the patterns of competition in party systems, measured by electoral volatility, is a typical characteristic of new and developing democracies. According to that study, the most important defining characteristic of party systems in less developed countries is captured by their lack of institutionalization, in other words, the amount of electoral volatility in their party systems. Since the publication of these three contributions, the debate on party system dynamics in the region has focused on cross-national levels of electoral volatility, their relationship with other indicators of party system stability, and their consequences for democratic quality and performance, while also broadening the analysis to Europe.

Party Systems

JON FRAENKEL At first sight, the Pacific Islands seem like a graveyard for institutional determinist theories regarding the impact of electoral systems on party polarisation. Maurice Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to deliver two-party systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems were more loosely associated with multi-party settings.2 Yet in the Pacific, first-past-the-post using countries, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (1975-2002), have developed multipleparty systems. The PR using territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have, at times, veered towards a two-camp polarisation around the issue of independence. Some firstpast-the-post-using democracies, such as Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, have not witnessed the emergence of any party-based system at all. Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented political parties, despite the first using a two round electoral system, the second a unique simultaneously tallied preferential voting system, and the third a block voting system in two-member constituencies. Electoral laws would appear to exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does shed some light on the direction of electoral incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once hedged with the necessary qualifications and confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, where electoral laws do not bring about the anticipated party structures are not confined to Oceania. India and Canada, for example, have numerous political parties, but use first-past-thepost electoral systems. Guyana uses a list PR system but has a two-party centred system, as did Austria during 1945-1990. Much of the literature has consequently been aimed at heavily revising Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral laws on party systems, either by emphasising that the critical association is in fact between district magnitude and the number of parties or by specifying the role of intervening variables, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of competing ‘issue dimensions’ to the political process.3 It is in situations where a single salient political cleavage (such as Labour/Conservative, or Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political order that distinct electoral laws may work in different directions, encouraging or limiting multi-partyism. In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral pressures on party systems exerted considerable influence over the success or failure of compacts aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict. In most South Pacific nations, the decolonisation issue did not prove an enduring The contribution of AusAID to this series is acknowledged with appreciation. Discussion Paper 2005/8 State, Society and Governance in Melanesia THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

This article analyzes the constitutional change in federations that is driven by the bottom-up reform of subnational units’ constitutional arrangements as an alternative to the reforms of the federal constitution. Looking at the case of Catalonia’s recent reform of its statute of autonomy, it discusses and evaluates some of the benefits and pitfalls of the utilization of substantial subnational constitutional discretion and the likely consequences of this mode of reform for the Spanish model of federalism and others. This is done through the study of the initiation of the Catalan reform process, its content and scope, and through the investigation of the political and institutional factors that account for its occurrence and final outcomes. Federal systems transform themselves in order to adapt to external conditions and to evolving internal power relations through implicit or explicit constitutional change or through a combination of both (Voigt 1999; Benz 2008). This constitutional change in federations and its different manifestations and propensity across countries has been mostly approached by focusing on federal constitutions at the national level. More recently, however, increasing attention is being paid to change occurring at the subnational level’s constitutional arrangements and its impact on the overall rules and evolution of the federation (Williams and Tarr 2004). Component units in federations may have subnational constitutions or autonomy charters, which are usually more easily reformed than national constitutions and differ in the degree to which they confer to some or all of the subnational actors different degrees of discretion or ‘‘subnational constitutional space’’ (Tarr 2007) for changing their own governing arrangements and, indirectly, the federal constitution. Depending on several political factors, subnational governments in different federations may decide to use this constitutional space allotted to them differently,

This article overviews and seeks to explain the processes of party system formation in the post-Soviet Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) by focusing on a crucial party-system property, fragmentation. The analysis reveals that to a much greater extent than in democracies, where party systems are largely shaped by societal factors, the level of party system fragmentation in autocracies is determined by the scope of presidential powers, as entrenched in the formal institutional order and reflected in the national constitution. The level of authoritarianism is largely inconsequential for party system fragmentation, while the role of electoral rules is secondary. Institutionally weak and institutionally strong autocratic presidents have a preference for fragmented party systems, while presidents with an intermediate range of powers seek and obtain low levels of party system fragmentation.

Political parties can be an important mechanism by which to better integrate states in the developing world. Despite this, in Russia parties continue to penetrate provincial politics only weakly and thus do not help to integrate the state and enhance its abilities to govern in the periphery by extension. Drawing on evidence of weak central-state capacity to govern in the Russian provinces and correspondingly weak political party penetration, emergent political and economic actors have little interest in building political parties and increasing state integration and capacity as a result. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the argument and analysis for the future of Russian political and economic development. M ore than ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to enjoy flickering developmental success. Despite the declarations of Russia's second popularly elected president, Vladimir Putin, and his institutional innovations designed to strengthen the Russian state and push reform further, it is unclear that he yet possesses the institutional weaponry with which to accomplish these formidable tasks. Putin quickly diagnosed one of Russia's clear afflictions-a weakly integrated state-and he has put forward a variety of institutional cures. He has, however, so far ignored an important, but often overlooked factor that contributes to Russia's weak integration-the underdevelopment of its party system in the provinces. The article is divided into four sections. Part one briefly discusses Putin's attempts to reintegrate the Russian state. This section makes a case for the importance of political parties as sources of political integration and centralstate capacity to exert its authority beyond the Kremlin. Part two presents empirical evidence showing the degree to which the Russian state is poorly integrated (as manifested by the center's faltering abilities to implement policy in the regions during the 1990s) and the corresponding weak penetration of Russian political parties into regional politics. Part three presents some competing explanations for party weakness in Russia and argues that emergent political and economic actors have little interest in building political parties and in increasing state integration and centralAUTHOR'S NOTE: This article was prepared with generous support from the Smith Richardson Foundation. The author would like to thank Sheri Berman, Philip Roeder, and one anonymous reviewer for especially useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The author also thanks Karen Dawisha for referring this piece to Publius: TheJorunal of Federalism and Michael Pagano for putting this special issue together.

With a very high unemployment rate but at the first stage of a timid economic recovery, Spain held regional and local elections in May 2015. The election results showed the fall of traditional parties and the emergence of new forces and citizens’ platforms, which increased the fragmentation of the party system. The PP (Partido Popular – Popular Party) continued to be the most voted-for party but post-election agreements brought the left to power in eight of the 14 regions that held elections, ending four years of conservative general dominance. After commenting on the context, the campaign and the results of the elections, this article explores the main characteristics of the new party competition and examines the profile of those voting for new political alternatives.

The article examines the peculiarities of the formation and development of multiparty system in the regions at the present stage of Russia’s political development. The article analyzes the processes of transformation of the Russian party system in the context of systematic changes in the mechanisms of legislative regulation of their party and political activities. The aim of the study is to determine the degree of influence of the regional party system on the exercise of political power in Russian regions. This is necessary to determine the main directions for improving the system of party legislation in the process of establishing a new political system. Conclusions. As a result of the conducted research, a number of unresolved contradictions in the formation and development of the modern Russian regional party system have been identified. These contradictions do not allow this type of party system to achieve the level of influence that would give them the opportunity to really and effectively participate in the current political process. It can be argued that the party systems that have developed today in the regions are lagging behind in their development in comparison with the all-Russian party system. The author concludes that in order to change the current situation, it is necessary to improve the quality of representation from political parties in regional and municipal authorities. In order for political parties in the regions to articulate the interests and needs of various social groups, they must have the necessary power resources in making decisions on the leadership and management of the region. One of such ways to increase the level of influence of the regional party system is, in the author’s opinion, the reform of party legislation in the direction of creating broader opportunities, both for creating parties of different political spectrum and for increasing their power capabilities.

One of the prime incentives for this dissertation was the renewed interest in the role of party agency for the emergence and structuring of party systems that came up in the course of the discussions about the third wave of democracy and the concomitant challenges to the theoretical fundamentals of common party system theory. In addition, scholarly discourse on the third wave brought up again the question as to how the party system as an independent variable impacts on processes of democratic consolidation, national integration and socio-economic development.Trying to examine the role of party agency in this regard and to assess the role of the party system as the independent variable, the dissertation deals with two regional and temporal contexts and a political phenomenon pertinent to these contexts that most often have ranked as unique or paradoxical in scholarly assessments. Academic accounts of post-colonial India are interspersed with references to a deviant case of, or an empirical anomaly to, party system and democratic theory, and the conventional vocabulary used to describe post-apartheid South African political development frequently resorts to such terms as political miracle or societal exceptionalism. A similar confusion and vagueness prevails with regard to the specific configuration of a democratic and competitive party system characterised by the towering and prolonged dominance of one party. The study is an attempt to shed light on these contexts and their party systems by departing from the conventional �paths� of party system theory as well as from the relativist assessments of post-independent India (1947-67) and post-apartheid South Africa (1994-). This is done by means of a diachronic comparison of the two countries� party systems with a distinct focus on the role of party agency in the shaping and maintenance of one-party-dominance and on the role of the two party systems as independent variables. Chapter 1 deals with the conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems, incentives and questions inherent in the kind of cross-national and diachronic comparison attempted in this study. Chapter 2 gives a brief outline of the regional settings at the time democratic party competition was beginning to take shape, outlines the institutional boundaries within which the two party systems were/are located, looks at the main characteristics of the electorate in post-independent India and post-apartheid South Africa and �takes stock� of the two party systems in terms of a broad outline of the dominant party and the relevant opposition parties. The next three chapters present the bulk of the empirical analysis and deal with the emergence, working and functions/effects of one-party-dominance in India and South Africa respectively. Each chapter refers to the basic outline of the analytical framework depicted above and combines theoretical arguments with empirical, as well as historical, givens of the two party systems under examination. Whereas chapter 3 examines how the two party systems were �shaped from above�, i.e. how party agency helped to achieve the dominant position of the INC and ANC respectively, chapter 4 examines the mechanisms of control employed to maintain dominance and the mechanisms of party competition prevailing in the two regional contexts. Both chapters deal with the party agentive factors identified in the analytical framework as responsible for the achievement and maintenance of one-party-dominance in the form of short analytical narratives. The last of these three chapters (chapter 5) sums up and discusses the effects and (redefined) functions of party systems in changing societies and gives an account of how both countries� party systems have fared with regard to these effects and in terms of fulfilling these functions. Chapter 6 takes up the differences and similarities of the two regional contexts as they have emerged out of the preceding three chapters, relates the �lessons� of the Indian experience to the prospects of one-party-dominance in South Africa by means of a comparison and reassesses the two key theses of the study, namely that a) party agency and strategy were among the most decisive factors in the formation and development of the two regional contexts� systems of one-party-dominance and are, in general, crucial for party system formation and development (they are especially relevant in the shaping of one-party-dominance in changing societies); and that b) systems of one-party-dominance have a potentially (but not necessarily) benign effect on processes of democratisation, national integration and democratic development in the crucial period of changing societies� transition to democracy and democratic consolidation.

Formulation of the problem. The urgency of a comprehensive study of the institute of political parties is conditioned by several illustrative circumstances. The past election campaign in the Ukrainian parliament in 2019 was marked by the fact that it was held under the old "rules of the game." It is known that the parliamentary election campaigns of 1998, 2002, 2007, 2012 also used a mixed system of elections, in which 50% of parliamentarians were elected in majority constituencies and 50% of people’s deputies were elected on a proportional basis for party lists. According to the current rules of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, candidates for the People’s Deputies will be nominated by a political party, which were registered in accordance with the established procedure no later than one year before the elections. Despite the fact that the institute of self-nomination of candidates for the People’s Deputies remains, political parties have become the main political players, the only active actors in the electoral process of Ukraine and have received a strong impetus for their development. The purpose of this article is to reveal the history of political party formation in order to gain a better understanding of the essential nature of these important political entities and to identify promising moments in the development of parties in Ukraine. Analysis of recent research and publications. In the world and Ukrainian partology, it should be noted that well-known foreign experts J. Sartori, M. Duverge, A. Leiphart, S. Avineri, G. Almond, E. Wind, S. Lipset, S. Rokkan, S. Neumann in characterization the current state and prospects of the development of parties as political institutions indicate a direct connection and mutual influence between the party and electoral systems. Particular attention of domestic partologists M. Primus, N. Goncharuk, A. Pakharev, I. Kresina, O. Erzhov, V. Lytvyn, G. Malkin, Y. Shvedy focuses on the problem of the influence of the electoral process on the formation of the party system in Ukraine. Recently, in connection with the growing role of parties in the political life of our country, studies of new aspects of their activity have appeared: L. Gonyukova considers political parties as an institute of state policy and governance, O. Sakiri concentrates attention on the principles of constructing the image of a political party, O.Nikogosyan considers the peculiarities of the development of political parties and party systems in the post-communist space, A. Tetyanich explores the constitutional and legal principles of state control over the activities of political parties, etc. The article deals with the history of the formation and development of political parties as socio-political institutions, from the time of antiquity to the emergence of mass parties in the second half of the nineteenth century. The latest trends in the evolution of the institution of political parties as subjects of democratic politics in polyarchy systems are analyzed. It is noted that political parties have become the main political players, the only active actors in the electoral process of Ukraine and have received a strong impetus for their development. Modern political parties emerge as institutions of democratic politics, they "grow" from the bottom, are created by politically active citizens for the protection of their own interests, and therefore represent first and foremost an important segment of civil society, which unites it with public authorities. For a long time, the division of the parties into the left was adopted (the Communists, the Social Democrats were referred to here), the centrists (those who tried to defend the interests of the majority), the right (who stood for an elitist understanding of politics). However, as most political parties shifted to the middle class in the 20th century, only two of them became right-wing: center-right and center-left. At the same time, the ranking scale itself remained the same. At the end of the twentieth century. significant changes occurred in the political sphere of society. Political parties began to lose their traditional class character and appeal not so much to certain social strata as to all groups of the population. American political scientist J. Lapalambara called this type of political party a "grab all party" and then a "voter party". This trend is also confirmed in modern Ukraine (Party of Servants). Parties have stopped offering ways to develop society, politicians are only interested in voter votes, not ideological issues. It is concluded that modern Ukrainian parties need to go a long way in their development to meet all the criteria of a democratic political party. Ukrainian parties must undergo a transformation from political additions of oligarchic holdings to truly mass popular structures based on the principle of modernization, and then there will be a significant increase in real support. A promising direction for further research is to consider the organizational foundations of the functioning of political parties in polyarchies and under hybrid political regimes. Remarks are made about the prospects of party building in contemporary Ukraine.