Why Great Powers Compete to Control International Institutions

China has proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), initiating a key turning point in the international finance system. Unfortunately, its design at present is quite problematic, for several reasons: it limits participation by Western countries, effectively locking in China as the undisputed leader; the lack of a Board of Directors in residence; the potential for a conflict of interest if the AIIB will fund projects within China; the potential of China to use AIIB for political purposes; the relationship the AIIB will have with already-existing international financial institutions; and the potential for a weakening of “best practices” in order to compete against the other international finance institutions. For these reasons, it was the right decision for Japan not to join as a charter member in order to negotiate the MOU; nevertheless, Japan should maintain the option of joining the AIIB in order to have leverage over the architecture of the AIIB.

It Is Not Decided Yet:The Scripts of China's and India's Rise Are Still Being Written Harsh V. Pant (bio) The rise and fall of great powers has long preoccupied scholars of international relations. This moment in international politics is also rife with the possibility of a power transition as the United States starts to look inward and China asserts its power across the globe. As a result, debates around the concepts of "rising powers," "emerging powers," and "major powers" have attained a new policy relevance as well. Manjari Chatterjee Miller has waded into this discussion with a fascinating new book that details an interesting argument about why some rising powers, like China, become great powers while others, like India, do not. In her assessment, while material capabilities are important, equally significant are the ways in which different states think about their own role in world politics. Miller compares the national narratives of rising powers and makes such narratives integral to the assessment of state power. Why some countries actively rise while others remain reticent is thus a function of "particular type of narratives, narratives about how to become a great power according to the prevalent norms" (p. 11). What is just as interesting and important is Miller's focus on the process of rising to emerge as a great power, and she underscores the differences among rising powers by going beyond standard material arguments. So, "if a country seeks to increase its relative material power without attempting either to acquire global authority or to court both external and internal recognition of itself as a great power in the making, it is unlikely to become a great power" (p. 10). Such powers, which Miller terms "reticent," lack narratives about their roles on the global stage. This results in their not acquiring global authority, thereby hindering their rise to the status of a great power. Rising powers that adopt and debate great-power ideas of the day emerge as great powers, while those who are not able to do this remain forever rising. Miller examines this argument using six cases: three active rising powers (the nineteenth-century United States, Meiji Japan, and [End Page 152] post–Cold War China) and three reticent powers (the nineteenth-century Netherlands, Cold War Japan, and post–Cold War India). With this book, Miller has brought together the material and ideational determinants of great-power politics like few others have managed, and has provided us with a new lens to examine shifts in global politics. Miller's argument once again underlines that ideas matter in shaping the trajectory of international relations, and as great-power politics return with a vengeance, it is important to be aware of how some rising powers will continue to have a disproportionate influence in shaping global outcomes. Not all rising powers are equal, and what makes some more important than others is what Miller explicates in her wide-ranging analysis. In this context, the cases on China and India present an interesting contrast. Miller is right that Chinese foreign policy changed dramatically in the 1990s as China began to integrate itself much more robustly into global multilateral frameworks. This attempt by China to enmesh itself in global trade, diplomatic, and security regimes is an important marker in her argument, as "great power by the late twentieth century meant the exercise of power through multilateralism and international institutions" (p. 108). As China tried to set the global agenda through extant and new institutions, its narratives about its own role in global politics evolved. This included presenting itself as a stabilizing influence in the global order as well as promoting and strategically using regional and multilateral frameworks to burnish its credentials as a "responsible global stakeholder." In contrast, Miller suggests that while India had the potential to emerge as a great power in the post–Cold War world, the country remained a reticent power, not seizing upon the opportunities that presented themselves. India's narratives remained similar to the ideas it propounded during the Cold War. In particular, Miller argues that India remained reluctant to embrace multilateralism the way China did, and thus did not reach out to other nations that...

This paper aims to provide a variety of methods to help solve tensions between great powers by using international law and institutions. It is widely acknowledged that many global tensions between great powers will significantly influence the whole world and must be solved instantly. We still know little about resolving tensions by using international law and institutions. By analyzing current global events and the functions of international institutions like the WTO and the UN Security Council, the paper points out the flaws in international organizations and the need for improvements. The article also views the significance of states as a middle power to resolve tensions. This paper presents an important message that there are plenty of weaknesses in the international system; the conflicts between great power would be dealt with more efficiently and effectively if international institutions and international law made some refinements.

Introduction John A. Hall and T. V. Paul Part I. Theories and Strategies: 1. A realist view: three images of the coming international order Michael Mastanduno 2. A liberal view: preserving and expanding the liberal pacific union Michael Doyle 3. Preconditions for prudence: a sociological synthesis of realism and liberalism John A. Hall and T. V. Paul 4. An institutionalist view: international institutions and state strategies Lisa Martin 5. Is the truth out there? Eight questions about international order Steve Smith Part II. Contenders: Major Powers and International Order: 6. Liberal hegemony and the future of American postwar order G. John Ikenberry 7. Russia: responses to relative decline Jack Snyder 8. The European Union: economic giant, political dwarf Juan Diez Medrano 9. Unsteady anticipation: reflections on the future of Japan's changing political economy T. J. Pempel 10. Chinese perspectives on world order Steve Chan 11. India as a limited challenger Baldev Raj Nayar Part III. Challenges: 12. Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state Michael Mann 13. Stateless nations and the emerging international order Hudson Meadwell 14. The coming chaos? Armed conflict at the world's periphery K. J. Holsti 15. Political religion in the twenty-first century Peter van der Veer 16. Environmental security in the coming century Karen T. Litfin 17. Demography, domestic conflict, and the international order Jack A. Goldstone 18. Great equalizers of agents of chaos? Weapons of mass destruction and the emerging world order T. V. Paul Part IV. Conclusions: 19. The state and the future of world politics John A. Hall and T. V. Paul.

As a rising power, increasing attention is focused on what China does on the world stage. The growing number of books and articles on China’s rise, whether it is sustainable, whether it is a model for other developing states, and most importantly whether it is likely to change the current international order, highlights the level of interest in this phenomenon. This article suggests that focusing on China alone is not enough; instead it is essential to view the rise of China exemplifying the relationship between international order, great powers’ status, and the shaping of the roles and responsibilities of great powers. It argues that when seen as a part of the construction of international order, great powers are also constructs within international order; as a result, China as a ‘great power’ does not exist apart from the international order it is rising into. This perspective broadens the range of possible questions that can be asked in relation to China (and other rising powers).

The notion that Great Powers fulfill a leadership role in international politics is old, influential, and contested. As the actors in the international system with the greatest capacity for taking action, Great Powers are assumed to think both further ahead and in broader, more systemic terms than other states; they then use their preeminent positions to organize others to promote public goods, reaping benefits along the way thanks to their direction of events. At the core of this understanding is the assumption that Great Power actions are, or ought to be, inspired by something more than simple self-interest and the pursuit of short-term gains. As an organic creation of international practice, Great Power leadership was traditionally the domain of historians and international legists; early students of the topic utilized inductive reasoning to derive general precepts of Great Power sociology from the landmark settlements of the 18th and 19th centuries. The framing of Great Powers as a leadership caste originated in the struggle against Louis XIV, was given tentative institutional form through settlements such as the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), and deepened considerably in both institutionalization and sophistication in the 19th century Concert of Europe. The return of France to full Great Power status, the Congress (1878) and Conference (1884) of Berlin, and the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) all demonstrated the willingness and ability of the Powers to cooperate in the management of international change. In the early 20th century, the leadership of the Great Powers was both challenged as an unjust agent of catastrophe as well as increasingly formalized through recognition in new international institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Theorists of international relations began to formulate theories based on Great Power management at the time of the discipline’s beginnings in the early 20th century. Realists and liberals frequently utilize Great Power concepts to explain processes of equilibrium, hegemonic competition, and institution building, while approaches influenced by constructivism focus on the role of ideas, statuses, and roles in the formulation of Great Power identities and policies. The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a 21st-century manifestation of the application of Great Power leadership to international problems; though hailed by some as the future of Great Power management, it provokes controversy among both theorists and practitioners. Similarly, extensive scholarly attention has been devoted to the management and accommodation of “rising powers.” These are states that appear likely to obtain the status of Great Power, and there is extensive debate over their orientation toward and potential management of international order. Finally, the position of Russia and China within this literature has provoked deep reflection on the nature of Great Power, the responsibilities of rising and established powers, and the place of Great Power management amidst the globalized challenges of the 21st century.

There is a growing concern that China has become more assertive in its foreign policies. The fear is whether China’s economic growth may translate into modern and effective military advancement. This engenders the critical question of whether China feels comfortable in the current international order, which is defined by international law and institutions. This article argues that the Chinese approach to international law and institutions is tightly associated with its evolving perception of sovereignty, and national interests vis-à-vis international law and institutions, and is characterised by a love–hate attitude towards them. With its opening up, China now views multilateralism as a way for the international community to constrain the capriciousness of a superpower, and regards the international institutions simply as power-sharing development. However, China’s integration in international institutions represents its attempt to work within international norms to pursue its interests. China’s ambivalence towards international judicial settlement of disputes signals the historical legacy as well as China’s uneasiness with playing an active role in international institution-building and rule-making.

While much previous research has examined the relationship between interstate military alliances and the structure of domestic regimes, existing findings point in contradictory directions. Some have argued that democracies attract each other as alliance partners, and thereby generate international peace as a consequence of their domestic regime type, while others have argued that the causal relationship is reversed, and that international pacification creates the necessary space for international alliances and domestic democratization. To disentangle this difficult empirical relationship, this article presents an empirically grounded simulation model of the dynamic coevolution of interstate military alliances, international conflict, and domestic democratization, demonstrating a statistical approach which accounts both for the complex interdependencies generated by coevolving multiplex networks of interstate ties and for their reciprocal influence on the coevolution of domestic political regimes, over the period 1920–2000. The results show that international institutions and domestic institutions are mutually constituted, with both ‘selection’ effects and ‘influence’ effects operating simultaneously. In particular, the evidence indicates that states with similar regimes are more prone to ally with each other, mutually democratic dyads are less inclined to engage in militarized disputes, and states that form international alliances with democratic partners are more likely to develop domestic democratic institutions. Tests of out-of-sample predictive accuracy, across multidecade prediction windows, further demonstrate that the coevolutionary model consistently outperforms specifications that ignore coevolutionary effects, in predicting subsequent patterns of military alliances, military conflict, and domestic democratization.

This article explores the international dynamics of the Gaza war, focusing on how global powers align, intervene, and utilize international aid as a strategic instrument. It examines the positions of key countries that support either Israel or Palestine, analyzing their actions through the lens of Realism, with supplementary insights from Anarchism. The study argues that while states publicly justify their involvement through humanitarian or legal principles, their actions are largely influenced by geopolitical interests, historical narratives, domestic pressures, and strategic alliances. Countries such as the United States, and the United Kingdom provide military and diplomatic backing to Israel to maintain regional dominance and economic leverage. The research further discusses how international organizations, including the UN and ICC, play both active and symbolic roles in shaping the discourse, often constrained by great power politics. By mapping the political gains pursued through aid, diplomacy, and international alignments, the thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of how the Gaza conflict has become a global arena of competing interests, identity-driven agendas, and contested norms of international order. Through a Realist lens (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), this article analyzes the Gaza War (2023–present) as a global power contest where states prioritize strategic interests over humanitarian or legal principles. Evidence—including U.S. military aid ($3.8B/year + Elbit contracts; International institutions (UN, ICC) are neutered by vetoes or selective enforcement, while neutral states (e.g., India) prioritize arms deals over ethics. The article concludes that coercive measures (arms embargoes, grassroots governance) must raise occupation costs to force compromise.

The Labour Party came to power in July 1945. Atless, the Prime Minister, well-known for his internationalist outlook witing the Labour Party in the interwar years, considered that it was timely to make the United Nations more powerful in international politics if peace and security were to be preserved. He was committed to the view that the presence of a world government was necessary in the management of the new international order between states in peacetime. Thus, he had no hesistation in committing Britain to this new direction of foreign policy. To Atlee, all states, including the world power, should not only base their policy on the United Nations but also subordinate themselves to the organization as the world's highest authority. However, his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, shared none of these assumptions. He , instead, shared the political view that Britain should pursue and uphold its standing as a Great Power. Bevin continued to hold on to his nationalist and imperialist views in peacetime, even though it was in conflict with the internationalist view of his own Prime Minister.

“The collapse of good conscience and the absence of accountability and public scrutiny have led to crimes against humanity and violations of international law.” Nelson Mandela . It goes without saying that International law has a great impact on the way states behave and interact with each other and so it does ascertain whether there is any threat to world peace or not, a breach of that peace, or any act of aggression that may undermine and sabotage international order. Ludwig Quidde was prompt to submit that: “every success in limiting armaments is a sign that the will to achieve mutual understanding exists, and every such success thus supports the fight for international law and order.” And he added that, the security of which we speak is to be attained by the development of international law through an international organization based on the principles of law and justice. It is noncontroversial that international law plays a key role in determining and regulating the relations of states in the global community. This paper attempts to describe how the main actors in international relations- the states- act and interact in our global environment within the parameters of international laws. It goes to show the scope in which the relations among states are determined by international law. While the foreign policy of a state arguably remains key to the conduct of relations with other states, international law serves as the Do’s and Don’ts that govern the extent in which states behave and interact with each other. Meanwhile, international institutions are a principal focus of international relations scholars, to be precise, the liberals, commonly called idealist by E.H Carr. The writer also seeks to examine and scrutinize the prominences of International institutions- watchdogs of international laws- to the liberals and the ways in which it has been theorized. It develops a definition from the liberal perspective and attempt to provide a conceptual framework of liberal institutionalism. It is hoped that the concept of war, the spirit of cooperation and democracy, prospects for peace, international order and justice will be analyzed through liberal lenses. Keywords: International, law, liberals, institutionalism, security, organization, peace, cooperation DOI : 10.7176/IAGS/73-01 Publication date :June 30 th 2019

The theory (or rather the notion) that the international economy functioned more or less effectively for roughly a century down to 1914 because Great Britain provided the ‘public goods’ required for the smooth operation of the ‘liberal international order’ has become a textbook generalization. That notion emerged quite recently and can be traced to Kindleberger's attempt to explain the pronounced cyclical fluctuations experienced by the world economy during the interwar years 1919–39, as well as the severity and duration of the Great Depression from 1929–33 in terms of the American failure to sustain conditions necessary for the financial stability of an interdependent global economy. In Kindleberger's view, Britain, which had acted as a hegemonic power before 1914, lacked the resources to continue with its historic role after the Great War, while the United States (which by 1918 enjoyed a position in the world economy of arguably greater weight and significance than the United Kingdom had ever possessed during the long nineteenth century) commanded neither the knowledge nor the political will to replace Britain as the responsible hegemonic power until after the Second World War.

Abstract: At the turn of the millennium, Western scholars heatedly debated the impact of China's rise on US-China relations and the wider great power relations. On the one hand, optimists, including economic liberals, democratic peace liberals, institutional liberals, constructivists, and defensive realists, advanced an optimistic view, arguing that US-China relations would be productive and peaceful. On the other hand, pessimists, including power transition realists and offensive realists, advanced a pessimistic view, arguing for a growing US-China rivalry, with the former anticipating a great power war and the latter predicting an intense great power competition. By reviewing these perspectives against the changing patterns of US-China relations from the 2000s to the present, this study reflects the relative importance of system-level forces vis-à-vis unit-level forces in accounting for the dynamics of great power relations.

North Korea may be ranked among one of the poorest countries of the world in terms of its GDP growth but it still holds its relevance as a major power in the international world order, given the nuclear stockpile threat posed against the Western bloc led by the United States. North Korea’s cyber capabilities has been characterized by opportunism. Till date, there is little evidence on North Korea having a nuclear doctrine. An analysis of the statements from the leadership suggests that North Korea has a mix of grandiose and conventional ideas on the aspect of cyber operations during military conflicts. The paper attempts to examine North Korea’s cyber weapon capabilities and their potential implications for International Security through focus on three key operations – Kimsuky, Lazarus and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 37. These operations have targeted South Korea, parts of South Asia and the Pacific whose laggard cyber security mechanisms have borne heavy consequences. With regard to the diversification of cyber capabilities, the focus would be placed on North Korean regime’s use of cyber espionage and malware applications across the Korean peninsula and in particular Japan and the United States. The application of case studies where the Korean regime – backed hackers were behind significant cyber operations, most of them fatal to the international security and order.

Since the end of the Cold War, a unipolar world order has emerged, characterized by the dominance of the Western world, particularly the United States in political, economic, and military spheres, positioning it as the central actor in shaping global norms, international institutions, and security architectures. By the onset of the war in Ukraine, Western leadership remained robust. However, the outbreak of the conflict exposed emerging counter‑hegemonic dynamics, as states such as Russia, Iran, China, and, to a certain extent, Turkey began to consolidate their strategic efforts to challenge the liberal international order. This alignment reflects not merely pragmatic cooperation but also deeper ideological and civilizational undercurrents. The geopolitical projects advanced by this conservative bloc are also expressions of alternative civilizational logics rooted in distinct historical narratives and strategic cultures. Using a qualitative methodology to shape a conceptual analysis of emerging trends in modern geopolitics, the paper concludes that while multipolar aspirations and counter‑hegemonic processes are increasingly visible, the durability of these alignments – whether situational or truly strategic – will largely depend on how states articulate and recalibrate their national interests amidst an era of unprecedented geopolitical turbulence.