The field of International Relations (IR) has experienced different waves of ‘great debates’ that have often maintained certain theoretical and methodological frameworks and perspectives as core to the field whereas others are seen as peripheral and merely a critique of the former. As a result of this segregation of knowledge, IR has not become as open to dialogue and diversity as we are made to believe. To be sure, aspects of the extant literature speak of IR as being ‘not so international’, a ‘hegemonic discipline’, a ‘colonial household’, and an ‘American social science’, among other derogatory names. Informed by such characterizations that depict a field of study that is not sufficiently diverse, the paper investigates the relationship between pedagogical factors and dialogue in IR. In doing so, it provides preliminary results from a pilot study in February-April 2019 that sought to examine different graduate-level IR syllabi from leading universities in the global North and South (Africa in particular). In particular, the objective was to decipher as what extent course design including required readings and other pedagogical activities in the classroom tells us about dialogue and the sort of diversity needed to push IR beyond its conventional canons.

This paper is intended to serve as a show and tell model for graduate students. Sections in parentheses and italics provide a running commentary by the author on the decisions taken throughout the paper. The goal is to permit students to follow the thinking of the researcher and see how it guided the theoretical, methodological and other decisions on content that finally made it into the paper. The paper in question explores how “public” military mobilization can be an attempt by weak actors to trigger intervention by third parties in a dispute with a stronger actor, in the hopes that the third parties will force the stronger actor to accommodate the weaker actor. This attempt is called “compellence via proxy”. In this research I explore why in reaction to failure, some weak actors are able to avoid escalation to war, while others are not. I posit that the flexibility of the decision makers of the weak actors is influenced by their ability to overhaul their winning coalition. A large-n evaluation of 68 cases of “public” mobilization, and an evaluation of six Balkan state mobilizations in the 1878-1909 era, do not support the idea that the size of the winning coalition, a part of the factors determining overhaul, has an association with war onset or its avoidance.

This study aims to reflecton qualitative interviewing with a particular emphasis on semi-structuredinterviewing (SSI), with the purpose of guiding students and young scholars ofInternational Relations and Political Science who will use this method in theirresearch. This study begs to differ from both radical post-positivist’s deepscepticism which makes any scientific inquiry almost impossible as well as frompositivism’s unreflective, unproblematized, instrumental approach tointerviewing. It proposes a reflectivist approach to qualitative interviewingthat emphasizes the political nature of the interviewing process with variouspolitical, ethical and even social consequences. The reflectivist approachrequires researchers to be self-critical at all times, in particular concerningtheir role and influence on the interview setting and the interviewee. This article proceeds as follows: It firstaddresses my own research on the nexus between civil society and the Kurdishquestion in Turkey, where SSI has been operationalized as the main researchmethod. It then addresses the positivist and post-positivist debates onqualitative interviewing as well as the reflectivist approach that this studypromotes. The article then engages in SSI in three distinct stages:pre-interview, interview and post-interview phases. Finally, the concludingpart introduces some works utilising interviewing in Turkish IR and wraps upthe theoretical/methodological arguments disseminated throughout the study athand.

Computational Social Science emerged as a highly technical and popular discipline in the last few years, owing to the substantial advances in communication technology and daily production of vast quantities of personal data. As per capita data production significantly increased in the last decade, both in terms of its size (bytes) as well as its detail (heartrate monitors, internet-connected appliances, smartphones), social scientists’ ability to extract meaningful social, political and demographic information from digital data also increased. A vast methodological gap exists in ‘computational international relations’, which refers to the use of one or a combination of tools such as data mining, natural language processing, automated text analysis, web scraping, geospatial analysis and machine learning to provide larger and better organized data to test more advanced theories of IR. After providing an overview of the potentials of computational IR and how an IR scholar can establish technical proficiency in computer science (such as starting with Python, R, QGis, ArcGis or Github), this paper will focus on some of the author’s works in providing an idea for IR students on how to think about computational IR. The paper argues that computational methods transcend the methodological schism between qualitative and quantitative approaches and form a solid foundation in building truly multi-method research design.

As one of the most significant actors of the region, Iran’s interactions with great powers (as well as regional powers and non-state actors) have come under scrutiny. This article adopts an historical account and suggests a framework to study Iran’s foreign policy. The framework is contextually built with a multilevel approach to specify the independent and intervening variables of Iran’s foreign policy through the light of neoclassical realist theory. In this context, it is argued that the independent variables of Iran’s foreign policy are geopolitics, threat perceptions and balance of power politics. These systemic variables are filtered through nationalism, theological and revolutionary ideology and policy making mechanisms.

Throughoutthe postwar era, many realists and liberals have maintained the fiction ofAmerican hegemony. They have described it as the keystone to global politicaland economic stability.1 They have also worried that US hegemony was in decline. In the 1970s,these fears were triggered by the resurgence of Germany and Japan, and in thelast decade, by the remarkable rise of China. Wecontend that US hegemony, to the extent it ever existed, was a short-livedpostwar phenomenon; that the US frequently behaved in ways that has threatenedthe order it is allegedly committed to upholding; that hegemony is unnecessary– perhaps inimical – to global stability; and that the functions associatedwith hegemony have in practice become increasingly diffused among the greatpowers. Conceptually, the commitment to hegemony stands in the way of ourunderstanding of contemporary international relations. Substantively, it offersan inappropriate and unrealistic role model for American policymakers.

Little is known about how, among weaker states, incentives to challenge the status quo are related to the expected response of the US as the system’s hegemon. In contrast to conventional wisdom that suggests militarized punishment can deter potential challengers, it is argued that weak but strongly motivated challengers can interpret the hegemon’s military intervention against adversaries as a window of opportunity to launch their own actions. Empirical results using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) and binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) models reveal that weaker states possess incentives to challenge the international status quo when the hegemon is preoccupied with prior foreign policy commitments, most notably war. In other words, weaker states dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemon when it is preoccupied with prior military commitments. They do so because war involvement distracts the hegemon, drains its capabilities and resolve, and opens up a window of opportunity for weaker states to issue challenges. In addition, weaker states that have an alliance portfolio dissimilar to that of the hegemon are more likely than others to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes. Theoretically, this paper provides microfoundations to answer the question of why weaker parties instigate asymmetric conflicts when it might seem irrational to do so.

Review article onChristopher J. Sneddon, Concrete Revolution: Large Dams, Cold War Geopolitics, and the US Bureau of Reclamation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015, 270pp., USD 45, hardcover).

Heroic leaders advocating for reconciliation has become particularly significant in the process of conflict resolution. This article analyses the case of South Africa’s national reconciliation experiences and Mandela’s iconic role in this process. It is claimed that Mandela’s reconciliation-oriented leadership, his personality, and endeavours have directly affected the promotion of intergroup reconciliation in South Africa in a positive way. The article’s analytic framework is built on Galtung’s Conflict Triangle and applied to reconciliation initiatives employed by Nelson Mandela in South Africa. The research question that this study focused on can be expressed as follows: What is the role of leaders in the process of national reconciliation? From this perspective, Mandela’s extraordinary efforts to strengthen national reconciliation in South Africa are examined by looking into his normative statements, symbolic acts, and judicial actions. The method proposed in this article contributes to the study of reconciliation at the national level, dealing with the normative statements and behaviours of those in power. In the final analysis, it was determined that there is a close relationship between the prospective success of the reconciliation process and a leader’s contribution to bringing about reconciliation in a society.

This paper provides a simple introduction to event data analysis, a quantitative data collection and analysis approach that has been used extensively for compiling broad datasets of foreign policy and other international behaviors. The authors define the steps undertaken in creating the Turkish Foreign Affairs Event Dataset (TFAED). This pilot study, which uses a single news source and covers a 23-year period (1990-2013) of foreign affairs in Turkey, was completed to evaluate the feasibility, time, cost, and possible problems that might be encountered with a full-scope study. The paper describes the obstacles encountered during the pilot study’s initial phases and discusses a sample of the preliminary findings. The paper concludes with potential uses of the dataset.