Abstract This paper examines the shifting semantics of ‘progress’ and ‘crisis’ as key frameworks for modern society’s self-description. Drawing on Rahel Jaeggi’s functionalist conception of progress and placing it in dialogue with Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, it reconstructs how progress historically emerged as a synchronizing device under conditions of functional differentiation – particularly in science – before being gradually supplanted by crisis as a more inclusive semantic. By tracing the conceptual histories of both terms, the analysis reveals their roles in managing temporal complexity and societal coordination. While progress organizes change through asymmetrical inclusion, crisis flattens distinctions by encompassing all as affected, aligning more closely with the structural needs of a polycrisis-prone world society. The paper argues that any contemporary rehabilitation of progress must address its semantic selectivity, historical asymmetries, and the communicative functions it shares with the crisis narrative.

Abstract Most democracy theories neglect the aspect of resistance to authoritarianism. Especially in times of an autocratic wave, the need for rebellion should be emphasised. In this article, I suggest conceptual considerations to enrich the debate on democratic competences and their strengthening in the context of the workplace. Our experiences at work affect our political behaviour and attitudes. Those who primarily encounter authoritarian conditions in their socialisation will find it more difficult to develop democratic skills. However, existing concepts of competences for a democratic culture are designed for times when democracy functions well and is not questioned. In phases of anti-democratic tendencies, these are not enough; what is needed then is democratic resilience. Theoretically, this can be argued with Erich Fromm, Albert Camus and Carole Pateman. She emphasised the need to democratise workplaces. However, assumptions of spillover do not consider democratic resilience. In this article, I explore three main aspects. First, I argue that rebellion and resistance to authoritarianism are at the core of democracy in all our social interactions. I then show that the aspect of resilience is neglected in existing concepts of democratic competences. Finally, I offer conceptual suggestions for democratic resilience in the context of workplaces.

Abstract In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Valentini searches for a unifying principle that underlies whatever genuine obligations we might have to obey the norms of any and all social practices, ranging from line queueing norms, through offsides rules in soccer, to obligations not to break the law. I argue that this search is driven, and distorted, by a commitment to what Bernard Williams labeled the ‘morality system’. Once we see this, we should question the value of the unifying project. Most social norms can be considered on their own terms, as part of a rich and variegated ethical life, without subsuming them under the question of whether others’ moral rights are at stake. Similarly, political obligation needs to be understood in relation to the practical activity of politics, not as an abstract moral quandary.

A plea for Beauvoir's timeliness today has to assert itself in a field that has become confusing, both in terms of gender relations in Western societies and in the face of the diversity of feminisms. With regard to the real role of women, among many people there is an apologetic understanding that gender equality may not have been achieved but 'is well on its way' or 'improvements have been made.' Aggressive demonstrations against male supremacy, still remembered by some from the 1960s, have become rather rare in present Western societies and limited to single countries with regressive political tendencies (reversal of Roe in the USA, abortion ban by the Pis party in Poland). In contrast to the vaguely floating impression of growing equality, the trend in professions and family has already come to a stop some time ago. Correspondingly, on the level of cultural discourses, 'neoliberal feminism' and 'postfeminism' arose to point loudly towards achieved equality and freedom for women. Neoliberal feminists, like Cheryl Sandberg, emphasize women's increased opportunities under liberal capitalism, while postfeminists celebrate the women's male-like freedoms in gender relations or demonstrate it offensively ('female chauvinist pigs'). Postfeminists also defend commercial and amateur pornography as a liberating medium for women, clearly and shockingly a red rag for earlier feminists. Before trying to comment on the role Beauvoir may play, or has played, in different waves of feminism, a word on the usual distinctions is in order. The widespread historical classification of the different phases of feminism is primarily sociological. The so-called second wave of feminism from 1960 to 1980 centred on the political attempt of women to fight for equal legal and socioeconomic rights within bourgeois institutions in Western societies. The so-called third wave in the 1990s, in contrast, besides its emphasis on intersectionality, e.g. by Black feminists, was primarily devoted to a change in lifestyles, i.e. was private in addition to the publically political aims claimed earlier. The period since 2012, now called the fourth wave, clearly shows that it is contemporary challenges whose character undergirds the profile of the ever-changing feminism and determines its content. For, in accordance with the heterogeneous present, it is ubiquitous topics that are prominent in the fourth wave: The fight against sexual harassment, the inclusion of transgender groups, transnationalisation and the critique of postfeminism. The goals of the earlier waves, not surprisingly, have not been fulfilled, and so many of the earlier goals, adapted to changed circumstances, are still negotiable.

According to a conflict-conscious conception of democracy, polarization is part of its essence. According to this 'agonistic' conception of democracy, polarization means that the political positions of values and interests can never merge consensually into one another but remain in opposition in order to struggle persistently and continuously for political power within a democratic framework. The 'polarization' currently in dispute as a new threat to democracy, on the other hand, is meant as a process or state in which the usual pluralism of liberal democracy changes into an opposition of parts of the population which, refusing to argue and communicate, confront each other only as power blocs. Because in this state the willingness to cooperate in joint state control is abandoned, not only is democracy endangered, but a transition to the autocratic alternative is also in the offing. Here is a brief description of the roadmap towards autocracy to identify the critical turning points. Without knowing them, we do not know where we currently stand. At the beginning of seeing clearer of what polarization is about, there is the definitional question of when an agonistic conflict of interests turns into an antagonistic one that undermines democracy itself. Not every conflict of opinion represents polarization, such as that of migratory bird conservationists against wind farm operators, 'Easter march' pacifists (in Germany) against rearmament advocates, radical 'Last Generation' activists against slow climate pragmatists. Where exactly does the polarization begin? By questioning parliament, for example, but where does this in turn start off? Through actions such as super-gluing oneself in the street, damaging works of art, or in the end only with terrorist acts? The transition from agonism to antagonism can probably be found where the opponent in the conflict is denied legitimacy in the political sphere. This transition can be expressed in threats of violence or exclusion, but it sometimes also manifests itself in nonviolent refusal to accept official policies. If these examples are not sufficient for the question of definition, it is because of the lack of a simple explanation of the tipping point from agonism to antagonism. Only if the underlying motives and drives are grasped can the potential to endanger the state be assessed. More in-depth work on the question of definition is necessary because the term 'polarization', as now widely used in empirical studies, threatens to get blurred into Open Access.

Abstract Deliberative democracy started out as an ideal for mass democracy. Lately, however, its large-scale ambitions have mostly been shelved. This article revivifies the ideal of mass deliberative democracy by offering a clear mechanism by which everyone in the community can be included in the same conversation. The trick is to make use of people’s overlapping social communicative networks through which informal deliberative exchanges already occur on an everyday basis. Far from being derailed by threats of polarization, echo chambers, and motivated reasoning, informal networked deliberation can indeed put everyone in touch, directly or indirectly, with everyone else.

Abstract ‘Practice theory’—a theory program that connects the goal of offering non-rationalist explanations to a strong focus on everyday routine activities, and builds on the work of Bourdieu but tries to gain a less narrow perspective—is being used more and more widely in the social sciences. Its advocates often argue that, since practice theory is a heuristic for doing empirical work, discussing it without addressing this empirical work cannot do justice to it. Therefore, this article analyses Reckwitz’s recently translated book on The Society of Singularities, which its author presents as an example of the advantages of (one dominant version of) practice theory. As will be shown, the book demonstrates that this version of practice theory does not fulfil its promises. Looking at its difficulties is instructive, however, because it helps see more clearly how the goal of an integrative ‘theory of practice’ could be achieved.

Abstract William Lynch has provided an informed and probing critique of my embrace of the post-truth condition, which he understands correctly as an extension of the normative project of social epistemology. This article roughly tracks the order of Lynch’s paper, beginning with the vexed role of the ‘normative’ inScience and Technology Studies, which originally triggered my version of social epistemology 35 years ago and has been guided by the field’s ‘symmetry principle’. Here the pejorative use of ‘populism’ to mean democracy is highlighted as a failure of symmetry. Finally, after rejecting Lynch’s appeal to a hybrid Marxian–Darwinism, Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes are contrasteden routeto what I have called ‘quantum epistemology’.