Jennifer Mather has provided a comprehensive and fascinating overview of the various cognitive accomplishments of cephalopods and their sensory, behavioral, and neurophysiological attributes. The advances in our understanding of a clade that has been separated from vertebrate evolution by well over half a billion years is a testament to advances in both methodology and the questions we now feel free to address. Mather embeds her review in the issue of consciousness, which is certainly a perennial issue in mental evolution, going back to Romanes and earlier. I argue that the term “consciousness” has such a checkered history and is used in such diverse ways even today that, despite current popular enthusiasm, it is scientifically misleading.

Donald Griffin not only made the study of animal minds acceptable for scientific investigation but the work of the cognitive ethologists that he inspired made animals and their lives fascinating and accessible to the greater public. The scrupulously detailed examination of his life and work by Ristau ensures that this history will always be there to respect his work and his legacy

Donald Griffin co-discovered bat sonar and founded the field of echolocation. He studied bird migration and founded Cognitive Ethology, the study of animal awareness and mental experiences. In all these endeavors, he faced hostile opposition. The biography (Ristau 2024) examines Griffin's life and the scientific explorations by him and others in these fields. This Précis emphasizes his arguments and supporting evidence for animal consciousness as well as his later research. Griffin considered the inhibiting assumptions made by scientists, including Cartesian views, the misunderstanding of innate behaviors, prejudice against lower animals, concern with violations of parsimony, and the assertions of the philosopher Thomas Nagel about “inaccessible” science. Griffin proposed ways to gather evidence supporting animal consciousness: (1) neural correlates of consciousness, (2) the versatility of animal behavior in meeting novel challenges and (3) animal communication, which Griffin considered a potential “window” on animal minds. He pondered what is a truly neutral hypothesis about animal mental experience? What is it like to be a particular animal? and how can we gather evidence to answer that question?

Individual differences in personality types within the same species have been studied much less than differences between species and populations. Personality differences are related to risk-taking and exploration, which in turn correlate with individuals' daily responses, decisions, and fitness. Bold and shy personality types can have different advantages and disadvantages under different social or environmental pressures. Analyzing personality differences has helped clarify how elk habituate to a well-populated area and how management strategies can be adapted to them. For wolves newly repatriated to Colorado, individual personality factors are likely to prove important for adapting to their new homes as well as to the needs of the people cohabiting them. Animal and human factors need to be investigated jointly for the long-term success of conservation initiatives. Karen Owens brings more than 25 years of animal behavior experience to conservation research. She has been the Director of Behavior at two animal shelters and specializes in temperament, sociability, and aggression. Her interests are focused on individual wildlife personality and beaver wetland restoration. Website Gosia Bryja, instructor of geography and environmental studies at Columbia College in Vancouver, B.C., is an environmental scientist and conservationist who has designed and implemented conservation initiatives across North and South America, Africa, and Asia. Her interests and research focus on wildlife-human interactions, particularly with large carnivores, trans-species psychology, and bridging science and ethics in wildlife conservation.

Carolyn Ristau’s (2024) timely biography reviews Donald Griffin’s pioneering ideas with depth and historical perspective, describing Griffin’s approach to science, his openness to interdisciplinary insights, and his bold stance on consciousness. Ristau’s work highlights Griffin’s relevance to contemporary debates on consciousness and natural selection.

Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (S&C) argue for sentience in plants on the basis of several studies of what they describe as "cognitive abilities" in plants. As other commentaries (e.g., Brooks Pribac, 2023; Damasio & Damasio, 2023; ten Cate, 2023) have pointed out, however, there is some misuse of several concepts, and a lack of evidence for sentience. We try to clarify three questions in S&C’s discussion: (1) How is communication defined and conceptualised in animal research? (2) Is plant communication comparable to animal communication? (3) Is communication (or the process we see in plants) a good basis for inferring sentience in plants?

The hypothesis that plants might be sentient confuses the notion of sentience (or consciousness) with that of sensing. Sentience/consciousness implies feeling, experience, and subjectivity. Sensing does not. Plants can sense/detect and even respond appropriately in the absence of any sentience/consciousness.

The unexpended cognitive capacities of plants suggest the possibility of combining them with advances in computation. It is important to explore such a new field of research despite the incompleteness of the empirical support for it. Jordi Vallverdú, ICREA Academia researcher at UAB, is an expert on cognition and epistemology, oriented to computational fields. His interests include emotional modelling, ethics, and art. Currently, he is working on causal analysis in Deep Learning systems. Website

target article takes a less speculative and more evidence-based approach to plant sentience than did previous works promoting that idea. However, it retains many of the idea's longstanding difficulties such as starting from a false dichotomy (plants must be either hardwired or sentient), not accepting the full burden of proof for an extraordinary claim, confusingly redefining accepted cognitive terms, implying cell consciousness, not adopting the most parsimonious explanations for plant behaviors, and downplaying all the counterevidence. We advise rectifying these problems before plant sentience can become a full-fledged scientific domain.

We cannot agree with Segundo-Ortin and Calvo that plants are sentient organisms. We have critically examined several aspects of their target article, and find their claims are not supported by the published evidence. We address these claims in sections on whether plants have a ‘neurobiology’ analogous to that of animal nervous systems, including neurotransmitters and synaptic receptors that respond to anesthetics; and whether plant signaling resembles neural transmission. For the latter, we especially consider the unique way plants signal their responses to wounding. Although the plant vascular system has been compared to the animal nervous system, animal blood vessels would be a better point of comparison.