This study evaluated the inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Ames strain on all-weather paper using 1% and 6% sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl). A suspension of approximately 1 × 108 colony forming units ...

Biosafety professionals have ever-expanding roles at their institutions. In this Beyond Traditional Biosafety column, we focus on topics that may fall outside the scope of the traditional biosafety...

Water and reusable medical device surfaces can be contaminated by natural toxins such as ricin either accidentally or intentionally. This report focuses on the removal of peanut lectin (PL), a ricin surrogate, from water and reusable medical devices and materials. An ELISA assay was used to determine if commercially available water filters could remove peanut lectin from water, and if commercially available cleaning/disinfecting wipes could denature peanut lectin from the surfaces of various medical device materials. Several medical devices and materials were tested to evaluate their surface retention of peanut lectin following cleaning. Reverse osmosis, ion exchange, and combination mechanical barrier systems were effective in removing peanut lectin from water. Wipes containing sodium hypochlorite were most effective in completely denaturing peanut lectin within 2 minutes of contact. The efficacy of removal of peanut lectin from the surfaces of six medical device materials and three medical devices ranged from 76% to 102% and 64% to 103%, respectively.

The APHIS/CDC Form 3, Report of Theft, Loss or Release of Select Agents and Toxins (TLR incident report) is the mechanism by which the theft, loss or release of a biological select agent and toxin (BSAT) is reported to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) or Health and Human Services (HHS)/Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). A total of seven hundred and twenty seven (727) TLR Incident Reports were received by CDC between 2004 and 2010. Based on information contained in these reports, there were: No reports of the theft of any BSATs, One confirmed loss of a BSAT occurred during shipment out of 3412 transfers of BSAT conducted during that time period. Eleven total laboratory acquired infections (LAIs) associated with BSAT releases reported to CDC between 2004 and 2010, in an average annual population of approximately 10,000 individuals with approved access to BSATs. No fatalities resulted from these infections and there were no reported cases of secondary transmission to other humans. Annual increases in the number of TLR reports submitted to CDC from 16 reports in 2004 to 269 reports in 2010. Approximately half of the reports were submitted by entities registered with CDC and approved to possess BSATs (59%) with slightly less than half submitted by entities exempt from registration and inspection (41%), (primarily diagnostic laboratories). In 2009 and 2010, the number of TLR incident reports from exempt entities 104 and 148, respectively) exceeded those submitted by registered entities (88 & 96, respectively). The majority of TLR Incident Reports from registered entities involved Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories. Most reports from exempt entities involved Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) laboratories. The majority of reports from both registered and exempt entities involved bacterial agents. These results show that the Federal Select Agent Program has been successful in implementing a monitoring program, increasing compliance of registered and exempt laboratories (as evidenced by increasing numbers of reports) and effective investigation that identified some LAIs, and resolved other loss & release reports to determine that biosafety and security in U.S. labs is being sustained.

Acts of bioterrorism, such as the “anthrax letters” in 2001, exposed public health professionals to potentially high concentrations of unknown biological organisms. After an event such as the “anth...

The Class III Biological Safety Cabinet (BSC) provides maximum personnel protection when it is adequately field certified and properly used. One of the major criteria for this protection is proper ...

A competency training program for international public health laboratories was designed by detailing all biosafety tasks in the context of working laboratory procedures. The list of biosafety tasks was used to develop practical, laboratory-based training checklists that can be used to demonstrate individual competencies across multiple trainers. Because of the intensive nature of the training, in this program, we employed two types of trainers: The Biosafety Instructor and the Laboratory Trainer and we expanded the number of trainers to include a Laboratory Trainer in each laboratory. This Train-the-Trainer course defines a step-bystep process to establish competency training programs in a facility. In the Biosafety Instructor training program, biosafety officers and laboratory managers are trained alongside each other as trainers. This type of program establishes facility-specific, quality-controlled training programs that promote the transfer of biosafety working procedures from the classroom to the laboratory. The program design gives the Laboratory Manager, Biosafety Officer, and biosafety committee ownership in the biosafety program, establishing a role for the laboratory manager as a Laboratory Trainer and encouraging a culture of biosafety within the facility.

Applied BiosafetyVol. 16, No. 2 Special FeaturesFree AccessAsk the ExpertsJohn H. KeeneJohn H. KeeneGlobal Biohazard Technologies, Inc., Midlothian, VirginiaSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:1 Jun 2011AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail "Ask the Experts." Applied Biosafety, 16(2), p. 122FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 16Issue 2Jun 2011 Information© 2011 American Biological Safety AssociationTo cite this article:John H. Keene.Ask the Experts.Applied Biosafety.Jun 2011.122-122.http://doi.org/10.1177/153567601101600209Published in Volume: 16 Issue 2: June 1, 2011PDF download