- Research Article
- 10.1080/10192557.2026.2665150
Autonomy via control: political embeddedness and judicial development in China’s courts
- May 01, 2026
- Asia Pacific Law Review
- Xiangyue Wei + 1 more +1
ABSTRACT China’s courts sit at the centre of how the Party-state turns political priorities into legal outcomes, yet their role in this process remains widely misunderstood. Existing scholarship assumes that Party control necessarily suppresses judicial autonomy. Drawing on original surveys and interviews with Chinese judges, this article uncovers a mechanism of autonomy via control, through which the judiciary leverages party control to assert professional authority. The key is that Party directives do not enter adjudication directly, they must first be filtered and processed within the courts, giving judges room to translate political commands into sources of judicial legitimacy and authority. Distinctly, ideological instructions are widely circulated to secure political loyalty and reinforce subordination, but remain legally non-binding and detached from adjudication. Directives regarding substantive judicial issues, by contrast, must undergo a legalisation process through which courts assert professional judgment by converting Party policies into binding judicial documents before they can guide and justify case outcomes. Through this dual-track mechanism, the judiciary reserves autonomy on professional issues and strengthens its authority in routine adjudication. Indeed, by implementing Party policies through judicial channels, courts leverage political resources as a source of legitimacy, thereby reducing the interference of peer entities and combating judicial corruption. These findings recast the Party-court relationship in China and provide an instructive case in non-democratic regimes where the judiciary fosters autonomy, capacity, and public credibility not by resisting political supremacy, but by working through it.
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