In our article, we discuss development issues in a strategically important Russian territory—Khasanskii Raion (district). We focus on the implementation of infrastructure projects within the framework of establishing the International Transportation Corridor Primor'e-2, and on subjective assessments of modernization in terms of the common good. We conclude that an assessment of the rhetoric and practice of proposed projects reveals a close relationship with other experiences of post-Soviet transformation, showing that modernization itself is largely selective, nonsystemic, and controversial in its social consequences.

Asian Perspective 40 (2016), 363-368 Introduction to the Special Issue Hyun-Gwi Park This special issue is devoted to the Tumen River (Duman-gang in Korean, Tumangan or Tumannaia reka in Russian, Tumenjiang in Chinese) and focuses particularly on the section of the river that serves as the border for China, Russia, and North Korea. This seventeen-kilometer section ofthe eastern end ofthe Tumen River is a relatively short distance considering that the total length of the river is 521 kilometers. However, it has great geoeconomic and geopolitical importance due to its function not only as a tri­ lateral border between China, North Korea, and Russia but also as a gateway to the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1). The importance of this borderland has been growing in recent years due to remarkable changes in the domestic development pol­ icy of each riparian country and also as a result of transformations in international relations in the region and beyond. Since the mid2000s , each country has been carrying out ambitious economic projects to develop its peripheries: China’s Northeast Development Plan (since 2007); the Russian Federation’s East Siberian and Far East Social-Economic Development Program (from 2008 to 2013), and the newly formulated 2025 Social-Economic Development State Program for the Far Eastern and East Siberian Region; and North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) Special Economic Zone. At the same time significant changes have occurred in North Korea’s relations with both China and Russia. Pyongyang has dis­ tanced itselffrom China and pursued closer cooperation with Russia in a balancing act reminiscent of its posturing to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War period (Armstrong 2013). Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis on its Euro-Atlantic frontier has forced Russia to more actively engage with its Asia Pacific frontier and East Asian neighbors. Reflecting these changes, “a huge energy deal” signed between Russia and China in Shanghai in May 2014 ended more than a decade ofnegotiations and haggling over terms 363 364 Introduction to the Special Issue Figure 1 The Tumen River Area in Northeast Asia Changchun • Jilin •Mudanjian Suifenbe' Vladivostok Nakhodks Pyongyang^stQsan Sea of Japan/ East Sea Source: d-maps.com, http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=13377&lang=en. and conditions for energy trading between the two countries (Anishchuk 2014). Thus, the importance of the Tumen River for Russia will con­ tinue to increase: it presents one of the last viable options for Russia to pursue its ambition to regain equivalent power status with the United States in the Asia Pacific region and to obtain access to alternative energy markets in East Asia. Similarly, the Tumen River has become increasingly important to China in its aim of securing a port with access to the East Sea/Sea of Japan Hyun-Gwi Park 365 that would provide a gateway to the shorter northern Arctic route to Europe and the Pacific Ocean, giving China more options to connect to the Asia Pacific economic sphere. Despite the increasing geopolitical and economic significance of this border area, research is markedly lacking that addresses current issues in this region. Most research has concentrated on the situation in the 1990s and early 2000s when the Tumen River Area Development Project was launched but subsequently delayed. While keeping in mind the importance of this earlier period of development, this special issue focuses on changes that have taken place since the mid-2000s (especially the articles by Green and Vaschuk and Konyakhina). We aim to provide a unique analytical window on multiple facets of this area as a borderland, based on empirically grounded approaches and historical perspectives. Given that the Tumen triangle area is located on the geograph­ ical periphery of three countries but at the same time serves as the meeting point for the frontiers of each riparian nation-state, we take into account the multiple dimensions of the area from a compara­ tive and interdisciplinary perspective. This would not be possible based purely on individual research. The special issue developed from a workshop held in Cambridge, England, in May 2014, where we showcased the first systematic approach and in-depth analysis ofdevelopment in the region. In particular, we highlight the dialec­ tical...

Asian Perspective 40 (2016), 131-146 COMMENTARY A Chinese Admission of False Korean War Allegations of Biological Weapon Use by the United States Milton Leitenberg A LITTLE-REMEMBERED ASPECT OF KOREAN WAR HISTORY IS THE ALLEgation by North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union that the United States had used biological weapons on an enormous scale over both China and North Korea during the war. Despite the pub­ lic disclosure in 1998 of Soviet Central Committee documents declaring the allegations to have been fraudulent, China—and North Korea much more noisily—still maintains the charges. The issue is of great importance to those concerned with arms control and allegations of actual use of weapons of mass destruction. Those charges have now been refuted in a striking posthu­ mous publication written by Wu Zhili, who was Director of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Health Division during the Korean War. Wu wrote a brief memoir in September 1997 that was found among his papers after he died in 2008. It was pub­ lished in a Chinese journal only in November 2013; an English translation first became available in April 2015 (Wu 2013).1 In 1952, Wu was critically involved in the Chinese government’s manipulations that produced the Korean War biological weapons allegations. His own testimonial contains a second one as well, by Huang Kecheng, chief of staff of the Chinese Army during the Korean War and later secretary-general of the Central Military Commission. Wu Zhili’s testimonial overturns everything previ­ ously published in a Chinese source. In addition, the full text of the cable from Mao Zedong to Josef Stalin on February 21, 1952, recently published by Russia’s State Archive of Social and Politi­ cal History (RGASPI), sheds more light on China’s responsibility for the allegations. 131 132 A Chinese Admission of False Korean War Allegations The Charges Two years before the war began, Soviet propaganda charged that the United States was testing biological weapons (plague) against the native Inuit peoples ofAlaska. In Soviet reporting on the 1949 trial in Khabarovsk of participants in the Japanese World War II biological weapons program, Pravda stated that the United States was “preparing for new crimes against human­ ity,” as in biological warfare. Chinese broadcasts reported that the US government was collaborating with Lt. General Ishii Shiro, one of the major figures responsible for Japan’s use of biological weapons in China, ostensibly in preparation for sub­ sequent use of biological weapons by the United States against China. In March 1951, China charged that General Douglas MacArthur “is now engaged in large scale production of bacteri­ ological weapons for use against the Korean Army and people” (Leitenberg 1998, 188).2 The first allegations of biological weapons use by the United States were made on May 8, 1951. North Korea’s foreign minister claimed that the United States had used biological weapons between December 1950 and January 1951, and was spreading smallpox in North Korea. Chinese statements were made on March 14; May 19, 24, and 25; and June 22. Between March 5 and May 13, 1951, the Chinese government also charged on ten occasions that the United States was using chemical weapons in the Korean War. North Korean statements continued into July, and then also stopped. The major campaign alleging US biological weapons use, however, began on February 22, 1952. The North Korean foreign minister again issued an official statement addressed to the United Nations Secretariat, charging that the United States had made multiple air drops over his country in January and February of infected insects containing plague, cholera, and other diseases. Two days later, China’s foreign minister Zhou Enlai supported the North Korean charges and on March 8, expanded them to claim that the United States had sent 448 aircraft on no fewer than sixtyeight occasions between February 29 and March 5 to drop germ­ carrying insects over Northeast China. The charges increased for Milton Leitenberg 133 months to come, with Chinese news agencies reporting many thousands of US air sorties to drop biological agents over China and North Korea. Nevertheless, on no occasion did the Chinese or North Koreans claim to have shot down a US aircraft...

The Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 did not dampen plans by Southeast Asian countries to develop nuclear power plants, despite safety concerns. The strong interest in nuclear power development is being driven by strategic considerations as states view nuclear power as an alternative energy source that can help address the dual objectives of energy security and mitigation of climate change effects. Our article examines the prospects for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build a stronger regional normative framework to promote nuclear safety and security and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In light of ASEAN’s vision to establish a political and security community in 2015, we argue that member states that plan to use nuclear energy need to address critical issues such as legislative and regulatory frameworks, human resource development, radioactive waste management, nuclear safety, emergency planning, and security and physical protection.

In this article we explore whether South Korea's long-standing tradition of economic nationalism remains an appropriate development strategy, or whether this approach has been rendered irrelevant by the current wave of neoliberal globalization led by multinational corporations. We examine the changed economic agendas of each Korean regime, with a particular focus on national identity and economic nationalism, mobilized and implemented by the state. We argue that, despite the rapid development of globalization and cosmopolitanism in South Korea, economic nationalism is still prevalent. Korea's adoption of neoliberal economic activities, such as lifting trade barriers to encourage the inflow of foreign direct investment, was necessary to assist certain areas of the economy. Furthermore, changing the direction of the growth trajectory remains subordinate to the goal of state building. Empirical analysis of results collected from survey data and one-on-one interviews conducted in 2010 help to validate our hypothesis. KEYWORDS: economic nationalism, economic globalization, Korean state, multinational corporations.Following KOREA'S independence from Japan in 1945, it was inconceivable that the Republic of Korea (South Korea) would become one of the world's most dynamic economies. However, the nation has recorded an annual average economic growth of 9 percent over the past four decades and, despite suffering heavily during the 1997 financial crisis, was the fifteenth-largest economy in the world in 2011 based on gross domestic product (GDP).One notable characteristic of the country's rapid economic growth was strong economic nationalism, stimulated initially by a negative response to earlier interactions with foreign regimes and then by the desperate need for economic survival. Economic nationalism has been a binding force that has given direction to Korea's modernization policies over the past half-century (Cho 2008; Lopez-Aymes 2010). Its growth mantra of development, productivity, and competitiveness constitutes the foremost and single-minded priority of state action (Onis 1991, 111), directing the state's management and protection of the domestic economy, labor, and even capital flows. Promoting domestic capitalists has been at the center of the national interest in economic development (Jones and Sakong 1980; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Onis 1991; Woo 1991; Dent 2000). The state's authoritarian and corporatist structures that underpin the processes of capital accumulation, the allocation of monopolies, and a reliance on foreign capital (e.g., in aid and loans) have long been identified as the key forces that pushed Korea's growth trajectory in a highly nationalistic direction (Jones and Sakong 1980; Amsden 1989; Chu 1989; Wade 1990; Woo 1991).1Ironically, successful economic growth and accumulated economic wealth have led to escalating wealth accumulation and increased consumption of foreign material goods, particularly Western products (Schutte and Ciarlante 1998). In comparison with the 1980s, when Korea first began to import a small number of products such as cigarettes and cars, an ever increasing level of buying power has given present-day Koreans access to a wider range of foreign products. Many of these products were not available in the Korean market a decade ago (Jeong Duk Yi 2002). If a nation's level of globalization is measured by its openness to the global economy-its consumption level of international media and foreign products, for instance-as well as by the movement of its capital, trade, investments, and people across borders and the degree of extension into the global markets,2 then Korea's economy certainly demonstrates substantial globalization.In the four-year period following the 1997 Asian financial crisis (1997 to 2001), Korea attracted approximately $52 billion in inward foreign direct investment (FDI), almost double the entire amount of inward FDI in the previous four decades. …

“Is Japan back?” Economically, the evidence is mixed at best due largely to slowness in carrying out vital structural reforms. In electoral terms, the Liberal Democratic Party has regained much of its prior dominance under Abe Shinzo. Most problematic of all, Japan is not back at all in regaining a commanding position within East Asia, in part due to its slow economic transformation, but due also to the atavistic positions taken by Abe’s government on the historical interpretations of Japanese behavior in World War II.

Prime Minister Shinzo's decision to enter talks on the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been a game changer in the competition over Asia Pacific free trade agreements (FTAs). His move helped to create a space for multilateral, mega-FTA competition before South Korea could fully prepare and implement its FTA predicated on bilateral deals. In this article, I provide an overview of South Korea's evolving strategies toward FTAs and explore how it has responded to the Abe effect. My focus is on two challenges for South Korea in participating in the TPP: US geopolitical pressure once Japan entered negotiations, and the de facto FTA negotiations with Japan under the TPP. Dealing with Japan is an especially tall order given the troubled history of South Korea-Japan economic and political relations. KEYWORDS: Korea-Japan relations, TPP, Shinzo, strategy, security-economy nexus.WHEN ABE SHINZO RETURNED TO POWER IN DECEMBER 2012, FEW people expected that Japan-South Korea relations would hit their lowest mark since diplomatic relations between them were restored in 1965. Instead of celebrating joint accomplishments of the past five decades, the two sides attempted to improve their severely strained relations, which included failure to hold a oneon- one summit meeting since took office. History conflicts emanating from Abe's historical revisionism in regard to imperialism and colonialism have been the primary source of political strains. While South Korea's president Park Geun-hye has demanded a more explicit apology from Japan on the history issues, such as the Imperial Army's enslavement of so-called comfort women, in Japan a view is gaining strength that it has apologized enough. Increasing enmity is reflected in public opinion surveys, such as one by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO in spring 2014. It found that nearly 70 percent of South Koreans have a negative image of Japan, while 66 percent of Japanese have an unfavorable image of Korea (East Asia Institute 2014). This trend will most likely continue throughout 2015 because, as John Delury's article in this volume argues, the odds of genuine reconciliation between and Park are very low.Abe's return to power has also made an economic impact. The best example is his decision to enter TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) negotiations on March 15, 2013, significantly affecting South Korea's trade strategy that sought middle-power leadership as a of regional and transregional free trade agreement (FTA) networks. Abe's decision means that Japan supports the TPP, the US initiative in regional trade architecture, and helps to enhance the TPP's credibility and viability as a mega-regional trade agreement within the US coalition-building strategy (Terada 2013). Abe's move prompted China's response to accelerate the pace of devising alternative FTA networks. And it created strategic dilemmas for South Korea. Because the United States, together with Japan, has taken the initiative in forging regional trade networks through the TPP while China is counterbalancing it, the FTA game is now about creating (or multilateralizing) a regional or megaregional FTA. This is a blow to South Korea's FTA hub strategy predicated on bilateral FTAs with the major economies.My article explores how South Korea has responded to the challenges caused by the major economic powers. After providing an overview of South Korea's evolving strategies toward FTAs as an FTA latecomer, I examine the country's policy toward the TPP. I then analyze the Abe effect on South Korea's global strategy. The new dilemmas facing South Korea on TPP participation are twofold. It felt strong US geopolitical pressure once Japan entered the negotiations. But should South Korea enter the FTA negotiations, it would have to deal with a difficult Japan.The Rise of South Korea in the FTA GameFTAs and the Hub Strategy in East AsiaEast Asian countries embarked on FTA initiatives in response to economic globalization, the Asian financial crisis, and competitive regionalism. …

The idea that China's rise, and more specifically its increased material capabilities, are about to produce a power shift in East Asia raises the question whether the Chinese government's ability to produce effects through discursive power has also increased. The government's use of discourses about China's war against Japan is a conspicuous example of attempts to exercise discursive power. Has China's ability to use the past for political purposes increased as its material capabilities have grown ? To answer this question, I theorize on the use of discourses about the past on three levels—domestic, bilateral, and international. My analysis demonstrates that notwithstanding its increased material capabilities, the Chinese government's discursive power has actually decreased.

In this article we aim to illustrate both the progress and the stalemates of the US and Japanese strategies to fortify the Okinawan Islands as a bulwark against China. As a conceptual tool to analyze the accommodation and resistance of militarization, we use the notion of a complex interplay of state, market, and societal actors, which showcases the process of mediating and recalibrating risks perceived by policymakers in Tokyo in response to the rise of China. In this process, risk has been shifted to individual stakeholders within society. We argue that the full-scale fortification of the Okinawan Islands will be hard to achieve because of the resistance of local residents and anti-base activists, as well as China's military and commercial strategies to circumvent any form of blockade.

The Fukushima nuclear disaster is far from over and remains a global health concern. While evacuations, sheltering, reducing intake of contaminated food, and other measures reduced radiation exposures, both the immediate and longer-term public health responses to the disaster leave major room for improvement. Commercially and institutionally, vested interests have undermined public health and safety.