ABSTRACT The fifth and final volume of Liu Zhi’s Tianfang Xingli adopts a different perspective from the first four volumes, returning to fundamental questions concerning God’s relation to the world. This essay explores the reasons for this change of approach, showing how it draws on concepts in Chinese philosophy, such as the Buddhist notion of ‘realm’ (jing 境), to nuance the preceding argument and bring it in line with Sufi ideas like tanzīh-tashbīh, manifestation, and the Holiest Emanation. It closes with a brief comparison of Liu Zhi’s thought with Arabo-Persian Sufism regarding the first emanation and the rise of multiplicity from the One.

ABSTRACT This article reconstructs two identity theses in the Neo-Confucian thinker Wang Yangming. The first thesis concerns the identity of the human heart-mind and the principles of things or affairs. Wang rejects the idea that the principle of human activity pertains to a given content outside of us. Instead, the principle is in and through intentional awareness of the activity. I shall call this Wang’s anti-empiricism. The second thesis concerns the identity of an inherent reality of the heart-mind and the cosmic principle. Wang argues that human activity is grounded in an unconditioned inherent reality, a sense of right and wrong, which is, at the same time, the principle of the cosmos itself. I shall call this Wang’s idealism. Unlike the bat’s echolocation, the human heart-mind does not pertain to the disposition of a circumscribable lifeform but to the unity of the myriad things—that is, the cosmos as a whole.

ABSTRACT Liang Shuming’s explication of Confucian tradition gives lixing 理性, a term most often translated as ‘reason’, a central role. Yet, Liang’s philosophy has nevertheless been characterized as an ‘irrational’ form of ‘intuitivism’ due to the substantial gap between Liang’s conception of lixing and common understanding of ‘reason’: Liang conceptualizes it as a primarily affective capacity, in explicit contrast to the cognitive and speculative ones that ‘reason’ commonly denotes. This study contextualizes and assesses Liang’s description of lixing, highlighting its value as a mode of ethical reasoning. First elucidating the motivations and enduring legacy of Liang’s theory, it then outlines Liang’s original theory of ‘intuition’ and its later revision into a theory of lixing. This contextualizes subsequent analysis of lixing as a capacity for objectively weighing patterns of human emotion, thereby ultimately illuminating how this conception of lixing might offer a reasonable account of what is morally rational.

ABSTRACT Here, we examine the relation between stone and world, in a philosophical-cultural context which is shaped by the experience of stone being either worldless or worldful. On one side, we focus on M. Heidegger’s understanding regarding the worldlessness of stone and on the other side, we present stone’s cultural worldfulness within Japanese culture. We chose these two instances because they hold clear expressions of how a stone can be experienced worldful or worldless. Within our examination, we do not approach the matter through comparative study (such as Asia vs West), because it is also possible to find suitable examples on reverse ends too. Throughout the article, we investigate the stone and its relation with specific cultural elements such as the idea of ki [気], notion of Zen Gardens (枯山水; Karesansui), and concepts of tama (魂 or 霊) and kokoro (心), to present how these elements render the stone worldful.

ABSTRACT Kwong-loi Shun offers a Confucian account of reflective equanimity that stems largely from the work of Mencius and Zhu Xi. Although Shun labels it as ‘spiritual’, his account tends toward the naturalistic. In this article, we offer an account of reflective equanimity according to Confucius that takes seriously the spiritual aspect, by tying it to Confucius’ notion of tian. We describe three aspects of tian from the Dialogues of Confucius that are consistent with Shun’s view and, we believe, extend his view, while simultaneously preserving and reconciling the competing ‘personal’ and ‘cosmic’ aspects of Confucius’ view of tian.

ABSTRACT The dichotomy of Prakṛti (the material principle that creates the phenomenal world) and Puruṣa (the conscious principle that experiences it) forms the basis for metaphysical dualism in the Sāṅkhya system. Viewed through a feminist lens, these metaphysical categories reflect a gendered binary, corresponding to the ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ principles. This paper offers a feminist intervention into Sāṅkhya by re-reading the Prakṛti-Puruṣa dichotomy through concepts in feminist philosophy. First, I examine the gendered metaphors, adjectives, and pronouns that characterise Prakṛti and Puruṣa in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṅkhya Kārikā to reveal the underlying gendered lens. Next, I explore how Vācaspatimiśra’s Tattva Kaumudī, a commentary on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā reflects the influence of the Advaita Vedānta tradition, attempting to align Prakṛti-Puruṣa dichotomy with the Brahman-Māyā framework, centralising Puruṣa and diminishing Prakṛti. Lastly, I challenge this Advaita Vedāntin interpretation and propose a feminist philosophical reading of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, drawing on Iris Marion Young’s conception of ‘difference’ from Justice and the Politics of Difference.

ABSTRACT The vehemence and stridency of Zhuangzi’s hostility to the Confucian program of self-cultivation cannot be explained simply in terms of his belief that it is misguided or mistaken. The antagonism clearly is grounded in a belief that the program is deeply pernicious and that it must be eradicated. It is not clear, however, precisely why he believes the program is so dangerous. This paper addresses that puzzle. We argue that there are two distinct, albeit closely related, grounds for Zhuangzi’s hostility. He believes: first, that the Confucian program of self-cultivation destroys natural virtue and, second, it makes it impossible for the individual to achieve enlightenment—i.e. to become one with the Way.

ABSTRACT Moral commitments play a role in the process of moral cultivation. This paper explores the concept of commitment and its significance in moral development. Rational relativists argue that commitment is an act of will that guides individuals in making decisions, especially when faced with value conflicts. Through a series of decisions, individuals develop their dispositions and become distinct persons. However, this view of commitment has two major weaknesses: first, rational relativism does not adequately address how to sustain and fulfill long-term commitments; second, commitments driven by selfish motives may undermine long-term moral growth. In response, I turn to the Confucian concept of zhi 志, which offers a more nuanced and holistic approach. For Confucians, the making and maintenance of zhi is a continuous, on-going process of moral cultivation. This paper demonstrates how the Confucian notion of zhi can effectively address these challenges, providing a more sustainable and morally enriching framework for commitment.

ABSTRACT This paper argues that a strong-sense Buddhist nominalism, which denies any resemblance between two things, even among natural kinds, fails to explain why names and concepts can successfully identify a group among other things. Drawing evidence from the theory of the three natures in two major Yogācāra texts—the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—I propose that these two texts affirm the affinity between concepts and things because they hold that it is the utilization of concepts in previous lives that gives rise to our shared world. While rejecting the idea that there is an inherent property or universal shared by natural kinds, these two texts agree that natural kinds are regulated by concepts and therefore share some features from among the set of characteristics defined by those concepts. I therefore propose a weak-sense Buddhist nominalism that endorses the idea that natural kinds share resemblances.

ABSTRACT The question of the origin of goodness in the Xunzi is an important key to understanding Xunzi’s thoughts. Current interpretation approaches are mainly divided into the sage-centered and Heaven-centered approaches. The sage-centered approach holds that goodness originates from the intelligence or the good potential of the sages. However, this explanation either conflicts with Xunzi’s idea that the gentleman and the petty man have the same endowment or with the theory of bad human nature. The Heaven-centered approach maintains that goodness originates from the Heaven or Dao. However, this approach leads to the problem of the rigidity of moral norms or contradiction with Xunzi’s naturalistic Heaven. In this paper, I point out a third approach, arguing that goodness originates from customs. This interpretation is compatible with Xunzi’s theory of bad human nature and naturalistic Heaven. Also, it avoids the problem of giving special humanity to the sages and the rigidity of moral norms.