Although research has explored censorship and foreign media consumption in authoritarian regimes, less is known about who chooses to violate censorship laws. Using data from North Korean refugees resettled in South Korea (2010–2019), we investigate the predictors of such violations. North Korea, where they can carry the death penalty, provides a critical case for understanding broader authoritarian contexts. We test three main predictors: economic independence from the state; college education; and socialization under an authoritarian welfare state (the “pre-jangmadang generation”). We find the first two are good predictors, while the third is not. Among the controls—exit age, ruling-party membership, perceived regime instability, proximity to China, and family in South Korea—exit age is significant, and perceived regime instability plays a minor role. These results highlight the role of socioeconomic autonomy and higher education in shaping dissent under authoritarian censorship.

Trust shapes policy compliance during crises, yet studies have paid little attention to the dimensions of trust, the types of policy, and how they can vary. Using the 2021 China General Social Survey, this study explores how multiple dimensions of trust (trust in the health system, trust in the government, and social trust) associate with compliance with different policy types (high-risk voluntary policy and low-risk regulatory policy) during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that all three trust dimensions have significant positive associations with aggregate compliance levels, with effect size variations across policy types. The associations also have marked regional variation; and internet use enhances the impact of government trust and social trust on policy compliance. This study provides empirical evidence from an authoritarian state and offers valuable implications for future emergency management in the developing world.

Analyzing data from the Chinese Social Survey (2017, 2019, 2021), this study reveals a structural transformation in volunteerism in China: state-led formal volunteering has increased, while socially autonomous informal volunteering has declined, shifting from a positive correlation to statistical independence. Against this backdrop, we extend resource theory by incorporating political capital alongside human, social, and cultural capital. Of these, we find that political capital (Communist Party membership and state-affiliated employment) has the strongest association with formal volunteering, exceeding the effects of education and institutional trust, with little correlation to informal volunteering. Moreover, formal volunteering shows pronounced stratification linked to human capital and social networks, while informal volunteering offers broader access across resource gradients, with religious belief as a significant predictor. These insights enhance our understanding of state–society relations and suggest that balanced policies valuing both structured and autonomous volunteering could effectively promote diverse civic participation and improve social governance in China.

This study analyzes Taiwan’s strategic responses amid growing US–China tensions and increasing cross-Strait instability. As China intensifies its military and political pressure, Taiwan faces the dual challenge of strengthening its self-defense capabilities while sustaining international support. The potential return of a transactional US administration raises concerns about reduced security guarantees. Taiwan must enhance its asymmetric defense strategies, expand diplomatic networks beyond the US, and diversify its semiconductor and supply chains to bolster resilience. Simultaneously, it must carefully manage its relations with China to avoid unnecessary provocation, while reinforcing domestic political stability and societal preparedness. This multidimensional strategy is essential to deter aggression, safeguard democratic values, and maintain regional stability.

Hedging, conceptualized as a set of improvised alignment practices, allows states to maintain maneuverability in the face of uncertainty. Using this conceptual framework, we re-examine the evolving foreign policy perceptions and strategies of Japan and South Korea in response to the growing US–China competition in the last decade. While Japan has consistently aligned with the US since 2013, when Xi Jinping took power in China, South Korea has undergone a more notable shift—from hedging to balancing against China. Surprisingly, the changes in perceptions of Chinese threat can be traced to the progressive administration of President Moon Jae-in. This analysis highlights the dynamic nature of alignment strategies and their implications for regional security and the US–China rivalry.

Chinese citizens have access to a wide range of institutional channels through which they can give political input, including contacting elected officials, contacting civil servants, and petitioning. For each of these modalities, Wave 5 of the Asian Barometer Survey allows me to distinguish between recent participants (those who did this in the last three years), potential participants (those who have not recently done this, but would), and non-participants (those who have not and would not do this). I find that across all three modalities, potential participants are more optimistic about government responsiveness than non-participants. But recent petitioners are significantly less optimistic than potential petitioners, and recent contactors are not significantly different from potential contactors in their impressions of government responsiveness. This indicates that petitioners come away disillusioned about responsiveness, while contacting officials has either no net effect or a slight negative effect, but no persistent positive effect.

This study addresses key theoretical puzzles regarding Chinese popular nationalism through a nationwide longitudinal analysis. Drawing on pooled cross-sectional data from the 2015 and 2019 Chinese Social Governance Survey, we investigate the association of education, democratic values, and perceptions of international threats with Chinese popular nationalism. We see a differentiated shift: higher education no longer correlates with lower nationalism but with stronger nationalism, particularly among postgraduates. Furthermore, the association between democratic values and nationalism is contingent on type, with substantive democratic values (rather than procedural or ambiguous values) linked to the strongest nationalism. Lastly, perceptions of international threats consistently correlate positively with nationalism. These insights significantly advance the microlevel understanding of evolving Chinese nationalism.

This study examines the consequences of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit and China’s military response, using survey data from 2,027 respondents in Taiwan and 4,575 in Shanghai. The visit achieved its goals: assuring Taiwan’s public and creating a deterrent effect on China’s public. In response, China’s military exercises aimed to alleviate domestic concerns about US involvement (counter-deterrence) and to undermine Taiwan’s confidence in US assurances (counter-assurance). The exercises had a slight counter-assurance effect but no significant counter-deterrence. This study highlights the complex interplay between military and non-military strategies in the Taiwan Strait’s security environment and their roles in geopolitical stability.

Dear Asian Survey Family and Friends,I am excited to announce that Asian Survey now offers authors the option to publish their articles Open Access (OA) through an Article Processing Charge (APC) model. In addition to providing authors with an option to meet any open publishing requirements from funders, this provides an opportunity for authors to increase discoverability and usage of their published work.When you submit an article via our online submission system, Scholastica, you will be asked if you want to make your article open access if accepted for publication. Please ensure you select the OA option if you desire to do so.For more information about publishing open access in Asian Survey, please visit online.ucpress.edu/as/pages/open_access.Thank you for your continued support of Asian Survey.Warm Regards,Uk HeoEditor, Asian Survey

Dear Asian Survey Friends and Colleagues,I hope this message finds you well.It has been five years since I joined Asian Survey as its editor in 2019. My initial term as the journal's editor ended in August of this year, but my tenure as the editor of the journal has been extended for another term. Thus, I will serve as the Editor-in-Chief of Asian Survey until the end of August 2029.As I begin my second term, I want to take a moment to share an important update about our publishing approach. We strive to be one of the most prestigious and selective journals in Asian studies. To this end, we have decided to reduce the number of articles published per issue from six to five, except for the issue that publishes year-ender articles (March/April issue).At the same time, we want to enhance the depth of our content. To make sure that each article we publish is given the attention and space it deserves, we are going to increase the word count limit of papers from 10,000 to 12,000.This more selective approach will allow us to focus on articles of exceptional quality and relevance, providing our readers with a curated selection of cutting-edge research and insights. We believe that this shift will not only enrich the scholarly dialogue but also contribute to the overall quality and impact of Asian Survey.Over the past five years, Asian Survey has been fortunate to receive a wealth of high-quality submissions (approximately 350 submissions per year on average). I strongly encourage you to continue submitting your best work to Asian Survey.Thank you for your continuing support.