Abstract As renewable energy supply chains have grown increasingly globalized, national clean energy transitions have become highly influenced by international dynamics. However, these dynamics are themselves collectively shaped by domestic policy that drives the deployment of renewables. While spatial spillovers of domestic renewable energy policies have been studied on an aggregate level regarding policy diffusion or the flows of technology across countries, implications on an actor-level have been largely neglected. This article addresses this gap by analyzing global patterns of market openings for wind, solar PV, and biomass, focusing on the role of private project developers in developing countries. We use a mixed method design, based on a newly merged dataset encompassing eighty countries, and on interviews with pioneering project developers. Results highlight how patterns in market openings are shaped considerably by technology characteristics. Further, empirical results show international private developers are a key first mover in many developing countries. We explore drivers for this internationalization trend, including the impact of international developers' home country policies and the accumulation of tacit knowledge from home country markets for market openings abroad. Finally, we discuss implications for industrial policy and argue for further research on global spillovers of national policies on the actor-level.

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Abstract Researchers have extensively studied how large firms and SMEs use business and political ties to obtain tangible and intangible resources in transition economies. However, how SMEs establish these ties in the context of power-imbalanced dependence by using unethical and illegal “strategic practice” such as bribery remains underexplored. Furthermore, how SMEs deploy strategies to mitigate such risky actions in the process of resource acquisition is also given limited attention in the literature. Lack of exploration of these issues leaves significant gaps in our understanding of how SMEs are able to initiate and operate their ties for survival and growth despite enormous institutional constraints. We analyze the negative and positive effects of power dependence on business resource acquisition via regression analysis using survey data drawn from 232 Chinese SMEs. The findings indicate that power-imbalanced dependence among SMEs is associated with their use of bribery to establish political ties with officials for access to resources. The moderating effect of power-mutual dependence on this relationship is also examined. Theoretical significance and managerial implications of these findings for SMEs in transition economies are discussed.

E.U. and U.S. businesses in China are actively shaping the business environment according to their interests. As a state-corporatist framework is applied, the question arises as to how Western businesses go about lobbying China's policies. This article provides insights on what kind of lobbying tools Western interest groups apply to actively influence China's party state. Drawing on a large data set of lobbying actions toward indigenous innovation policies, this article aims to demonstrate that China's political system is receptive to influence from the outside. The argument builds on evidence showing that China's state corporatist system provides some leeway for pluralist lobbying strategies. It is hypothesized that Western interest groups are not completely co-opted by China's state-corporatist system, which increases the number of membership driven lobbying strategies. As Western groups stand outside the system, they are expected to devote their lobbying efforts to the international level. Specifically, this article analyzes how constrained access in domestic China affects transnational venue shopping versus domestic strategies.

Abstract Building on the growing debate on political determinants of foreign direct investment, we investigate the relationship between U.S. political influence and the global distribution of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Using country-level and firm-level datasets of China's greenfield investment, we find strong evidence that Chinese state controlled firms strategically reduce investment in host countries under significant political influence of the United States. Our results are robust to alternative specification and two falsification tests. The findings suggest that the Chinese government uses FDI as a way of economic diplomacy.

Abstract We contribute to the post-crisis literature on macroeconomic stability by arguing that polycentric banking systems can better achieve stability than monocentric systems. Building on the theories of E. Ostrom, we engage the literature on free banking systems to show that these systems met the requirements of polycentric governance systems, and that the unintentional result of the underlying governance institutions was macroeconomic stability. In contrast, modern central banking, because it is monocentric, lacks important features regarding knowledge aggregation and incentive compatibility conducive to generating macroeconomic stability. We conclude by discussing various legal barriers that stand in the way of a transition from monetary monocentrism to monetary polycentrism.

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This special issue examines the interaction of states and global markets in the development of clean energy technologies such as solar, wind, and electric vehicles. First, papers will explore how global markets shape the domestic politics of clean energy policy. For instance, how do global supply chains, global competition, and industry structure affect the domestic politics of developing clean energy industries and of transitioning toward a sustainable energy system? How do global market dynamics shape the non-market strategies of fi rms toward clean energy and technology policy? Second, papers will investigate how differences in domestic industrial and regulatory policies on clean energy shape global markets. For example, how do policy leaders versus followers impact global clean energy markets? How do policies that stimulate technology supply and policies that promote technology demand combine in the global diffusion of clean technology?

Abstract Industry has organized increasingly effective self-governance initiatives since the 1980s. Almost all of these are based on the economic leverage of large retailers and manufacturers over their worldwide supply chains. This article documents commonalities in six of the best-studied examples—coffee, dolphin-safe tuna, fisheries, lumber, food processing, and artificial DNA—and offers straightforward economic and political theories to explain them. The theories teach that oligopoly competition can strongly constrain private power so that firms are answerable to a shadow electorate of consumers. Furthermore, rational firms often benefit from ceding significant power to suppliers and NGOs. These results extend traditional arguments that free markets constrain private power and suggest an explicit framework for deciding when private politics are legitimate.1