Abstract The document proposes three concepts—a globalization process with Chinese characteristics, new triangular relationships and security shoring—to discuss the maturity, extension and depth of the socioeconomic relationship between Mexico and China. These concepts may also provide valuable insights for future studies. Drawing on these concepts, the analysis focuses on bilateral institutions and trade, Chinese overseas foreign direct investments (OFDI) in Mexico and infrastructure projects. These examinations allow for detailed understanding of China’s increasing presence in Mexico, as well as its challenges. In the case of bilateral trade, for example, Mexican imports from China have increased significantly throughout the twenty-first century and substituting for US imports; the US is however by far still the most important trading partner of Mexico. The systemic competition and confrontation between the US and China are generating massive challenges in third countries and regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean and Mexico. The chapter concludes with a summary of key findings and insights, followed by a series of proposals.

Abstract The year 2025 marks the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between the European Union (EU) and China, a partnership that has evolved from modest beginnings in 1975 into one of the most complex and strategically significant in global politics. Although political trust has eroded, five decades of trade, technological exchange, and multilateral cooperation have produced deep interdependence. The interaction between the two sides is now defined by a structural tension between continuity and change. Some dimensions, particularly economic engagement, climate cooperation, and institutional dialogue, have demonstrated remarkable durability, while others, such as politics, norms, and security, have undergone profound transformation. This paper investigates why stability persists in certain areas, while adjustment or disruption occurs in others. It argues that continuity endures where material interdependence, institutional frameworks, and shared functional interests are strong, whereas transformation stems from normative divergence, strategic competition, and external shocks. The result is a hybrid order that combines cooperation and competition within a single framework. Adopting a policy analytical rather than theoretical approach, this paper traces these dynamics across major policy domains and concludes with an assessment of institutional resilience amid continuity and change, showing how bureaucratic structures and diplomatic routines sustain engagement even as the political foundations are weakening.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a key economic component of the Biden administration’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific, was launched to serve both economic and geopolitical purposes. At the heart of these objectives is the aim to undermine China’s growing influence in the Asia–Pacific region. If well implemented, it is expected to pose a series of challenges to China. The Biden administration’s strategic project, however, is very likely to fall short of its ambitious goals due to the constraints imposed by the US domestic politics, which significantly influences the content of the IPEF and the overall negotiation process. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have been embracing protectionism more than ever, which has greatly undercut the concessional space for any free trade move. In areas such as supply chain resilience, clean economy and fair economy, where the IPEF member states have come to consensus, the Biden administration has chosen to take a pro-workers approach notwithstanding the divergent interest pursuits by different interest groups within the US. This politically correct approach, however, is likely to face challenges in its implementation, as it largely conflicts with the interests of major corporations. Additionally, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives holds the purse strings, adding another layer of complexity to the situation. Meanwhile, the tussles and uncertainties surrounding the domestic politics of the US is very likely to discourage other member states.

Most of the literature on Sino-American relations focuses on conflicting policies (for instance, over the South China Sea or intellectual property) or on characteristics of the international system (such as multipolarity, hegemony, or the Thucydides Trap). But conflicts also arise because domestic problems become internationalized. In particular, while economic development typically leads eventually to domestic stability, geopolitical influence, and mutual benefits with other countries, it also creates difficult challenges. The U.S. economy is shifting from a manufacturing workforce to a services workforce, mainly because of technological advance. But U.S. politicians of both parties have found it more convenient to blame China for the decline of manufacturing jobs than to make difficult decisions at home. Likewise, as China develops, its originally simpler economy and society become complex and it faces predictable economic problems and political challenges. Beijing has sought to suppress the ramifications of social differentiation rather than accommodate them. This results in ever tighter political controls at the cost of future economic growth. Political leaders can find it convenient to blame the resultant stresses on foreigners. Misidentification of the problems leads to exaggerated fear of potential nearby color revolutions and to a mistaken sense that Russia shares the same problems as China. When China was poor and weak, as with other poor, weak countries, the developed world tolerated intellectual property theft, predatory industrial subsidies, and denial of market access. Now, China’s economy is very large and these same behaviors create massive global distortions. Meanwhile, the U.S. overreacts to the emergence of new and challenging powers, exaggerating their prospects and the dangers they pose. This exaggerated status anxiety and fear typified the U.S. response to the Soviet Union and Japan and now typifies its response to China.

A new central leadership was elected at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), ensuring China’s domestic political stability and the continuity of its domestic policies. As an extension of China’s domestic politics, China’s diplomacy stands to likewise embody stability and continuity with regard to its overarching structure, ideology, and diplomatic principles. However, the report delivered by General Secretary Xi Jinping to the 20th CPC National Congress on October 16, 2022 contains two new proclamations, provided with supporting analysis, about the current international landscape and its dynamics. One deals with increasing uncertainty within the external environment; the other formalizes China’s self-image as a major power with expanded diplomatic reach and more substantive diplomatic activities and positions. Viewing the world from their vantage point in China, China’s diplomatic and foreign relations officials intend to exude the following characteristics: greater resolve and clarity in China’s development goals and path, commitment to enhancing balanced and positive interactions with other major countries, and greater accountability as a major country via more proactive diplomacy. In highlighting “Chinese characteristics,” China’s diplomacy will prioritize national security and demonstrate a stronger fighting spirit.