This article examines the ways in which close relationships between women that previously had been deemed socially acceptable, and even encouraged, under early nineteenth century beliefs in separate gendered spheres, came under intense scrutiny at the turn of the twentieth century. The new social landscape of women’s colleges became a target of such scrutiny. The emerging field of sexologists, who sought to medicalize and psychoanalyze sexual preferences and behaviours, alongside so-called race suicide theorists, who saw declining birth rates among white middle class Americans as a threat to the existing power structures of American society, perceived female relationships, especially among young college-aged women, as a focal point to their respective concerns over the future of the country and the broader state of the world. Books, magazines, and even a presidential address show the fear that the new social behaviours on the women’s college campus instilled in certain American theorists and figures.

The governor general of the East India Company, Lord Cornwallis introduced the permanent settlement act in 1793 in Eastern India. This law expanded to South India later on after the 1800s. The law gave superior landholding rights to a group called Zamindars, a diverse group that can be broadly categorized as rural elites. These land holding rights included a plot with tangible boundaries and tax collection power on behalf of the government. This deed operated on the basis of heritable ownership and would be saleable and mortgageable. However, if a Zamindar failed to pay the revenue before sunset of the due date, the government seized the land and sold it to the highest bidder. This act had both short- and long-term socio-political impacts on its operations. This research looks into the origins of the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793 in a more holistic manner. Most research focuses on either intellectual or political motivations behind the introduction of the Act. This research will try to synthesize the factors and consider the ways they both influenced each other. It will also look into its initial operations and reactions towards it. This will also further explain the Act’s origins by understanding what changed in the first place, why and how so.

This paper examines the Gospel of Thomas (GoT), a non-canonical Christian text from the second century CE, while challenging its previous associations with Gnosticism. This paper argues that the Thomasine soteriology (i.e., understanding of salvation) involves a return to a pre-Adamic human nature in the image of God, a position that requires unique reinterpretations of Christian doctrine. First, the paper shows how this gospel presents Jesus as a guide rather than a traditional savior, urging practitioners to embody his teachings to recognize their inherent divinity. It then describes the centrality of Christian asceticism and its role in purifying practitioners for their spiritual journey. The article also explores the importance of Jewish exegetical traditions for the GoT’s soteriology, while also acknowledging its critiques of Jewish laws. The primary goal of this study is to highlight the distinctive soteriology of return of the GoT. Its unique use of various influences to advocate for the realization of inner divinity may provide insight on the diverse nature of Early Christianity.

This paper explores the origins of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle within the contemporary history of armed humanitarian intervention. By reviewing legal and political scholarship surrounding the concept of R2P and its application, this paper uses a constructivist lens to argue that R2P failed to be adopted as a principle of customary international law due to its normative and legal ambiguity. This paper concludes with a critical examination of R2P's first, and likely final, invocation during the Libyan crisis of 2011.

economic interests and humanitarian sentiments that appear to explain why different political leaders adopt different positions on questions of inclusion and exclusion.But Mavelli has a response to this.He explains that a neoliberal rationality of value can explain diverse responses to refugees by different states, each of which assigns a market value to not only economic but emotional concerns.He shows, for example, that the United Kingdom's decision to "invest" in just a few thousand Syrian refugees and Germany's decision to open its borders to many hundreds of thousands of refugees in the wake of Alan Kurdi's death in 2015 were both expressions of biopolitical care for the host population: a small number of Syrian refugees was a sufficient source of emotional capital for the people of Britain; a larger number of refugees served Germany's needs for emotional capital and also human capital in a time of labor shortages.As depressing as it may be, it is a highly compelling argument.Historically minded readers such as myself might wonder how and to what extent the logics of citizenship that Mavelli theorizes and documents are new.He does an excellent job of explaining these logics in the language of neoliberal rationality and he suggests that questions of inclusion and exclusion are "increasingly" subordinated to this rationality.But when and how did this emerge, and how does it play out in ways that are different from the logics that preceded it?Could an argument be made that the humanitarian inclusion of outsiders has, for a long time, been dependent on the "emotional value" that insiders have attributed to them, and, if so, is the difference today the fact that such practices have become intensified, refined, and/or subject to more conscious calculation, or perhaps something else?But that, of course, is not Mavelli's project.His project is to expound the neoliberal logics of citizenship that attribute market value, both material and emotional, to a diversity of people, from the uber-wealthy to the most poor and vulnerable, in ways that dictate their inclusion or their exclusion, their protection or their sacrifice.And in that, he has done a remarkable job.

The realization of dream elements in waking is the textbook example of dialectical thinking. For this reason dialectical thinking is the organ of historical awakening. Each epoch not only dreams the next, but also, in dreaming, strives toward the moment of waking. It bears its end in itself and unfolds it-as Hegel already saw-with ruse. (Benjamin, 1978, p. 162) Scholars have interpreted Marx's conception of political change within the framework of his critique of capitalist society in myriad ways. Three main interpretations have prevailed in Marx scholarship in the last few decades with regard to his conception of political change under capitalism. The first interpretation, which is epitomized by Althusser's (1965) division of Marx's intellectual development into an early and late period, claims that his earlier philosophical and radical democratic analyses give place to a more scientific conception of capitalist society (see Cantin, 2003) . The philosophical and ideological interests of the Young Marx, which provides "a radical-democratic interpretation" (Habermas, 1989, p. 126), according to this understanding, are superseded by the scientific and materialistic analyses of the Old Marx. Whereas the Young Marx entertains the possibility of achieving human emancipation through radical democratic politics, they highlight "the incompatibility of such writings with the historical insights and doctrines of the mature Marx" (Krancberg, 1982, p. 23). From the second half of the 19th century, they claim, Marx no longer pays attention to those political concepts and philosophical questions influenced by Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel, but is rather interested in providing a scientific analysis and critique of the capitalist mode of production for revolutionary communist politics. The second and third groups of scholars directly oppose this division of Marx into an early and late period through the Althusserian concept of epistemological break, although their emphases on the development of his conception of This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.