Abstract This article reads chapter 6 of Huaping Lu-Adler’s Kant, Race, and Racism as a contribution to the contemporary debate about racism and the philosophical canon that began with Peter Park’s Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy. Lu-Adler adds to Park’s narrative a detailed analysis of the link between racism and the historiography of philosophy in Kant’s own work, not just in his followers or those who influenced him. By doing so, this article argues, Lu-Adler enables critical philosophers of race to tell a new version of the story about racism in the history of philosophy that preserves the main conclusions drawn by Park, without having to rest so much of the case on an argument about the influence of Christoph Meiners. The second part raises two problems for Lu-Adler’s account, the first relating to the question of methodology and the role of pre-Kantian historian of philosophy Jacob Brucker, and the second relating to Lu-Adler’s account of Kant as an educator who contributed to racist ideology.

Abstract This article delves into the intricacies of casta paintings, particularly focusing on the anonymous eighteenth-century work, Las Castas, produced in Mexico. Las Castas serves as a testimony to the complexities of colonial racialized subjectivity. More precisely, Las Castas presents us with a depiction of mestizaje as a rigid system of social stratification, with black individuals occupying a predetermined and inescapable role. The article introduces the irreversibility thesis, challenging prevailing notions of the race mixing process (mestizaje) in colonial Latin America, and asserting that being of black descent, contrary to being of indigenous and Spaniard descent (mestizo), was considered an irreversible stain determining one’s social position within the mestizaje process. This article explores the genre of casta paintings as a colonial artifact and highlights the complexities inherent in colonial subjectivity through a taxonomic visual epistemology lens.

ABSTRACT Contemporary US discourse on reparations tends to focus on the suppression of Black economic interests, but the harms of slavery are not exhausted by the labor expropriation of slaves and its concomitant wealth accumulation for white people and the United States at large. Reproductive oppression was constitutive of the institution of slavery, and its harms continue to reverberate today. This article thus calls for reproductive reparations, or the transparent and sustained attention to the effects of racialized reproductive oppression as they intersect with calls for reparations for slavery. Reconceiving reparations through histories and presents of reproductive harm is required to more fully account for the wrongs of slavery and provide a broader reach for radical societal transformation in our present.

Abstract In the middle of the nineteenth century, Josiah Nott of Mobile, Alabama, was on the hunt for arguments that would help to defend the so-called Southern way of life. He had some success at the time in attracting some support for polygenesis from American scientists more reputable than he was, such as Louis Agassiz and Samuel George Morton, but it was only as the Civil War was drawing to a close that his ideas began to take hold in France. It was around that time, too, that his argument against race mixing as a potential threat to human survival began to find an audience. By the end of the nineteenth century, it was being incorporated into the new science of eugenics.

Abstract The core of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks lies not in the famous fifth chapter, “The Lived Experience of the Black,” but in the sixth chapter, “The Negro and Psychopathology.” Fanon there does much more than clarify his critique of certain tendencies within psychoanalysis. In accord with what he called the book’s “progressive infrastructure,” he advanced the argument far beyond what he had arrived at earlier in the book. So, for example, he significantly modified some of the criticisms of Sartre that he had introduced in the fifth chapter, while recognizing that some of those criticisms would stand against him if he continued to maintain them. Furthermore, he clarified what Fanon called “the solution” to the Black’s alienation.

Abstract Echoing bell hooks’s discussions on “black rage,” this article explores the politics of “Dalit rage” by juxtaposing some instances of projections of Dalits as an “angry,” “illiberal,” and “intolerant” constituency with examples of anger from Dalit literature. While these projections in “mainstream” media and caste Hindu–dominated civil society narratives often represent them as engulfed in the emotive states marked by anger, intolerance, and impatience, the instances from Dalit literature archive a “Dalit rage” that demands to be dissociated from the Nietzschean category of ressentiment. Through B. R. Ambedkar’s readings of Nietzsche in Philosophy of Hinduism and Nietzsche’s readings of Manu’s Manavadharmashastra in Twilight of the Idols, this article draws a fine line of differentiation between Nietzsche’s contempt for ressentiment and Manu’s disdain for anger. “Dalit rage” occupies a distinctly different thymotic space and articulates a Dalit predicament that exploits rage as a marker of protest, resistance, and caste-ridden social conflicts. This article shows why we cannot bracket Nietzsche’s contempt for ressentiment with Manu’s demands of the sudras (and, in extension, other “lower castes”/Dalits) to be “meek” by exploring Manu’s perpetuation and legitimization of the varna order through a “morality of breeding” and Nietzsche’s more wholesale rejection of morality as he deems it a pia fraus (moral fraud). Thus this “Dalit rage” offers us a repository of the limits of a liberal democracy and enables an Ambedkarite reading of Nietzsche whose project of constructing ubermensch is markedly different from Manu’s “morality of taming” through a “morality of breeding.”

Abstract This article examines the existing and emerging morphology of caste-based discrimination in urban and academic spaces in India. Practices of caste-based profiling are similar to racial profiling or policing but are not acknowledged as caste-based discrimination by the public and the law, since they do not match constitutionally recognized practices of discrimination like untouchability. Caste-based profiling is deeply ingrained in how upper-caste people in urban and academic spaces speak, read, and think. Profiling performs the same function as untouchability, since it weeds out the Dalit from public spaces that pretend to be liberal and secular. Profiling is part of a larger process of “casteization,” which ensures the continuation of caste-based discrimination in newer forms to maintain caste hierarchy and upper-caste hegemony. Profiling traps the urban Dalit in a conundrum with respect to self-representation—should they reveal their Dalit identity to build solidarity with the Dalit, Bahujan, and Adivasi community but risk social ostracization and stigmatization, or should they hide their Dalit identity and try to evade caste-based discrimination? This article defines the emphasis of a new political movement inaugurated by Dalit writers called “Dalitude,” which attempts to break out of this conundrum, challenges casteization, and aims to empower a lower-caste majority.

Abstract What I aim to elucidate in this article is Baldwin's moral psychology of anger in general, and black rage in particular, as seen in his nonfiction. I'll show that Baldwin's thinking is significant for moral psychology and is relevant to important questions at the intersection of philosophy of emotions, race, and social philosophy. It also has pragmatic application to present-day anti-racist struggle. Baldwin's theoretical account of Black rage, I'll argue, (1) dignifies Blacks by centering them as people with agential capacities and (2) provides them with a pragmatic politics of rage that is useful in the fight against white supremacy and racial injustice.

Abstract In this article I criticize Hannah Arendt's concept of natality as unable to confront the ways in which racial capitalism links the biopolitical cultivation of natality to the necropolitical natal alienation that is structural to modern slavery. I base this argument in an understanding of social death as the production of racial capitalism, one that gives slavery an aftermath, post-abolition, which continues to dispossess Black and brown people of their capacity to begin something anew via their inclusion into juridical personhood. I conclude this article with an articulation of the political impossibility of Black and brown people to begin something anew under a polis that remains structured by racial capitalism in Ralph Ellison's phenomenological description of the invisible man's misrecognized new beginnings with the Brotherhood.

Abstract Here, the claim that Middle Eastern (MENA) persons are racialized is a response to complexities that define the United States (US); namely, the language of race is seen as antiquated or misleading, and thus it fails to capture MENA American experiences, leading some to call for different terminology (i.e., xenophobia or Islamophobia). The author argues that we should call social-political violence committed against MENA people racism because to name it otherwise is to ground the experience in an incomplete description which affords lighter moral responsibility and omits historical conflict. The article first elaborates the problem of racial conflict in the US and the specific problem of MENA racialization. It then responds with a historical argument that emphasizes key genealogical markers in the co-emergence of orientalism, colonialism, and racialization. The article closes by contrasting the idea of race with competing terms to defend its use on descriptive and normative grounds.