This essay is an exposition of the philosophy of populism, a philosophy by and large inspired by Michel Foucault to herald the New Discourse called ‘post-Marxism' a term made famous by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe which would lay the foundations for not so much the secular New Social Movements comprising multiple issues like gay rights and environment, but ironically would be an apologia for right-wing populist movements based on messianic theologies. It claims that while post-Marxism wanted to jump over Marxism, in actuality it became partner to radical messianic politics as in the case of Foucault's ardent support for radical Shiite Islam in Iran. This essay concentrates on the theory of populism and connects it to the politics of messianism in Iran claiming that these theories of populism are theories created in Western universities comprising Eurocentric ideas based on the uncanny combination of the theory of the ‘essential spiritualism of Asia' and ‘biopolitics'. This essay claims that the contemporary politics of Shiite Islam in Iran have less to do with the internal history of Iran, and more to do with a form of ‘manufactured Islam' where Islamic radicals picked up Ali Shariati's existential rendering of ‘authenticity’ as jihad and martyrdom (shahadat) in order to mobilize the masses first against the shah and then in the bloody war against Iraq. It argues for a decolonization of knowledge that leads to the decoupling of the nineteenth and twentieth century European ideas of spiritualism and biopolitics in order that one is able to see non-Western societies as they are and not as they are imagined by Orientalist scholarship.

This paper aims to evaluate Marx’s conception of alienated labour from the point of view of Alasdair MacIntyre’s conception of practice. I will argue that Marx’s conception of alienation in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (and elsewhere) is too abstract, and therefore needs to be revised to reflect the reality of the 21st century. It presupposes that, in capitalism, all salaried and waged labour is alienated (a claim recently reiterated by Amy Wendling in her otherwise outstanding Karl Marx on Technology and Alienation). Clearly, this is not the case. The key characteristics of alienation as spelled out by Marx may not be present in a great variety of contemporary jobs dominated by services, especially if they are (or can be seen as) MacIntyrean practices (for example, practicing medicine in a public hospital or working as an engineer in a private company). Drawing on some of the most notable literature on the forms of alienation and reification, I will aim to theorise the conception of meaningful non-alienated labour. Given that practices, as meaningful non-alienated activities, are small islands of human excellence and resistance against the economic pressures of institutional profit maximisation and the self-valorisation of capital, I will conclude the paper by considering the political importance of this conception of labour for anti-capitalist struggles in the 21st century.

An inquiry into misgovernance in globalization vs. anti-globalization aims to understand why the ‘world factory’ has a relative lower world pricing impact and animates in the history of ‘ecological transformation’ theory for world economy growth in green economy transitions from old-industrial to advanced-industrial regime during 1980–2019. This analysis reveals that oil price in a weaker US dollar value unexpectedly decreases world food prices but in the manner of depending upon an increase in real exchange rates on the US dollar values relative to the Euro and RMB as the base terms of trade, so that further forces the China producer price to undertake a higher production cost and lets EU members undertake a higher inflation rate. A critique on that is to clearly understand that the counter-acting effects of external uncertainty in world growth are against each initial domestic plan for green transformability and forces all world trade partners to cooperate against the expected loss of the weakened US dollar values. These necessary but reluctantly complementary cooperations are highly likely to make each sovereign money value towards a similar misgovernance equifinality undertake the cost burden of contractionary depreciation in the US dollar values. Hence a possible solution is to cooperate to lower the costs of world growth, particularly to assist the world factory to work against a further world loss caused by the weaker US dollar values in order to strengthen globalization in next period.

During the financial crisis that started in 2007–2008, the incomes of the most outstanding professional footballers increased exponentially in Spain. By contrast, most wage-labourers witnessed a drop in their wages. Professional football industry owners relied on professional advisory reports, such as one developed by the KPMG consultancy to justify the income increase. According to this report, each player is remunerated according to his contribution to social wealth. In this article, such a claim is questioned. Firstly, the notion of wealth developed and used by mainstream economics is criticized. Secondly, based on Marx’s concept of rent, an alternative explanation is developed. In doing so, a contrary conclusion is reached in that the incomes of football stars do not correspond to their contribution to social wealth and they, in fact, appropriate wealth that they themselves do not produce.

This paper critically analyses the political economy of the US-China rivalry in Latin America, China’s penetration into the region since the early 2000s, and Washington’s response. It argues that a new form of Cold War rivalry is brewing in an increasingly multi-polar world: one that is shaping geopolitics, trade, and security arrangements, as well as potential conflicts in a ‘transitional’ process of ‘21st century imperialism’ for control and influence, where the US still dominates but where China is favourably placed. As Latin American leaders have welcomed ‘outsiders’ into America’s ‘backyard’, a consistent pattern of Chinese investment and construction has followed. While economic development and aid from China was secured, it was believed that greater regional integration and independence from US imperialism would also follow. The question remains whether fostering a relationship with China has meant greater independence from imperialism, or whether it has led merely to its regional transformation.

The Popular Front politics which governed Comintern policy 1934–1939 have been positively judged by historians of British Communism. The experience cannot be properly assessed without integration of its provenance in Soviet Stalinism and subsequent unfolding in France and Spain. This article reviews the literature, analyses the origins of the line and validates explanations which locate its roots in the search for solutions to the challenges fascism offered the Russian regime. Arguments that national parties had a significant hand in its creation and development are evaluated. The Popular Front’s break with earlier Marxism; its understanding of fascism; the class structure; alliances with the bourgeoisie; its suppression of working-class insurgency; its revival of nationalism; and the relation of its theory to legitimation of the interests and strategies of the Soviet elite, are critically discussed. The successes and failures of the policy are assessed and its afterlife sketched. A short-term, instrumental tactic, it remained part of the repertoire of Stalinism and informed national parties’ journey to reformism and Eurocommunism.